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Abstract
EXTRACTING INDIGENEITY:
Oil, Environment and Self-Determination in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
by
James J. A. Blair

Adviser: Professor Marc Edelman
This ethnographic and historical project examines how the settlers of the Falkland Islands (In
Spanish, Malvinas) are constructing themselves as “natives” through new forms of
governance over energy resources. Three decades after a violent war that cemented the
archipelago’s British status, offshore oil discoveries led Argentina to renew its sovereignty
claim. In response, the Falkland Islanders held a 2013 referendum on self-determination, in
which 99.8% voted to remain British, with just three dissenters out of 1,517 valid votes. Most
of the Islanders are white settlers, making their invocation of self-determination different
from that of former colonial subjects with aboriginal rights. Unlike comparable settler
colonies predicated on the elimination of the native, there is no historical trace of a precolonial indigenous population on the islands. To understand how the settlers are securing
rights to territory and resources, this project examines debates around political, economic and
ecological stability. The research incorporates participant observation, analysis of colonial
letters and reports, and interviews collected during 20 months of fieldwork in the
Falklands/Malvinas, Argentina and the United Kingdom. Drawing on this data, chapters
explore contradictory practices of territorialization, through aspects of displacement,
enclosure, peoplehood, personhood, infrastructure, science and nature. The dissertation
concludes that by claiming self-determination, the Falkland Islanders are crafting a settler
colonial protectorate for hydrocarbon production through popular consent to British
sovereignty.
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INTRODUCTION

In March 2013, residents of the Falkland Islands (in Spanish, Malvinas) voted on whether or
not they wished to remain British.1 With an assignment to report on the referendum for The
Economist, I wore both researcher and journalist hats during the week of the vote. Upon
arrival at the Mount Pleasant Royal Air Force base, which doubles as an international airport,
I noticed that the baggage claim area seemed starkly different from the way it had looked
during my earlier research visit. Previously, a crumbling papier-mâché penguin and signs
warning against invasive species were the only décor. In preparation for the referendum, the
Falkland Islands Government (hereafter, FIG)—a group of locally elected representatives and
British contractors legislating on all matters other than defense and foreign affairs—had
covered the walls with blown-up photograph placards. Most featured charismatic local fauna,
such as penguins, albatross and sea lions, but the new display centered on a photo of six
Falkland Islander children, leaping from a grassy field with arms stretched high. They looked
almost as though they were emerging autochthonous from the territory their British ancestors
settled.2 The words “Our Islands, Our Home” were painted across the blue-sky backdrop.

1

At the risk of being misinterpreted as supportive of a particular cause in the sovereignty dispute, I have
On becoming native, belonging, indigeneity and autochthony, see inter alia Dominy (2000); Geschiere (2009);
Zenker (2011); Clifford (2013); Gressier (2015).
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1

Figure 1 Falkland Islands Government (FIG) placard and pamphlet cover. Source: Cockwell, Jenny.
2012. “Our Islands, Our Home.” Stanley: Falkland Islands Government.
http://www.falklands.gov.fk/assets/Our-Islands-Our-Home.pdf.

On the bumpy ride from the Mount Pleasant base to the islands’ only town, Stanley,
the driver of my shuttle van updated me on the referendum preparations and the outcome of
recent offshore oil exploration campaigns. In 2010, FIG-licensed oil firms made their first
“commercial” discovery of oil (the equivalent of 400 million barrels) in the Sea Lion well of
the North Falkland Basin. The other passenger in the van was a helicopter pilot from New
Zealand whom the UK Government flew in to assist in the eradication of rats and reindeer on

2

South Georgia Island—a former Falkland Islands Dependency, now a separate British
Overseas Territory (BOT)—situated between the Falklands and Antarctica. While we talked,
the driver’s young daughter, who was wedged between my front passenger seat and her
mother’s driver seat, tapped two metal objects together, producing a staccato rhythm. She
motioned for me to look at the source of the sound: her unlikely instrument was a pair of
bullet shells. She continued playing them as we drove past a stretch where the visiting team
of “de-miners” from Zimbabwe was clearing active landmines still embedded in the bare,
undulating landscape, thirty-one years after Argentina’s invasion.
At the edge of Stanley, overlooking the new oil yards, we could spot the “Falkland
Islands totem pole,” a column of signs listing the names of British military officers’
hometowns, as well as their distance in miles (Stanley is situated at latitude 51°S and London
is located nearly 8,000 miles away, at latitude 51°N). A common feature of military bases
around the world, the Falkland Islanders have appropriated the “totem pole” to mark their
British imperial heritage and stake their claim to “indigeneity” in one stroke. With the
Queen’s head on the reverse side, the “totem pole” featured on the official referendum coin.

Figure 2 Falkland Islands "Totem Pole." Author photo.

3

Figure 3 Official Referendum Coin (MercoPress 2013).

This stimulating airport shuttle provided an apt introduction to the islands, which are
still in the process of adjustment decades after the violent conflict. While the war certainly
has not faded from memory—bullet shells and landmines are aspects of everyday life—the
placards and “totem pole” indicate an emergent sense of local identity. In a less overt manner,
the biosecurity warnings, oil drilling and eradication campaigns suggest a more subtle way in
which the Islanders fortify their dominion. As they engage in new forms of natural resource
management, the settlers are also asserting a bolder sense of indigeneity.
The Falkland Islands (Malvinas) are a former British Crown Colony, yet they are
handled as an ongoing “special and particular colonial situation” in international law because
they remain on the UN’s list of “non-self-governing overseas territories.” In the decline of the
British Empire, the Falklands became a British Dependent Territory in 1981, renamed a
British Overseas Territory (BOT) in 2002. The South Atlantic archipelago consists of East
and West Falkland and 778 smaller islands (only a fraction of which are inhabited). The total
area is 11,900 km2 and, as of the 2012 census, the total resident population is 2,931, making
the population density 0.24 people per km2. Of that population, 2,120 residents or 86% live in
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Stanley.3 Apart from the military garrison at Mount Pleasant, which ranges from 350 to 1,300
personnel, the remaining residents inhabit the rural “Camp” (a term adapted from the Spanish
campo, meaning countryside).
Even after former General Leopoldo Galtieri’s military junta surrendered the South
Atlantic archipelago to the British after the 74-day occupation of 1982, the Argentine state
has continued to assert the popular national cause for the Malvinas. Argentina was informally
subject to British imperial rule through financing of its national infrastructure in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.4 A century later, and struggling to overcome debt
and inflation, the Argentine government under Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner passed bills that threatened oil companies exploring near the islands
with legal action, and banned ships that fly a Falklands flag from docking on South American
coasts. Argentina has gained considerable support from the international community. In more
than forty resolutions, the UN Special Committee on Decolonization (also known as the
Committee of 24 or C24) has supported Argentina’s position. A recent UN ruling expanded
the limits of the nation’s continental shelf, and the Argentine Foreign Ministry argues that the
islands and surrounding minerals are within its waters (Argentina’s coast is 250 miles away)
Nonetheless, the FIG continued to license oil exploration unilaterally with the support
of UK Prime Minister David Cameron. The Islanders back their claim to resources and
territory with the near-unanimous results of the 2013 referendum on self-determination:
99.8% voted to remain British, with just three naysayers among 1,517 valid votes. Yet, the
referendum was not designed to tease out facets of national identity or even hopes for a clear
political future. The FIG planned the vote as a public mandate that it could use as a
diplomatic tool to press its claim.
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Most of the Falkland Islanders are white settlers, making their invocation of selfdetermination different from that of former colonial subjects with Native rights to a priori
sovereignty. According to the 2012 census, 59% of residents consider their national identity
to be “Falkland Islander.” Twenty-nine percent identify as British, and English is the standard
language (local vernacular includes Anglicized Spanish syncretisms, as I describe below).
There is also a significant influx of mixed-race migrants from St. Helena (9.8%)—another
South Atlantic BOT—and Chile (5.4%). Unlike comparable settler colonies predicated on the
elimination of the Native (Wolfe 2006), though, there is no historical trace of a pre-colonial
indigenous population on the islands. Taking an anthropological approach to geopolitics, this
dissertation examines how the settlers of the Falklands/Malvinas are constructing themselves
as “natives” through new forms of governance over energy and the environment.

Figure 4 David Cameron and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner drilling for oil with referendum ballot box
and Margaret Thatcher’s image in a cloud of smoke. Source: Disney, Phil. 2013. “Phil Disney on the
Falkland Islands Dispute – Cartoon.” The Guardian. January 4.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cartoon/2013/jan/04/falkland-islands-cameron-argentinacartoon.
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Figure 5 Referendum Poster featuring MLA Dick Sawle. Source: Ellis, Tony. 2013. “Your Country
‘Wants You’ To Vote ‘Yes.’” Stanley: The Printshop.
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An Emphatic “Yes”
The 2013 referendum offered a window onto some of the ways in which Islanders craft their
“settler indigeneity.” As ethnographic studies of democracy have shown, the temporal frame
of a vote throws conceptions of civic duties and rights into sharp relief.5 Local sentiments
during this moment ranged from pride and hubris to uncertainty and anxiety. Stanley
residents greeted international media crews by parking Land Rovers across the harbor in rows
to spell out the word YES, and hundreds paraded through town in a rally that included SUVs,
motorbikes and even horses. Stores, houses and cars were plastered with the Union Jack, as
well as stickers labeling objects “British to the Core” and posters featuring FIG Member of
the Legislative Assembly (MLA) Dick Sawle—one of the originators of the referendum—as
Uncle Sam or John Bull, instructing his constituents to vote “Yes.”
Being both a journalist and academic researcher put me in close quarters with British
and Argentine scholars and reporters, as well as observers from Canada, the United States,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, New Zealand and Uruguay. The observation mission Referendum
International Observation Mission (RIOM) – Misión Internacional de Observación del
Referendo (MIOR) was funded and organized by a Canadian organization called
CANADEM, but the Head and Deputy Head were both US Americans with ties to the
Republican Party.6 The Deputy Head, who was surprisingly cavalier about his role and
especially fond of inappropriate jokes, embraced British geographers Klaus Dodds, Alasdair
Pinkerton and me, as he might members of his fraternity. One of the outside observers,
Emeritus Professor of Global Politics, Peter Willetts, gave a talk before the voting day at
Stanley’s Chamber of Commerce, in which he argued that the referendum was a moral
5
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they declined.
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assertion rather than a legal right of self-determination; he suggested that the Islanders seek
“distributed sovereignty” through free association with Canada, which audience members
dismissed as “fanciful.” Of course, giving advice to voters in a public forum made Willetts
ineligible to serve the role of observer. Even though the FIG was right to disqualify him (he
concurred), the Argentine government misconstrued and exaggerated the significance of his
removal.
To ensure high voter turnout in Camp, the FIG arranged flights to eight outer islands
and assembled five teams of Land Rovers. I spent much of the voting day on one of the
unpaved mobile polling routes. Farmers invited me into their settlement houses and offered
me tea and biscuits, as we discussed what the referendum meant to them. Unsurprisingly,
none of my interviewees veered from the “Yes” decision, but some residents of younger
generations did raise the possibility of future independence, perhaps by redistributing oil
revenue to reimburse the UK for defense costs. They expressed support for the continued
presence of British forces, and emphasized that the referendum was not the result of the
government “pulling strings.” One Islander told me, “If Argentina got sovereignty—God
forbid—and we had to move there, it would be like moving to a foreign country.” However,
free trade and fewer travel restrictions with South America would be welcome and, as I will
explore in Chapter 1, the links with Argentina have a deep, obscured and largely untold
history.
Upon returning to Stanley, I took refuge from the squalls of freezing rain and snow,
and awaited the ballot count in the Town Hall alongside Argentine public intellectual Beatriz
Sarlo, who had come out in support of the Islanders in a letter signed by her and sixteen other
prominent Argentine figures.7 The turnout was high at 92%, and the ballot count went
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relatively smoothly, apart from audio problems and a miscalculation of the percentage of
“Yes” votes (the FIG Chief Executive announced 98.8% but meant 99.8%). When the results
were revealed, crowds gathered under Stanley Green’s Whalebone Arch to toast “Her
Majesty and the Falklands” and sang “Rule Britannia.” Decked out in custom-made Union
flag suits and dresses, Islanders, ranging widely in age and ethnic background, embraced one
another in inebriated elation. Even if the vote was a foregone conclusion, some voters
admitted feeling afraid and nervous when the polls closed. Others stood speechless in tears of
ecstasy. That week, Islanders told me that they “felt like [they] had died and gone to heaven.”
A few days after the vote, this divine feeling subsided, as their adversarial neighbors were
blessed with media attention of their own. Plumes of white smoke appeared at the Vatican: an
Argentine cardinal, Jorge Mario Bergoglio, was chosen to be the next Pope.8

Overcoming Methodological Nationalism: The 1982 War and Debates over Sovereignty
Despite the emphatic referendum vote, contestation over sovereignty endures, and nationalist
bias has long infested the historiography of both British and Argentine claims to the islands.
Scholarly literature on the Falklands/Malvinas focuses almost exclusively on the 1982 armed
conflict or the ongoing sovereignty saga. These are important concerns for global politics and
international law. However, such a narrow framing prevents us from understanding how the
Islanders’ emergent kinship enclave and “racial formation” also disrupt standard narratives of
modern liberal nationhood (Omi and Winant 1994). Stepping back from the normative order
of international law, and redirecting critical focus instead on the collectivity of people at the
center of the dispute, this study will probe the current predicaments and contradictions of a
twenty-first century settler colony with new regimes of resource extraction, capital
accumulation, imperial science and subnational or transnational governance. Rather than
8
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providing a plea, defense, apology or accusation in favor of any particular national cause, my
aim is to craft an argument against methodological nationalism: “the assumption that the
nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer
and Glick Schiller 2002, 302). Taking an anti-essentialist, anthropological approach to the
Falklands/Malvinas, I seek to make the national assertions of a “non-self-governing overseas
territory” strange. This historical and ethnographic study will therefore examine how
different constellations of groups and individuals, crossing in and around the islands, make
contradictory claims to sovereignty, territory and indigeneity, often in essentialist terms. In
what follows, I will synthesize the key points of analysis deriving from the 1982 conflict and
geopolitical debates, before delving further into the theoretical contributions on offer here.
On April 2, 1982, an Argentine taskforce invaded the Falklands/Malvinas, overtaking
the few British Royal Marines stationed there.9 The next day, Argentine military forces
seized South Georgia. Before British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responded with
force, Alexander Haig, US Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan, shuttled between London
and Buenos Aires to negotiate a potential settlement. On April 25, the British recuperated
South Georgia. Haig’s mission ended and the US tilted diplomatically toward the UK,
placing economic sanctions on Argentina. On May 1, British forces attacked Stanley’s
airstrip. Peru’s President Fernando Belaúnde Terry attempted to negotiate peace with
Argentine General Leopoldo Galtieri, but this bid failed when a British nuclear-powered
submarine controversially sunk the Argentine cruiser Belgrano outside the established war
exclusion zone on May 2, killing 323 people. Argentine forces returned fire on May 4, hitting
the British frigate Sheffield with an air-to-surface missile and destroying a British harrier
plane. As UN peace negotiations commenced, British special forces raided the outer Pebble
Island, destroying several aircraft.
9
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On May 21 a British taskforce landed at Port San Carlos, located on the opposite side
of East Falkland Island from Stanley. After much bloodshed, the British Parachute Regiment
took control of the settlements at Darwin and Goose Green, where 115 Falkland Islanders
(including 43 children) had been confined to a hall for nearly a month.10 Argentine and
British forces sustained respective air and sea losses, as the British advanced on Stanley in an
iconic 56-mile “yomp” with full loads over three days. On June 12 fierce battles occurred on
the mountains surrounding Stanley: Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Tumbledown. The
British emerged victorious in Stanley on June 14 when Argentine General Mario Menéndez
surrendered. In total, 255 British, 655 Argentine, and three Falkland Islander lives were lost
in the relatively swift conflict.
In spite of its brevity, the war has inspired countless battle histories, diaries, memoirs,
song tributes, video games and other cultural products. In addition to official versions of the
war, Falkland Islanders have given captivating insider accounts of poise, mischief and
sabotage under occupation.11 Works of fiction, creative non-fiction and film have also offered
imaginative reflections.12 The motivations for the war and its impact on British and Argentine
national politics are well studied. Thatcher leveraged the UK’s patriotic political mood to
secure the Tories’ power and fight so-called “enemies within,” which included both
organized miners’ unions and criminalized Black Britons.13 In Argentina, the failure of the
so-called “Clean War,” an ostensibly just national cause, paradoxically spelled the end of the
military dictatorship’s “Dirty War.”14 During the postwar “Desmalvinización” period, abused
child conscripts became subaltern veterans in a “liminal” struggle for state benefits and social
10
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programs for themselves and their grieving families.15 Scholars have begun to examine rituals
of memory and everyday nationalism in homes and classrooms (Benwell and Dodds 2011;
Panizo 2015; Benwell 2016). In 2014, two museums were opened to commemorate and
honor the Falklands/Malvinas. In Buenos Aires, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
launched the Museo de Malvinas, which is located controversially in the campus of ExESMA (Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada or Army Mechanical School), a former detention
and torture center infamous during the military dictatorship. The Falkland Islanders also
relocated and opened their own new Historic Dockyard Museum in Stanley, which includes a
touching recording of residents who witnessed the violence as children. The two museums
offer contrasting, fragmented narratives of sovereignty that this study aims to reconcile to
some degree.
Political theorists dating back to Samuel Johnson (1771) have long debated the
sovereignty of the islands, yet the Falkland Islanders are a sociopolitical entity for which we
do not have clear language. The sovereignty controversy rests on a fundamental tension
between international legal principles of territorial integrity and self-determination in
decolonization.16 The rights claims not only of the Islanders, but also of Argentina, work
against our preconceptions of how these underlying principles generally apply. The key
diplomatic distinction in the sovereignty dispute continues to lie between recognition of the
“interests” of the Falkland Islanders on the one hand, and protection of their “wishes” or
“desires” (deseos) on the other. On December 16, 1965, the UN General Assembly passed
Resolution 2065, which promoted peaceful bilateral negotiations between the governments of
Argentina and the UK, “bearing in mind…the interests of the population of the Falkland
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Islands (Malvinas).”17 Even though this resolution was not binding—the UK argues that it
became moot when the Argentine military junta seized the islands by force in 1982—all
subsequent resolutions in favor of the Argentine position may be traced back to this one.18
Excluding “wishes” from the equation, and labeling the Islanders a “population” rather than a
“people” limited their right to self-determination, whereas including these terms would have
obstructed Argentina’s claim to sovereignty through territorial integrity.
After much pressure from the Falklands Lobby, which I outline in Chapter 3, the
UK’s position on preserving the “wishes of the Islanders” in any settlement became critical to
the breakdown in negotiations leading to the violent confrontation.19 In her memoir, Thatcher
wrote, “We looked carefully at the resolutions and at the charter. The battle on selfdetermination is between those who believe that ‘interests’ can be paramount (in which case
governments can decide what is in the best interests of the people) and those who say that the
peoples expressed wishes are the proper guide to these interests and the proper yardstick for
self-determination” (Thatcher 2015 [1983], 24). Despite wavering in the colonial period
preceding the war, the British position has thereafter centered on the “paramountcy” of the
Islanders’ wishes.
Nonetheless, when British forces overtook Argentina’s military occupation, the term
“unconditional” was deleted from the statement of surrender, and the subsequent UN
resolution used the word “interests” in lieu of “wishes” (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse
1990, 410; 413). Refusing to accept the Islanders’ wishes as “a people,” the Kirchner
administrations repeatedly referred to them as an “implanted population” (población
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implantada), dismissing their referendum as an illegal “meeting of squatters” (consorcio de
okupas).20 Under Cristina Kirchner’s presidency, the Argentine Foreign Ministry created a
Malvinas Secretariat (and Subsecretariat), dedicated specifically to critiquing what they view
as the UK’s unjust “usurpation” and “systematic” occupation of the islands.21 From this
perspective, the Islanders are glossed as mere pawns for the UK’s exercise of imperial control
over the territory for strategic military advantages and natural resource wealth (Pastorino
2013). Functionaries of the Malvinas Secretariat told me that in their view, the British
“established a colony, but not a colonized people…they established a colony over territory,
not over the population.” When I spoke with them, no member of the Malvinas Secretariat
had ever visited the islands to verify this assessment because they felt that getting their
passports stamped by the FIG would amount to false de facto recognition of British
jurisdiction.
However, the Foreign Ministry has recruited defected Islanders as spokespersons for
the Argentine cause. I explore the attempts to mend severed links among these “malvinenses”
or “malvineros” in Chapter 1, but the divergent paths of two defected Islanders, whose stories
have been publicized recently, are instructive. (For this reason, unlike most living
interlocutors discussed in the chapters that follow, I will use their real names here.) Alejandro
(Alec) Betts, born in 1947, moved to Argentina months after the end of the war in 1982,
while James Peck, born in 1968, relocated to Buenos Aires in 2011. Both men have children
from multiple marriages, and they sought Argentine citizenship in part for love and kinship
ties (given the fragmented nature of their transnational kin systems, critics accuse each of
them of abandonment). In the islands, Betts had worked as a sheep shearer and developed a
critical perspective of the landowning elite as a secretary of the sheep owners’ association
20
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and active unionist. He became sympathetic to Argentina’s cause as an employee of Líneas
Aéreas del Estado (LADE), which provided an air link to the continent in the 1970s. Betts
resides in the province of Córdoba, where he earns a pension controversially, as a civilian
veteran of the 1982 war. He has attempted unsuccessfully to launch political campaigns for
mayor of his municipality and as a candidate for Argentina in the regional organization
Parlasur (Parliament of Mercosur). In 2015 Betts received an Argentine identity card (DNI),
which listed provocatively his previous Stanley address. He has published numerous books
and is a regular petitioner on behalf of Argentina at the annual meetings of the UN C24.22
In contrast, Peck has been less than faithful to his adoptive homeland. After being
broadcast on television embracing Cristina Fernández de Kirchner when he received
Argentine citizenship, Peck has now publicly disavowed his ties to the country, posting a
photo on Facebook in late 2015 of his DNI cut into pieces. The Argentine government and
national press celebrated Peck’s transfer to Argentina as an extraordinary coup for Kirchner
because his father Terry Peck was considered a 1982 war hero. Terry escaped Stanley during
the Argentine occupation and trekked across East Falkland Island on foot to join the British
Parachute Regiment on the frontlines of battle. Having separated from Terry before the war,
James Peck’s mother had entered into a brief relationship with an Argentine living in the
islands. A visual artist, Peck draws on his haunting past to paint a bleak, melancholic picture
of the personal ravages of war and kin estrangement.23
To defend their “wishes” to remain British, the FIG sends their own rotating MLAs to
serve as petitioners at the UN C24, though their words usually fall on deaf ears among
member states overwhelmingly in favor of Argentina’s position. The Islanders hinge their
argument on the apparent absence of a precolonial indigenous population in the Falklands,
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critiquing sharply the history of genocide in Argentina. The FIG points out that Argentina,
which they call an “aspiring colonial power” with “an expansionist agenda,” is also a settler
nation, and that most of its citizens have fewer generations of continuous residency than
some Falkland Islanders do (up to nine). The MLAs insist that the Islanders are “a people” in
their own right, and not a downtrodden colony paid to stay in the Falklands by the British
government.24
Identifying as “British to the Core” in a locality positioned geographically and
politically on the global periphery requires a particularly abstract geohistorical imagination.
When I inquired as to how the Falkland Islanders see their claim of self-determination
relative to that of other postcolonial populations, one MLA punctuated his response with
repetitions of the phrase “I don’t know how to say this without sounding racist.” He
explained that the Islanders are “essentially very, very, very British…the essential core of the
Falkland Islands is very British, and we don't have that divergence of views that maybe other
countries have.” Of course, “British” in this response not only signifies national identity, but
given the councilor’s self-conscious qualifier, it is also an obvious euphemism for whiteness.
Predictably, this paradox of self-determination for white British settlers has proven to
be a difficult obstacle for the Islanders’ international diplomacy efforts.25 To counter
diplomatic resistance, Islanders employ two different rhetorical strategies that circumvent the
history and politics of race. The first is to prioritize local residence over European descent.
As one of the British diplomats appointed Governor of the Falklands during my fieldwork,
Colin Roberts, insisted, “They are natives! In relation to this place, they are natives.” Here,
Roberts invokes a relational notion of “becoming indigenous” akin to James Clifford’s
concept of “diasporic natives,” a “rooted experience of routes” (Clifford 2013: 84; Starn &
24
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Cadena eds. 2007: 213). Whether or not they constitute a “people,” it might be more precise
to say that the Islanders are part of an “imperial diaspora” (Ho 2004, 214). In this sense, they
have “indigenized” British colonial rule, not only through population, but also possession,
commerce, administration and military defense (Cohn 1983). In the words of Ann Stoler
(1997, 7; 2006), the Islanders may thus be understood as “perfected natives” with “degrees of
imperial sovereignty.”26
The second strategy is to argue for a deracinated universalism that considers no one
native. Roberts’ predecessor, Governor Nigel Haywood reasoned: “You can come at it from a
number of directions. One is, it would be very, very difficult to find anywhere other than
possibly the center of Africa who you could claim has an indigenous population because the
whole history of humankind is migration.” Ironically, this line of thought echoes Kuper’s
(2003) controversial anti-essentialist doubts about political criteria for indigenous peoples. In
fact, autochthony has been a more salient category than indigeneity in Africa.27 African
groups struggled to become involved in the global indigenous movement after collectivities
of the Antipodes or Americas had already gained rights (Niezen 2003; Hodgson 2009).
Moreover, the Governor’s benign image of migration contrasts with the worldview of the
Falklands’ so-called liberator: Thatcher, a staunch nativist, decried Britain being “swamped
by people with a different culture” (Thatcher 1978).28 Haywood’s reasoning is, nonetheless,
consistent with the rhetoric of the FIG. Decentering the British from colonial history, they
point to “the Mongols and the Chinese and Polynesians” who colonized peoples’ lands in
previous eras, or the Spanish who “were absolutely brutal” in the Americas.
Despite being well defended by the Mount Pleasant military base, Falkland Islanders
describe Argentines as “bullies.” They accuse their neighbors of intimidation and even
26
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“economic terrorism” for creating obstacles to shipping and air links (there are signs that this
may change under Argentina’s new government). While no regional trade embargo has truly
limited the free flow of goods with Chile, Uruguay or Brazil, the Argentine government has
banned Falklands-flagged vessels from its coasts. The possibility that container vessels may
be impounded is a specter haunting every transaction in the islands. In this sense, most
Islanders view the sovereignty dispute as an irritation. One Stanley resident described the
Falklands metaphorically as “an airplane on due course, but every now and then you hear
noises from the engine: those noises are Argentina.” No matter how much pressure the
Argentine government applies, Falkland Islanders are not easily bothered, and they are
unlikely to budge from their resolute stance on British sovereignty. Another joked to me,
“How many Falkland Islanders does it take to change a light bulb? Change what? There’s
nothing to change.” Ultimately, while Argentina’s government calls the islands an
“anachronistic colonial situation,” the MLAs suggest that the UN C24 is, itself, an
“anachronism” for privileging the interests of member states over the people of Overseas
Territories.29
In short, the legacy of the war, and the sovereignty saga have presented a series of
complex factors that continue to challenge the fulfillment of either Argentine national
interests over territory, or the Falkland Islanders’ wishes to determine their own future as
“natives.” Instead of arguing in favor of one particular party, my work will seek to overcome
methodological nationalism and engage critically with the contradictory aspects of these
contending claims.
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Rethinking Self-Determination through Political Ecology, STS and Settler Colonialism
While there is an extensive literature on the 1982 war and the sovereignty dispute, as I have
indicated, it is often heavily partial toward the claims of either the UK or Argentina. Each
discourse operates in an isolated bubble from the other, despite considerable flow of people,
commodities and customs throughout the past centuries that remains largely unexamined. In
contrast, relatively little has been written about the settler society of the Falkland Islanders
who offer a constant counterpoint. Journalists, naturalists, insider hobbyists and independent
scholars have produced a number of historical sketches and travelogues.30 Two previous US
social scientists attempted to study cultural dynamics of the disputed islands through field
research. Both made a conscious decision to exclude the war or sovereignty from their object
of analysis, and unfortunately their doctoral dissertations remain unpublished.
The only ethnographic study based in the islands is Alcohol Beverage Use in the
Falkland Islands Camp: An Ethnography of a Cultural Domain by Rutgers anthropology
graduate Thomas L. Melchionne (1985). Even though Melchionne’s fieldwork, which he
conducted as a traveling teacher and sheep shearer, spanned the 1982 conflict, he barely
discusses the war or sovereignty dispute. Instead, Melchionne offers an intriguing culturalist
interpretation of the rural livelihood of Falkland Islanders, focused primarily on drinking
behavior, but he also provides exegeses on habits and customs related to language, gender,
kinship and residence in Camp. The other emic study based on extensive field research is UC
Berkeley geography graduate Wayne Bernhardson’s (1989) Land and Life in the Falkland
Islands (Islas Malvinas). Bernhardson’s nearly 800-page “apolitical” tome of historical
geography is the result of unlimited access to Stanley’s colonial letters and reports before
they were housed in a secure archive with set visiting hours. His painstaking examination of
30
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historical and environmental changes in the islands served as a valuable guide for my own
archival research, and I reference it throughout.
While these social scientific studies provide useful insights on cultural and ecological
aspects of the lifeways of Falkland Islanders, by excluding the sovereignty controversy from
their work, they ultimately throw the baby out with the bathwater. The recent discovery of
offshore oil and overlapping maritime claims have now made the islands a force field for
examining the settler colonial context of extractive economies (Dodds and Benwell 2010).
Without either narrowing the focus to the sovereignty controversy, or omitting it from my
scope of analysis, the present study will examine how the geopolitical dispute figures into
everyday engagements with natural resources and the environment. Writing against
methodological nationalism, I aim to show that the Falklands/Malvinas upsets hackneyed
modern liberal norms of sovereignty and territory. I do this by conceptualizing the
archipelago as a permanent frontier: a cultural, political and geographical outlier, which
defies conventional ways of analyzing the contemporary world order. This twenty-first
century settler colony is a sociopolitical entity, for which we do not yet have an accepted
taxonomy. Instead, we find a new alignment of resources, capital and state formations that
cut across common assumptions of place and people, public and private.
Fundamentally, this is an ethnographic and historical project, which (1) explores how
Falkland Islanders are trying to control their own future through resource management; and
(2) documents how settlers have asserted themselves as “natives” through historical relations
with the environment. To understand how the settlers are claiming belonging and asserting
rights to territory and resources through lived experience, this study analyzes debates around
political, economic and ecological stability. The referendum showed near-total consensus on
British nationality and citizenship, but how are the Islanders negotiating considerable
asymmetries in racial and ethnicity, residence, and language, as they recast themselves as “a
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people” with a shared commitment to oil production? To what extent do decisions about
petrodollar management or oil infrastructure development act as vectors, through which
Islanders constitute peoplehood? And, as they try to account for the risks involved with
extracting non-renewable fossil fuels, how are the Islanders naturalizing their colonial
heritage, as stewards of the land with scientific claims to authority over conservation? With
independent peoplehood deferred indefinitely, the Islanders are trying to control their own
future through resource management. By examining geopolitical aspects of the sovereignty
dispute in ethnographic detail, my project relates the politics of energy and environment to
the history of empire and international law.
Rooted in anthropology, my research uses ethnographic and historical methods to
advance understandings of sovereignty and self-determination through engagement with the
interdisciplinary fields of settler colonial studies, political ecology and science, technology
and society (STS). In international law self-determination serves both as a criterion for
expressing “juridical statehood” (Jackson 1993) for constituencies with “primordial
attachments” to places (Geertz 1963b), as well as a tool for recognizing “lived sovereignty”
(Agamben 1998; Hansen and Stepputat 2005). Given the concept’s flexibility, broad
tendencies in scholarly literature swing between: (1) championing anticolonial nations’ uses
of its Wilsonian notion of “non-intervention” to support new state independence (Manela
2009); and (2) critiquing its imperial uses for maintaining dependency (Anghie 2004). Social
scientific research on indigenous politics describes a symbolic use of self-determination with
a “relational” meaning of dignity, which has augured in new transnational movements of
indigenous rights.31
However, critical scholars of settler colonialism have reconceived self-determination
as a phase of state policy that perpetuates colonial regimes of land tenure through empty
31

See Tully (2000); Kingsbury (2000); Muehlebach (2003); Niezen (2003).
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gestures of recognition.32 They draw parallels between self-determination and other legal
processes of “eliminating and excluding Natives” in the seizure of land (Kauanui and Wolfe
2012; Simpson 2014). In the case of the Falklands/Malvinas, the FIG backs its claim with
British residents of up to nine generations. Self-determination in this case may then be
understood not strictly as a politicization of indigeneity (Mamdani 2001a), but as a “native”
category for asserting settler colonial exclusivity based on common residence.
Social scientists interested in relations between societies and their environment have
long analyzed “adaptive structures” for maintaining balance in fragile settings.
Anthropologists took up “cultural ecology” to study alternative irrigational and agricultural
institutions based on local knowledge.33 This project draws on interdisciplinary work related
more specifically to “political ecology,” which in its early years took ideas from political
economy and used them to understand land degradation or famine as historically produced in
underdeveloped areas.34 Bernhardson’s (1989) aforementioned historical geography shares
influence from this intellectual genealogy.
Despite the promise of wealth, natural resources—and particularly oil—are also
widely regarded as a peril. Research on modernization in oil booms indicates that the sudden
surplus in revenue during oil development poses considerable challenges to democratic
governance (Watts 1992; Coronil 1997). Prominent economists and political scientists have
argued that resource-reliant postcolonial nations are “cursed” with economic stagnation,
environmental degradation, political conflict and authoritarian regimes.35 Recent politicalecological and ethnographic research, however, has called into question the “resource curse”
hypothesis, describing instead how social movements of the poor mesh uncomfortably, and in
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locally specific ways, with clientelism among elites.36 This project explores such social class
formations in the Falklands by focusing on the history and politics surrounding the
environmental transformations of infrastructural projects, particularly how Islanders develop
new ways of securing access to and control over resources (Watts 1987; Peet and Watts
1996). The emphasis on local context in political ecology allows for a closer examination of
assumptions of ownership and “indigeneity” among resource managers that geopolitical
debates advancing international legal positions or econometric theories tend to overlook.
The study employs scholarship at the interface of political ecology and STS to better
understand the actions of planners, engineers and scientists (Forsyth 2002; Goldman et al.
2011). Resource extraction may be motivated by material interests, but scientists also coproduce standardized packages of political worldviews, in making knowledge claims about
nature’s uses and values for energy.37 Scientific “facts” circulate as powerful cultural
epistemologies and norms among relational networks of human and nonhuman actors, objects
and institutions.38 By examining how the sovereignty dispute forms assumptions for
“experts” assessing environmental impact, this study analyzes the messy or situated
knowledge with which the Islanders define and objectify nature.39 It examines the
“technological zones” through which expert procedures produce a screen-discourse of
conservation for elites interested in oil production (Barry 2006; Barry 2013).
The study thus contributes to anthropological work on energy politics, influenced by
theorists of postcolonial technoscience. In his influential book Carbon Democracy, Timothy
Mitchell (2011) suggests that the materiality of carbon energy has conditioned the possibility
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Weszkalnys (2011); Appel (2012a); McNeish and Logan (2012); Bridge and Le Billon (2013); Appel et al.
(2015).
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for democratic politics.40 Not all petro-states are liberal democracies with market economies
(Rogers 2014; Rogers 2015), but according to Mitchell, former imperial powers have
promoted self-determination in order to create protectorates for energy consumption. Local
governments at extraction sites then become native agents embedded in technopolitical
networks of engineers, shareholders and military personnel (Onley 2004; Hecht 2012). These
insights resonate deeply in the current context of the Falklands/Malvinas, the difference in
this case being that the “native” status of the settler agents has been called into question and
remains under constant scrutiny. By examining how the United Kingdom and Argentina
secure their respective claims to oil-rich maritime territory through scientific knowledge, the
study investigates how the oil industry is rooted in imperial systems of knowledge.
In short, this project analyzes ethnographic and historical evidence on current
preparations for offshore oil development, in order to understand how the settlers may be
“indigenizing” colonial rule.41 I argue that by consenting to British sovereignty through selfdetermination, the Falkland Islanders are creating a settler colonial protectorate for
hydrocarbon production. The Argentine government views extracting mineral resources as a
direct violation of its territorial integrity, but the UK refuses to negotiate on the paramountcy
of the Islanders’ wishes for self-determination. Analyzing this geopolitical deadlock through
the combined theoretical lens of settler colonialism, political ecology and STS, I aim to throw
new, critical light on contradictory aspects of race, nature and culture.

Research Design
Remote archipelagos have, of course, been fruitful sites for ethnographic research since the
field of anthropology’s very beginnings (Malinowski 1922; Radcliffe-Brown 1922). Here,
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rather than analyzing the internal logic of an isolated “people without history” in an out-ofthe-way place, I will examine how the Falklands/Malvinas is a settler colonial enclave
located on the global periphery, but with powerful connections on multiple scales.42 With a
critical eye to the ways in which the Islanders have presented their self-determination vote as
evidence of stability for regional trade partners, multi-national oil firms and investors in the
City of London, I have sought not just to represent subaltern subjects, but also to “study up”
among ruling elites (Nader 1972). The islands’ “anachronistic colonial situation” thus makes
it an especially apt site for pursuing an Atlantic history of the imperial present.43
The research informing this study incorporates 20 months of participant observation,
analysis of colonial letters and reports, and more than 100 interviews conducted with: (1)
townspeople, farmers, migrants, resource managers, scientists, planners, engineers and
business elites in the Falklands/Malvinas; (2) government functionaries, scientists, defected
Islanders and their displaced descendants in Argentina; and (3) oil executives, repatriated
Islanders and government representatives in the United Kingdom.
During the Austral winter of 2012, I carried out exploratory field research in Buenos
Aires, Tierra Del Fuego and in the Falklands/Malvinas. For local perspectives on the
Argentine cause, I attended relevant events and established affiliations with local
anthropologists and historians. I then traveled to the islands for two weeks of exploratory
fieldwork. I visited the Falklands/Malvinas for a second time during the March 2013
referendum on self-determination. I observed balloting both in town and in the countryside
42
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along one of the five unpaved mobile polling routes. I administered surveys before, during
and after the vote. I then used my survey as a basis from which to structure interviews and
observations. I published my findings on the referendum in two articles, one online and one
in print, for The Economist.44 Then, upon returning to the US, The Economist gave me media
accreditation to attend and report on relevant UN meetings where I interviewed petitioners
from the islands and Argentina, as well as diplomats from other member states.45

Figure 6 Field sites within the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

I returned to the islands for extensive field research from January to May 2014, and
then again from September to December 2014. Most of my research on these topics took
place in Stanley (the red dot in Figure 6), but I seized every opportunity to collect data in
Camp. I visited multiple Camp settlements by automobile, ferry or inter-island flight. As
noted above, I interviewed residents during the referendum on an unpaved, mobile polling
44
45

Blair (2013a; 2013b).
Blair (2013c; 2013d).
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route. I went lamb-marking, attended a “bachelor and spinster’s ball” (held in a shearing
shed), and took part in Camp Sports on West Falkland Island, which included sheep-shearing,
peat-cutting and other rural athletic contests. Much of my fieldwork also involved
participating in the field research of marine ecologists, which I discuss in Chapter 6.
In order to capture how debates around infrastructure development and the
management of petrodollars are forming new relations of power on the islands, I observed
and analyzed plans for development and financing. I interviewed a wide variety of actors in
the government and private sector, examining especially closely the plans for a new
commercial port and temporary dock (see Chapter 5). With office space in the South Atlantic
Environmental Research Institute (SAERI), I had an inside perspective on environmental
impact assessments of the proposed oil development, and I participated in both bi-annual
meetings of the Falkland Islands Offshore Hydrocarbons Environmental Forum (FIOHEF). In
rural settlements, I observed changing relations with the landscape and energy resources,
ranging from peat strips to wind turbines. This was complemented by work in the local
archives, where I examined colonial reports, gazettes, diaries, letters, periodicals and early
maps for historical perspective on resource governance. Finally, to grasp how the Islanders
are using their self-determination claim as leverage for enhancing the prospects of oil, I
conducted interviews with resource managers of the FIG—one of which was my
housemate—as well as visiting oil consultants. Once relations were established with
participants, I gathered life histories with Falkland Islanders, as well as migrants and contract
workers.
Between visits to the Falklands/Malvinas I carried out a shorter phase of fieldwork in
Argentina during May-August 2014. In Buenos Aires I primarily conducted archival research
at the National Archives. To gain a better understanding of Argentina’s contemporary claim,
I interviewed functionaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I also interviewed scientists
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involved in the government's “Pampa Azul” (Blue Pampa) campaign, which is designed to
showcase environmental research in the South Atlantic (see Chapter 6). In the Patagonian
province of Santa Cruz, I met and interviewed defected Islanders and their descendants (see
Chapter 1). Interviewing these actors and recording their life histories has provided for a
more robust analysis of histories of migration and settlement, experiences with the dispute
and opinions on the oil development.
I began analyzing data and writing my dissertation in early 2015 based in the UK,
where I also conducted targeted interviews and further archival work. Through networks
established during my initial research, I met and interviewed repatriated Islanders connected
to the Falklands Lobby in London. At the National Archives in Kew, I examined colonial
reports and gazettes, some of which are omitted from the islands’ archives. I visited the
London offices of firms involved in the oil exploration, where I interviewed top executives,
and also met oil affiliates and supply chain consultants in Aberdeen.
Unlike much of the scholarly work on the Falklands/Malvinas, I have conducted this
project from the relatively unsentimental position of being an American researcher. As a USUK Fulbright scholar, I had the opportunity to discuss the conflict with US ambassador to the
UK Matthew Barzun, and I informed him of US influence of which he had been unaware:
namely, that a Houston-based oil firm has become a prominent oil licensee, which has given
both the Islanders and Argentina the impression that President Obama and the US
government are less than neutral. My dissertation aims to offer a more comprehensive picture
of the geopolitical associations being formed through such relationships. In turn, the work
will hopefully provide policy makers with a clearer idea on the actors involved, so that they
might form decisions that adapt appropriately to the dynamics of this particular conflict.
My perspective is informed by grounded experience with the nuances that have
hindered a non-violent end to the dispute. I have personally had to avoid being entangled in
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the imbroglio when: newspaper editors tried to publish stories with a neoliberal line and
national favoritism that I do not endorse; functionaries of the Argentine Foreign Ministry
tried to persuade me to send them private documents; ministers of the UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office asked for advice on lobbying US Congress; and the Falkland Islands
Government invited me to apply for a “tender” to conduct a social impact monitoring
program on the potential oil development (which would have risked fines and imprisonment
in Argentina).
The sovereignty dispute also impacted the logistics of my multi-country research
itinerary. For example, when my debit card went missing in Patagonia, I thought I had
succeeded in explaining to the Bank of America agent where the Falklands/Malvinas were
located, until I discovered later that they had sent a replacement card to an address in
Djibouti! The explanation was that “Malvinas,” and not “Falkland Islands” appeared on
Google Maps. To reach the islands from South America, there is only one flight per week
from Punta Arenas, Chile. After conducting research on the Argentine side of Patagonia, I
missed the flight that stops once per month for next of kin in Río Gallegos, so I had to travel
to Chile in order to then fly to the islands. However, when I arrived at the bus station, I was
told that the customs agency workers were on strike for a week, which forced me to miss my
scheduled flight. There are surely inferior places to be stranded than the stunning glaciers and
mountain ranges of Patagonia, but the uncertainty surrounding border crossing made it
difficult to enjoy the layover. Argentine customs agents questioned me when they discovered
previous passport stamps labeled “Falkland Islands”—or worse, stamps that did not match
because different Argentine customs officers had neglected to mark my tourist visa upon reentrance from the islands. It was a relief to get past the border where, as if to taunt me for
missing my flight, a sign read: “Las Malvinas son Argentinas” (The Malvinas are Argentine).
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Figure 7 Border Crossing near Río Turbio, Argentina. Author photo.

Chapter Summary
The dissertation is structured to explore contradictory forms of territorialization in the
Falklands/Malvinas thematically, according to the following aspects: displacement, enclosure
peoplehood, personhood, infrastructure, science and nature.
Chapter 1 | Displacement: Drawing on colonial letters, diaries and ordinances, as well
as interviews with descendants of early settlers, the first chapter outlines the history of
settlement and the movement of people between the islands and Patagonia. A cattle frontier
built on conditions of debt peonage resulted in the alienation and exile of South American
gauchos after permanent British occupation. The chapter traces lines of kin descent and
discusses new efforts to reunite estranged relatives in the continent.
Chapter 2 | Enclosure: The second chapter analyzes how Islanders have adhered to
British imperial property ideologies of resourcefulness and self-sufficiency. I describe how
the settler colonial property regime has ranged from: (1) a usufruct cattle frontier founded on
31

debt bondage; to (2) a pseudo-feudalistic absentee-owned system of community sheep
ranches; and (3) the current system of privatized small family farms. I examine historical
forms of enclosure and improvement of the commons, including corrals, sheep fences and
land subdivision, as well as contemporary dynamics of energy security, horticulture and
barter networks.
Chapter 3 | Peoplehood: This chapter analyzes the contradictions of the colonial
subjection of settlers and the Islanders’ assertion of “native” peoplehood. To grasp
contemporary social and racial formations, I examine categories of nation, race and ethnicity
that have transformed over time. I trace the local construction of a white ethnic community:
locally-born “kelpers.” I then explore how since the 1982 war, the society of settlers in the
Falklands has become a transnational composite of Islanders, British contractors and military
personnel, as well as migrants from St. Helena, Chile and elsewhere. Despite this apparent
multiculturalism, citizenship remains contingent on degrees of imperial sovereignty, and
strict immigration laws and customs restrict access to either formal political rights, or the
informal mores of intimacy, safety and work ethic known as the “Falklands Way of Life.”
Chapter 4 | Personhood: Shifting to the problematic of personhood, this chapter
describes how the Islanders are crafting a new oil regime to avoid a “resource curse” and
“future proof” their settler society. I trace the history of resource extraction in the islands and
relate speculation surrounding the delayed decision to develop the Sea Lion oil field with past
strategies to capture wealth by salvaging shipwrecks, sealing, whaling, and commercial
fishing. As hopes rise for an oil bonanza, new forms of corporate personhood threaten to
eclipse previously established modes of independent personhood in the resource frontier.
Chapter 5 | Infrastructure: This chapter examines how Islanders are using
infrastructure as a means of resolving the temporal paradox between retrospective
peoplehood built on a shared past and prospective personhood constituted in an uncertain
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future of oil production. I describe the built environment as a permanent frontier: a
spatialization of temporal insecurity comprising makeshift forms of infrastructure. The
chapter examines shifting debates over the engineering design of the Sea Lion drill site. It
then pays particular attention to the construction of the aptly named “Noble Frontier”
temporary dock facility, built to accommodate oil exploration, as it relates to mired plans for
a permanent deepwater port.
Chapter 6 | Science: This chapter analyzes the enclosure of the South Atlantic as a
knowledge frontier. It examines how the UK and Argentina secure their respective claims to
oil-rich maritime territory through scientific research. Centering on a “data gap” project,
financed jointly by the FIG and its offshore oil licensees, the chapter describes how marine
ecologists tag penguins with tracking devices and “curate” their data as part of a new
geographic inventory of the South Atlantic. Data representing the penguins’ foraging patterns
feed into environmental impact assessments and influence where oil firms plan to locate
drilling and fuel transfer sites.
Chapter 7 | Nature: Toward a theory of settler indigeneity, the final chapter examines
quotidian practices to ensure biosecurity and preserve biodiversity. It discusses the
implications of Darwin’s cross-species comparisons during his voyage of the Beagle, and
then tracks how the historical disgust that Darwin and early settlers felt toward Yámana
(Yahgan) Natives of Tierra Del Fuego influenced the desire to expel non-human bodies and
objects in various eradication campaigns. Taking a multispecies approach to analyzing the
Islanders’ self-determination claim, I argue that by “colonizing” with native species in
ecological restoration projects, settlers aim paradoxically to assert indigeneity while
celebrating British heritage.
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To transition between these differently themed chapters, I have included a series of
Interludes, which offer complementary histories, analyses and perspectives that defy or
unsettle conventional narratives of sovereignty in the Falklands/Malvinas.
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CHAPTER 1: DISPLACEMENT
The settler on the Falkland Islands need not fear the many
disappointments and almost insurmountable difficulties experienced by
the hundreds who embarked their all in the Swan River scheme - He need
not dread, on his return home from a journey, to find his wife and children
murdered by the ferocious and blood thirsty savage, as has lately been the
case in Van Diemen's Land - neither need he fear to hear the warwhoop of
the Indian burst upon his ears, as he is assembled round his domestic
hearth with his family, as was not long ago the case in the back
settlements in America -- he need not fear as in the African Settlements,
the murderous attack of the Caffre - neither has he to reside among a
number of slaves, against whose rising he has not a moment real
protection. He has only steadily to pursue his aim, certain of never being
in want, and with every prospect of acquiring wealth.46
European “Discoveries” and Temporary Settlements
This dissertation is sympathetic to the theory that indigenous people reached the
Falklands/Malvinas before the arrival of Europeans. As I discuss in Chapter 7, ongoing
archaeological research suggests that humans may have been present at some moment in the
millennia preceding European colonization. However, there remains no concrete historical
evidence of an initial colonial encounter with Native people in the islands. Given the
implications for contemporary sovereignty claims, the European “discovery” of the islands is
the subject of considerable scrutiny and dispute among historians and scholars of
international law and politics.47 I will not pretend to produce an authoritative account because
46

“A Visit to the Falkland Islands” (1832).
Legal scholar Julius Goebel’s (1982 [1927]) study is a seminal analysis of the “discovery” claims and
eighteenth-century settlements of the islands. The Yale University project includes extensive detail on the
controversial ambiguities that the respective discovery claims present for international legal decision making.
Laurio Destefani’s (1982) work is also highly regarded, but it is perhaps more partial to the narrative that would
support the Argentine sovereignty cause; Gough (1992) provides a complementary analysis from British
Commonwealth sources. Falkland Islanders and their British trustees defer to V. F. Boyson’s (1924) study,
which is faithful to local knowledge and difficult to find outside of Stanley. The work of Mary Cawkell (1960;
1983; 2001) derives largely from Boyson’s work (see also UK FCO-sponsored literature, such as Levick
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it is not the principal subject of the present study, but for unfamiliar readers, it may be helpful
to outline a possible sequence of events.
Falkland Islanders and their British trustees have long held that the English captain
John Davis first sighted the archipelago on his ship “Desire” in 1592 (hence the Islanders’
official slogan “Desire the Right”).48 However, Iberian maps dating from up to fifty years
earlier, featuring a comparable archipelago called “Sansón,” suggest that Magellan (or
Esteban Gómez, one of his deserters) encountered the islands on his famous 1520
expedition.49 A less controversial claim is that the Dutch sailor Sebald de Weert observed the
islands in 1600. British commander John Strong may have been the first European to actually
set foot on the islands in 1690 on the “Welfare.” He named the sound separating the two
main islands “Falkland,” which later became the English name for the full chain. The French
may have arrived earlier; at the very least, a detailed map demonstrates that Amedée François
Frézier landed there in 1711.
Even though they have no part in the current sovereignty dispute, the French were, in
fact, the first Europeans to form a settlement in the islands. To build a settlement, French
Officer Louis Antoine de Bougainville assembled an expedition of sailors and merchants
from Saint Malo who gave the archipelago the French name Iles Malouines, from which the
Spanish name Malvinas derives. In addition to these residents, it is significant that de
(1982)). The Argentine Foreign Ministry (2014) and its supporters have produced their own narrative, deriving
from the government-funded research of Paul Groussac (1934). See inter alia Muñoz Aspiri (1966). Meanwhile,
responding to international legal scholars supporting Argentina’s claim (Kohen 2014), independent researchers
Peter Pepper and Graham Pascoe (2012) have labored fanatically to develop an exhaustive account sympathetic
to the UK.
48
“Right” in “Desire the Right” also carried the connotation of whale oil in the early twentieth century, as in the
species Right Whale. One especially outspoken, contrarian Islander is a follower of the popular historian Gavin
Menzies, who suggests controversially that Chinese sailors first “discovered” the islands in 1421, despite
questionable research (Menzies 2008).
49
A series of Portuguese and/or Spanish sailors may have “discovered” the islands between the expeditions of
Magellan and Davis, particularly the Bishop of Plasencia on the vessel referred to as the “Incognita” in 1540.
See Goebel (1982, 16–34); Destefani (1982, 37–46). It is unlikely that Amerigo Vespucci sailed to the islands
on his controversial voyage of 1501-02. Although his letters refer to an island in the latitudinal vicinity, the
description does not match the archipelago. Moreover, scholars have long called the authenticity of the letters
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Bougainville’s colony consisted primarily of displaced Acadians already at home in the
settler colonial milieu of America. In this sense, the European colonization of the islands was
an extension of the conquest of the New World continents.
In early 1764, de Bougainville and his crew sailed into what is now called Berkeley
Sound on East Falkland Island, claimed possession of the islands for Louis XV and
constructed a fort, St. Louis (hereafter, Port Louis).50 The French colonists built a sustained
colony with wood from Patagonia and abundant oil and meat from seals and sea lions. They
also collected penguin eggs, hunted geese and harvested root vegetables and peat for cooking
and heating (Pernety 2013; Bernhardson 1989, 87–99). Despite bright prospects for
developing a commercial sealing and whaling outpost, the French colony was short-lived. In
1767, de Bougainville delivered the settlement to the Spanish, who renamed it Puerto
Soledad.
However, before the Spanish took possession of de Bougainville’s colony, the British
Commander John Byron (grandfather of poet Lord Byron) had already independently
surveyed another section of the archipelago at Port Egmont on the northwestern Saunders
Island in 1764. Without apparent knowledge of the French settlement, Byron’s crew occupied
Port Egmont and planted a vegetable garden that a garrison led by Captain John McBride
inherited two years later (Goebel 1982, 231–240). The British settlement grew under
McBride’s successor, Captain Anthony Hunt until the Spanish removed the garrison
forcefully but without any casualties in 1770 (Penrose 1775; Clayton 1981). After much
combative diplomacy, the British reoccupied Port Egmont with Spanish permission in 1771,
only to abandon it again in 1774. Defenders of British sovereignty argue that even if
occupation was not continuous, the claim never expired, for upon departing, Commanding
Officer S. W. Clayton left a plaque asserting that the islands are property of King George III.
50

On the French outpost, see Bougainville (1772) and Pernety (2013 [1771]).
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Even though the Spanish managed to take over the French fort in 1767 and secure
exclusive control over the islands from 1774 to 1811, with the British occupied elsewhere
during this period with the American Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the islands were
never hospitable to them. The first of twenty governors, Felipe Ruiz Puente’s original
garrison consisted of over 500 personnel, of which roughly 130 would remain in Puerto
Soledad, consisting of a fluctuating population of soldiers, seamen, seventeen remaining
Acadians, as well as servants and slaves.51 The settlement grew with more than 2,000 heads
of cattle and up to 38 buildings made out of stone, imported wood or turf.52 But, lacking
sustained vegetable or peat cultivation, the Spanish depended on annual provisions from Río
de la Plata. They suffered shortages, struggling to supply adequate rations, and used the
settlement primarily as a military outpost and penal colony.53 If they had not inhabited the
islands before European colonization, the first indigenous South Americans reached the
Malvinas during this period—as prisoners.54
Irrespective of the sovereign military power, transient sailors, particularly North
American sealers, occupied the islands’ coasts throughout the early colonial period. From
1811-1820 the islands served as an ungoverned haven for sealers, whalers and gauchos of
various nationalities. On November 6, 1820, an American naval officer turned privateer
commander David Jewett, assisting in the South American independence campaigns, sailed
the frigate “Heroína” into the former Puerto Soledad (Port Louis) and raised the Argentine
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flag among the sealers (Figueira 1985).55 The next section will discuss the short-lived colony
of Buenos Aires that existed in the Malvinas between Jewett’s act and permanent British
occupation and settlement.

The Lost Colony of Buenos Aires
In addition to the increased presence of sealers and whalers, feral cattle flourished throughout
East Falkland Island (in Spanish, Isla Soledad) during the power vacuum of the early
nineteenth century. While Jewett did not remain in the islands after planting the Argentine
flag, Luis (or Louis) Vernet, a merchant originally from Hamburg, seized the opportunity to
invest. Vernet and his business partner Jorge Pacheco signed a contract on August 25, 1823
for usufruct rights to cattle from the government of Buenos Aires.56 On December 18th of
that same year, the government gave Pacheco a concession for a tract of land for Vernet to
build a colony on East Falkland Island.57 After an initial expedition failed in 1824, Vernet
enlisted three foremen and twenty-three gaucho “peones” (peons) to recover his losses in
1826.58
In 1829 Buenos Aires would name Vernet its Political and Military Commander of
the Malvinas,59 but his colony was more of a business enterprise for raising cattle and selling
hides than a nation-building project for the nascent Argentine republic. In this respect, the
islands resembled the mainland closely during this period. Instituting his own paper currency,
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a common practice among some latifundistas (large estate owners), Vernet paid the gauchos
one to two “dollars” per head of cattle they caught and slaughtered.60 The work of making
horse-riding gear, such as lassos and saddle pads, constructing corrals, minding cattle,
building huts and cooking beef were included in this contract. Most of the gauchos were from
the Río de la Plata region, though the settler who would become their primary foreman Jean
(or Juan) Simon was French. It is important to note that in addition to the gauchos, some of
whom came from and went back to South America, Vernet’s colony included five Charrúa
Amerindians who had been imprisoned in Montevideo: Manuel González, Luciano Flores,
Manuel Godoy, Felipe Salazar and “M.” Lattore. Moreover, it often goes unmentioned that
he built his colony on contraband slave labor. Vernet bought at least thirty-one “negros y
negras” captured previously during the war with Brazil, from an associate in Patagones on
August 7, 1828, along with horses and other supplies.61
“Gaucho,” as Islanders are keen to point out, refers to occupation rather than national
origin. While they were instrumental to state formation in Argentina, the gaucho did not
become symbolic of authentic Argentine national identity until the turn of the twentieth
century (Delaney 1996; De La Fuente 2000). Gauchos were usually classified racially as
mestizos (mixed-race), although various colonial letters group the Charrúa captives together
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with them as either gauchos or as indios (Indians in English).62 Vernet’s colony of around
100 individuals also included Dutch, German and British colonists, though he failed to
persuade then-UK minister to Buenos Aires Woodbine Parish to recruit more British settlers
and “capitalists abroad,” to replace the merchants of Buenos Aires whom Vernet berated for
having “no spirit of enterprise.”63 Similar to their status in other “cattle frontiers” of the
Americas, Vernet’s hired gaucho cattle herders were subjugated in a system of debt peonage
and marginalized as “barbarous” vagrants or bandits.64
Vernet envisioned his colony not just as a gaucho satellite for cattle herding, but also
as a potential commercial center for fishing and a launching point for conquering Patagonia
(as indicated in the opening quote, it served as a safe haven from potential confrontations
with Natives). He wished to capture wealth from the sealing and whaling activities already
underway, by establishing settlements of at least three families and twelve men on each
island with a possible naval war ship to enforce regulations.65 Vernet also gained control of
Staten Land, a source for wood nearer to the South American coast. He and his wife Maria
enjoyed the cosmopolitan comforts of a library of books in Spanish, German and English and
quite a variety of other amenities.66 They held foot races and dances, entertaining guests with
music played on their imported piano.67
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A sample cargo for Vernet’s colony lists, in addition to passage settlers and peons from Montevideo,
crockery, spades, hinges, locks, ponchos, clothing, paper, medicines, seeds, trunk of ready made clothes,
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Things seemed to be working in relative harmony for Vernet, until he tried to enforce
Buenos Aires’ regulations on fishing and sealing. In 1831, Vernet detained three sealing
schooners, and after taking them to trial in Buenos Aires, he was never able to return to the
islands. Ironically, according to one of the last accounts of Vernet’s settlement, Maria sang
“Di Tanti Palpiti” in the company of the crew of one of the detained schooners. The aria
begins with the words “Oh patria! dolce, e ingrata patria! alfine a te ritorno!” (Oh fatherland!
Sweet and ungrateful fatherland! At last I return to you!).68

1833 and the Legend of “El Gaucho” Rivero
It is often overlooked that the US Navy, and not the British, destroyed Vernet’s settlement in
1832. With Vernet already in Buenos Aires while the sealing vessels awaited trial, there was
little he could do to protect his settlement when Andrew Jackson’s administration ordered the
Lexington to sack Port Louis, in response to his detention of the three American sealing
vessels.69 General Juan Manuel de Rosas sent a garrison to maintain stability in the schooner
Sarandí. However, its crew (most of whom were themselves Americans or British) staged a
mutiny shortly after arriving in the islands and assassinated Rosas’ commander, Esteban
Mestivier, thus leaving the colony defenseless. Just over one month later, on January 2, 1833,
the British ship the Clio arrived to decisively reclaim the islands for Britain.
paper, tent, shot, book, pipes, barrel whitening, shot, horseslings, chain dog, timber dogs, boathooks, timber
dogs, curtails, bottom drawers, guitar, earthen pots, sweet wine, vinegar, yerba, paper, sweet oil, small articles,
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As in the struggles leading to the formation of the Argentine Republic (De La Fuente
2000), gauchos played a central role in the violent aftermath of the event that Argentina’s
government views as the British “usurpation” of the islands. On August 26th of that same
year, one of the gauchos formerly employed by Vernet, Antonio Rivero (also referred to as
Antook), led seven others, including gauchos José María Luna, Juan Brasido (or Brasilio,
nicknamed “Rubio”) and the five aforementioned Charrúa prisoners, in a violent uprising,
which left dead Vernet’s former managers: the French foreman Simon, Irish steward William
Dickson and Scottish superintendent Matthew Brisbane, as well as two other inhabitants
named Ventura Pasos of Buenos Aires and Anton Vaihinger (called “Wagner,” a German).
Dichotomizing the national identities of the two parties as Argentine gauchos on the
one hand and British colonists on the other, some Argentine intellectuals mythologized the
event more than a century later to usher in a brand of nationalism that left-Peronists have
since repeatedly seized upon.70 Depending on one’s political sympathies, historians have
interpreted “El Gaucho” Rivero’s uprising alternately as an apolitical crime of murder, a
rebellion in defense of Argentine sovereignty against British rule, or an act of potentially
revolutionary resistance against unfair labor conditions, carrying over from Vernet’s debt
peonage regime.71 Testimonies that the gauchos wanted to be paid in silver or gold rather
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than Vernet’s devalued paper currency, and trends of similarly disenfranchised peoples
staging hidden revolutions support the latter (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000; Grandin 2014).72
Researchers and journalists, particularly those collecting evidence to support
Argentina’s sovereignty cause, tend to lament the restricted access to Port Louis, the primary
settlement during the pre-1833 settlements of the French, Spanish and Luis Vernet under
Buenos Aires. However, when I ventured to the now-family-owned working sheep farm with
a group of Stanley-based “ramblers” who had scheduled a visit ahead of time, the current
landowner welcomed us cordially. Rolling up to the gate in his four-wheeler, he handed out
maps and pamphlets identifying many of the same turf houses and enclosures that I had first
encountered in the dusty reports of Vernet’s estate.73 I had the opportunity to walk along and
photograph gaucho era ruins, including: a stone corral, the French Commandant’s house and
“secret tunnel”; gauchos’ cottages; original church and Spanish buildings; a store and gun
battery; a house; a magnetic observation station and the site of a Spanish fort. The
settlement’s graveyard features the tombstone of Vernet’s former deputy Brisbane, who was
one of the victims of the Gaucho Rivero uprising. A rather biased epitaph demonstrates how
Brisbane, who came to the islands from Perth, Scotland, has become symbolized in
contradistinction to his killer Gaucho Rivero, as a martyr for the British. The inscription,
which ironically echoes Argentine statesman Domingo Faustino Sarmiento’s (2010 [1845])
racialization of gauchos, reads: “In memory of Mr. Matthew Brisbane who was barbarously
murdered on the 26th, August 1833.”
nothing to do with Argentine sovereignty. Left-nationalist Mario Tesler (1971; 2013) argues that these authors
rely overly on sources that detract from the sovereignty cause.
72
For the cause of the assassinations being attributed to the money form of payment, see the direct testimony of
José María Luna, one of the accused gauchos, PRO, Admiralty 1/42 (Academia Nacional de la Historia 1967,
84). See also the statement of Antonio Rivero, himself, AGN, Doc. 242, 2-3-6 (Academia Nacional de la
Historia 1967, 97). This theory has also been accused of being overly materialist (Tesler 1971, 322–323).
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See e.g. the map drawn by Luis Vernet’s brother Emilio in Doc. 5 24 marzo 1787. Nota del Sr. Pedro de
Mesa y Castro al Ecmo. Sr. Marqués de Loreto, legajo 127, 2-3-3. See also Doc. 33 Copias de las colecciones de
documentos referentes al coste de la colonia fundada en el Puerto de San Luis; and Doc. 112 balance of cost or
value of the colony remains after its destruction by the Corvette Lexington on 31 Dec. 1831.
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Figure 8 Gravestone of Matthew Brisbane, Port Louis. Author photo.

Figure 9 Port Louis settlement. Author photo.
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The British eventually captured Rivero and his comrades, bringing them to England
for trial in early 1834 (apparently only to be released in Montevideo a year later).74 The rest
of Vernet’s hired gauchos actually stayed in the islands under British rule. Vernet viewed the
incidents involving the Lexington and El Gaucho Rivero as unjust trespasses on his usufruct
rights to cattle and land, more so than a violation of Argentine sovereignty.75 Rejecting debt
bondage, Rivero and his comrades valued a more egalitarian system of pasturage rights,
common to this period, without any monopoly on violence (See Chapter 2).76
Recently, in 2012 the Argentine government passed Decree 256 in Rivero’s memory.
The so-called “Gaucho Rivero Law” (Ley Gaucho Rivero) banned ships scheduled to stop in
the Falklands and flying a British flag from using the ports of the province of Buenos Aires. I
discuss the impact that this law has had on containerization in Chapter 4, but it has been most
effective in hampering the Falklands’ tourist industry. After the law was passed, most cruise
lines changed their itinerary to avoid the Falklands or the South Atlantic more generally,
having received threats and protests led by the left-nationalist group Movimiento Patriótico
Revolucionario Quebracho in support of the legislation. These threats caused 21 cancellations
that would have brought 23,000 potential visitors to the Falklands in 2012-13 (Ushuaia’s
tourist industry in Tierra Del Fuego was also ironically impacted, triggering counterprotests). The cruise tourism industry bounced back after the protests died down starting in
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2014, but when cancellations continue to occur “due to weather,” and the sun is shining in
Stanley, local residents usually assume that the haunting politics of “Gaucho Rivero” had
something to do with it.77

Integration and Alienation of South American Gauchos
After permanent British settlement, island residents of South American origin were
paradoxically integrated into the main colony as a labor force. Here, I will discuss how they
became increasingly alienated and were ultimately displaced. In 1842, the main settlement
and seat of British Colonial government moved from Port Louis to Port Stanley and
subsequently expanded into the rural Camp. Twenty-two of the thirty-three residents of
Vernet’s settlement had remained at Port Louis after the British reclaimed the islands in
1833.78 Even after the uprising of Antonio Rivero, gauchos continued to play a central role in
maintaining the livelihood of the British settlement, which consisted initially of a small naval
garrison. The gauchos labored just as they had done under Vernet’s regime, capturing cattle
and producing meat and hides.
While most of the holdovers from Vernet’s colony as well as the naval officers were
men, three women remained: Antonina Roxa, Carmelita and Gregoria Madrid. The latter two
were Afrodescendants; Carmelita had three children with three different men in the 1830s
before tragically drowning herself in 1845, and Gregoria Madrid married a settler and lived in
Stanley until her death in 1871. We know more about Antonina Roxa, who was described as
an “Indian Princess” from Salta via Río de la Plata. A local icon, Roxa’s role was not only
important in the domestic sphere of the settlement, but she was also considered a skilled
gaucho and a “person in her own right” (Tatham 2008, 471). In Stanley, she owned land,
77
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multiple houses, and accumulated a substantial herd of cattle and other livestock. After
marrying and divorcing an American sailor, Roxa became the first resident to swear an oath
to the Crown in 1841. In the 1850s, she remarried a gaucho from Montevideo and acquired,
leased and worked on Camp settlements at Hope Place and Port San Carlos in East Falkland
Island, before her death in 1869.
As the colony grew in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, settlers debated how labor
recruitment would impact its embryonic sense of Britishness—with xenophobic undertones.
The islands’ absence of so-called “aborigines” and their relatively few settlers made some
British colonial commissioners interested in converting the settlement into a penal colony and
naval station.79 Speculative investors moved instead toward advancing the commercialization
of the cattle trade, which did occur with the establishment of the Falkland Islands Company
(FIC) in the 1850s (see Chapter 2). However, ideas to attract tens of thousands of small
farmers never materialized, and racialized fear surrounded the impact of importing “Indian
gauchos” on white settlers’ safety.80 These are the early conditions upon which the
contemporary settler colonial protectorate that I explore further in Chapter 3 has been built.
Thus began a lasting racially charged debate about population control: who would be
deemed “desirables” and who “undesirables?” The FIC’s founder Samuel F. Lafone and his
agent proposed recruiting five-ninths of their workforce from the Shetland Islands, where
they were considered to be “hardy and industrious” and “religious men” with “good morals.”
One-ninth would have to be from Río de la Plata because of their superior knowledge of
cattle management. The FIC proposed that two-ninths come from southern Chile, where “the
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people are more docile and humble than the inhabitants of the River Plate.” And the final
ninth would be “intelligent Basques and Catalans” working in the saladeros of Montevideo.81
Collapsing this calculated division of labor by race and ethnicity, the early British
Colonial Governors Moody and Rennie enforced their own hierarchy, which disadvantaged
South Americans more generally. Passing an “Alien Ordinance” in 1849, the government
deported South American workers, classified as “Aliens,” “Banda Oriental” (referring to
what is now Uruguay), “Spaniards,” “Indians,” “Spanish Indians,” “Indian gauchos” or
“Spanish gauchos” whose behavior they deemed “barbaric,” or whom they suspected of
spreading subversive, anti-British views.82 “Aliens” and “Resident Strangers” were listed
separately from “whites” and the remaining few “coloured” people in colonial reports.83 To
prevent Stanley from becoming “overrun by Spaniards and Indians to the great annoyance
and inconvenience of the inhabitants,” the colonial government and FIC required that cattle
be concentrated out of reach from town in the Southern plains of East Falkland Island called
Lafonia, after the eponymous FIC founder.84 By 1858, the FIC had “no Spaniard in its
employ” at Stanley.85 Finally, to displace the gauchos with a preferred population, the
government encouraged immigration from residents of Buenos Aires of northern European
descent. Then, when the economy shifted from cattle to sheep, colonial managers ultimately
found little use for gauchos and recruited Scottish or English shepherds instead.86
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The gauchos did not passively accept their replacement with British laborers. As their
population decreased, a second, less mythologized Gaucho Rivero-like incident occurred
when the gaucho Manuel Gil murdered FIC Camp manager John Rudd. There are multiple
theories about Gil’s motives, but based on the reactions of Governor James George
Mackenzie, it is clear that there was widespread fear among the British managerial class that
“all the Spaniards resident in the Islands” were complicit, if not directly involved in
conspiring for the manager’s death.87 The lack of institutional control over violence in Camp
is one of the reasons for the vanishing of the cattle frontier in the Falklands, and the gauchos
with it. However, as I will show, the islands may no longer be a cattle frontier, but the settler
colonial protectorate that took shape in its wake introduced new agroindustrial practices,
which have created a lasting frontier condition for different regimes of extractive capital.

Vernet Vive
Beyond the bureaucratic functionaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or nationalist
protesters in the streets, one eccentric individual remains at the heart of the Argentine cause
for sovereignty over Malvinas. Lucho, the direct descendant of Luis Vernet, is a poet, writer
and independent historian who works tirelessly to advance what he calls little projects
(proyectitos) that will push for the full restoration of what he sees as his ancestral right to
land and the territorial integrity of his country.
Through a mutual contact, Lucho invited me to interview him in his apartment in La
Plata, a small historic city about an hour south of the federal capital Buenos Aires. I had
previously viewed Lucho giving speeches as a petitioner on behalf of Argentina at the annual
meetings of the Special Committee on Decolonization (C24) in New York. There, he read
lengthy passages from his great grandmother’s diaries from before 1833, reflecting what
87
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everyday life was like in Vernet’s idyllic colony of Malvinas. Describing the scenes of María
doing chores with her fellow settlers (and slaves), Lucho spoke with sincere pathos. I did not
know exactly what to expect upon meeting Lucho in person, but he told me that he had
reserved the whole day, so that we could work together in a relaxed setting.
As is customary for Argentine men, Lucho greeted me with a big hug and a kiss.
Lucho turned out to be an exceedingly warm intellectual soul with a tragicomic sensibility
and a compulsive addiction to tobacco. We spent more than eight hours in his cozy study
room, brimming with books about Malvinas. Between my momentary prompting of names
and dates to establish what he viewed as the correct sequence of events in the sovereignty
saga, Lucho told me everything there was to know about the Malvinas, from the significance
of Vernet’s decree as Political and Military Commander to the history of sealing, fishing,
salted cowhides, rabbit skins and leather. Throughout the day, we transitioned from ritual
sipping of yerba mate, to red wine and sandwiches, and by the end of the day Lucho had
smoked his way through two packs of cigarettes.
Lucho has written a number of articles on the subject of Malvinas that span the past
thirty years of geopolitics and three centuries of history. While he is less interested in the
battle history of 1982 and perhaps more focused on the colonial period, no aspect of the
Malvinas is dull to Lucho. He thinks and writes in milestones (hitos) or axes (ejes). That is,
he links together and strategically universalizes non-contemporaneous moments as much as
180 years apart, through a discourse of human rights that risks collapsing geography and
history. These ecstatic pauses give Lucho the continuity he lacks from the loss of Malvinas.
Handing me two books at a time, he asked: What was the relationship between the British
settlement of the 1770s at Port Egmont and the French settlement at Port Louis? How did the
UK provoke the Argentine military junta in the first place, and what was the role of Peru and
the US in the 1982 conflict, or Fidel Castro for that matter? What was the significance of the
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various decrees that established Vernet’s rights to colonize the islands between 1823 and
1829? And should we think of the Malvinas as a paradigmatic cattle frontier, a sheep station
or a marine resource extraction site? These are some of the questions that have given Lucho a
gray beard and the darkest of bags under his eyes.
Lucho also experiences great joy exploring the past, in some cases embellishing or
justifying Vernet’s generosity as chief colonizer. Reading the letters of his ancestor out loud,
he told me, “Four dozen pairs of wool socks. Why did he buy four dozen pairs of wool
socks? For the people, for the laborers. Five dozen t-shirts. This shows a side of him…the
everyday life of the business. To buy wool socks, t-shirts, vinegar, well, all of that amounts to
300 dollars, and he used to save it all. He has a bookkeeper’s mentality to handle the bills. He
writes down everything from renting a boat to buying nails. He saves it all.” Indeed, for a
short-lived colonial project, there are seemingly endless volumes of records on Vernet’s
settlement.
For Lucho, Malvinas is not just lost family property, but also the centerpiece to
Argentina’s patrimony. One of the most interesting dynamics of the enigmatic Lucho is that
even though he is a descendant of Vernet, and sympathizes with the historical tragedy of this
ancestor, he is more devoted to the contemporary national cause of Argentina—specifically
left-Peronist principles—as a loyal adherent to the Kirchner administrations that forced the
sovereignty issue back into the political arena. This is perhaps best exemplified by his
favorable view on the Gaucho Rivero rebellion. Lucho knows quite well that “El Gaucho”
Antonio Rivero rebelled against his own ancestor’s manager employees, and that the story of
his uprising has taken on an exaggerated life of its own as a national Peronist myth. Still,
Lucho does not think of the myth in a pejorative sense; he sees it as a “deep reflection of
reality” and considers Rivero a “proto-Marxist social revolutionary.” As he put it, “El
Gaucho Rivero represents the anti-imperialist sentiment of the Argentine people in relation to
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the English.” To Lucho, the uprising was valid and legitimate, even if aspects of the myth are
not entirely true to history. In short, he said, “Today, I am a Riverista: not because of
historical truth, but because of the myth that he represents, and because today he has also
become an emblem of the discussion around sovereignty.”
I left Lucho’s apartment with my head spinning—not just from the copious secondhand smoke—but also the sheer range of our discussion. Lucho was a historical
anthropologist’s dream informant: he was a fascinating, humble individual with intimate
connections to and encyclopedic knowledge of my research topic, but he also armed me early
in my fieldwork with a list of ambassadors, diplomats, scholars, musicians, artists and
veterans of the war that he knew personally and would connect me with directly. He invited
me to a number of events in which he spoke or that he helped to organize in La Plata, Buenos
Aires, and eventually Río Gallegos in Patagonia. Lucho sensed my enthusiasm about the
topic, and he was fascinated to meet someone from the United States that was: (a) interested
in the question of the Malvinas; and (b) taking a critical approach to the history of settler
colonialism. He would later smile as he introduced me to everyone as “un yanqui antiimperialista” (an anti-imperialist Yankee). In some ways, he saw his ancestor Luis Vernet in
a similar light as a yanqui, having been educated in Philadelphia before his enterprises in the
South Atlantic and Southern Cone. This is evident, Lucho pointed out, from the meticulous
contracts and bookkeeping preserved in Vernet’s archive.
Despite his obsession with the islands, Lucho is dead set against visiting them if it
means that he will have to get his Argentine passport stamped by the British FIG’s customs
agents. He lived vicariously through my field research and followed up frequently with
requests for updates on my progress. He does not want to be treated as a foreigner in a land
that he considers to be part of Argentina, and like Argentine diplomats, he considers the
passport stamp a de facto acceptance that the dispute does not exist.
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Enlaces: Living Links in Patagonia
The closest Lucho has come to visiting the islands has been traveling to Patagonia to bring
one of his many “proyectitos” to fruition in Río Gallegos, a city in the province of Santa
Cruz. I first learned about this project one day, when I was on my way to the national
archives on the 151 Colectivo bus, and Lucho called me out of the blue. He had just returned
to Buenos Aires from New York, where he served as a petitioner at the annual meeting of the
UN C24, and he invited me to lunch. I abandoned my plan to go to the archive of Vernet’s
endless stacks of documents, and instead took a taxi to spend the afternoon with his living
descendant at a charming Criollo restaurant in Plaza San Martín. Lucho was leaning on the
corner of the Cancillería (the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), unsurprisingly
deep in thought and puffing on a cigarette.
Lucho explained to me that he had just met with another descendant of defected
Islanders (hereafter, malvinenses or malvineros). He had come up with an idea to hold a
family reunion of sorts, including all the descendants of malvinenses in Argentina. This was
his way of trying to prove his suspicion right that there may be as many or more descendants
of malvinenses in mainland Argentina than there are third-generation Islanders in the actual
Malvinas (thus supporting the Argentine government’s accusation that the Islanders’ claim to
self-determination is invalid for being an “implanted population”).
Lucho called this project, which was supported by the Malvinas Secretariat of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Enlaces Malvinas: Raíces del Futuro” (Links of Malvinas:
Roots of the Future). It was meant specifically to reconnect estranged Islanders with their
malvinense descendants in the region. Lucho scheduled the reunion to occur on the 128th
anniversary of the wedding of Carlos Moyano, a founding governor of Santa Cruz, and Ethel
Turner, one of a number of Islanders who migrated to Patagonia in the 1880s-90s. According
to Lucho, “This is not Romeo and Juliet, of the Capulets and the Montagues. This is not love
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that transcends disputes. It is a political and commercial alliance consolidated through
marriage.” The malvinense descendant with whom Lucho met at the Cancillería that day was
none other than the descendant of Moyano and Turner.
Ironically, the links between the Falklands/Malvinas and Patagonia began to take hold
just as the gauchos became alienated and displaced. Beginning in the 1880s, a wave of
shepherds seeking to invest their savings and own their own land migrated to “the Coast.”
This coincided with and in some ways complemented the second “Desert Campaign,” in
which Argentine General Julio Roca led bands of mercenaries to annihilate the Amerindians
of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. The British colonial governor even “kindly welcomed”
Roca during a visit with the Governor in Stanley in 1901.88 While the FIC and other absentee
landowners had already enclosed the vast majority of the Falklands (see Chapter 2), the
Argentine Republic, particularly Carlos Moyano, encouraged non-land-owning Islanders,
such as the son of the slain FIC manager Rudd, to stake new claims to land in Patagonia.
Some of these migrants amassed considerable wealth by starting their own businesses on the
FIC model. Others never owned land and continued to be peons or managers in the farms of
Patagonia. From 1882 to 1895, more than 26 families and 61 additional settlers migrated to
South America. The migrants established farms throughout what is now the province of Santa
Cruz, helping to found the towns of Río Gallegos, Puerto Santa Cruz and Puerto San Julián,
as well as strengthening connections with Punta Arenas, Chile and the missionary settlements
in Tierra del Fuego.89
To explore some of these connections, I timed one of my research trips to Patagonia
to coincide with Lucho’s Enlaces event. My first stop in Río Gallegos was a former
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governor’s house has been converted into a “Museo de Pioneros” (Pioneer Museum). As I
perused through the photographs and antique items in the back of the museum, I caught a
whiff of tobacco and heard an unmistakable voice: it was Lucho chatting with the museum’s
greeters. He gave me a hug, and we toured the museum together. Lucho pointed out some of
the surnames of possible defected Islander “pioneers”: Rudd, Jamieson, MacCall, Beecher,
Ness, Halliday, Felton, Hamilton, Smith, Williams, Dean, McLeod, Anderson, Greenshields,
Grant, Betts, Cameron, Blake, Blakely, Hansen, Johnson, Hardy, Morrison, Reid, Lewis and
Waldron. Having visited the museum before in 2001-03, Lucho was already familiar with the
iconic photos of rugged settlers, and he pointed out other Australian or Scottish origins of
shepherds, highlighting the oft-neglected yet central role of the Malvinas in the British
Empire. Lucho also lectured me on the ostensibly harmonic relations between some of the
pioneers and Tehuelche people whose territories overlapped or neighbored the ranches of the
“pioneers.” After much fascinating discussion, Lucho and I parted ways so he could go meet
someone at his hotel and then dine at the Club Británico. Cracking a smile, he told me the
Club Británico's president has the surname “Martínez.”
Situated in a prime location of the windy coastal town of Río Gallegos, the Club
Británico de Río Gallegos (the British Club of Río Gallegos) serves as a refuge for the
descendants of malvinenses and other elites.90 One side of the Club Británico serves as an
upscale restaurant that is open to the public (those who can afford it), and on the other side
there is a members-only pub, which requires a numbered code to unlock the door. Women
were not permitted to enter the pub until the 1970s. A plaque in the doorway lists the Club’s
past presidents, directing the 300 members (roughly 25% of whom are British or malvinenses
of some stripe). George MacGeorge, the Club’s founder, along with others who owned
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massive estancias of up to two million hectares, traveled from Punta Arenas or the
Falklands/Malvinas, became involved in Roca’s “Desert Campaign,” and drove herds all over
Patagonia. Today, their descendants run major wool, meat refrigerating and oil businesses,
they govern populations as mayors of major towns, and they maintain positions of power and
privilege through the auspices the Sociedad Rural (the Rural Society, a very powerful
conservative group of landowners).
While the Club Británico is in some senses strikingly British, its members are
multiple-generation Argentine citizens. I gained access to the members-only side of the club
through an invitation of a malvinero. The pub felt like a typical English watering hole: there
were plush leather seats, wood panels and football (soccer) on TV. It split off into two semiprivate rooms where a group of women played bridge (members also played snooker
upstairs). My host ordered me a pisco sour—a cocktail usually associated more closely with
Chile or Peru, but one that is apparently common in the British Club. Very few members
know English, and all interactions are in Argentine Spanish or castellano. Members greet
each other with the Argentine custom of a hug and a kiss.
Upstairs, the walls are filled with photographs celebrating the settlers of the late
nineteenth century, but also demonstrating “cultural integration with indigenous people”:
Tehuelche Natives. I asked if any of the settlers appearing to be photographed in close
quarters with the Tehuelche were mestizo (racially-mixed), but I was told no, “they are
probably just sun-burnt.” Interestingly, though, members also compared the current Falkland
Islanders to indigenous people. One malvinera compared the situation to Rapa Nui (Easter
Island), suggesting that the Argentine government ought to do what Chile did: “integrate” the
Rapa Nui Natives through education. “They finish elementary school, they go to the
continent, they mix, they end up marrying and they stay,” she said. When I drew the
distinction based on unequal relations of power between the Islanders and other indigenous
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peoples, such as the Rapa Nui, she said it did not matter, suggesting that the Chilean
colonizers were Araucanos, so they were closer to the Rapa Nui on an ethnic/racial hierarchy,
and so too are the Argentines with the Islanders (i.e., both groups self-identify as white). Yet,
interestingly, one malvinero described himself as an “indio” when trying to speak English
with an Islander cousin.
These interactions give some credence to the Islanders’ accusations of Argentina as an
aspiring colonial power. In addition to this situated racialization and the common perception
that the “kelpers” (see Chapter 3) are squatters or captives of the British, multiple-generation
mainland malvineros and other ordinary Argentines see the islands through the feminized
kinship structure of the “Hermanita Perdida” (Lost Little Sister). This metaphor was made
famous by the milonga of that title written by Ariel Ramírez and Atahualpa Yupanqui.91
Here, the nation of Argentina is portrayed as a protective brother, lamenting the loss of his
little sister, who has been taken captive by yellowed papers and blonde pirates, despite the
millions of Argentine voices calling for her to come home.
“Hermanita Perdida” by Ariel Ramírez and Atahualpa Yupanqui.
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De la mañana a la noche.
De la noche a la mañana.
En grandes olas azules
y encajes de espumas blancas,
te va llegando el saludo
permanente de la Patria.
Ay, hermanita perdida.
Hermanita: vuelve a casa.

From morning to night.
From night to morning.
In large blue waves
and laces of white foam,
the permanent greeting of the homeland
is coming to you.
Ay, lost little sister.
Little sister: come back home.

Amarillentos papeles
te pintan con otra laya.
Pero son veinte millones
que te llamamos: hermana...
Sobre las aguas australes
planean gaviotas blancas.
Dura piedra enternecida
por la sagrada esperanza.

Yellowed papers
paint you with another spade.
But we are twenty million
voices calling you: sister...
Over the southern waters
white gulls glide.
Hard stone rendered tender
by the sacred hope.

For a film of the milonga, see Yupanqui (2010).
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Ay, hermanita perdida.
Hermanita: vuelve a casa.

Ay, lost little sister.
Little sister: come back home.

Malvinas, tierra cautiva
de un rubio tiempo pirata.
Patagonia te suspira.
Toda la Pampa te llama.
Seguirán las mil banderas
del mar, azules y blancas,
pero, queremos ver una
sobre tus piedras clavada.
Para llenarte de criollos.
Para curtirte la cara
hasta que logres el gesto
tradicional de la Patria.

Malvinas, captive land
of a blond pirate time.
Patagonia whispers you.
All of the Pampa calls you.
The thousand flags
of the sea will remain, blue and white,
but we want to see one
planted in your rocks.
To fill you with Criollos.
To toughen your face
until you get the traditional trait
of the homeland.

For the malvinenses, it is perhaps more accurate to describe the kin relation as an
estrangement of distant cousins. At the Enlaces reunion, held at the Universidad de la
Patagonia Austral (UNPA), contending social forces, mediated through preconceived notions
of peoplehood, sovereignty and kinship, were set into motion. The group of around forty
participants could be broken down into at least three main groups: (1) those pushing for the
connection to the sovereignty dispute, namely Lucho, Alec Betts and their institutional
support from the Kirchner Government’s Malvinas Secretariat, represented by ex-senator
Daniel Filmus; (2) scholars, filmmakers and journalists covering the reunion, most expressing
a militant research bias toward the former; and (3) the malvinenses of Santa Cruz, most of
whom simply wanted to trace their family history and share in their mutually exilic sense of
estrangement. While the wind screeched, Filmus brandished a 1816 letter from the liberator
San Martín connecting the Malvinas with national independence and formally signed a
statement initiating a new Observatory on the Malvinas. The descendant of Moyano and
Turner shared letters from the 1890s between Ethel Turner and her sister Agnes who
remained in the islands. Film projections showed interviews with those who had connections
during the brief period of negotiations and trade in the 1960s-70s before the war. And Betts
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and Lucho led an engaging workshop, in which the malvinenses were given the opportunity
to share their stories and perhaps even strategize on how to advance the sovereignty cause.
This consisted mostly of people telling what they know of their family history, and in some
cases Betts or others could fill in missing links in the relation: the name of a landowner, a
brother who married someone’s estranged cousin, or the location of a path named after the
murdered FIC manager Rudd, from whom several malvineneros descend. These
reconnections produced infectious excitement, which Lucho could not contain, that the
workshop was fulfilling its goals.
One of the perhaps most interesting moment of the workshop was the set of
observations of one malvinero, a leading figure in the Sociedad Rural, who had traveled to
the Malvinas with a group of Uruguayans to explore the possibility of doing business with
Islanders for wool and meat. He encountered a Camp resident who had gone to school with
him in Argentina decades earlier, but the erstwhile classmate did not invite him in for tea.
The war, and national discord more generally, precluded cordiality. Despite the coldness, the
visiting malvinero was fascinated by how similar the material structures of the shearing shed
and the other settlement houses seemed to be: “the sheds, ceilings, veneers, timbers, lights,
machinery, motors and presses. It was all the same,” he said. The wool presses were the same
that farmers had been using in Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. The machine only has to bale
wool for a few weeks once per year, so there was no need for any of the farms to invest in
new fixed capital. (Within the islands, Camp residents also acknowledge that the farms are
the same, but they point out that the Islanders did not inherit these artifacts from them, but
rather from Australia, and that the Argentines adapted them from the islands.) In light of this,
what the workshop exposed were some of the commercial, regional and British imperial links
between the Falklands/Malvinas, Patagonia and the Commonwealth, more generally, rather
than a deep connection to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Argentina as a nation.
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While Filmus, Lucho and Betts had their own imperatives and expectations geared
toward motivating the malvinenses to play an active role in the Argentine government’s
sovereignty cause. Nonetheless, the testimonies of malvinenses revealed a more ambivalent
sense of distant, seemingly irreconcilable loss from displacement. They wanted to build
living memory, know more about their families’ past, and celebrate the shared history of
sheep farming in the region. Moreover, despite their loosely common origin in the past
worlds of Malvinas, Lucho and Betts do not share a generational, transregional bond with the
other malvinenses. Their ancestors came in different “waves.” While Lucho’s ancestry in the
Malvinas goes back to before 1833 with Vernet, the malvinenses trace theirs back to the
period between the 1880s and 1940s. In contrast, Betts is a first-generation immigrant, and
one of the only defected Islanders who can claim that the war was the deciding factor (again,
he also had personal family reasons for migrating). He is not a “descendant of malvinenses,”
and he addressed them as a separate group.
To many of the malvinenses, Lucho and Betts seemed like strangers, imposing an
unwanted objective from Buenos Aires. They were viewed as coopting their family
memories, even if it meant that some local benefit could come out of it. Some of them had
served as UN petitioners at the Argentine government’s request in the past, but they largely
preferred to leave the sovereignty issue aside because they thought it would fail. Some of
them even preferred to call the islands “Falklands” rather than “Malvinas” because that was
what their family elders were used to saying. In fact, more outspoken malvinero dissenters
maintaining contact with Islanders were not even invited to the Enlaces reunion. Ultimately, a
pair of visiting scholars gave the malvinenses’ misgivings rhetorical ethos, splitting the
crowd into two camps: one in support of a research project integrating the descendants, and a
licit political project to “convince” the malvinenses to provide family memories that might
support the sovereignty cause.
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Visibly nervous, clutching an unlit cigarette and struggling to open a window, Lucho
offered that the question of sovereignty regarding Malvinas should be reduced to rights over
territory, not people. He said, “It is a South American archipelago. And another reality: it is a
Patagonian archipelago. Historically and culturally, it belongs to Patagonia.” However, one
malvinera countered that their ancestors did not come to Patagonia for Argentina. They came
for land, which they did not have access to in the Malvinas; unlike Vernet, it was never theirs
to recuperate. Rather than fighting for Argentine sovereignty, the malvinenses preferred,
ironically, to celebrate their British heritage and, if possible, reconnect relations with their
estranged next of kin, or at least gain knowledge of their family history. They are, for the
most part, proud to be Argentines, but some of the malvinenses reason that if they identify as
Argentine after 4-5 generations, then they understand how the Islanders, some of whom have
up to nine generations of settlers, have adhered to their own British-derived customs and
habits. Some participants suggested that reconnecting on a human scale could lead to an
eventual state transition, but most were doubtful of this strategy. To save faith, Betts came to
Lucho’s defense with an impassioned speech about the wounds that only sovereignty
“restoration” could heal. Betts said, “If nothing concrete comes out of here today, we still
will have won. We have won in the sense that, after today, you, the descendants of
malvinenses, have the opportunity to get together and reunite.”
Finally, some Islanders who continue to reside in the archipelago have reached out to
next of kin in Patagonia. One told me that he was in Río Gallegos looking for the grave of his
deceased uncle when he found out his grandson was still alive. He looked him up in the
phone book and found that he lived on a street named in memory of the Malvinas war!
Despite the ill omen, the cousins did get in touch, shared a meal and have remained in contact
ever since. Still, when I met the malvinero cousin, he told me that even though he has been
invited (which the Argentine government would reimburse), he remains reluctant to visit.
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Figure 10 Presentation of Malvinas Secretary Daniel Filmus. Author photo.

Figure 11 Enlaces workshop. Author photo.
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Conclusion
This chapter provided a broad historical overview, ranging from the possible “discoveries” of
the Falklands/Malvinas to contemporary experiences of displacement. Here, displacement
took an unusual colonial form because while there may be no historical evidence of a “precontact” indigenous population in the islands, imperial claims to res nullius were always in
dispute.92 Competing forms of rule over the frontier led to multiple violent conflicts.
Temporary settlements of the French, British and Spanish failed to establish permanent
colonies in the eighteenth century. The merchant Luis Vernet had a grand vision for a
colonial project, which began to take form as a colony of Buenos Aires. However, when
Vernet tried to enforce regulations on sealing, the US destroyed his settlement, clearing way
for the British to reclaim the islands in 1833. Control over the cattle frontier remained
tenuous under British rule, when “El Gaucho” Rivero led an uprising against Vernet’s former
colonial managers; Rivero’s cause has become symbolic of Argentina’s claim to sovereignty.
Vernet’s descendant Lucho has carried the banner for his ancestor, leading to new projects to
advance the cause for rightful heritage to Malvinas, such as Enlaces: an attempt to reunite
estranged defected Islanders or malvinenses in the continent.
This chapter has also illustrated the importance of kinship for understanding how
different collectivities of people experience displacement. Argentine national folklore
symbolizes the kin structure of Malvinas through the poetic justice of “hermanita perdida”—
the country is imagined as an older brother mourning his estranged little sister (the lost
colonial land). Here, both Argentina and Malvinas are understood as children of the Spanish
Empire and criollo settlers, who inherited the subsoil and built the nation after the transfer of
power resulting from the struggles for independence. This certainly resonates for Lucho who
longs to return his ancestor’s lost property to the nation that he now considers home. The
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symbolism is also comparable to other island discourses of dependence, such as the
postcolonial relations described in Françoise Vergès’ (1999) Monsters and Revolutionaries.
Analyzing the relationship between France and post-abolition decolonized subjects of
Réunion Island, Vergès describes a “colonial family romance” in which France is understood
as a protective mother, while inhabitants of Réunion are viewed, and self-identify, as
children.
However, just as histories of slavery and debt encircle Réunion, as Lucho was quick
to point out, the marriage between British settlers and Argentines on the continent was no
Romeo and Juliet story of love or affinity against all odds. For the malvinenses, the
fundamental kin relation is one of estranged cousins to Falkland Islanders, constituted
through a shared political economic history and culture of sheep farming, and not simply
through relations to the land. This is evident in the continuity of British colonial heritage that
survive in the habits and customs of members of the Club Británico.
Through Enlaces, Lucho launched an ambitious campaign to unite mutually exilic
compañeros in the common cause of Malvinas. It is possible that this is just the beginning of
a broader realization of Lucho’s vision for Enlaces. He will surely continue his efforts, but
these particular malvinenses were averse to sovereignty discussions and, in fact, they were
surprisingly loyal to their estranged Islander cousins, despite spatiotemporal barriers
presented by the latter’s settler colonial protectorate. These different attachments to the past
and aspirations for possible futures show how displacement and mixed heritage produce
unexpected alliances, as well as divisions over sovereignty and territory.
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INTERLUDE | THE MANY FACES OF ALLEN GARDINER

In his eloquent and incisive study on power and history, Silencing the Past, Michel-Rolph
Trouillot (1997) destabilized conventional narratives about the Haitian Revolution. In one of
the book’s essays, Trouillot exposed how different interpretations of “The Three Faces of
Sans Souci” have silenced an untold war within the war. To Europeans and most Western
guild historians, Sans Souci is a palace in Potsdam without any apparent connection to the
long-overlooked, first and only successful slave revolution in human history. To Haitians and
their visitors, Sans Souci is the palace in Milot where Henri Christophe, the former slave who
became emperor of Haiti, shot himself. However, few realize that Christophe built this
resilient palace in nearly the exact same location where he had ended the life of a rival
revolutionary named Sans Souci. The latter was an African-born slave who had risen through
the ranks as a guerrilla fighter under Toussant L’Ouverture and rebelled against Christophe’s
primarily Black Creole hierarchy after defeating the French, with an army of his own.
Trouillot showed how every mention of Sans Souci, the palace, effectively silences the
history of Sans Souci, the man. He wrote, “Silences are inherent in history because any single
event enters history with some of its constituting parts missing. Something is always left out
while something else is recorded” (Trouillot 1997, 49).
In the history of the Falklands and Patagonia, the multifarious figure of Allen
Gardiner has had a comparable silencing effect to that of Sans Souci in Haiti. Maritime
historians associate Allen Gardiner with the name of the schooner that assisted in the
establishment of a series of South American Missionary Society stations. Scholars of
Patagonia draw inspiration from proto-ethnographic studies, such as Uttermost Part of the
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Earth by E. Lucas Bridges (2007 [1948]), son of the missionary Thomas Bridges, who
disembarked the Allen Gardiner in Tierra Del Fuego and founded settlements at Ushuaia and
Harberton. There, Bridges chronicled the “dying” language and culture of the Yámana
(Yahgan) and Selk’nam (Ona) peoples in their “original condition,” and converted them into
loyal Christians. Considering that there is no historical evidence of a “precontact” population
of Amerindians in the Falklands, it is common to treat the archipelago’s settlement as a
distinct narrative from Patagonia’s colonization process. However, Allen Gardiner stands out
in time to bridge these separate geohistorical processes, demonstrating how they were in
many ways mutually constitutive.
The South American Missionary Society (formerly the Patagonian Missionary
Society) actually had three successive ships named Allen Gardiner—a schooner (1854-1873),
a yawl (1874-1884), and a steam yacht (1884-1896)—all in memory of the Society’s
eponymous British founder.93 Former Royal Navy Commander Allen Francis Gardiner had
taken a keen interest in delivering “civilization” to the Natives of Tierra Del Fuego and
Patagonia since before Robert Fitzroy encountered and transported four Yámana Indians to
and from Britain with Charles Darwin on the journey of the Beagle (see Chapter 7). After
establishing the Society in 1844, Commander Gardiner assembled a crew to search for one of
the famed Yámana who might serve as a potential interpreter: O’rundel’lico (known more
commonly as James “Jemmy” Button, alluding to the item Fitzroy exchanged for his
custody). Commander Gardiner made two journeys to Tierra del Fuego without encountering
O’rundel’lico; the second visit of 1850-51 ended in his death by starvation. On one of the last
entries of his diary, Gardiner outlined a plan for future missionaries: “To convey a few of the
natives to the Falklands, to teach them English, and learn their language, and to provide a
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brigantine or schooner of a hundred tons’ burden as a mission vessel” (Marsh and Stirling
1867, 79).
Determined to carry out Gardiner’s final instructions, the Society built a schooner and
named it in honor of their martyr. In October 1854, Captain W. Parker Snow sailed the Allen
Gardiner from Bristol, England, toward the Falklands, taking possession of the northwestern
Keppel Island on February 5, 1855. Stanley residents and their British colonial administrators
expressed mixed feelings about the Society’s plans to extract indigenous Yámana from Tierra
Del Fuego and “civilize” them remotely in a new settlement on Keppel Island. Shipping
agent, Admiral B. J. Sulivan, supported the Society’s plan, reasoning that it could reduce the
fatal confrontations between wrecked sailors and Natives on the coast.94 Others, including
Colonial Chaplain Charles Bull and Governor Moore, contended that the scheme amounted to
“kidnapping” or slavery, if the true motive was to force the Natives to work with cattle at
Keppel.95 Governor D’arcy wrote, “This little Arcadian settlement will probably be the means
of eventually civilizing the remaining few barbarous inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego... It
cannot be questioned that if these good missionaries are to succeed in making a man a
Christian out of a mere savage and wild man, they must first make him a rational being, and
it must contribute a great deal to forward his conversion if he can by degrees be brought into
a settled mode of life, and to this most desirable end the mission is practically working by the
mode so wisely adopted.”96 Even the Allen Gardiner’s own Captain Snow, who had
previously struggled to suppress the slave trade, had reservations about “any abduction of
these poor ignorant natives.”97 Unlike Commander Gardiner, Snow succeeded in locating
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O’rundel’lico. Yet, even though this particular Native did understand English and grasped the
missionaries’ intentions, Snow reported that he did not consent to going with them to Keppel.
In spite of Snow’s dissent, to accelerate the settlement of Keppel, the Society sent
General Secretary Reverend George Pakenham Despard to revive the operation in 1856.
Despard clashed with Snow over the scope of the enterprise at Keppel, leading to Snow’s
dismissal. As Snow suspected, Despard did devise plans to recruit Natives, not only for
religious instruction and “civilization,” but also as unpaid laborers for wood cutting in Tierra
del Fuego, as well as gardening and cattle raising at Keppel, for profit.98
Among Despard’s crew was yet another Allen Gardiner: son of the Commander,
Allen Weare Gardiner. The Missionary Society reached a “breakthrough” in 1858 when
Allen W. Gardiner followed through on his father’s fatal wish, and persuaded O’rundel’lico
to “volunteer” to come to Keppel in the Allen Gardiner with his wife and three of his
children. Having already endured a “civilizing” process nearly three decades earlier,
including meeting the King of England with Fitzroy, O’rundel’lico was seen as critical to the
mission at Keppel. However, like Allen Gardiner’s many forms, the subjectivity of
O’rundel’lico was also changing and unpredictable. Despite his literacy with British social
rules, manners and customs, the missionaries grew disappointed in O’rundel’lico’s so-called
“idleness” and “lack of humanity or curiosity.”99 Yet, they underestimated O’rundel’lico’s
skill in the art of mimicry and deception, a central dynamic of slavery, subversion and
colonial violence in the New World (Taussig 1993; Grandin 2014).
Seeking to “civilize” more Yámana individuals, catechist J. Garland Phillips and
Captain R. S. Fell sailed the Allen Gardiner to Wulaia (or Woolya) in Tierra del Fuego in
November, 1859. This site was where O’rundel’lico considered home, and the missionaries
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were familiar with it from previous shuttles. This time, the Society wanted to establish a more
permanent presence. They left the Allen Gardiner to garden, collect wood and establish a
house of worship, but after finding that some of their equipment had gone missing, the
missionaries searched the Natives, which caused considerable discord. Moreover,
O’rundel’lico was offended at the want of gifts and provisions the missionaries had to offer
for all the work he had done at Keppel. When the missionaries left the Allen Gardiner to
commence worship, up to three hundred Natives gathered, and within seconds, Captain Fell,
Phillips and the rest of the crew were overpowered and killed. Only the cook Alfred Cole
survived, by remaining on board the Allen Gardiner.
After the so-called Wulaia Massacre, Cole made it to shore, where O’rundel’lico
eventually took him in, providing food and clothes. On trial in Stanley, Cole blamed the
massacre on O’rundel’lico for not getting “as much as he thought he had a right to, and that
he was at the head of the whole proceedings.”100 When cross-examined, O’rundel’lico said
that he had never wanted to stay at Keppel, and acknowledged his comrades were angry at
having their bags searched, but he accused the unlikely Selk’nam (Ona) who inhabit the main
island of Tierra del Fuego of perpetrating the violence.101 Revd Bull and Governor Moore
exculpated O’rundel’lico of responsibility for the “deplorable tragedy,” and viewed the
plunder in which he took part as righteous indignation for their “enforced and irksome
residence” at Keppel.102 The trial thus supported claims that O’rundel’lico and his peers had
been involuntarily kidnapped, reinforcing Stanley residents’ uneasiness about the missionary
settlement at Keppel. O’rundel’lico’s role in the uprising and his pardon secured his place in
history: not only as the captive survivor of multiple fierce procedures based on a highly
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flawed social-evolutionist framing, but also as a principled renegade who rebelled against the
colonial intrusion of Tierra del Fuego.
Despite the disaster at Wulaia, and Governor Moore’s strict prohibition of the
involuntary importation of more Natives, the Society continued using Keppel Island as a base
for its missionary work. Despard resigned, and O’rundel’lico never returned, but the younger
Ookokko became the Society’s new “industrious” darling, when he and his 16-year-old wife,
Cammilenna apparently participated in the Keppel Island mission project at their own will.
Ookokko was more willing than O’rundel’lico had been to act as an interpreter, and he helped
garner support for the Society not only from fellow Yámana but also Stanley residents like
Charles Bull.103 In 1865 Despard’s replacement Reverend Waite Hockin Stirling brought four
Yámana boys to England for intensive training in Bristol, including “Threeboys,” the son of
O’rundel’lico who had made the same transatlantic journey with Fitzroy decades earlier.
Stirling’s intention was to dispel myths of the Yámana as subhuman beings, yet the voyage
ironically reproduced this stigma through scientific racist procedures, such as anthropological
head measurements.104 On their return to the Falklands in 1867, one of the Yámana, Uroopa,
fell ill with consumption (tuberculosis), and died on the Allen Gardiner. Before his passing,
Stirling baptized Uroopa as “John Allen Gardiner.”105
By the turn of the twentieth century, hundreds of Yámana had visited Keppel, Thomas
Bridges had begun compiling his dictionary of Yámana, and the Society established mission
stations at Ushuaia and elsewhere in Patagonia. Despite significant setbacks, the settlement at
Keppel Island effectively served its purpose as a remote base for the Society, and with the
opening of the Western islands of the Falklands to settlement, ordinary Falkland Islanders
became more integrated with their neighbors at Keppel. The Society continued using Keppel
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as an agricultural hub for “the industrial education of the natives”—involving coerced child
labor in an isolated, unforgiving environment—leaving most of the Christian indoctrination
and “civilizing” activities to the Ushuaia branch.106 The Allen Gardiner and its nautical
reincarnations continued shuttling the missionaries and Yámana between Tierra Del Fuego
and Keppel until the Society sold the farm in 1911.
The captivating saga of Allen Gardiner, O’rundel’lico (“Jemmy Button”) and the
South American Missionary Society has become the stuff of horror or legend, depending on
one’s perspective. Yet, as with Sans Souci, each recording leaves out key parts of history.
Christian evangelists made heroes out of Commander Gardiner and his successors, and
historical fiction writers have tried to tell the tale of the redoubtable “Jemmy Button,” with
mixed results.107 Given the disquiet among Stanley residents and their British colonial
governors, it is important to remember the Keppel Island settlement as an unjust use of
power. The missionaries’ removal of the Yámana and the commercialization of their unpaid
labor defied post-abolition anti-slavery laws.108 Therefore, it behooves us to rethink the socalled “massacre at Wulaia” as a legitimate uprising against abusive conditions.109
Perhaps the most tragic irony from this legacy is that the historical fact of the Keppel
Island settlement has worked to silence the possibility that there was a pre-colonial
indigenous population in the archipelago. Whenever arrowheads, canoes or middens are
discovered in the Falklands, the immediate assumption is that the Yámana taken to Keppel
left the items, dismissing the idea that they might be artifacts of an earlier era. The presence
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of Natives at Keppel thus strengthens the settlers’ claim that Europeans were first to occupy
the islands. The Falkland Islanders may have been insulated from much of this ugly history in
Stanley. The settlers considered themselves more “civilized” than either: (1) what some have
described to me in racist language as the “little downtrodden savages of Tierra del Fuego,
running around in guanaco skins”; or (2) the misguided Anglicans trying to “save” them. But
the story of the South American Missionary Society is inseparable from the settlers’
narrative.110 As they expanded their domain westward, the settlers modeled sheep farming
stations after the Keppel settlement, and while it is now uninhabited, some Islanders are eager
to convert the island into a tourist destination to showcase both cultural heritage and
biodiversity.111 Even though the colonial government expressed discomfort with the forced
removal of the Natives, by aiding and protecting the missionaries, the Islanders and their
British trustees were ultimately complicit with the systematic kidnapping at Keppel.
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Figure 12 Source: “Pathos and Providence: Captain Gardiner and Missionary Partners, South America’s
Martyrs by Starvation.” 1960. n.p.: Evangelical Union of South America. Personal collection of Author.
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CHAPTER 2: ENCLOSURE

Introduction
Falkland Islanders rest their contemporary claim to British sovereignty on the modern liberal
notion of self-determination, but they defend their desires to become an energy producer
through adherence to a broader notion of “self-sufficiency.” In order to eke out a living and
ultimately gain profit on the remote colonial frontier, British settlers have embraced tropes of
“resourcefulness.” In turn, this political economic concept inflects how the settlers assert a
shared cultural heritage and sense of place. Toward a more comprehensive understanding of
extant property relations within the islands, this chapter analyzes historical transformations in
enclosure and improvement of the commons.
These concepts are grounded in theory developed long before British colonization of
the Falklands/Malvinas by classical liberal political economist John Locke. Written in a time
of great political and social upheaval in late seventeenth-century England, Locke’s (1964
[1689]) Two Treatises of Government argues that the rights of use, preservation and
sustenance, i.e. labor, are the distinguishing factors for the appropriation of parts of the
commons. In paragraph forty of the chapter “On Property,” Locke reasons that it is “Labour
indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing… the improvement of labour makes
the far greater part of the value” (Locke 1964, 296). Enclosure and improvement of land, as
well as consumption of its natural goods were based, for Locke, on what is properly one’s
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own, according to ownership of the laboring person and duties to the moral authority of
God.112 Locke thus naturalized property without deriving it from consent.
Problems arise in the Two Treatises, though, when Locke locates the abundance of his
imagined state of nature geographically in “America.” With an eye to the situation of the
Falklands/Malvinas, it is interesting to note, as political philosopher James Tully (1993) has
shown convincingly, that this move exposed a hidden agenda in Locke to rationalize English
colonialism. Given Locke’s introduction of appropriation without consent, his theory on
property served as a justification for the dispossession of American Indians and their land by
slave traders and planters. Tully acknowledges that Locke’s liberal theory may have
conditioned the possibility for American Indians, if recognized constitutionally as sovereign
property owners, to oppose tyranny i.e. unjust government (Tully 1993, 175).
Nevertheless, Locke’s vision of America in a state of nature both dismantled
American Indian political organization as non-self-governing and deterritorialized the land on
which they dwelled, by deeming it uncultivated terra nullius.113 This agricultural norm gave
land perceived as being “un-improved” the false moniker “waste,” making it available for
appropriation through British imperial conquest and occupation (Tully 1993, 163, 156).
Through domestic enforcement of the Enclosure Acts and Game Laws, as well as global
strategies of accumulation by dispossession, British estate owners used this seemingly benign
laissez-faire ideology to expropriate rural peasantries, control women’s bodies and extract
common resources.114 Even without encountering a precolonial indigenous population in the
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Falklands/Malvinas, then, British colonialists had already privileged themselves for
naturalizing land rights without consent, based on Locke’s liberal understanding of property.
To grasp more fully the significance of the Islanders’ property relations for their
emergent bundles of rights claims, it is important to consider the historical stages of
dominion and ownership that have changed over time in the Falklands/Malvinas. This chapter
will examine how property, particularly in the rural Camp of the islands, has undergone
various transitions of monopolization and subdivision of land. As I will describe, the settler
colonial property regime has ranged from: (1) a usufruct cattle frontier founded on debt
bondage; (2) a feudalistic absentee-owned system of community sheep ranches; and (3) the
current system of privatized small family farms. Throughout this history, enclosure has taken
various forms, from cattle corrals and sheep fencing to land subdivision. I argue that while
colonial administrators have continually sought to make settlers “self-sufficient,” the ways in
which Islanders appropriated the improvement concept have fluctuated from paternalistic
dependence on the Colonial Office and the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) on the one hand,
to a surprisingly subversive project of mutual aid on the other. To conclude, I examine three
aspects of livelihood—energy security, horticulture and the barter system—which speak to
the Islanders’ liminal status between an ideal type of rugged individualism, and a more
collaborative form of improvement.
An anthropological approach that conceives territorial property not just as ownership
and rights over pieces of land as objects, but rather as a process of relations between and
among persons and soil, is helpful here for trying to articulate the basic structures of social
rank linked to land inheritance and social status given to residence (Malinowski 1935;
Gluckman 1965). This way, rather than speculating in a Lockean mode of analysis about
rights to cultivation and extraction, we can begin to draw meaning from historical and
ethnographic moments of “clan” objectification and obligation, through a broader

77

understanding of consubstantiality between chained and unchained things.115 To borrow
Katherine Verdery’s (2003) innovative framework for rethinking the decollectivization of
socialist property in Eastern Europe, this chapter is therefore guided by two questions: (1)
How were property relations constituted historically on the Falklands/Malvinas; and (2) How
are they currently being reconstituted politically? Tania Li’s (2007) The Will to Improve is
instructive for using such anthropological methodology to make Lockean property ideologies
strange. Based on fieldwork in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, Li found that by rendering
political contestation “technical,” colonial and neoliberal development programs were
actually constituted by that which they exclude. Improvement—not just the enlightenment
idea of human progress, but principally the commitment to make labor productive and land
profitable—is a social force that collapses contradictory claims to belonging and indigeneity.
Drawing on this theoretical orientation, this chapter examines how shifting ethics of
enclosure and improvement have justified the extraction of wealth and resources in the
Falklands/Malvinas. My aim here is neither to tell a moral success story about the British
“gentlemen” who spread the gospel of improvement to grow commercial markets (Hancock
1997), nor is it a strict historical materialist origin story about how capitalist property
relations in the Falklands/Malvinas should be traced back to English agrarian reforms (Wood
2002). The present study suggests, rather, that in some respects settlers fulfilled the hopes of
British colonial administrators to craft a colony of self-sufficient individuals, yet in other
cases the Islanders customized the improvement doctrine as a solidary struggle against
monopolistic control over land.
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Corrals: Specters of the Gauchos
During my fieldwork in Stanley, I spent most weekday mornings at the Jane Cameron
National Archives, where I had a three-hour window to squeeze as much meaningful
historical data as possible out of stacks of colonial reports and letter books. There, I also met
Lynn, a senior local historian responsible for various historic preservation projects, including
the previous iteration of Stanley’s tourist museum and a booklet on the presence of corrals
and gauchos in the islands. Noticing my avid interest in the minutiae of the islands’ colonial
past, particularly cross-regional phenomena like corrals, she informed me of her most recent
hobby: cataloging unrecognized “built heritage” sites in the Camp.
To get a better sense of what this research entailed, Lynn invited me to her house in
Stanley. I rode my bicycle over one afternoon and found in her possession a compendium of
human-made turf walls, stone corrals and other sites. Lynn restricts her study to all terrestrial
areas outside of Stanley because one of her frequent collaborators is already in the process of
publishing volumes on Stanley and maritime history. Starting with a topographic map, Lynn
divided the islands neatly into twenty-nine sheets, each forming a section of a book project.
Together with her husband and two other Islander couples, Lynn had combed all corners of
the islands by Land Rover in order to identify corrals, shanties, “try pots” (large casks for
boiling penguins down for oil; see Chapter 4), unmarked graves, ruins of farm buildings,
stone enclosures, whale skeletons, and other sundry artifacts. In addition to taking photos and
marking their maps, Lynn and her team also record the GPS coordinates of structures. When
the sites are too hard to reach, they enlist the NGO Falklands Conservation (FC), the FIG
Public Works Department or friends to take geodata bearings. Upon her request, I too
provided Lynn with photographs of a human-created “chasm” that served as a moat to
prevent sheep from going onto the beach on Carcass Island.
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Raised in a fully analog environment on one of the remotest islands in the
archipelago, Lynn marvels in the technological capabilities of her computer’s digital
software. She devoted a digital folder to each of the twenty-nine sections of the islands
containing geographical references, descriptions and footnotes. But most fundamental to her
project is Google Earth software, which Lynn uses not only to mark points collected from onsite observations, but also to search for visual evidence of new sites from satellite images.
Before the digital era, Lynn’s team would just walk into the FIG Mineral Resources
Department and ask for aerial photographs to find places of interest. Now, a vast array of GIS
coordinate push-pins cover the satellite image of the islands’ landscape on Lynn’s
customized Google Earth map, each with a specific title, e.g. “Swan Inlet small corral.” I
watched Lynn, as though in a trance, with her eyes glued to the screen, push and scroll her
mouse to zoom in on the satellite image, wait for the resolution to improve, and then squint to
see if she could make out any possible sign of a turf corral. She has found a number of new
sites thanks to this method; Lynn told me that she could do this forever, despite the
considerable costs.116
The rapid expansion in development due to oil exploration, including new laydown
yards and roads, has brought urgency to Lynn’s project. For those looking to build, she plans
to identify and publish built heritage sites in an open access document that will be available
publicly on the local museum’s website. Lynn hopes that this record will influence the FIG
Historic Buildings Committee to protect more structures—or at the very least restrict
Islanders from pulling rocks out of corral walls to fashion makeshift barbecue pits. Lynn’s
effort may not be in vain. Having gained a reputation as the local expert on corral ruins, she
has already had construction workers call her to seek permission, for example, to bulldoze a
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mound of turf to build a road. When she looked up the GPS coordinates and found that the
site was a turf corral dating from before the permanent British occupation of 1833, Lynn
convinced the foreman to redesign the road so that it would squiggle around the perimeter
instead.

Figure 13 Built Heritage project materials. Author photo.

Lynn’s devotion to her hobby raises questions about the role of cultural heritage and
patrimony in claims over sovereignty and property (Collins 2011): Why would a Falkland
Islander, who vehemently supports British sovereignty like nearly all of her local peers, be so
interested in preserving artifacts, such as corrals, which the Argentine government cites as
evidence of their prior occupancy and “usurpation”? In fact, Lynn is more interested in pre1833 artifacts than relics of the 1982 British war victory. She periodized the project so that it
would only cover sites erected before the start of the military conflict, and she is equally
interested in recording vestiges of the French and Spanish settlements, as well as that of Luis
Vernet. As evidence of her impartiality, Lynn pointed to her record of a turf rectangle at
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Sussex Farm, which she suspects served as an early prison for the Spanish colony or Vernet’s
settlement.
Lynn was not the first Falkland Islander I had encountered who decried Argentine
aggression and simultaneously obsessed over South American gaucho culture and history. On
my first visit to Camp, a retired sheep farmer, Dallas, noticed me inspecting the two coats of
sheep’s wool hanging in his yard and invited me into his shed. There, he confessed his labor
of love: crafting horse riding gear out of leather in the style of Rioplatense gauchos. With
palpable pride, Dallas demonstrated his skills of threading together intricate whips and saddle
attachments. From the outside, no one would have suspected that the interior walls of this
quaint British-style sheep farmer settlement house would be lined with gaucho adornments.
This was not his only secret: Dallas said that his most important item is the stool he sits on to
do his leatherwork. Lifting his seat cover, he revealed that it was full of Budweiser beer cans.
He insisted that I have one, and we discussed his nostalgia for living off the land and getting
around by horseback. Having grown up in England, he confessed that when he took the job as
a shepherd in the 1960s, he thought the Falklands were in Scotland! Over fifty years later, he
not only feels that he belongs in the islands, but, given his passion for gaucho heritage, he has
grown a strong affinity to South America, as well. While he expresses contempt for
Argentina and its government, he holidays regularly in Chile and Uruguay, where he attends
rodeos and meets other horse riding gear aficionados.
Corrals and gaucho heritage provide a reminder of what the islands might have been
like if they had not become a British colony. The French and Spanish introduced livestock to
the islands in their temporary settlements of the late eighteenth century. When the Spanish
left the islands unattended in 1811, feral cattle flourished throughout East Falkland Island. As
I discussed in Chapter 1, this provided a new source of “wild” cattle, which merchant Luis
Vernet viewed as an exciting business opportunity. Again, after Vernet had acquired usufruct
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rights to cattle on East Falkland Island (Isla Soledad), the work of making horse-riding gear,
such as lassos and saddle pads and constructing corrals were included in this contract.
While Islanders do downplay or distort occasionally the Rioplatense origin of the
islands’ social habits and customs, there is no denying the important place of gaucho cattle
herding in the country, and the corrals mark that legacy. In Stanley’s archives, one can find a
quite detailed inventory of the corrals and structures of Port Louis, a project that a group of
curious year nine Islander pupils carried out in 1991. One gets a clear sense of Vernet’s
vision for land tenure: he sought to cut up the settlement into relatively equitable lots in
harmony with natural boundaries like Pig’s Brook, while still consolidating larger tracts for
wealthier colonists willing to help populate his colony.117 Branching out beyond the
settlement at Port Louis, Vernet divided the territory into eleven sections, constructed five
corrals, which dot the landscape of Isla Soledad. The chain of corrals facilitated the killing of
5,553 cattle between 1826 and 1831.118 The corrals were designed to capture cattle by
“volteada”: a method of coaxing wild cattle by driving them into an already tame herd.
However, the gauchos’ captain Simon instructed his peones to hunt cattle using lassos
instead; this less efficient method subjugated the gauchos in a system of debt peonage.119 (It
is also what Gaucho Antonio Rivero cited as the principal motive behind his insurrection, in
addition to the general panic after the USS Lexington’s destruction and unfair payment in
worthless paper currency.)120
As we will see, the introduction of wire fences and Scottish shepherds would eventually
displace the gauchos, even after more of them were recruited when the British took control of
the settlement in 1833. But corrals remain present throughout the islands, as vestiges of the
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peons and their relations with the land. They also conjure Vernet’s vision for a prosperous
colony built on the export of wild cattle (and potential fishing and sealing). Under formal
British colonial rule, a firm Lockean private property ideology would all but evacuate the
islands of Vernet’s conception of usufruct rights and ultimately dismantle the gauchos’
frontier pasturage regime, as well, a familiar story that resonates throughout the New World.

Monopolizing the Colony: the Falkland Islands Company (FIC)
Subsequent to British settlement, the aforementioned English merchant Samuel Fisher Lafone
caught wind of the islands’ potential riches, apparently through direct correspondence with
Vernet.121 Based in Montevideo, Lafone owned and managed a number of estancias and
saladeros (cattle ranches and salting facilities). Seeking to expand his business, he bought
exclusive rights from the first British Colonial Governor Richard Moody (1842-1848) to the
wild cattle in the southern peninsula of East Falkland and adjacent islands in 1846 (the same
date as the Enclosure Acts in England), marking the first moment of formal land
expropriation and enclosure under British rule.122 This area is still known as “Lafonia,” even
though Lafone, himself, never actually set foot on that land; he managed it through a local
agent as an absentee landowner.
In 1850-1852 Lafone established by Royal Charter the Falkland Islands Company
(hereafter, FIC), in which he became a major shareholder.123 The company was ostensibly set
up to persuade British settlers to populate the colony as partners. However, like Vernet,
Lafone was principally a businessman. His prioritization of ranching over colonization
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Colonial Report of 1846, Governor Richard Moody, March 9, 1847, JCNA.
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“Some Account of the Falkland Islands. To which is added a Preliminary Sketch for the Formation of a
Company, to be called The Royal Falkland Land, Cattle, Seal and Whale Fishery Company, London.” JCNA,
Governor’s Library, 1949 [1850]. See also Blue Book for 1852, Governor George Rennie, January 8, 1853,
JCNA.
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underscored what would become a durable tension between and among three social forces:
(1) the FIC and other absentee landowners’ drive for revenue; (2) the British colonial
government’s administration; and (3) occupying settlers’ immediate concerns with political
stability and economic subsistence.124
Merchant George Thomas and his brother John Bull Whitington, as well as colonists
John Markham Dean and Captain Robert Christopher Packe, formed rival clans in opposition
to the FIC for rights to land, cattle and salvaged shipwrecks.125 To edge out the opposition,
Lafone’s brother-in-law John Dale, the FIC’s first Colonial Manager, recruited and imported
new groups of gauchos from South America to tame and kill wild cattle. Colonists
refashioned the corrals that dotted the landscape into physical stakes for making claims to
frontier territory in the Camp.126 To establish its local headquarters, the FIC erected a now
iconic stone corral in Darwin, the islands’ first main settlement outside of Port Stanley, in
1859.127
FIC managers built up the company’s work force, but delayed supplementing labor
with enclosure and cultivation of land.128 Due to the lack of shelter in the great plains of
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See Rennie, letter to Grey, February 6, 1850, JCNA, G/4 (Bernhardson 1989, 292–292A); Rennie, letter to
Pakington, September 7, 1852, JCNA B/8. For details on small capitalist competition for grabbing land, see
Moore, despatch to Newcastle, July 26, 1860, JCNA, B/11; Moore, despatch to Newcastle, March 8, 1862,
JCNA, B/12. See Bernhardson (1989, 320;323;337) for a thoughtful discussion of the dynamics of the local
“elite” class during this period, who other than FIC managers, did not hold very much land.
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Dean and Packe would have more influence locally, while George Thomas Whitington was more invested in
making commercial interests in the Falklands dovetail with colonization efforts elsewhere. See G. T.
Whitington, 1834 Prospectus of the Falkland Islands Association, AGN VII, Doc. 129, series 2-3-4.
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In a report to London, FIC manager James Lane wrote in 1862, “…our Sheep extend now over the whole
Choiseul Sound District viz from our leased District No 8 to the Government reserve at Swan Inlet - & that there
are Shepherds Houses & corrals erected at Mackinnon Creek, Teal Creek & at Swan Inlet River, North of
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November 24th, 1862, JCNA.
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Lane Despatch 25, July 26, 1859, JCNA. Having focused mainly on the East Falkland Island, colonists did
not settle the other large West Falkland Island or other western “outer islands” until 1866 when James Waldron
claimed 87,000 acres at Port Howard. See The West Falklands, History of Farms and Farmers, Dean/Chorley
Collection, JCNA.
128
Relatively small enclosures had provided initial “proofs of progression” in agriculture in the early stages of
the colony, but it would take decades before this practice became common throughout the islands. Blue Book of
1851, Governor George Rennie, February 25, 1852, JCNA. According to FIC manager James Lane, as of 1858,
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Lafonia, they found that cattle and their pastures had “deteriorated.”129 Corrals, sod walls,
gorse hedges and weekly rodeos helped to confine wild cattle to some extent, but there were
tremendous gaps in boundaries, and frequent disputes over killing cattle ensued.130
Ultimately, the FIC’s cattle venture struggled to meet its goals, instead ushering in a
monopolistic land tenure regime focused on sheep farming. As I discussed in Chapter 1,
parallel to this shift in livestock, the FIC recruited shepherds from the Scottish Highlands and
elsewhere in Britain to displace the South American gauchos. In 1867 the FIC’s outlook
brightened when, under the direction of Colonial Manager Frederick E. Cobb, the company
hired Wickham Bertrand of New Zealand, as Camp Manager. Bertrand helped Cobb to solve
the islands’ scab disease, which had prevented sheep from growing wool (see Chapter 7).
Wool then became the staple commodity on the islands, as wild cattle became virtually
extinct. The sheep population increased from 65,000 in 1870 to a peak of 807,000 in 1898.131
Along with the improvement in agriculture came more expansive practices of
enclosing land with hundreds of miles of wire fences. Fencing kept sheep from dispersing,
which caused scab infection and pasture degradation. The material for fencing was costly, so
while enclosure propelled the FIC, it exacerbated uneven development for smallholders.132
Installing fences was also hard work, as one laborer, writing under the penname “El
Vagabundo,” described in this poem submitted to the January 1913 issue of Falkland Islands
Magazine:

the FIC did not have a single grass enclosure, and “The words 'cultivation' & 'enclosures' were a signal for
laughter.” James Lane, Despatch 4, November 11, 1858 and Despatch 15, March 14, 1859, JCNA.
129
Dale, despatches to Directors of Falkland Islands Company, 1852-1853 (Bernhardson 1989, 313–315). See
also Lane Despatch 30, September 28, 1859, JCNA.
130
See e.g. Lane Despatch 28, August 11, 1859 and Lane Despatch 113, November 24, 1862, JCNA. For a
description of the weekly rodeos to keep herds tame, see Blue Book of 1860, February 12, 1861, JCNA.
131
Guillebaud (1967, 4;15).
132
For a breakdown of fencing costs, see Lane, Despatch 24, June 27, 1859 and Lane Despatch 38, November
29, 1859, JCNA. See also Bernhardson (1989, 414–415; 461).
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“At The Making of the Fence”
Most men sticks to dead things, said things, read things,
Bits o’ people’s lives an’ never thinks o’ life themselves;
But I am all for seen things, green things, clean things,
Things you see in ships an’ not in books on musty shelves.
I wish I lived in old times, bold times, gole times,
Times o’ Enry Morgan w’en ‘c sailed the Spanish Main;
I’d go a-buccaneerin’, veerin’, steerin’,
An all me crew a-cheerin’ as they ‘eaved the moorin’ chain.
An’ the diamonds would be chinkin’, blinkin’, winkin’,
In the blazin’ sunlight streamin’ through the ‘atches cracked an’ worn;
While the crew would all be boozin’, snoozin’, carousin’
An’ the Jolly Roger flyin’ at the mizzen ‘acked an’ torn.
But there aint no use desirin’, firin’, admirin’,
Longin’ for the drinkin’ an’ the fightin’ an’ the fun;
So I swings me bloomin’ ‘ammer, slam’ ‘er dam’er,
‘Ere comes the boss (Gawd cuss ‘im!) ‘an me job aint ‘arf begun.
Longing for the earlier days of colonialism before the entrenchment of the FIC, “El
Vagabundo” curses the onerous work of enclosure. Seeking a fresh start, many smallholders
and workers like this one began migrating to Patagonia during this period. Among those who
stayed in the islands, new forms of enclosure and private property refined the Islanders’
speech habits: sheep fencing introduced a new series colloquial terms (see Appendix B).

Figure 14 Sheep shearing competition. Camp Sports West. Photo by Charlie Stuart.
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Making Settlers “Self-Sufficient”
While it certainly played a key role, enclosure alone did not suffice for the British to establish
a profitable colony. Empire-building, virtually from scratch—in a landscape without trees—
required that the ground beneath one’s feet serve as the primary source for social
reproduction. Converting the land into a resource meant adaptation and improvement of the
soil. Thus, unlike their Spanish counterparts, British settlers would extract abundant peat for
heating fuel, and vegetable garden plots were some of the only traces of the initial temporary
British settlement of the 1760s at Port Egmont on Saunders Island.
Governor Moody, who administered the main settlement’s relocation on East
Falkland Island from Port Louis to Stanley, commented extensively on native soil and grass
types. Noticing that the maximum capacity for improvement would derive from the rich soil
and thick plant life of estuaries and valley floors, he guided settlers on how to reuse animal
feces, peat ash and kelp seaweed for manure, as well as the proper ways to till the soil in
these areas.133 Similar to British imperialists elsewhere who propagated notions of the colony
as “the useful garden” (Drayton 2000), Moody encouraged settlers to experiment with
horticulture and cultivation of the native tussac grass (see Chapter 7). Introducing a
temporary lease system of land tenure, Moody envisioned intensive enclosure and
improvement as the proof necessary to attract new settlers and investors to join in the colonial
effort. Nevertheless, with vast tracts of land at the disposal of a consistently sparse
population, reports show that uncontrolled grazing was ubiquitous throughout the islands for
many years to come (H. Munro 1924; Guillebaud 1967, 18–24). Viewing the land as a literal
loan, one outside consultant described the settlers’ laissez faire stocking regime as “drawing
on their principal as represented by the soil and pasture” instead of prospering off of their
“interest” (H. Munro 1924; Bernhardson 1989, 508).
133

Moody despatch to Stanley, April 14, 1842, cited in Bernhardson (1989, 242–243; 250).

88

Relatively slow to adapt land for durable pasture, settlers acted promptly to breed
more profitable livestock. Farmers had imported sheep from “The Plate” or Río de la Plata in
South America, which were of course introduced previously from Europe. Still, British
colonial administrators marked this stock as a racially inferior Mestizo (mixed) variety. To
“improve” the South American sheep and yield higher rates of profit from their fleece and
flesh, settlers crossed the animals with “hardy” English rams.134 With the shearing shed as
their laboratory, settlers used wool bales as petri dishes for experimenting with different
breed combinations. In 1860, a quarter of the colony’s 8,000 sheep was of a “pure” English
breed, which British governors boasted about as having been a “profitable flock,” “admirably
adapted to the climate.”135 One bullish governor asserted that crossing the Mestizo sheep with
Leicester breeds doubled the fleece weight, and increased the value of wool exponentially.136
After the FIC accumulated and bred up to 40,000-50,000 of such sheep by the early 1870s,
smallholders imported fewer Ríoplatense sheep, and instead began to source the majority of
their stock internally from the company.137
Once wool from “improved sheep” became a staple commodity, British colonial
administrators felt adequately prepared to assess the colony’s potential for more independent
growth. Here, capitalist agrarian improvement was a gauge for the settlers’ “self-sufficiency.”
In 1867, one governor wrote with cautious optimism, “It is not, I hope, unreasonable to
anticipate that this Colony, improving as it is in many important aspects, will eventually
provide by local taxation for the maintenance of a modern establishment, and cease to be a
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Governor T.S.L Moore, Blue Book of 1857, JCNA. See also Lane despatches No. 3, November 10th, 1858,
No. 21, June 14th, 1859, and No. 38, November 29th, 1859, JCNA. Colonial administrators and FIC managers
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superior attributes of the English “Cheviot” or “Southdown” breeds. Late nineteenth- and twentieth century
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Blue Book of 1859, January 28th, 1860, and Blue Book of 1860, February 12th, 1861, JCNA.
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Governor D'Arcy, Colonial Report of 1872, March 22nd, 1873, JCNA.
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Governor D'Arcy, Colonial Report of 1871, JCNA.
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burden on the mother country.”138 On the one hand, administrators such as this one cited
improvement as scalable value, worthy of further assistance from Imperial Parliament. On the
other hand, loyalty to the UK and its property ideology reproduced dependence on
government aid for further colonial improvements and many private enterprises.139

Mutual Improvement
Through the establishment of a General Improvement Society, Governor George Rennie
(1848-1855), a sculptor by training, attempted to mold the settlers into a more independent
collectivity. To demonstrate confidence and skill in adapting the soil and climate, the Society
initiated what would become a long tradition of an annual horticulture show. Rennie
distributed twelve allotments of one acre each for “the working classes to build on or
cultivate gardens.”140 Gardening of root vegetables and select leafy greens caught on among
Stanley residents, eliminating the need to distribute food rations to settlers. Remarking on the
Improvement Society a decade later, Governor William Robinson reported:
European vegetables thrive exceedingly well. The Falkland Islands Improvement
Society (a Society recently formed for the encouragement of market-gardening)
held its first meeting in April last. I never saw, in any part of the world, finer
potatoes, turnips, cauliflowers than were then exhibited. Every house in Stanley
has its plot of garden ground attached, and, owing to the number of vessels that
call here during the year, the cottages find a ready and profitable sale for their
surplus produce.141
In this sense, by becoming more self-sufficient, individual households would appear to have
fulfilled the imperial promise of a Neo-Europe (Crosby 1986). This was not a modest “From
each according to their ability, to each according to their need” arrangement, for, beyond
providing for themselves, improvement laid the foundation for capitalist development. With a
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surplus of fresh produce, Islanders were able to sell further provisions to the booming ship
supply business amid increased traffic from the California gold rush before the US
transcontinental railroad was completed.
However, this entrepreneurial spirit made settlers feel stifled by the limits of growing
produce or raising livestock on their own properties. In 1859 thirty residents of Stanley
petitioned for a commonage ordinance that would provide a more egalitarian distribution of
land and access to grazing and pasture on the Government Farm.142 Moreover, in Camp,
discord between managers and laborers sharpened. Employers viewed plentiful gardens as
evidence that workers were spending excess time and capital on horticulture at their
expense.143 Sensing the mounting pressure from opposition in Camp, managers ridiculed their
workers and rejected grievances. They dismissed shepherds as idle, overpaid and tardy.144
By 1889, the government-led General Improvement Society had rebranded itself as
the member-run Stanley Social Club and Mutual Improvement Association. The club
continued to put on horticulture shows, and in 1890 the friendly competition extended into
the annual Sports Week in Stanley and Camp, consisting of rural recreation, including sheep
shearing, horse racing, dog trials, peat cutting, foot races and other events. (The Sports
Association still holds such festive events each year at the end of the shearing season, in
which the author sheared his first sheep, pictured in Figure 14.)
Yet, here the focus was no longer on the individual self, but rather on the collectivity.
At the turn of the century, settlers started to understand improvement not just as a process of
making nonhuman animals and land interest-bearing, but also as a moral and political project
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of mutual aid. In their weekly meetings, the Mutual Improvement Association read a series of
papers, lectures and debates on such topics as: “compensation,” “mutual improvement,” “our
civilization,” “universal disarmament,” “the unemployed problem,” “socialism” (on multiple
occasions), “reform or socialism,” and “socialism-what is it?” (the latter discussed
Malthusian theories on overpopulation, comically in such a thinly peopled territory).145 The
mutual improvers congratulated each other on efforts to help the poor and young with
subsistence provisions, all while privileging British moral standards of etiquette over the socalled “wicked” “Gaucho propensities” of the earlier era of “barbarism.”146
The general “can-do” ethic of the emergent working class influenced improvements
not just to private landholdings, but also public works in Stanley. With a newfound sense of
urgency, government and residents developed roads and sanitation, water supply, the
construction of a jetty for the general public, compulsory education and a savings bank.147
Nostalgia for this era is on display in the newly opened Dockyard museum in Stanley. Images
depicting sheep shearing and dipping, lamb-marking, gathering, peat and agriculture
development have descriptions like “living off the land,” “resourceful” and “practical.”
Whether they were self-sufficient or mutually supportive, the modern settlers would remain
dependent on the FIG, and increasingly, the FIC.

“Company Islands”
In addition to owning and enclosing up to nearly half (46%) of the land in the islands, by the
mid-twentieth century the FIC had established a monopoly on wool trade, shipping, retail,
chandlery, banking, accommodations and entertainment (Guillebaud 1967, 12–13;
Shackleton KG PC OBE 1976a, 1:333–334). Through this hold on production, distribution
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and consumption, the FIC had overpowered the local British Colonial Governors in local
influence. Acquiring the West Store in Stanley, a one-stop shop for nearly any everyday
necessity, the company reconfigured the port village as a company town, and the islands
more generally as a company colony. Journalist Ian Jack put it succinctly in 1978 (M. Wright
2006, 20):
The men of the camp….live in tied houses on company land. They shop in the
company store for goods delivered by company ship, and have bills deducted
from company wages. Many of them use the company as a bank, the wool
they shear from the company sheep goes to Tilbury, again by company ship,
where it is unloaded at the company wharf, stored in the company warehouse
and sold on the company wool exchange in Bradford. By means of
directorships and shareholdings, and by owning the only means of transport
and marketing the Falkland Islands Company extends its influence over the
islands’ few other landlords. For better or worse, the Falklands are company
islands.
With even more widespread influence in Camp than in Stanley, the FIC built schools and
stores, screened movies, established a network of horse-riding traveling schoolmasters, and
redistributed rent-free housing and pensions for life with thirty years of service. Even though
most FIC profits were paid to absentee shareholders in the UK (86% from 1919-1938, for
example), the firm would remain hegemonic locally until the late 1970s (M. Wright 2006,
21). FIC ownership changed hands in 1972, when Dundee, Perth and London Shipping took
the firm over, and when Charringtons fuel and oil company acquired it a year later in 1973,
but few changes to operations occurred until the 1982 war.
While landed property, sheep farming and the overall economy would become more
diversified in the 1980s and 1990s—as I shall explore in the next section—many Islanders
still see the FIC as their “biggest offender” for over-exploiting labor and resources. Despite
their expansive social programs, one elderly former FIC employee remarked, “I didn't get
nothing out of them—only what I pinched—and I wasn't the only one. Even some of the
bosses were thieves.” For local residents like this one, the FIC remains a “cagey” outside
presence, justifying petty theft. Even though the company’s monopoly has dissolved, giving
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Islanders more opportunities to manage their own farms, the FIC now recruits most of its
labor from countries, such as Chile, St. Helena, Peru, Poland and the UK, for two-year
contracts. While they are contented to be free from the shackles of the company, xenophobic
members of Stanley’s white working class view the new multicultural FIC as a different kind
of threat.
I discussed some of these local dynamics with Larry, the FIC’s director who is also
the head of the Falklands Chamber of Commerce. Born in Hong Kong, educated in the UK,
and having lived in South Africa, Larry practically embodies the British Empire. Explaining
where he feels he belongs, Larry started to say, “I don't have any…” and then corrected
himself: “home is here for me. I've been here since 1986. It's the longest I've been anywhere
in the world…I found my way down to the Falklands on a three-year contract, and basically
stayed here.”
An imposing presence, Larry is gregarious, bordering on bombastic. He is a far-right
Thatcher-Reaganite who is not afraid to speak his mind. Larry boasted of being quoted by the
BBC, comparing the Falkland Islanders to Palestinians under siege. Taking on an almost
accusatory tone, he lambasted Americans’ lack of moral principles for not supporting the
Islanders’ self-determination claim. When I asked him about the similarities and differences
between the way the British handled Hong Kong and the Falklands, he thought about it for a
few seconds and then pinched his pale cheek and said “yellow skin.”
At one point in our conversation, the phone rang. Larry told someone the name of a
specific part that needed to be ordered. I was surprised that Larry is responsible for such lowpriority matters, but he explained that the phone he answered gets passed around, so it just
depends whose week it is. This signaled Larry to give me a breakdown of the current division
of labor by race in the islands (see Chapter 3). He explained, “We have sort of rules on who
you're going to give [phone] credit to. The general rule is, a born and bred Islander, no
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problem. Person with PRP [permanent residence] settled from the UK, no problem. St.
Helenians, not usually a problem. Chileans, settled here, married here, not usually a problem.
Chileans on work permits, a large problem. They tend to come and then leave with the
device…they buy so much a month and then they disappear.” Ironically, shortly after our
meeting, born and bred Falkland Islander construction workers were convicted of a series of
burglaries. Moreover, many Falkland Islanders consider it unethical to shop at the FIC’s West
Store because it generates profit for absentee shareholders.
Nestled into the company’s warehouses, Larry’s office is isolated but far from
luxurious. Papers are spread out, layered all over his desk. When I visited, his secretary was
absent, as were chunks of the wall, exposing electrical wiring. A humble headquarters for the
forceful director of such a historically dominant institution, the office speaks to the awkward
way in which the FIC was unseated in the islands’ power structure.
Although the FIC does not hold as much agricultural land as before, Larry confirmed
that the company still has fairly extensive holdings around Stanley. A “land bank” of about
400 acres positions the FIC advantageously as a local agent for supporting oil exploration
with space for development of storage facilities and the elusive potential deepwater port in
Port William. As I describe in the Chapter 5, the FIC also won the contract to supply labor
for the construction of oil infrastructure, through the joint venture. Among other things, this
kept the FIC pitted against Islander-owned shipping agents and fishing companies.
However, in contrast to the early years of the company when the British colonial
government kept the FIC in check through penalties on killing cattle, today Larry considers
his relationship with the locally-elected FIG Legislative Assembly “very positive.” He
considers the UK-appointed Chief Executive “one of his best friends.” Larry rejects the idea
that today the islands are a company town—now the pie is bigger. There are fewer squabbles
with the private sector, and Larry characterizes himself as an advocate against monopolies in

95

the islands. “I believe in free trade. We should free things up rather than restrict peoples’
ability to do things,” Larry said. He does not want the FIC to be a “dead hand” on the
Falklands, as Islanders have viewed it in the past. And he points out that there are a number
of locally-owned companies that make more money than the FIC does, particularly in fishing.
Ultimately, Larry sees the Falklands’ private sector and government as being “all in
the same boat,” united geopolitically in opposition to Argentina. To illustrate the FIC’s role
in the sovereignty dispute, Larry recounted his trip to Ushuaia in Tierra Del Fuego. When he
announced he was from the Falklands, his receptionist gave him a hard time, but
accommodated him anyway. In the hotel restaurant, he ordered the best bottle of wine
available. He was delighted that the waiter put on white gloves to serve him, and with the
exchange rate, the bottle only cost £10. However, to avoid controversy, Larry was put on a
separate bus tour from other guests. The tour guide passed by Ushuaia’s central Malvinas
memorial without mentioning it, but Larry would not miss the opportunity to be a gadfly.
When the guide told him that Ushuaia was founded in 1870, Larry countered that the
company he works for was founded long before that in 1850. Waiting for the guide to ask
which company it was, he responded proudly “The Falkland Islands Company.”

The Shackleton Reports and Subdivision of Land
While I discussed broader impacts of the war above, in the islands, the most immediate
outcome of the war was a large-scale break-up of the monopoly on land by the absentee
landowners of the FIC into plots owned by individual families. In 1976 the UK Government
sent a survey team to the Falklands, made up of researchers from The Economist Intelligence
Unit and other FCO affiliates, chaired by Lord Edward Arthur Alexander Shackleton. Son of
the famous Antarctic explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton, the chair was a geographer and Labour
Party politician. The results of the survey were three comprehensive volumes (including an
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updated 1982 synopsis immediately following the war), outlining the islands’ economy,
resource prospects and strategies for development (Shackleton 1976a; 1976b; 1982).
Adopting the tone of colonial reports in other British territories, the studies describe locally
born Islanders as “the indigenous ‘kelpers’” (see Chapter 3) or even the declining
“indigenous stock” with whom new would-be settlers would have to avoid friction.148
Yields of profit from FIC wool exports had also declined, and Shackleton warned of
the “grave danger of regression to a primitive form of land utilisation as practised during the
early phase of colonisation based on wild cattle” (Shackleton 1982, 3:60). In order to
eliminate stagnation and prevent a return to the ostensible anarchy of gaucho culture, the
reports outlined, among other recommendations: potential improvements of grassland and
breed, and the establishment of new rural education programs for more efficient sheepfarming methods. All three volumes, including the report published after the war, indicated
that offshore resource exploitation in particular would require cooperation with and even the
participation of Argentina, so before pursuing fishing or oil licensing in earnest, the reports
suggested a “radical” land tenure reform program for wider ownership and reinvestment of
profits (Shackleton 1976b, 2:46–47; 1982, 3:9; 96). At the time of the surveys, Islanders ran
only ten farms, representing 4.8 per cent of total area, as family businesses. Moreover, only
three out of the ten were owner-occupied.
Shackleton viewed enclosure as a necessary precedent for improvement of the colony
and its land. Drawing on previous reports that pointed to fencing as a primary means of
pasture renovation and improvement (e.g. Wannop 1961; Davies 1971), Shackleton’s team
considered the impacts of ploughing, rotating, sod-seeding and over-sowing on various soil
and grass types. Concerned that the interests of distant monopolistic shareholders may not be
appropriately attuned to local knowledge and experience, the reports recommended breaking
148
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up large company-managed community ranches into small family-run farms. Shackleton
described Camp managers as “paternalistic,” and attributed “the relatively low level of
enterprise and engagement of the indigenous population” to internal “dependence” of the
working class on the government and FIC (Shackleton 1976a, 1:76; 80–81; 1982, 3:41).
The General Employees Union, formed in 1943, had negotiated a Camp Wage
Agreement, which established a minimum wage, piece rates, adjustments, long-term awards
and an unusual bonus system (based on the price of wool rather than productivity). But the
now-ubiquitous practice of contracting professional gangs for sheep shearing for four-five
days, two-three times per year, had just begun to erode the rural working class. Shackleton
viewed this flexible labor supply of shearing gangs as a sign of progress. To enhance
contract-shearing with a more intensive system of sheep farming, the reports promoted a
titling process administered through a Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organization
(QUANGO) that would increase private property ownership for occupants through the
dissolution of community farms (Shackleton 1982, 3:16).
Falkland Islands Governors Goldsworthy (1891-1897), Allardyce (1904-1915),
Middleton (1920-1927), Henniker-Heaton (1923-1924; 1935-1941) and particularly Cardinall
(1941-1946) had each crafted plans to diversify the islands’ economy and subdivide land
decades earlier.149 However, all failed to persuade either London or the FIC. Echoing many
of these earlier policy drafts, the UK parliament received Shackleton’s report with more
serious concern in the context of the islands’ stagnant wool economy, and, of course, the
British war victory.
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Governor Allan Wolsey Cardinall developed an especially fascinating “revolutionary” Utopian plan to
transform the islands into a rural society modeled on Danish cooperatives. Governor Alan Cardinall, despatch to
Viscount Cranbourne, February 2, 1942, CSO 8/42, JCNA, discussed in Bernhardson (1989, 579–587); Tatham
(2008, 140–141).

98

Figure 15 Source: “Map Showing Farms on Falkland Islands, 1936.”
http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/falkland/falklands1936map.htm.
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Recommendations from Shackleton’s first two reports went into force before the
conflict with Argentina. In 1979/1980 the FIC sold its Green Patch settlement on East
Falkland Island, an experimental farm built in the 1920s, to the FIG. The FIG then divided
the farm into six sections, each sold at a subsidized price to a family of settlers (Shackleton
1982, 3:30). In 1981 government bought Roy Cove, a farm on West Falkland Island, for
subdivision. Subsequent to the 1982 conflict, the following farms subdivided: Fox Bay East,
Dunnose Head and Port Howard in 1983; San Carlos in 1985; Fox Bay West in 1986; Port
Stephens and Teal Inlet in 1988; and Port San Carlos in 1989. Finally, in 1992 the FIG
purchased Goose Green, North Arm, Fitzroy and Walker Creek from the FIC (Pompert
Robertson 2014, 207). The displaced working-class farm employees, who did not gain
ownership of subdivided land, moved to Stanley, migrated externally or bought relatively
small, unclaimed islands in the archipelago.
The Port Stephens subdivision was the only farm privatized through an employee
buyout rather than government expropriation and sale. First purchased by the Dean family in
1869, the farm became an FIC settlement in 1945, and it is now managed by a family whose
residence there dates to 1909 (Pompert Robertson 2014).150 The settlement is the farthest
southwest on West Falkland Island. In the main settlement house, a plaque with a Disney
cartoon “goofy” character hung on the mudroom door, welcoming visitors to God’s Own
Country. The owner explained to me that when he was giving orders to one of his workers on
the farm, they asked him “who are you? God?” And he replied, “Yes, I am God and this is
God's Own Country.”
Unsurprisingly, this divine manager viewed the subdivision as the inevitable result of
unsustainable labor costs and the strengthening of British trade unions, including that of the
islands, in the 1970s. Selecting his closest in command, he divided the 250,000-acre, 50,000150

See The West Falklands, History of Farms and Farmers, Dean/Chorley Collection, JCNA.
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sheep farm into five sections (his was somewhat larger); each was stocked evenly with
10,000 sheep. While the FIG usually provided mortgages for subdivisions, in this case the
FIC financed it.
Since the end of absentee ownership, the government has crafted policy promoting
greater differentiation in the scale and size of settlement farms. Some Islanders reflect that
the subdivision of land sacrificed “settlement culture” for an ineffective economic model. In
the privatizing shift away from FIC monopoly, the FIG encouraged instead what it called an
“enterprise culture” (Gurr 1996, 24). However, Bernhardson (1989, 685) points out that by
conceding ownership of pastoral land to “native Islanders,” tenure reform actually restored
the nineteenth-century geographical formation of settlement.151 The difference was that as in
enduring latifundio systems that continue to operate in other export-oriented economies, the
debt peonage of the initial cattle herding period became inverted, now with a shortage of
labor rather than bosses (Edelman 1992, 96).
According to some of my interlocutors, the subdivision transformed the Falklands
more than the war, itself. It brought about a significant change in how people view the land,
for in the 1970s most Camp residents did not own a patch. Absentee landowners owned
roughly 90% of 36 farms. Inversely, about 90% of the now-97 farms are locally owned
(Pompert Robertson 2014, 208). The new land-owning middle-class status group of small
farmers supplemented the subdivision with new techniques of enclosure, including wind and
solar-powered electric fencing, as well as mechanized shearing, shepherding with motor
bikes, and a new abattoir.
Under the new self-regulated property regime, rural to urban migration toward
Stanley has decreased the Camp population substantially. For example, Port Stephens’

151

See Bernhardson (1989, 466) for a map of smallholders, and Bernhardson (1989, 652) for a map of the
subdivision.
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population went from forty-two to four (Pompert Robertson 2014, 210). Moreover,
privatization was only partial. Even though it had sold all of its farms by 1992, the FIC still
held mortgages. Along with the emergent QUANGO Falkland Islands Development
Corporation (FIDC) (and now Falkland Landholding), the FIC would remain a leader in the
private sector for financing leases and loans and subcontracting public works. During my
fieldwork in 2014, the FIG was crafting a Rural Development Strategy that incentivizes
settlers to start businesses in Camp with tax breaks, but the prospects of wealth from oil,
fishing and tourism continued to draw Islanders into Stanley.
Lafonia’s all-but-abandoned landscape now bears the ruins of the FIC settlements:
Telephone poles installed for bare wire wind-up phones, spots where sheep grazed at fence
corners, sod or steel shelters built for them to avoid hypothermia and clumps of gorse which
served as miniature corrals for gauchos. In remote settlements one discovers areas to stack
peat or pile ash, empty dog cages, dilapidated dip yards and sheds for hanging mutton or
milking cows, as well as the signature “palinkey” (from the Spanish palenque, a wooden
frame used to hang mutton or beef carcasses. See Appendix A).
From the Goose Green settlement, one of the largest of the former FIC Camp
settlements near Darwin, a boggy path between minefields leads to Bodie Bridge, the world’s
southernmost suspension bridge. It once connected the vast farms of Lafonia to the FIC’s
original headquarters for wool production. Long abandoned, the bridge is now falling apart.
While visiting contract workers delight in taking the risk to venture across it on weekend
adventures, local residents view this as trespassing. Although Lynn’s registry of built heritage
products has not yet come into force, and the bridge is not preserved as an official monument,
Islanders are seeking to protect ruins of their settler colonial past that suspend British
sovereignty in the present. Toward a conclusion to this chapter, the next three brief sections
explore aspects of livelihood in the Falklands that throw light on the contemporary
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significance of self-sufficiency and mutual improvement: energy security, horticulture and
the barter system.

Energy Security
As I have noted, early British settlers of the Falklands fueled their colony on peat. Cutting,
storing, drying and burning peat remains quintessential to the Islanders’ assertion of “selfsufficiency.” Having participated in peat-cutting competitions in Camp, I learned firsthand
that marking straight lines with one’s spade to create even bricks, and then heaving and
stacking the thick blocks into neat piles for drying is quite strenuous work. A cubic yard of
the dense, dripping wet mud is generally understood to weigh roughly a ton, and some
Islanders have been known to harvest as many as 100 cubic yards in a day (10 yards per night
would be more typical).

Figure 17 Peat cutting competition, Camp Sports West. Author photo.
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Despite the considerable effort, some households continue to use peat over other fuel
sources. While diesel, kerosene and wind now generate the vast majority of energy
consumption in the islands, those who grew up with peat stoves still hover around the kitchen
at house parties, leaning on electric stoves out of habit. Efforts to commercialize the islands’
peat plenty date back to 1872, but the trade never took off.152 To accumulate enough turf to
heat their homes and cook food, they built giant walls of the carbon-rich stuff. A stark
example of uncontrolled resource exploitation was the pair of disasters that struck Stanley in
1878 and 1886. When the massive peat banks uphill from town released to cover entire
neighborhoods in so-called “peat slips,” two people died and several buildings were
destroyed. Nonetheless, peat production became significant to Falkland Islands cultural
heritage (as evidenced in the terms listed in Appendix C), and while Islanders began
mechanizing peat extraction, hiring a “peat boy,” or using diesel in the mid-twentieth century,
some still prefer to dig into their own property to warm their homes.153
In 1971 a Joint Statement on Communications between Argentina and the UK put the
peat energy regime, and its connotation of self-sufficiency, under threat. The agreement made
it possible for Argentina’s national oil company YPF to begin supplying hydrocarbon fuel to
the islands from September 13, 1974. YPF swiftly established a monopoly on fuel imports,
and Islanders increasingly drove vehicles instead of riding horses. Many began replacing
their peat stoves with gas heating systems. To some Argentine observers, the fuel supply
chain symbolized the hope of closer political relations with the Islanders.154
Of course, the 1982 war banished YPF from the islands, opening up the opportunity
for a homegrown fuel supplier. In 1987 a firm called Stanley Services took over the
monopoly on oil supply in the Falklands, and it has now grown to include a lodge and
152

Governor D’Arcy, Colonial Report of 1871, February 27th, 1872, JCNA. See also “The Commerical Value
of Peat,” Falkland Islands Magazine, August 1895, JCNA.
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“Peat Fuel: its Manufacture and Use,” Falkland Islands Magazine, July; September 1905, JCNA.
154
A. Betts (1987); Gleyzer (1966); Bonomi (2014).

104

upscale restaurant/hotel, an automobile dealership, a satellite TV service and shipping and
tourist agencies. The director of Stanley Services, a keen local history buff, is first to admit
that he descends from an early settler who participated in the “extermination” of the
Selk’Nam people in Tierra del Fuego. Behind his desk is a painting of the ship on which his
great grandfather arrived, the Fair Osmond; a photo of the Ocean Guardian drilling rig, used
to discover Sea Lion, the islands’ first commercial oil field, flanks his other side. Selfidentifying as a subaltern—“Native,” “Benny,” “Sourdough” or even “white Negro”—he has
called the Falkland Islanders the “luckiest working class people on earth” (see Chapter 3;
Livingstone 2012). He is an active investor in the oil exploration projects, admires rags-toriches US American capitalists like Andrew Mellon, and is deeply suspicious of the UK FCO
whenever politicians “stiffen their backs” on the sovereignty issue. In some respects, Stanley
Services was founded in order to counteract the historically feudalistic, UK-based FIC. This
company is designed to run like a cooperative, with 45% ownership by government. It gains
not much more than 2-3% revenue, primarily from bunkering fuel for ships.
To complement peat and gas in the years after the subdivision, each Camp settlement,
as well as Stanley’s power station, also acquired wind turbines. This was a long time coming,
for as Governor D’Arcy reported in 1871, “The general impression is that the winds of the
world are concentrated in and about the Falkland Islands.”155 Islanders took an interest in
generating electricity from wind energy as early as 1920, and a study was undertaken in the
mid-1950s (Shackleton 1976a, 1:283).156 Farms routinely used diesel generators for just 6-8
hours a day when necessary, but this was inefficient; combining the diesel with wind
powered backup batteries allowed for 24-hour electric power in Camp. After a series of trials

155
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Governor D’Arcy, Colonial Report of 1870, April 21st, 1871, JCNA.
Falkland Islands Magazine, March 1920, JCNA.
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among self-funded individual residents, the FIDC secured and administered a grant scheme
from the European Union that covered 61% of the first round of costs during installation.
In the current crisis over climate change, one might perceive the drive toward
renewable energy as a sign of environmental awareness and progress in the Falklands. Indeed
FIG publicists amaze visiting diplomats by showing them how six turbines near Stanley
power 40% of the town’s electricity, and how most farms consume an average 80% of their
power from wind. But for most Camp residents, the introduction of wind turbines has had
much more to do with a cheaper, higher standard of living than the values of nature
conservation. Wind power should ideally save 60-80% of fuel, but with 24-hour power,
farmers began using more electricity: they bought TVs, computers, knitting machines and jet
boilers. Islanders used to do laundry on windy days so that it could dry more efficiently on a
line; now they clean clothes on such days for the ample electricity available from the turbine
to power their tumble dryer.
Going from peat to oil and finally to wind has thus changed the Islanders’ analogical
reasoning about energy consumption. While those who have switched entirely to gas and
wind are saving themselves a significant amount of the time and mess involved with cutting
peat, they are consuming more energy cost. This may call into question the benign
environmental impact of renewables. Apart from the brief period of dependence on
Argentina, however, the Islanders’ perception that they are energy self-sufficient is relatively
unwavering.

Horticulture
In 2013, the horticulture show happened to coincide with the referendum week. Journalists
from the Argentine newspaper El Clarín were present to film and interview participants. The
show featured tremendous vegetables divided into various sections with prizes like “most
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outstanding of the potato classes.” One side of the Church hall was devoted to cut flowers,
home produce (jams, marmalades, chutneys and pickles), eggs, butter and other dairy
produce. Across the end of the hall was a bounty of home produce—baked breads, cakes,
biscuits and savories. Along the other wall were the decorated cakes (a main attraction), as
well as a children’s section, and of course vegetables. There were something like 43 different
categories of vegetables, ranging from white potatoes to red potatoes to purple potatoes and
potatoes with red eyes. Finally, at the far end of the hall were pot plants, including herbs.

Figure 18 Horticulture show, Stanley. Author photo.

Despite this impressive array of plants and foodstuffs, participants grumbled that it
had been a difficult year. No thanks to the history of excessive grazing, the perennial trouble
for horticulturalists is that the soil is such poor quality. A successful garden must possess not
only good soil but also shelter, which is probably more important than anything with the
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extreme winds. Before the emergence of poly tunnels or greenhouses in the past 10-15 years,
residents located their gardens under gorse hedges. The catch is that if one puts a garden by a
hedge, the gorse consumes most of the soil’s nutrients, so one has to use more manure, more
water, and so on.
Noticing the settlers’ propensity to garden and save against the odds, one of the key
recommendations given to the UK after the 1982 war was the commercialization of vegetable
production (Shackleton 1976a, 1:45). Initially, the idea was that the presence of a more
permanent garrison would offer a new consumer base. Owned and managed by a particularly
vocal Islander who lost an eye in the conflict, the market garden Stanley Growers now
provisions small cruise ships and the occasional oil exploration crew with “ultra fresh”
veggies, as well as supplying fishing vessels with stock of “a reasonably high standard.” UK
“expats” and others in town decry high prices for local residents, but the islands’ remoteness
makes produce, particularly that which is imported wholesale, more costly.
Before the war, the islands did not have the abundance of frozen vegetables that they
enjoy today. Woody, an especially cheerful organizer of the horticulture show spent decades
honing his gardening skills in Camp, first at Hill Cove on the West and later at Goose Green
on East Falkland. As a 16-year-old boy, his first pay package was roughly £69 per month,
which was the lowest wage rate among shepherds. Yet, his store bill for three months was
just £4.40. Far from austere, Woody ate well off his garden, and now that he has moved to
Stanley, he considers himself more “self-sufficient” than most of his neighbors. Rather than
buy something out of the freezer, he prefers to pop out to his garden for a fresh carrot or
turnip.
Barring disaster, and notwithstanding the occasional glut of cabbage, Woody can keep
producing fresh vegetables all year. He explained, “It's part of the Falklands way of life. It's
tradition. Because you can buy whatever you want whenever you want, and food products are
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getting so much better than they used to be with technologies improving for freezing things
and drying things and putting things in tins and bottles and bags…but people will still grow
their own. Which is good you know. It would be a shame to see it all die out and have
nothing to talk about.” Indeed, competition is high and much debate surrounds the rules of
categorization: is rhubarb a vegetable? How big of a pot should be used for herbs? What kind
of manure is the winner using? Horticulture thus not only serves an economic need but also a
social desire.
The Horticultural Society is also less insular than it once was. It has an active
Facebook page geared toward recruiting audiences or new members. Woody pointed out that
the “tradition” is no longer exclusive to white settlers. He observed that one of the first things
that recent “Chilean imports,” i.e. migrant workers, did when they arrived in the Goose Green
settlement was to plot out a garden. Moreover, the communication between and among town
and Camp settlements is more fluid. While years ago there were always enough horses, cows
or sheep to provide ample manure, fewer livestock remain near Stanley. Woody explained,
“If you want a ton of manure from Goose Green, you can get it for a case of Carlsberg
[imported beer]—a ton of shit for a case of Carlsberg—and I don't drink Carlsberg, so I say
it’s trading shit for shit.” Self-reliant horticulturalists have also taken up composting.

The Barter System
Trading beer for manure may seem humorous or unremarkable, but it is a clear example of
the unofficial barter system that has long been prevalent in the Falklands since the early
twentieth century interest in mutual aid. Islanders work their own home gardens and view
their unlikely vegetable growth as complementary to their defiant self-determination claim
against Argentina (as well as material proof against alleged dependence on the UK). But, in
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addition to providing for themselves as individuals, most multi-generational Islanders use a
non-monetary reciprocal gift exchange system to support one another.
Debts for favors are frequently settled through a gift of animal meat. I first observed
this custom when my host on the outer Saunders Island invited me to accompany him by boat
to Hill Cove on West Falkland Island to pick up some dog food. A man in a Land Rover was
awaiting our arrival on the coast, and after exchanging a few words, but no money, he gave
us the bag of dog food. In return, my host unloaded something mysterious under the cloak of
a tarp. I asked him later what that was, and he told me it was “meat that we killed”—a
mutton.
A couple of items deserve further analysis from this transaction. First, how does one
kill meat? Rural Islanders tend to refer to animals destined for slaughter, as this one was just
a day earlier, as “meat.”157 The predetermined label of mutton or beef for living, breathing
animals precedes the action of killing, thus indicating that settlers speak in terms of usevalue. And yet this meat was not meant for immediate personal consumption, nor did it go
through the same estranging process of commodification as other animals sent to the islands’
abattoir for export and potential profit. Rather, it was a gift—an inalienable form of wealth
imbued with the value of a debt owed—much like the kula shells or potlatch blankets that
people tokenize and exchange in noncapitalist economies that anthropologists have observed
in numerous other societies.158
Now, if this farmer had been truly “self-sufficient,” then why not just feed the mutton
carcass directly to the dogs? A bag of dog food may be more caloric and can likely last longer
than mutton, but this is beside the point. The mutton was never payment for the dog food, in
the first place. It was a gift in exchange for the action of the man in the Land Rover. My host

157
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On the distancing of meat and animal and the relation between sheep and imperialism, see Woods (2015).
See Malinowski (1922); Mauss (1950); Weiner (1985); Strathern (1988); Graeber (2012); Gregory (2015).
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ordered the dog food online. It got its way to West Falkland Island by international freight
and inter-island ferry, and the neighbor drove it across the island in his SUV. He likely
received other items for himself or others in his settlement, and brought the dog food along as
a favor.
This arrangement, which Falkland Islanders refer to as “the barter system” is akin to a
“moral economy.” That is, peasant collective actions that have alleviated subsistence crises
throughout history, and now transnationally.159 The difference in this case is that the Islanders
are farmers who own their own property, as well as the means of production. They participate
for the most part in capitalist enterprises, such as tourism and wool trade. While it may not
constitute resistance to market forces, the Islanders’ barter system has its roots in the notion
of mutual improvement that earlier generations of working class shepherds took up to
challenge unequal access to land and unjust exploitation of labor.
Some residents lament that with the wider distribution of cash from fishing, oil and
tourism, the barter system may be disappearing. But as David Graeber (2012) has shown
convincingly, the common notion perpetuated in classical economics textbooks that barter is
an origin from which market economies evolve naturally is a myth. In the Falklands, I have
observed that while mutton or lamb may not be swapped as frequently as it might have been
earlier (at one point in time, meat gift deliveries by plane were announced on the radio for
unsuspecting residents), such exchanges have actually proliferated in different forms—
including but not limited to a case of beer. If one leaves her car in a Camp settlement
overnight while visiting friends, there is a fair chance that it will be filled up with gasoline in
the morning. Residents created a Facebook group called the “Falkland Islands Bring & Buy,”
a forum comparable to Craigslist, where they can make inquiries or post household items,
such as clothes, books or toys for sale. (Most, but not all, postings in the group do have a
159
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price.) Finally, with limited bandwidth, Islanders do not have the luxury to stream videos or
music online. But most residents have a cable and wireless plan that provides free nighttime
Internet service from midnight to 6am. Little to no local laws enforce against possession of
pirated media, so many Islanders set their computers to download torrents of videos during
the off-peak hours. They then hold parties or informal gatherings in which attendees
exchange multiple hard drives full of entertainment media. While these iterations of the barter
system may depart from the idea of a moral economy as a way of addressing food shortages,
the spirit of mutual improvement remains in tact. Cash might make it easier to order things
overseas, but within the archipelago, Christmas party invitations stand in for money.

Figure 19 Gift of mutton. Author photo.
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Figure 20 Dog food. Author photo.

Conclusion
The above three modes of livelihood demonstrate that Falkland Islanders continue to pivot
themselves between the Lockean ideology of individualist self-sufficiency on the one hand,
and a more collaborative understanding of improvement on the other. Apart from a brief
period of dependence on Argentina’s national oil company in the 1970s, the Islanders have
sought to demonstrate energy self-sufficiency by generating local power from peat, gas and
wind. Similarly, to ensure food security Islanders have built a competitive tradition around
horticulture. Through the establishment of a moral economy, a barter system has enhanced
subsistence provisioning. These dynamics speak to the ongoing relevance of historical
practices of enclosure and improvement outlined in this chapter.
Corrals, built primarily before the permanent British settlement, remind us of an
initial cattle frontier settlement based on usufruct rights to land through debt bondage of
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gauchos. Despite some continuity after British occupation, the cattle venture declined, and
the dominant colonial FIC developed a different paternalistic land tenure system focused on
sheep farming. Despite widespread enclosure through sheep fencing, uncontrolled grazing
prevented the improvement of grasslands. Experiments in sheep breeding sustained the wool
trade, but colonial administrators’ efforts to make the settlers “self-sufficient” clashed with a
working class reappropriation of “improvement” as mutual aid. Nonetheless, the FIC enjoyed
a near-total monopoly on production, distribution and consumption in the islands, which
endured until a dramatic subdivision of land following the 1982 war.
The Islanders’ adaptations of a British imperial property ideology contrasts with
Argentina’s inherited Spanish normative order of state ownership over subsoil. These
contradictory principles sharpen the opposition between self-determination and territorial
integrity in the sovereignty dispute. The Argentine government asserts national sovereignty
over the full South Atlantic continental shelf, as though its symbolism were self-evident. But
the history and politics of property within the islands demonstrate that the settlers have used
ongoing material practices of enclosure and improvement to stake their claim to British
sovereignty through self-determination. If a resolution to the dispute is ever to be reached, it
is imperative that we understand these inherent contradictions of property relations.
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INTERLUDE | FORCED ENCLOSURES

A grim reminder of the 1982 war, apart from the British and Argentine cemeteries, is the
series of 117 minefields embedded in the Falklands’ rolling landscape. In fact, a cemetery on
West Falkland Island was, itself, mined, in addition to a water source, a corral that doubled as
a public barbecue area, and sandy beaches that penguins inhabit. To fortify their occupation
of Stanley and Camp settlements, the Argentine military planted some 15,000-20,000 antipersonnel and anti-tank mines in 1982 (some estimate up to 25,000). Falkland Islanders claim
to have witnessed Argentine helicopters randomly scattering mines, but the Argentine former
colonel responsible for mining contends that they were mapped out according to grids, and
that some may have been put there by the British.160 As a precaution, vast swathes of land are
fenced off with red signs warning “Danger Mines” with a white skull and cross bones
symbol; these signs have now become an iconic merchandise item sold to tourists in
Stanley’s gift shops. Venturing outside of Stanley, one has to watch where she steps and
make sure that she never sees the back of one of these signs.
Falkland Islanders told me that since they are so well marked, the minefields have
actually had a surprisingly positive impact. Minefields have effectively closed off areas of the
countryside that had been overgrazed, and they have helped to conserve rare wildlife because
birds are too light to set off the explosives, and humans or livestock are restricted from
entering and disturbing their habitats. Islanders have even extended “minefield” fencing
beyond areas of known mining in order to assist in conserving neighboring habitats or to keep
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people from poking around their rubbish dumps. An FIG councilor told me, “It is important
to understand the philosophy of Falkland Islanders about minefields because we never
typically call for the clearance of minefields on the grounds that we know that it is
monstrously expensive, it's dangerous, they're all fenced off, so they're safe.” There has not
been an accident in the Falklands other than from people trying to remove them. And
Islanders point out that there are several places around the world where peasants and children
are losing limbs from scattered mines, for example in Egypt, Iran, Angola, Afghanistan, Iraq
or Cambodia. Falkland Islanders insist selflessly that these are the areas that should be
prioritized for mine removal, and even that if the UK has money available to put toward
demining that it goes to those areas where there are genuine humanitarian considerations.
Even though Falkland Islanders have grown accustomed to being surrounded by live
explosives, free from imminent danger, the UK is responsible for removing the mines in
accordance with the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Every
few years the British government issues a tender for contractors, who recruit cheap labor
from around the world with the necessary certifications, to do this unenviable job. Early on,
the so-called “de-miners” were Lebanese, but for the last several seasons, the teams of
workers have come from Zimbabwe. Stanley residents have made the Zimbabweans feel
especially welcome. Islanders have taken de-miners into their homes, and in at least two
cases they have even sponsored those wishing to stay to be permitted to rent homes and take
up more secure lines of work.
My field research in the Falklands coincided with periods of mine clearance. I could
hear the explosions detonate in the evening, and I met several of the 42 de-miners at public
events in town like a flea market in the Town Hall. I kept up with one of them through email, and after their contracts expired, I got to know the former de-miners who decided to
stay in the islands permanently. Shingai became friendly with Falkland Islanders by playing

116

football (soccer). One of his teammates who runs a local flooring company offered him a job
as a carpet layer; he also works evenings as a waiter at the fine dining restaurant in Stanley’s
swanky hotel, the Malvina. He decided that he liked being in the Falklands, so he sent for his
family, including a wife and three children. Shingai’s best mate Joseph who was also part of
the team of de-miners, decided to stay, too. He works in the FIC warehouse, and is arranging
for his family to relocate to the South Atlantic, as well. They volunteer in Stanley’s Fire
Brigade and have even represented the Falklands as athletes in the Island Games and
Commonwealth Games. Islanders point to Shingai and Joseph as model immigrants: proof
that anyone, regardless of race, class or ethnicity, who works hard will be valued and
accepted in the Falklands.
De-mining in the Falklands is especially difficult because even if the mines were laid
out on a perfect grid, the peaty land or sandy beaches allow the location of the mines to shift
considerably over time. Moreover, the explosives left in the Falklands are minimal-metal
mines, making them challenging, if not impossible, to detect. Shingai and Joseph are
therefore extremely methodical in following a specific process. Shingai explained that there
are at least three ways in which they were trained to do de-mining: manual, mechanical, or
animal-assisted (usually involving dogs). In the Falklands, they did both manual and
mechanical mine removal. The machines they use have chains that are powered to hit and
destroy the mines to a depth of 20 centimeters. Because of the shifting terrain of the
Falklands, the majority of the mines are deeper than this, so in order to ensure that 100% of
the mines are cleared, the work has been primarily manual. This involves calmly and
cautiously digging 1.2-meter trenches, at least 20 centimeters deep, in 4-6 rows a meter apart,
according to a pattern laid out in the original maps provided by Argentina’s military.
Shinghai walked me through what goes through his mind when he is digging for explosives:
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So it's normal, but it's a cautiousness. It's building it up. OK, I'm conscious of
what I'm doing; I know what I'm doing. I know what I have to do. This is it.
First thing's first, I have to be safe, and the other person will be safe, and
everyone will be safe. And that's how we do just go like that. Simultaneous.
Simultaneous, like it just happens. You just know the moment that, you just
focus on your job and you just get on with it. And you know you want to do
it, and you actually do it if you want to. But if you feel you're not ready that
day, you have to say: I'm not ready to go into it.
As they dig and clear 1-meter lanes, the de-miners lay chains and rope to mark
where they have been. With their hands in front of them, they slowly sift through
rocks and dirt. If they feel something, they place sticks around the edges, and when
they get to the mine, wherever it is, they actually hit it from the side (not the top!).
“The moment you hit it, you actually forget about it,” Shingai said. After chipping
away enough soil to feel resistance, the de-miners place a ribbon on it and continue
digging with a trowel to excavate the mine. Finally, they use an electro-jet to
detonate the explosive with what is essentially another explosive, and retrace their
steps with the mechanical method.
Shingai and Joseph entered into de-mining through careers in security. After three
months of training and another three months on the ground, they served in rapid response
teams, clearing mined war zones and border areas. Zimbabwean de-miners are deployed in
Mozambique, the Central African Republic and elsewhere. Despite the high risk of physical
harm and low pay, these jobs are highly selective and sought after among Zimbabwe’s
surplus population of unemployed workers. Nonetheless, the travel and stress take their toll.
After returning from Afghanistan in September 2010, Shingai decided that after fifteen years,
he was tired and had nearly had enough. He wanted a steady job that could support him to be
with his family each and every day. At this conjuncture, he got a three-month contract to do
de-mining in the Falklands in early 2011 for £450 per month. He said to himself, “OK, I'll
just go there for 3 months, get my money and… stay with my kids [in Zimbabwe].”
However, there was no steady job for Shingai in his home country. The 2011 contract was his
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second trip to the Falklands and, having already met Islanders through pickup games of
recreational football, he inquired about job opportunities and sure enough his teammate had
one for him, enabling him to stay. What is perhaps most remarkable is that as a floor-layer,
Shingai’s skills transfer amazingly well: who could be more precise and meticulous working
on the ground than a mine-removal specialist?
Shingai and Joseph miss Zimbabwe. “We have people starving…but it’s still one of
the most beautiful places,” Shingai said. Fresh produce is far less expensive or grows more
easily; unfortunately, they cannot afford buying tomatoes and carrots and do not have their
own gardens in Stanley. On a typical weekend night, Shingai will finish his shift at the
Malvina restaurant and chat with his extended family over Skype video from midnight until
6am, while it is both daytime in Zimbabwe and off-peak hours for free internet in Stanley. He
sleeps during his days off. Shingai and his family live in one of the early settlers’ original
houses, a historic building on Pioneer Row. They rent it from the daughter of their sponsor,
an FIG MLA who Shingai considers his “father.”
Beyond a facile critique of white paternalism, how to make sense of this fascinating
instance of an indigenized European settler accommodating a proletarianized African
migrant? Such unlikely kin relations escape Argentina’s family romance allegory of the
Malvinas as hermanita perdida, and they transcend the bifurcated paternalistic ownership
structure between managers and workers in the FIC’s earlier monopolistic regime. Even if the
de-miners face similar challenges to other migrants, which I discuss in Chapter 3, Islanders
told me that they value their “can-do” work ethic: a reminder of mutual improvement.
Furthermore, by doing their jobs, they offer an additional safety valve for the settler colonial
protectorate.
Shingai invited me to have dinner at his house on Pioneer Row with Joseph and his
family. The two de-miners picked me up with Shingai’s two sons, while his daughter and
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wife, Gwen, finished cooking what I did not realize was going to be a feast: trout caught by
Joseph’s coworker, fried squid, beef vertebrae, and most importantly maize meal (grits).
Gwen and Shingai have to order the maize meal to be shipped, which is one of the expensive
compromises of living in the Falklands. After dinner, the men took what was left of the
savory squid into the living room, where the news was on TV, which guided our conversation
to some degree. We talked about paralympian Oscar Pistorious who was on trial at the time
for the murder of his wife. Shingai and Joseph were convinced he was guilty. They said that
the South African judge who is Black should see through the defense’s case about an
intruder, even if it is true that there are break-ins in South Africa. Moreover, they said that the
security of the house was so high that it should not have been possible; as trained security
professionals, they spoke with authority about their trade. When the separate topic of
healthcare was raised, Joseph called privatized healthcare “the mark of the beast” in the
United States, and he quoted the bible. Joseph is very devout. He was raised Catholic, but in
Stanley he goes to the Tabernacle, a Pentecostal Church. Joseph criticized how the
“Falklands Way of Life” is relatively secular; he believes that religious practice provides
discipline that Islanders lack. He drinks, but not too much; eats but not too much; and they
both said that the locals do too much of both.
Shingai and Joseph told me that they are “quite happy” in Stanley. They say it is
quiet, clean, tidy, safe, suitable for raising kids, and everybody knows each other. Despite
having put themselves into harm’s way in some of the most intensely disputed areas in the
world, Shingai and Joseph told me that they do not follow the political drama of the
sovereignty dispute. I asked them what it is like coming from Zimbabwe: another former
colony where white European settlers tried to claim self-determination, yet in contrast to the
Falkland Islanders, white Zimbabweans lost power and 33% of the country’s land when
Mugabe’s “fast-track agrarian reform” began around 2000 (Hughes 2010; Scoones 2010;
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Moyo and Chambati 2013). They regretted elements of greed, but highlighted common
understandings with white Zimbabweans who, they said, “grew up there and have got the
right to say what they want.” As we have seen, this emphasis on local belonging and equal
rights to possession through continuous occupation is consistent with the Falkland Islanders’
rhetoric of self-determination.
One night, when I met Shingai and Joseph at a pub, there was only one other patron:
Norris, a Northern Irish veteran of the 1982 war who returned to the islands and works as a
painter. I had met Norris before, and he had shared horrific memories of hand-to-hand
combat during the conflict. I invited him to join us. Unbeknownst to me, Norris and the deminers knew each other quite well because they work together: Norris paints the houses
where Shingai puts in the flooring, and Joseph coordinates shipment of the building
materials. Interestingly, despite their unanimous agreement about how grateful they are to be
living in the Falklands, and how nice and clean of a place it was, all three complain that
locals are underskilled, chronically hungover and lacking in work ethic (the exact opposite of
the Islanders’ historical values of improvement and self-sufficiency). Norris, Shingai and
Joseph also bonded over extensive experience with war and violence. Norris said that he
“enjoys” war: he cherishes the thrill and immediacy of life or death. Here, the de-miners drew
a significant distinction between what Norris has done and what they have done: they said
that Norris has been in danger, whereas what they do is risky. They downplayed their own
precarity and expressed profound respect for Norris’ ability to stay out of harm’s way.
In sum, by securing the landscape, the de-miners are enhancing the Falkland
Islanders’ territorial dominion. In exchange, the Islanders are opening their settler colonial
protectorate to the de-miners. Falkland Islanders have offered Shingai and Joseph new
lifeways and unprecedented stability. They no longer need to risk their lives in the ruins of
war, and can provide for their families in an agreeable environment. Yet, for now, home
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remains in Zimbabwe, as manifested in the missing components of life in the Falklands: the
longing for kin, dearth of fresh produce and meaninglessness of secularism. As one Falkland
Islander told me, “Not all the minefields are fenced in.”

Figure 21 A team of de-miners (Mercopress 2012).
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CHAPTER 3: PEOPLEHOOD

Introduction
If the Argentine perspectives explored in Chapter 1 viewed the Malvinas as a lost little sister
or the Islanders as estranged cousins, the British colonial land tenure system and the FIC’s
monopolistic regime discussed in Chapter 2 reveal how kin relations between Islanders and
the UK have been somewhat more avuncular. As geographer Klaus Dodds (2002) has shown,
drawing on the work of Paul Gilroy (1987, 51–55), political rhetoric underwrote the Falkland
Islanders’ whiteness as a national cause in the British motherland.161 Thatcher and other UK
leaders spoke of not abandoning “loyal” British subjects, whom they referred to as “kith and
kin,” “our boys” or a comparable “island race” of “British stock and tradition” (Dodds 2002,
2–7; 118–41). In this sense, the UK’s support for the Falkland Islanders in the 1982 military
campaign stands in stark contrast to its denial of former colonial subjects’ rights in other
imperial territories.162
However, this chapter will suggest that even in the Falklands, where the referendum
results show a strikingly monolithic public opinion, contradictory political strategies of the
UK and the FIG have cultivated an ambiguous racialized relationship among settlers. A
contested “people” in the civic arena, the Falkland Islanders may also be understood as a
“self” that is not simply an isomorphic unit, but rather a complex sociopolitical formation
161
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composed of multiple racial, ethnic and national subjectivities. The experiences of Falklands
residents that I explore here reveal a layered, indeterminate social process of self-definition at
work behind the “unequivocal” self-determination claim. Building on Immanuel
Wallerstein’s definition of peoplehood as “not merely a construct but one which, in each
particular instance, has constantly changing boundaries,” this chapter will analyze unstable
and contradictory aspects of class, race, ethnicity and nation in conceptualizations of the
Falkland Islanders as a cohesive social unit (Wallerstein 1987, 379). I argue that the British
colonial government treated the Falkland Islanders first as settlers, but later as subjects, who
have ultimately positioned themselves in the current form of the protectorate, as rightful
British citizens.163
First, I will describe how in response to the settlers’ paradoxical “subjection,” a
conservative, white working-class movement for representation in government took hold,
through the establishment of the Falkland Islands Reform Club. Here, race became articulated
as both a “means” of gaining rights and accumulating capital, as well as a “modality” through
which class is lived (Hall 2002). I will discuss how as white settlers began to naturalize as
“natives,” they protested farm managers importing “alien” migrant labor, and then lobbied
British colonial administrators against any potential sovereignty deal with Argentina. As
Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller (2002) have shown, migration offers a key field of
inquiry for interrogating common instances of ignorance, naturalization and territorial
limitation in methodological nationalism.164 Unsettling notions of peoplehood that rest on a
container model of society, this chapter will therefore shed light on contemporary categories
of race and disenfranchisement. By analyzing struggles over democratic representation and
immigration restrictions in the settler colonial frontier, I will show how categories of race and
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class feature in the type and kind of access to job security and residence available, ranging
from a white “expat” class of political elites to subaltern groups of “undesirables.”
My findings ultimately suggest that the invented sociopolitical entity of the Falkland
Islanders exemplifies what Ann Stoler (2006) has called “degrees of imperial sovereignty.”
That is, variegated scales of difference and allegiance have allowed forms of empire to
endure, even after the era of decolonization. As I will show, the FIG has given such degrees
specific values or “points” in the application process for obtaining permanent residence
permits (PRP). Without the necessary qualifications for PRP, one loses the rights to own
property, build a career, or access guaranteed healthcare. But even with PRP, one cannot vote
until they obtain the final degree of imperial sovereignty: “Falkland Islands Status.” As I
shall explain, full recognition as a Falkland Islander tends to require that one is locally born.
Nonetheless, legal naturalization is designed to comport new arrivants to the “Falklands Way
of Life,” a local allegory comprising intimacy, safety and work ethic that have come to define
propriety in the settler colonial protectorate.

Kith, Kin and Kelper: Becoming White, British and “Native” in the Falklands
Data from periodicals show that at the turn of the twentieth century the Islanders were
governed similarly to colonial subjects in other parts of the British Empire, but with degrees
of white privilege that kept their peoplehood relatively indistinct from imperial
administrators. Once they had spent enough time in the rural Camp, the English and Scottish
laborers whom colonial managers recruited to replace the gauchos were considered to be
similarly barbarous and degraded. Class stood in for race, as proletarianized settlers, “lacking
good manners,” clashed with farm managers. Outside British observers described the settlers
as an unhappy “race of beings” that “ought to be happy,” an “Anglo-Saxon race” or a “race of
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white men” with working-class values.165 One anonymous member of the Royal Navy, who
was stationed in the islands in the period leading-up to the 1914 Battle of the Falklands in
World War I, actually excluded Falkland Islanders from the white race. In his letter to the
Daily Express, entitled “No Civilization Here: A Lonely White Man’s account of a visit,” the
author describes the islands as “a fairly peaceful country, with no savage native tribes.” Yet,
this same “Empire maker” was paradoxically anxious to board the H.M.S. Glasgow for the
“opportunity of seeing civilized white men once more!”166 While the British media racialized
the Islanders as “a rough, uncultivated people” and regarded the islands as a far-flung “little
blob” on the map, the prevalence of racist cultural products, such as blackface minstrel shows
or “red skin village” Wild West Shows within the islands celebrated a white settler colonial
sensibility.167
During the same period as the migration of non-land-owning settlers from the
Falklands to Patagonia, members of the working class who remained in the islands began to
build a domestic labor movement, which also served as a vehicle for advancing white
working-class conservative values. In addition to the Improvement Society explored in
Chapter 2, the Falkland Islands Reform Club, founded in 1887, objected to the lack of
advancement in labor conditions, which members viewed as disproportionate to the rising
profits of the wool industry. Key grievances were the lack of access to credit, perpetuating
debt for store goods, and land redistribution. But the Club’s primary objective was political
representation, through appointment of a working-class Member of Legislative Council.168 In
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spite of the Club’s efforts, the appointed legislators would consist entirely of managers and
elites for many years to come.
Fallow for decades, new iterations of the group appeared in 1920 and 1933 as the
Falkland Islands Reform League, again demanding legislative representation.169 Stagnating
wages, unemployment and precarious seasonal labor in Camp led the Reform League to take
a more militant stance (the FIC London Chairman described it as Bolshevik-type, although
the Governor downplayed any serious disorder).170 In 1940 one member declared: “[T]he day
has arrived when [the worker] knows the value of his labour and demands a fair return for it,
he lives and has lived since the country was first colonized in a state bordering on subjection,
in a mild form no doubt but subjection it undoubtedly is, he is subject to his master’s whims
and fancies…”171 This social class division thus marked the transition from settlers referring
to the UK as “home,” to subjects criticizing managers for “importing” British laborers who
might not be committed to the progress of the colony.
In short, laboring rural settlers gradually came to view themselves as “native”
Falkland Islanders who deserved a right to work and a decent living in “their” country. The
term that came to refer to a “native” of the Falkland Islands was kelper. Alluding to kelp, the
abundant seaweed surrounding the archipelago, “kelper” usually indexes an individual born
in the Islands, though there are exceptions to this rule.172 Currently, this expression is
somewhat out of fashion, but repatriated Islanders in the UK and mainly elderly people
within the islands continue to self-identify as kelpers; Argentines employ it in a derogatory
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way (and some Islanders refer to Argentines in a similar sense as “Argies”). But in the early
twentieth century, “kelper” emerged as a “white ethnic community construct,” through which
locally-born descendants of British settlers began to stake political claims and make
“possessive investments” in the future of the colony.173 This collective awareness of self—as
“kelpers”—became directed outward in the years following the Great Depression, as
Islanders protested against recruitment of labor from Patagonia that might threaten the job
security of “native” Islanders.174 A Colonial Ordinance introduced in 1935 categorized a
“prohibited immigrant” as “any person not being native of the Colony” without the required
papers. According to one governor, the law was designed specifically to protect the labor
market “for the natives of the Colony.”175
The mounting tension between the working-class nativist settlers and their appointed
colonial administrators came to a head after World War II. Even though the signing of the
Atlantic Charter in 1941 had guaranteed the right to self-government, and proposals had been
in place for reformed Legislative Council with locally elected members, many Islanders
resented the delay in effecting these changes, besides government overspending and other
economic misgivings. In 1948, 740 residents of the Falklands sent a petition to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies, demanding the removal of their appointed Governor, Geoffrey
Miles Clifford, as well as representation in government.176 Significantly, the petitioners
pivoted their requests on being a “British community, 100% white, and noted for its loyalty
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to the crown in the past…”177 As Dodds (2002, 118–141) has argued, the Islanders’ claims of
“kith and kin” and “loyal” UK “stock” effectively positioned the settlers as racially privileged
in comparison with other colonial subjects of the British Empire, yet still different from
Argentina. Notwithstanding Argentina’s own myth of national whiteness, which lies outside
the scope of Dodds’ work, as I have explored in the preceding chapters, Islanders developed a
custom of classifying South Americans, including Argentines, as non-native “coloured”
people or “aliens.”178 As in other post-abolition, settler colonial contexts of the Americas, the
“native” Islanders thus chose whiteness—what W. E. B. Du Bois called “a public and
psychological wage” (Du Bois 1998, 700)—aligning politically by race instead of by class.179
Here, the Islanders’ construction of whiteness became both a class formation, as well as an
instrument for asserting settler exclusivity and continued British domination. Islanders used
their racial affiliation as a platform for declaring themselves rightful citizens rather than
colonial subjects, and demanding devolution of degrees of imperial power.180
While the Islanders did gain some unofficial representation in Legislative Council, the
settlers’ racially driven assertions took some convincing. Entering the era of decolonization,
the Colonial Office, which apparently had still never sent a minister to the islands as of 1952,
compared the “native Islanders” to “African or Indian” workers on tropical estates.181 This
inherent contradiction between a British imperial habit of racial classification on the one
hand, and an assertion of essential sameness on the other, is representative of a lasting
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ambivalence in the relation between UK administrators and the Islanders. This imperial
equivocation nearly compromised the islands’ British status, as Argentina pressed the UK on
the sovereignty issue, passing Resolution 2065 in the UN’s Fourth Committee in 1965, which
pushed for negotiations that recognized the Islanders’ “interests” but not their “wishes.”
There followed a steady bilateral negotiation process between Argentina and the UK that
lasted through the 1970s until the breakdown in talks leading to the 1982 conflict.
Meanwhile, the Islanders “wishes” came to the forefront primarily through the efforts
of the emergent “Falklands Lobby.”182 As they had done in the petition of 1948, when the
possibility of a sovereignty transfer arose, the unofficial members of the Falkland Islands
Executive Council urged Parliament to reconsider any agreement with Argentina with a 1968
manifesto, including the prominent assertion that the Islands have “no racial problem” and
lead “a very British way of life” (Dodds 2002, 130). Subsequently, the Falkland Islands
Emergency Committee (FIEC) and Falklands Lobby mounted a campaign to portray the
Islanders as a loyal piece of Britain under threat from outside forces. Within the islands,
Stanley residents held protests, carrying a banner and signs that read “Keep the Falklands
British,” as depicted in a famous October 1968 photograph, which the celebrations following
the 2013 referendum would eventually resemble, published in the Daily Express. The
accompanying article describes it as “a picture not of a crowd – but a people.”183 Later that
same year, Lord Alun A. G. J. Chalfont made a significant visit to the Islands—the first ever
by a British Minister—but his efforts to persuade Islanders to consider potentially beneficial
interests of closer ties with Argentina fell on deaf ears. The Islanders ultimately influenced
London to defend their wishes for self-determination to remain British, despite the Argentine
Government’s intensifying claim to territorial integrity.
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As the Falklands Lobby or United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC)
pushed for political and diplomatic support for the Islanders’ wishes in London throughout
the 1970s, they continued to emphasize the Islanders’ white racial composition and British
national affiliation. Still, the UK government wavered in its interpretation of the Islanders’
racial classification. Lord Shackleton described the Islanders as the “locally born indigenous
‘kelpers’” or, in relation to population decline, as the “indigenous stock,” which he divided
from those coming from the UK on contract.184 At the time, he said that the “indigenous
‘kelper’ stock” represented 77% of the population, and he listed their qualities: “honesty,
versatility, and hardiness; but there is also an apparent lack of enterprise at individual and
community levels, and a degree of acceptance of the status quo which verges on apathy”
(Shackleton 1976b, 2:1; 4). However, Shackleton also emphasized the kelpers’ strong sense
of British identity and said elsewhere in his reports that the islands had points of interest, as
“an isolated archipelago, remote from Britain, and without any indigenous population, settled
by people of British stock; the general ‘Englishness’ of the culture and way of life…”
(Shackleton 1976a, 1:266). This paradox of “indigenous ‘kelper’ stock” without any
indigenous population—among a core of British descendants maintaining an “English” way
of life in the global periphery—demonstrates how the settlers’ transformation from subjects
to citizens remained unresolved in the twilight of the British Empire.
During the period of decolonization, the Falklands Lobby established a Falkland
Islands office in London in January 1977 (now Falkland House), which would eventually
push for rights to political and diplomatic representation, as well as commercial fishing
licensing (see Chapter 4). In 1980, when Islanders perceived FCO Minister under Margaret
Thatcher, Nicholas Ridley, to be “selling them down the river” through a potential
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“leaseback” agreement with Argentina, townspeople in Stanley rejected him in a “bellicose”
manner (J. Smith 2013, 210; Tatham 2008, 439–41). Through furious lobbying, the Islanders
convinced Members of Parliament that a handover of sovereignty to Argentina would amount
to race betrayal by upper-class bullies. As talks with Argentina broke down leading to the
1982 war, the settlers’ reassertion of themselves as both indigenous “kelper” subjects with
the right to self-determination, as well as neglected white British citizens, ultimately earned
them the UK’s steadfast defense. In the following sections of this chapter, I will discuss new
contours of class, status, race, ethnicity and nationalism in the current context of the
Falklands, which have seen successive waves of immigration, intensive regimes of temporary
labor and restrictions on permanent residence or citizenship in the post-war period.

Figure 22 Kelper mug. Falkland Islands Museum Facebook page. Photo by Angela Clark.
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10152863431288690&set=g.202600596533824&type=1&theat
er.
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Figure 23 A less savory mug sold at Stanley’s Victory Bar, featuring a map of South America with
Argentina's national territory painted blue and labeled "Mierda Sea" (Shit Sea). Source: “A Falklands
Saturday.” 2012. Falklands News. February 19. https://falklandsnews.wordpress.com/2012/02/19/afalklands-saturday/.

Protecting Power: Local “Bennys,” Contractor “Expats” & Military “Squaddies”
In spite of nativist immigration restrictions, depopulation caused a significant labor shortage
in the Falklands during the twentieth century. To supplement the “native” labor supply, the
FIC recruited workers from Chile and Argentina in the 1940s, with a subsequent wave that
included Uruguayans in the 1970s.185 Starting in 1980, the FIG started looking elsewhere in
the British South Atlantic Empire for labor: particularly the island of St. Helena. The
establishment of the Mount Pleasant Royal Air Force Base (MPC) following the 1982 war
added not only a permanent garrison of more than 1,000 soldiers, but also a wave of St.
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Helenians for service jobs at the military complex. The St. Helenians have now arguably
assimilated into Stanley more prominently than most South Americans and many British
expatriates (hereafter, “expats”), although the Chilean segment of the population is
increasing. New groups of migrants continue to arrive for work from other locations around
the world, including, for example, the Philippines. Argentine citizens have been allowed to
visit the islands as tourists since 1999. However, after a series of incidents—clandestine film
projects, child rugby recruitment and flag-waving—a group of Islanders gathered 494
signatures in 2015 to petition for stricter limits to free speech, including a ban on Argentine
flags. The relatively few Argentines that remain are primarily spouses of Islanders born in the
Falklands before 1982.186 In what follows, I will discuss how, amid these population shifts, a
new division of labor by racial classification has emerged, and the Falkland Islanders have
scrambled to protect and “preserve” the social and political mores that they have come refer
to as the “Falklands Way of Life.”
The UK’s ambiguous racialization of the Islanders as alternately indigenous or white
British “stock” did not vanish with the war effort. Rather, the construction of a base separated
by an hour-long drive over a dirt track surrounded by minefields only made the distinction
between UK-born citizens and Stanley residents more immediate. The British soldiers have
their own movie theater, bowling alley, bars and restaurants. Besides a relatively isolated
training facility uphill from East Stanley, stationed military personnel whom Islanders refer
to as “squaddies,” usually only come into town for nights out on select weekends. Yet,
through their limited interactions with locals, the military introduced a lasting epithet that has
virtually replaced “kelper” as a vernacular term to index that an individual is locally-born: the
“Benny.”187 Deriving from a character named Benny Hawkins in the British soap opera
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Crossroads, the term was used to stereotype a local resident as comparable to the witless,
backwoods boy, who wears a boiler suit and a wool hat. “Benny” refers to a pervasive white
working-class conservative aesthetic sensibility that blends Scottish and British
Commonwealth distinctions of taste with those deriving from the rural United States, for
example: singing along to Lynrd Skynrd’s “Sweet Home Alabama,” while dancing a “twostep” (also referred to as a “Benny two-step”), a variant of the Scottish Ceilidh. While it is
still considered derogatory if an outsider employs the term, Islanders, particularly of a
younger generation, have now reappropriated “Benny” in an affectionate way in conversation
with one another. Most locally-born Islanders who spoke with me rejected the “kelper” label
and instead self-identify as a “Benny,” as well as “Chay,” “Native,” “Sourdough” or even
“white Negro.” These codes distinguish fellow Falkland Islanders not only from so-called
military “squaddies,” but also set themselves apart from British “expat” contract workers.
Of course, “Benny,” “squaddy” and “expat,” much like the prior ethnic community
construct, “kelper,” are also often indices for whiteness.188 Santiago, a Chilean Spanish
instructor who has lived in the Falklands for more than a decade, has gained an especially
keen perception of distinctions of race and nationality in the islands. He explained, “An expat
is a white person that comes from the UK…to the Falklands to work, especially in
Government and they normally go for two years: ‘contractors.’” Of course, given their small
population, Islanders need foreign skilled professionals, and the Islanders’ degrees of
imperial sovereignty have allowed for a relatively stable pool of such experts and consultants
to be readily available from the UK. Some “expats” stay beyond their contracts, and a few of
them are now elected MLAs.189 Thus, while most Islanders are glad that power has devolved
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to some extent, they do not necessarily aspire to be fully in charge of all aspects of society,
and benefit significantly from the continued formal links with the UK.
Nevertheless, numerous permanent residents who spoke with me also critiqued how
their government administration, including lawyers and judges, consists in large part of
visiting “expat” professionals. Irritated at most contractors’ lack of commitment to the longterm well being of the society, some Islanders called contractors “imperialist transients” or
“breeze-ins.” Governor Colin Roberts observed astutely that unlike before, when Islanders
used to refer to the UK as “home,” now “many Falkland Islanders would say I'm not 8,000
miles away from home. I’m at home, and there is a difference.” It is perhaps significant for an
emergent nation formation that Islanders have begun to refer to the Falklands increasingly as
a “country,” and indeed much governance has devolved to locally-elected representatives. At
town hall meetings, Islanders air grievances about contractors’ perks, such as refrigerators
(“white goods”) provided in accommodations, giving them a higher standard of living than
locals. They mock them for not being able to stand the cold or wind, and for preferring the
posh, bourgeois-bohemian chocolate and wine bar over a rusty, understated pub like The
Rose.190 Misrecognition brings Islanders’ opinions on “expats” into relief: one Falkland
Islander interlocutor was outraged at being labeled “English” in Argentine media—a
common mistranslation glossing white Anglo-Saxons as ingleses. To avoid mistaken identity,
some interviewees introduced themselves to me as Islanders before saying anything else
because based on biologized, ethnic absolutist notions of national British culture, many or
most Islanders could be misidentified as English (Gilroy 1987).191
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The military is not immune to this distanced opposition. Despite deep appreciation for
the UK’s defense and foreign affairs, Islanders I interviewed who also participated in the war
expressed outrage at Argentine accusations of “militarization” in the South Atlantic.192
Despite the degrees of imperial sovereignty, a deep-seated mistrust of the UK FCO dates
back to the negotiations of Chalfont and Ridley. Some Islanders that I interviewed saw the
military presence as too secluded from the rest of society, and condemned how investment in
the community seemed to be decreasing little by little—a process one Falkland Islander
veteran of the 1982 war described as “civilianization.”
Less directly affiliated with whiteness than expats, “squaddies” are moreover not
exempt from racial discrimination in the Falklands. At a foot race competition during Camp
Sports Week, one of three British “squaddies” participating in the one-mile run took the lead.
He happened to be Black, and I observed a farmer in the audience joke that one of the
younger local boys had been “overtaken by a nigger.” Here, the racist implication was that
the military officer should have been either impaired by, or given unfair natural advantage
according to the color of his skin. It was unclear how well this young man knew the farmers
at this settlement because there was an assortment of spectators present from around the
islands, but it was of course striking to witness someone ostensibly liberated by British forces
assign such a negative stereotype to one of its members. Meanwhile, when the squaddies
flooded into Stanley on weekend nights out, they complained to me about the relative scarcity
of local women. Half-hearted, sexist proposals have circulated in Stanley to give the West
Island away for “3 forty-foot containers” full of “Argie” women to improve the genderimbalanced local population.193 While this particular sex trafficking scheme was meant to be
humorous, Falklands citizens and their British trustees have created intensive regimes of
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labor recruitment that I will discuss in the next section, which offer insights on the everyday
afterlife of the British Empire in the South Atlantic and Southern Cone.

“Saints,” Chileans and the “Undesirable” Slot
The early social division between settlers who were allowed to naturalize (desirables) and
“aliens” who toiled under temporary contracts (undesirables), remains a point of contention
in the current context of the Falklands. In this section, I will discuss how most Chileans and
St. Helenians—or “Saints,” the local shorthand for the group—have become implicitly
excluded from either the “Falkland Islander” or “contractor” categories of people with
limited, uneven access to political representation and civil rights. Ethnographic observations
that I will offer here of casual racial discrimination, precarious working conditions, diasporic
cultural production, and forbidden sexual practices shed light on some of the predicaments of
members of each particular social group, who face different kinds of challenges for gaining
permanent residence (PRP) and “Falkland Islands Status.” The mechanisms and processes
that order and govern possibilities for peoplehood in the Falklands, however, are
generalizable to the historical and political form of the settler colonial protectorate.
The Ministry of Defense recruited so-called “incomers” from St. Helena (and later
Chile) primarily to support the reconstruction effort after the war. St. Helena was a source of
cheap labor, and the “Saints” performed menial tasks at the new Mount Pleasant military
base, such as cleaning toilets. One Islander interlocutor speculated that the recruitment of
“Saints” was also a way in which the British government could skirt the amount of aid it had
been providing to St. Helena, a former British colony (now a BOT in its own right). Once
they finished their contracts at Mt. Pleasant, many “Saints” were able to find work in Stanley.
Nonetheless, as Santiago the Chilean Spanish instructor explained, “Someone from St.
Helena who is not completely white but closer to someone from the Caribbean maybe in
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terms of the way they look, they’re not expats; they’re ‘Saints.’ You would never call them
an expat; they’re ‘Saints.’ You would probably call an Australian an expat, and we do have
Australians.”194 Here, according to Santiago, despite a shared British Commonwealth
heritage, “Saints” would not meet the criteria for the white ethnic community construct of
“expats” that relocated British descendant settlers of Australia may have done in the
Falklands. We can assume that by “closer to the Caribbean in appearance,” Santiago meant,
“not white,” but what else motivated this typological distinction?
First, there is generally a heightened British political correctness in the Falklands, and
even a growing effort to celebrate multiculturalism in contradistinction with Argentina’s
Eurocentrism (Gordillo 2016). However, without attempting the fraught Ricoeurian
methodology of a “hermeneutics of suspicion,” I observed myriad examples of race-thinking
or casual racism that offer critical insights on the assumed norms and values of whiteness,
which often remain implicit in invocations of Falkland Islander peoplehood. For instance,
one elderly Falkland Islander portrayed the “Saints” as extremely nice, insisted on calling
their employer “sir,” but this interlocutor found the Chileans more “adaptable” as flexible
labor wherever one needs it. This same Islander viewed St. Helenians as closer to their
families in the “urban” setting of Stanley, and underscored how they have their “boom box
on their shoulders.” Similarly, one contractor in the process of naturalization described the St.
Helenians as the “boys in the hood” of the islands, “riding around playing reggae music.”
While I did meet St. Helenians, who had been living in the islands for more than 15 years and
still had never visited any Camp settlements outside of Stanley, the racial undertones in these
characterizations of urban Black youth blurred occasionally with local panic over petty crime
in disproportionate and contradictory ways. For example, migrant workers were targeted in

194

For analysis of the construction of race and race-mixing in St. Helena, see Yon (2007).

139

Stanley for accusations of littering, even though these are the very same residents who are
hired to do the bulk of cleaning and maintenance work.
Among work permit holders, there is a distinct difference in skill level between the
“expat” contractors with specialized postgraduate degrees who direct government
departments on the one hand, and unskilled laborers migrating predominantly from Chile, but
also St. Helena, Poland, the Philippines, as well as the UK or British Commonwealth (and, as
discussed previously, Zimbabwe) on the other. While there are some high-level Spanish
fishing business owners, who are a consistently welcome presence in Stanley, the crews
comprised primarily of Indonesians and Filipinos barely touch land apart from the Seamen’s
Mission Centre (see Chapter 4). Temporary workers range from qualified carpenters,
plumbers and electricians to a labor reserve maintained to pick up the slack from local
“school leavers.” Some of my interviewees involved in public policy described the
population of “Saints” and Chileans as “backfill.” Yet, Chileans seeking or having gained
permanent residence now manage a number of accommodations and restaurants; they work in
retail, construction, at the market garden, as hairdressers, and a distinct group of seasonal
workers are recruited annually to work at the slaughterhouse. Some migrants, whom some
Islanders I interviewed accused of being “money-oriented,” have now entered middle
management in shipping agencies or are self-employed. Many of those who have worked
both for the Ministry of Defense and in town prefer Stanley because at Mt. Pleasant one just
has a room, not a more conventional house or shared home. Empanadas, chacareros (steak
sandwiches), cazuela (stew) and pisco sours are now basic menu items in town. Still, some
prefer working at Mt. Pleasant because they find it too difficult to absorb the English
language and British culture in Stanley. One Chilean I met cooks and cleans at one of the
several mountaintop military stations, and she told me that she prefers it because she enjoys
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the solitude and the ability to be virtually “her own boss.” Even if it means living in a sterile
militarized environment, she finds the base more accommodating.
Several Islanders I spoke with measure class, race and status based on the kinds of
vehicles different groups drive. One multi-generational Islander informed me that she had
discerned a pattern of Chileans driving slightly worse or older Land Rovers than white local
residents, but now that some Chileans are becoming more integrated, it is the St. Helenians
who drive the oldest and worst automobiles. To this interlocutor, this confirmed that St.
Helenians are currently doing the jobs that Chileans perhaps used to do, particularly service
work. However, other interlocutors insisted that St. Helenians have formed a middle-class
status group and that Chileans are positioned lower on the socio-economic ladder (with newly
arriving Filipinos even lower). Unlike Chileans, who perhaps arrive with the intention of
learning English but may struggle to do so with short-term contracts, the St. Helenians have
the advantage that their mother tongue is English. However, the dialect differs greatly from
that of the Falkland Islanders, which has facilitated a comparable enclave effect to that of
Chileans.
Despite this social segmentation, sexual practices between migrant workers and
Islanders or contractors, ranging from romantic entanglements to sex work, have created
more intimate relations and reproduced multigenerational, multiracial families in the
Falklands. Bars close at 11pm in Stanley, but once every month or so, a converted shed called
The Trough becomes an after-hours venue for music. During one of my stages of fieldwork, a
band called “The Pushers” consisted of a Filipino singer, a St. Helenian guitarist, a Chilean
bassist and a British Falkland Islander drummer who led the band. This grouping illustrates
the increasing diversity of the local population in the sphere of cultural production. One of
the local bars, Deano’s, also holds a weekly “Latin Night” in which Chileans, contractors and
some Falkland Islanders dance to cumbia remixes of pop songs. The party often continues
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late into the night after the bar closes, when attendees transport cases of Budweiser to the
Chilean abattoir workers’ smoke-filled portakabins.
During one Latin Night, I met Flavio, a slaughter foreman from Chile. Flavio did not
speak any English, so he was delighted to converse with someone other than his coworkers in
Spanish. Since he was only in the islands for five weeks at a time, he also never bothered to
get a mobile phone. He would check his e-mail in one of Stanley’s “hot spots,” but it was not
easy to schedule meetings or social events. Flavio’s method of communication was simply to
rush toward me, wave and whistle, whenever he spotted me walking in town. One day, as I
was walking home from my office, Flavio greeted me with a big smile and invited me to have
tea in his place: a portakabin in the trailer park called Murray Heights, tucked behind the
bypass road, up the hill from Stanley. Flavio told me he did not really know his neighbors.
One was a prostitute and another was a Peruvian who also works at the slaughterhouse. But
most of the temporary workers in Murray Heights kept to themselves. Flavio’s portakabin
was comfortable, but, again, there was no phone or Internet. He had a collection of thirtyforty mugs, but almost all of his possessions were destroyed or stolen in the aftermath of the
devastating 2010 earthquake in Concepción, Chile, where he used to live. This disaster forced
him abandon his career in Human Resources and travel. He went to Perú first, where he
cooked for a living. Then, he saw an advertisement for a job at the Mount Pleasant military
base as a chef, and he applied for it. He wanted to learn English, but thus far in the Falklands
he has only worked with Chileans, so he has not acquired any new language skills. (This was
the case for many Chileans I knew in the islands.)
For entertainment, Flavio lifted his bed to find some music or a DVD to play, but the
sound did not work on his television set. Flavio prepared pan amasado (homemade bread
common in Chile), scrambled eggs, ham and coffee. He was obviously a talented cook, and a
gracious host. Flavio had worked as a cook for a year at MPC and has been back and forth 3
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times before his job at the abattoir. In between these contracts, he worked in tourism in the
northern Chilean town of San Pedro de Atacama. He showed me a slide show later from his
travels in the Atacama Desert, and also from MPC, including provocative photos of one of
the soldiers in uniform giving him a kiss.
Flavio told me that he had a bad day at the abattoir. He had a confrontation with
someone whom he referred to as a musulmán (a Muslim Chilean who was visiting to carry
out a Halal certification inspection). The Halal inspector would not let them sell much of the
mutton because several of the sheep were pregnant, but the real source of Flavio’s distress
was that the Halal inspector targeted him directly. Flavio informed me that the inspector had
told him that he would not be able to return for work again because they do not allow
homosexuals. Having trained in—and even instructed—the field of Human Resources, Flavio
had a keen sense of his rights, and he felt discriminated against unfairly. Yet, as a temporary
migrant, Flavio did not feel entitled to rights as part of the Falkland Islander community,
even though he felt “safe” (seguro). As part of the matadero (abattoir) crew, he had been
exposed to the seedy underbelly of a surprisingly active nightlife in Stanley, which included
sex work and drugs (usually “legal” highs). The drug use in Stanley pivoted on the
consumption habits of Falkland Islanders and British contractors, but, again, action against it
was targeted disproportionately on South American and St. Helenian incomers. In addition to
the Chilean temporary workers, the meat abattoir also employed “born-and-bred” Falkland
Islanders who were themselves deemed “undesirable” or “unemployable,” including recentlyreleased convicts of sexual abuse.195 Despite being thrown into this unsavory shadow world,
Flavio was also inserted into a supportive network of Chileans, both at MPC and Stanley,
who would get together for barbecues and Latin Night at Deano’s. If he had wanted to, Flavio

195

I do not have room to discuss it adequately here, but the Falkland Islanders have entered a sex panic crisis
regarding multi-generational sex and pedophilia.

143

might even have been able to endear himself to one of the Chileans who has permanent
“status” and might act as a sponsor. Flavio was trying to earn an honest living, but his
sexuality ultimately placed him in the “undesirable” slot, and his permit was discontinued.

Points for Permanent Residence or Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty
Falkland Islanders I interviewed said that they love “their” Chileans or that migration is good
for the society. However, as I will discuss in what follows, there are varying concrete hurdles
for temporary workers—including those deemed desirable—which prevent them from
building savings, gaining citizenship or owning homes. First, if someone enters the islands
with a work permit, they have to pay into their pension but cannot transfer it unless they stay
in the islands for at least five years. This may incentivize workers to be less “transient,” but
most are given two-year terms that are not necessarily open to renewal. Under the current
system, a work permit usually lasts two years, although this is not set in stone. It is usually
extendable with the right to reside, work and earn money for two additional years, but an FIG
policymaker told me that around 17% of “contractors” disappear after their contract is up.
After another three years, one is able to apply for a permanent residency permit (PRP), which
offers more privileges, such as the right to own land, operate businesses, medical, and so on.
However, one cannot vote until they obtain “Falkland Islands Status,” which takes a
minimum seven years.196
This process may seem relatively straightforward, however, I met former migrants
from St. Helena and Chile that had resided in the islands for more than seven years, and yet
they were reluctant to apply for status because they did not “feel eligible.” One St. Helenian
who worked in service and retail came to the Falklands when she was two years old, two
decades before the 2013 referendum in 1993. She explained to me, between pensive pauses of
196
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uncertainty, that even though she would vote “yes” to remaining British, she did not want to
vote in the referendum out of “respect” for the Islanders’ self-determination. Even though she
had the paperwork for a long time, and most of her peers were aware that some of her family
was born in the islands, she had not applied for “status.” St. Helenians do, however, have an
upper hand on Chileans in the sense that they not only speak English but also already have
British BOT citizenship. Moreover, the second generation of St. Helenians currently residing
in the Falklands have benefited from education in Stanley, as well as A-levels in the UK. A
number of the younger generation St. Helenians already gained Falkland Islands Status,
which their parents arranged, allowing them to vote in the referendum.
Santiago, on the other hand, did not have PRP, let alone “status” to vote, even though
he was fluent in English and arguably one of the most integrated Chilean residents in the
Falklands. Born under a strict curfew in the first years of Pinochet’s brutal dictatorship in
Chile, Santiago was reticent about discussing politics. He espoused strict proprietary
standards regarding nationality and language capacity: Santiago critiqued fellow Chileans
living in the Falklands who had not learned English, just as he questioned American tourism
managers operating entirely in English with gringo backpackers in Torres del Paine, the
Chilean National Park where he used to work in Patagonia. He insisted that the Falklands are
part of South America (but not Argentina), and he has been doing his part to teach local
residents Spanish. Santiago first became interested in moving to the islands to practice his
own English, and as a translator, he has been especially keen to enhance communicative
capacities between and among different peoples. It is paradoxical then that Santiago has held
fellow migrants to high standards for adapting their language and culture to fit in, yet he has
maintained that only Falkland Islanders should have the right to vote (in Santiago’s view, this
should be restricted to residents with birthright). This stubborn principle has made Santiago
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somewhat of an outcast among Chileans, which became clear to him when he was not invited
to the wedding of a prominent Chilean couple.
Nonetheless, Santiago told me that he was quite fond of the “Falklands Way of Life,”
its sense of safety and the people he has met. He has become part and parcel of the generation
of 30-40 year-old Falkland Islanders and British or Australian contractors in Stanley. He was
also close with Islanders of all generations through his virtual monopoly on Spanish lessons
in the archipelago. Even though he fit in well with British Falkland Islanders, Santiago drew
great pleasure from “taking the piss out of” people, and he took it in stride in return, as well.
However, while he was proud of these tokens of tough love, Santiago was hyper-conscious of
his cultural difference and occasionally reprimanded peers for veiled or overt forms of
racism, particularly racialized accusations of him being Peruvian rather than Chilean.
Everyday racism was not the reason why Santiago had become discouraged from
applying for PRP. He doubted that the government would offer it to him, but more generally
Santiago was offended at the permit’s unreasonable difficulty, especially its emphasis on
points for finances and monetary wealth. He asked his Falkland Islander friends to fill in a
mock application, and even though their status is secure with birthright, only two out of ten
would have qualified for PRP if they had been migrants.197 Moreover, if he wanted to apply
for PRP, Santiago would have to get a letter or certificate of comparability issued by a UK
institution to support his translation degree, even though he has already been working as the
main translator in the islands for many years. Ironically, the FIG Customs and Immigration
Department is one of his primary clients. When they told him his degree would need to be
assessed, Santiago asked why, if it were good enough for them when they need him for a
translation, would it not be adequate when he wanted to become a permanent resident? Even
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though he has been living in Stanley for more than a decade, Santiago was not sure if he
wanted to stay in the islands forever, and this was the ostensible commitment required for
“status.” He entered the country with a two-year work permit to be a teacher, tutor or
translator for a school, which later closed. He then became self-employed, which meant he
had no sponsor to vouch for him or cover the airfare if something went wrong. Santiago was
happy to stay in the islands, but without PRP he has still had to renew his self-employed
work permit every two years, which also required him to pay for new medical examinations
and other fees. Santiago eventually came to refer to the Falklands society in terms of “we.”
He pays taxes and unlike Flavio, he has felt like he is part of the local community—far from
being considered “undesirable,” the FIG has relied heavily on Santiago for translation—yet
he has resigned to the fact that he will never be a Falkland Islander.
Owing to such failures, the government, and their voting constituents, have developed
what one former MLA described to me as a “schizophrenic” policy on immigration. Do the
Islanders want to continue the short-term contract system and preserve the aging population
of the Falkland Islanders, or do they want to encourage long-term migration of people and
their families to integrate into the community? Why? According to this Stanley resident,
“We’re schizophrenic because we want to protect our community and protect our history and
our culture and what are we as a ‘Falkland Islander’ going to become if we grow? And how
are we going to grow?” Here, repetitions of the word “protect” offer an explanation: the
sociopolitical entity of the Falkland Islanders as a white ethnic community construct has
emerged (with limited growth) as a settler colonial protectorate that preserves a selective
British history and culture through degrees of imperial sovereignty, which are assigned
specific values in the point system for permanent residence permits. The FIG has gone
through many iterations of immigration reviews, which tinker with the point system, yet the
policy has changed relatively little, and certainly not in a way that will make it easier for
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newcomers to settle permanently. As the settler colonial protectorate becomes geared toward
offshore oil production, fears of new waves of people streaming into the islands for work in
the industry, who might outnumber “Falkland Islanders,” have caused some FIG Counselors
to express the need to “get a grip on unfettered immigration” so that the local community is
not “eroded.” The next section will explore how, amid a temporary workforce that threatens
to outnumber the “native” population, Falkland Islanders are defining themselves and their
distinctive lifeways as “a people.”

Defining the Falkland Islander and the “Falklands Way of Life”
In law, the FIG defines a “Falkland Islander” as “a person who has Falkland Islands
status.”198 However, in practice, a “Falkland Islander” is generally considered to be a white
person who was born in the islands and/or one who possesses a lineage of British settlers. In
this section, I will discuss how the “locally born” classification, in particular, allows “native”
Islanders to define and separate themselves from the racial, ethnic and national categories
discussed above.199 As we shall see, however, degrees of imperial sovereignty also allow
some Falkland Islanders—who may or may not have been born in the Islands—rights to
permanent residence through obtaining Falkland Islands Status, as well as broader access to
the “Falklands Way of Life”: a local allegory of imagined Britishness that promotes intimacy,
safety and work ethic.
The primacy of birthright became clear when I listened to Santiago’s interpretation of
the local order of people in the Falklands. He told me, “You’re only a Falkland Islander if
you were born here, and that’s how they see it. And I will never be a Falkland Islander…a
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Benny is [also] only someone who was born here.” One concrete example Santiago pointed
out is that there is a prize awarded annually in the marathon for the first Falkland Islander to
cross the line. To win it, one has to have been born in the Falklands, irrespective of residence
status. Another moment that throws light on this definition is the magnified celebration when
two Falklands-born individuals get married. Islanders and “expats” described such couples to
me as the “hope” of the Islanders’ longevity as a people. Moreover, some “expats,” might
have strong opinions on all the local decisions regarding capital programs, education, law,
and so on—some even voted in the referendum if they had “status”—but those I met who
have children consider that generation of their family to be the “true Islanders” because they
were born in the Falklands.
However, residents do not always adhere strictly to the categories that Santiago
mastered. Friendly family rivalries exist over who is more Falkland Islander when, for
example the parent of a child was not born in the Falklands, but the child was, or if the child
of a parent with a long lineage of Falkland Islanders was born outside of the islands. Santiago
viewed a European-descendant naturalized citizen as still “not a Benny, not a Falkland
Islander,” even with PRP or Falkland Islands Status, unless they were born in the islands. He
asserted that they would still be referred to properly as “expats” if they were of British or
Commonwealth origin, or by their nationality if elsewhere. Yet, I observed Islanders use
degrees of categorization for such individuals, including terms like “half-Benny” or “fullBenny” to index their immigration status.
Take, for example, one of my main interlocutors, Gus, who migrated to the Falklands
from Spain when he was 8 years old because his father worked in the fishing industry. While
he had moved several times within Spain, an already contentious place in terms of regional
and national identity, Gus eagerly latched onto the resolutely local Falkland Islander identity
in addition to maintaining his Spanish nationality and heritage. Unlike his older brother who
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retained his Spanish accent and returned to Spain, Gus acquired speech habits like most
“native” English-speaking Falkland Islanders, including the Anglicized Spanish syncretisms
and British humor. (Gus also still speaks Spanish, having concentrated in Latin American
Studies and having traveled extensively throughout South America.) His closest friends
growing up were all Falklands-born Islanders or British “expats.”
Gus might have qualified for PRP as early as 1996, but he went away to college in
1997, interrupting the naturalization process. The FIG covered the costs of his education
because at that time one did not need to be a resident, as long as they paid taxes to have rights
to overseas education (now one does). Gus moved to London after University, which meant
that he stopped being a resident, and his tenure as an aspiring “Falkland Islander” was reset
back to zero. After three years living in London, Gus wanted to go back “home” to the
Falklands, but even after spending his formative years in the islands, he was told he would
need a work permit! Gus had relatively little work experience, just three years out of
University with limited financial resources. He does not complain, though, because when he
applied, the regulations were less stringent. Gus was allowed to apply for PRP from abroad,
which he obtained relatively quickly because he told me it was a more “subjective” process
before the elaborate point system that is in place currently, and everyone knew him. After all,
they had paid for his education, he identified with the Falklands, and he still had a living link
with his father residing there. Even after receiving PRP status, Gus had to wait 6 more years
to become naturalized with BOT citizenship, which is basically the equivalent of British
citizenship but without the right to vote in Parliament. Being naturalized allowed Gus to
apply for “Falkland Islands Status” one year later, or a total of 7 years of being back in the
islands. Since returning, Gus has worked in commercial fishing and government. Now he is a
senior member of the Mineral Resources Department and is the individual primarily
responsible for crafting new legislation. Gus is not alone: numerous Saint Helenians,
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Chileans and arrivants from other national origins self-identified as “Falkland Islanders”
when I surveyed them during the 2013 referendum vote.
Related to these racial/ethnic classifications is a local allegory referred to as “the
Falklands Way of Life.” Usually what people mean by this is: (1) knowing each other, i.e.
everyday practices of familiarity, such as greeting each other on the street, or at least raising a
finger from the steering wheel to acknowledge someone driving on the other side of the road;
(2) having very little crime, which usually translates into the freedom to leave one’s keys in
the ignition with the vehicle unlocked or to leave home with the front door open; and (3)
work ethic, for Islanders pride themselves on having virtually no unemployment, apart from a
small portion of so-called “unemployables” or “undesirables” who have trouble holding
down a job. Furthermore, one in five residents have more than one job (partly due to “way of
life,” but also out of necessity).200 Finally, the “Falklands Way of Life” embodies a
conservative fear that the islands will be “overrun” by “outsiders” who may not continue the
traditions of horticulture, collecting penguin eggs or cutting peat.
These values of intimacy, safety and work ethic intersect with the prevalent “British
to the core” homogeneity of national identity. Linked to this is a certain imperialist nostalgia
(Rosaldo 1989), which manifests in discouragement of dissent on regional and global
politics, even if Islanders enjoy a spirited divergence of views on local, intra-island matters.
“In some ways we’re all incomers…and people are welcomed here, as long as they don’t go
around saying what a terrible place it is,” one Falkland Islander told me in Stanley. Another
Islander in Camp asked me if I knew who the three who voted “no” were, so that “they could
shoot them and tidy up the place.” Now, the violent sarcasm from this last interlocutor came
as quite a surprise because it was out of character with his generally cosmopolitan, if secular
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outlook. He made frequent statements about being an international man, praising Chilean
employees of his tourist lodge, and decrying violence he viewed as being caused by religion
in unidentified geographical and social contexts around the world. Curiously, he thought of
the islands as a place to forget about politics.
Under the surface, Islanders disclose a more complicated political value system. Even
though Thatcher is immortalized in a bronze bust, as well as the name of a road in Stanley,
not all Falklands residents are actually Thatcherites, particularly considering their workingclass historical formation. Most remember that Ridley was part of her administration when he
pushed for the Islanders to consent to a leaseback deal with Argentina. This is evident on the
walls of the local fish and chips shop, which feature quaint little paintings that depict scenes
from the miners’ strikes that Thatcher repressed after the 1982 war. One “expat” told me
ironically that he came to the Falklands when Thatcher came to power—before the war—
because he saw her as a bully! (This same interlocutor told me that when they actually met
Thatcher, she was surprisingly warm and motherly.) Islanders confessed to me that behind
literal closed doors, they shot elastic bands at Thatcher’s photo for entertainment. They
realized that it was not necessarily doing the Islanders many favors that the Falklands were
always associated with such a divisive political figure. Indeed, the Falklands’ association
with the British military and the Union Jack has influenced those on the left in the UK, such
as Jeremy Corbyn, to push for an “accommodation” for Argentina. One left-leaning UK
contractor told me that when they went to Patagonia on holiday, the absurdity of geographical
proximity and likeness of the landscape made them think that actually, “the Falklands should
be Argentina’s.”
The contradictory notions of community described above compel us to question
whether the society of the Falklands is truly becoming “diverse” after recent rounds of
migration, or if practices of multicultural “tolerance” are symptomatic of degrees of imperial
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sovereignty. Take, for instance, a birthday party I attended in Stanley. It was held for the
“expat” spouse of a contractor who is in the process of applying for Falkland Islander
“status.” The spouse had just spent the last 6 years teaching elementary school in Thailand
and the Amazon region of Peru. Their home was decorated with paintings from Peru and
Bolivia, depicting colorful shantytowns and Chola women working with baskets. We
consumed an array of appetizers from a variety of global cuisines, with a decidedly Spanish
Mediterranean theme: squid, tortilla, chickpeas, chorizos, and so on. Two Falkland Islanders,
one working in the fishing industry and his contractor partner, a traveling teacher, were
present, as were Gus and his Antipodean date, a contractor teaching high school, another
British contractor working in construction, two Chileans who own and manage a hotel and
restaurant, another Chilean woman who has a high-level job in a shipping agency, a St.
Helenian couple working in communications and flooring and a Thai woman employed at
Government House. The latter individual and her host sat on the floor and spoke in Thai for
much of the evening.
A cynical observer might view this multi-cultural gathering simply as settler
colonialism dressed up as an exaggerated “kumbaya” ceremony, but it also served as an unironic safe space for candid discussion of struggles with the immigration process. The
Chileans who were present all had footholds in the emergent oil industry through investments
in accommodations or supply chain services, but at least one of them decried the “hassle” to
get PRP, naturalization and status. Again, most of their Chilean peers did not bother applying
because it would require a rigorous background check, including a letter from Chile,
employment and bank account criteria, age and number of years in the islands, and more. The
45 “points,” to which these qualifications amount are just impossible to accumulate for some.
Even those Chileans who had given birth in the islands were unable to obtain status for
themselves or their children. Still, having been in the islands for 10 years, the Chilean who
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spoke out at the gathering had sought “status” in order to gain a political voice and vote, as
well as using the Falklands as a possible stepping-stone to relocating again in the UK or
Europe. Meanwhile, the St. Helenians in the room already had British citizenship. They had
been living in the islands for nearly 25 years and were recruited originally to “clean
shitbowls” at MPC. The couple has continued to have trouble getting their son and newborn
grandson a work permit to return, even though they are proud to call the Falklands home, and
they raised their son there from ages 6-21.
While white British contractors are already members of government council, when I
asked residents of the Falklands if they thought Chileans or St. Helenians with status could
get elected and serve in office, the unanimous response was: “It’s not quite there yet.” On the
one hand, this may not necessarily be due to discrimination; one could argue that the children
of Chilean and St. Helenian families who moved to the islands after 1982 are now graduating
from school, so it may take 10 years before the first wave of the second generation become
eligible. However, there is no reason that someone of the first generation, who has been in the
islands for years, has status and is part of the community should be unable to run, just as a
number of British “expat” former contractors have done.

Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed how the sliding scales of race, ethnicity and nationalism have
shifted over time, as represented by the unstable predicaments of subjectivities struggling
with migration, citizenship and assertions of “self” in the Falkland Islands. Reacting to their
subjection by British colonial administrators, settlers formed a conservative, white working
class struggle for government reforms that would give them a democratic voice. Settlers
naturalized as “native” Islanders, identifying themselves as a separate white ethnic
community formation, apart from, though still aligned with the British, i.e. as “kelpers.”
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Influential circles of nativists pressured farm managers to halt labor importation, and lobbied
British Parliament against a potential sovereignty agreement with Argentina. This backstory
is often overlooked in analyses of the 1982 war, yet it remains crucial to the current British
position on refusing to negotiate on the paramountcy of the Islanders’ wishes.
The chapter also discussed contemporary categories of race and immigration status
that impact what kinds of individuals may or may not claim to be a Falkland Islander, in the
eyes of the BOT quasi-state, as well as how this settler colonial logic differs in practice
among residents. In turn, this distinction delimits access to social programs, and it ultimately
measures the value of one’s wishes and desires by deciding who was eligible to vote in the
referendum. If class stood in for race during the subjection of settlers in the earlier colonial
period, then race has become a key criterion for defining the Falkland Islanders as a people in
the contemporary settler colonial situation. Phrases like “kith and kin” and “British stock”
may have marked Falkland Islanders as white by essentialized British descent in defense of
British sovereignty. Yet, during and after the war, military personnel labeled Islanders
“Bennys” to signify backward hinterland rurality. Islanders have internalized and
appropriated this epithet to represent pride in white working class conservativism. The
current settler colonial milieu includes a patchwork cohabitation of residence with a range of
racial, ethnic and national identity formations. While the playing field is far from even—there
are certain qualities, including sexuality, language and class, which divide and protect
powerful “desirables” from disenfranchised “undesirables”—new connections through
marriage, affinity and multi-generational residence are slowly changing the face of the
Falklands.
While the emergent society may be relatively fluid in the Falklands, the Islanders’
self-determination claim requires an assertion of “self” that is firmly fixed in a resolutely
British territory with “degrees of imperial sovereignty” (Stoler 2006). I argue that degrees of
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imperialism are unevenly distributed in the settler colonial protectorate of the Falklands
through a concrete point system for permanent residence. In reaction to external labor
recruitment and population change, Falkland Islanders have preserved popular consent to
British sovereignty through forms of racial, ethnic and national exclusion that limit access to
political representation, voting rights and other privileges. Nevertheless, the international
community remains reluctant to accept the Islanders’ claim to peoplehood. While the
Islanders’ formation of whiteness may have given them evidence of British “kith and kin,”
the rub is that it also prevents decolonized nations from recognizing them as a distinct
“people” from the UK with an inalienable right to self-determination.
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INTERLUDE | SETTLER COLONIAL DIGLOSSIA

In addition to the corrals discussed in Chapter 2, a particular “language ideology” also keeps
the gaucho presence active in the landscape, through “native” Islanders’ speech habits.201
Despite nearly two centuries of continuous British occupation, Islanders continue to use and
embrace terms deriving from Spanish and the historic gaucho culture (see Appendix A).
As unusual as it may seem, Falkland Islanders who consider themselves “more British
than the British,” and who view Margaret Thatcher as their liberator, refer to each other as
“chay.” An Anglicized syncretism for “che,” the Patagonian term of affection was
immortalized as the famous nickname of Argentine revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara.
Indeed, the wardrobe of one of my interlocutors in the islands included a t-shirt featuring El
Che’s iconic portrait. Another wore a printed tee with the word “Poocha!” in bold (an
Anglicized syncretism of the Spanish pucha, a polite way of puta, meaning “shoot” or
“gosh”). Gaucho language is very much in fashion among “native” Islanders, and it is not
exclusive to Islanders of multiple generations; I have known British, Chilean and St.
Helenian migrants to be quite fond of employing “chay,” “poocha, man!” or a variety of other
syncretisms. These speech habits index their affection for the multiply colonized place, and
simultaneously assert their own belonging.
In a parallel ethnographic situation in the Pacific, Miki Makihara (2004) has described
how Chile forcibly proletarianized indigenous islanders in Rapa Nui through the auspices of
the “Easter Island Exploitation Company;” this is especially apparent in the company’s
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transformative introduction of the Spanish language. Makihara calls the language ideology
that formed in Rapa Nui “colonial diglossia,” which features a “high” standard use of Spanish
and a “low” vernacular indigenous language. The language use of Falklands/Malvinas
residents reveals different relations of power from that of Rapa Nui, although as we have
seen, there was a similarly monopolistic colonial company, which did play a central role in
the population’s shift of language and culture. Falkland Islanders’ speech habits demonstrate
a “high” standard use of English and “low” vernacular use of Spanish (as well as some
words, such as “chay/che,” likely deriving from Tehuelche). To be consistent, I refer to this
particular language ideology as settler colonial diglossia.
While British scholars have produced interesting interview-based socio-linguistic
research on the Falkland Islanders’ English dialect, such work neglects to take seriously their
significant “low” vernacular uses of Spanish.202 This research operates under a kind of
teleology that positions Islanders’ speech at a halfway point toward an ostensible destiny of
full Southern Hemispheric English dialect koinéization. Instead of diagnosing the
underdevelopment of Falkland Islander English, here I wish to take up the fascinating
syncretisms directly. If we are to analyze the speech practices of islanders, it behooves us to
take into consideration extended linguistic-cultural circumstances, which are tied closely to
peoplehood and nationality.203 What are the metapragmatic political economic contexts of
islanders’ speech practices, domestic and at large?
While the use of motorbikes and Land Rovers has distanced new generations of
Islanders from the cattle frontier gaucho culture, one may still observe colloquial expressions
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among Islanders of Anglicized Spanish syncretisms for horse-riding gear, features of the land
and place names derived primarily from South American Spanish (See Appendix A). To be
clear, the terms to which I am referring do not include many of the revisionist toponymic
translations that Argentine nationalists employ to support the country’s claim to territorial
integrity (Pondal 1956); in fact, functionaries of the Argentine Foreign Ministry consider
Anglicization evidence of deliberate “implantation” of the population.204 (Functionaries I
spoke with were not aware that Islanders call one another “che.”) These are terms that
Falkland Islanders, themselves, employ, which is tempting to interpret as speaking against a
strictly British national heritage. But to Islanders, the survival of syncretic place names is part
of what they call the “Falkland Islands Way of Life.”
As linguistic anthropologist Keith Basso (1996) found from research among the
Apache in the Southwestern United States, “placenaming” enables people to appropriate
physical environments with local wisdom. One of the more interesting aspects of place,
which enables its use for global connections, though, is its porosity of boundaries.205 Unlike
the “linguistic alienation” that Garret (2007) observes in a comparable diglossic context in St.
Lucia—drawing on Jaffe (1999)—the particular place of the Falklands/Malvinas may be best
understood not as “pure,” or even as “periphery.” Rather, I wish to suggest that settler
colonial diglossic expressions of placemaking offer a window onto the instability of
imperialism.
Settler colonial diglossia separates locals between: (a) those who find meaning in
their historical South American connections; and (b) more xenophobic settlers or recent white
British “expat” arrivants seeking a little piece of Britain in the South Atlantic. The louder
members of the latter group spread fear about the impact of the influx of Peruvians and
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Chileans recruited to build houses. They seek to limit migrant families’ access to education
by excluding children who do not speak English. More tolerant Islanders learn Spanish,
volunteer on Galician fishing vessels or even become romantically involved with Chileans if
they please.
However, I have observed that the domains in which code-switching thrives are
mainly the masculine, heteronormative, working-class conservative barbecues of the rural
Camp. Buffered from the British contractors and more cosmopolitan bourgeois-bohemian
residents of Stanley, some “Campers” drop “chay” into each and every sentence, as though
the contexts for code-switching were irrelevant. Between and among Falkland Islanders in
the Camp, few remarkable things are just “awesome.” The proper way to phrase it would be
“Poocha! That’s awesome.” One interlocutor explained that the use of syncretisms is a way
of acknowledging and reinforcing that he is talking to another Islander (usually, but not
exclusively, one born in the Islands or having descended from multiple generations).
After a long day of lamb-marking in one Camp settlement, I discussed the
significance of diglossia with my hosts, a mixed Falkland Islander/British “expat” family,
and Santiago, the Chilean Spanish teacher who had accompanied me. Sipping on pisco and
then Chilean Carmenere, our Falkland Islander host mother told me that she was humiliated
during her education in the UK when an English teacher told her it was nonsense to say that
she went down to the “arrosure” (derived from the Spanish arroyo meaning stream) to catch
some zebra trout (a native fish species). But this was the language she acquired growing up in
Camp on East Falkland Island. Interestingly, almost all of the Spanish-originating place
names are located in East Falkland because the main period of gaucho activity occurred
before the West was settled. Yet, now that the gauchos have been displaced, settler colonial
diglossia is common throughout all areas of the Camp.
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An especially intriguing variant of settler colonial diglossia may be found in a remote
settlement of West Falkland Island. The farm’s elderly owners Humphry and Lou are a
fascinating Falkland Islander-Argentine couple. Several members of their family attended
boarding school, farmed, and were even born in Argentina; their daughters were stranded
there during the 1982 war. Humphry and Lou had a unique perspective on both the islands
and Argentina, which they referred to as “the Argentine,” (an antiquated English usage
translating “La Argentina”). They do not take offense by, and even sympathize with,
Argentines who insist on calling the islands “Malvinas.” Lou has fond memories of growing
up in the Belgrano neighborhood of Buenos Aires, and Humphry went to school there during
the rise of Perón. They are shocked at the so-called “villas miserias” (shantytowns) that dot
Buenos Aires today. Humphry spent eight years managing the expansive Condor sheep
estancia, spreading from near Río Gallegos, Patagonia to the “Straits of Magellan” (Humphry
uses Spanish syntax for this and other place names). Condor was under the same British
ownership as Port Howard, one of the largest farms in the Falklands. Within their settlement,
Humphry and Lou call horse pens “corrals” and streams “arrosures” but the accent veers
closer to Argentine castellano: e.g. “arroyo,” in which the “y” is pronounced as a hard “j.”
Yet, Humphry and Lou adamantly support the Falkland Islanders’ claim to selfdetermination. And, critical of the legacy of colonialism within Argentina, Humphry points
out that while it likely entered into Falkland Islands’ vernacular speech via the primarily
Rioplatense gauchos, most Argentines forget or deny that “Che” likely derives from the
Tehuelche word for “you.”
On May 6, 2012, Alicia Castro, Argentine ambassador to London under Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner, announced that her government intended to begin sending direct
flights from Buenos Aires to the Malvinas. The passengers that Castro planned to fly to the
islands would not be military personnel, government officials, or even oil company
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executives, but rather Spanish teachers. As Castro explained, her country “did not want to
change the way of life on the islands, but urged them to distance themselves from Britain and
embrace their neighbors” (ITN 2012). This plan did not come to fruition during the Kirchner
presidencies. However, with more Falkland Islanders training in Spanish voluntarily,
particularly in Stanley, some of their Anglicized pronunciations are giving way to accents
more faithful to formal Chilean Spanish. For example, while the place Laguna Isla used to be
referred to as (pronounced): "lagun eyes lee,” many Islanders now pronounce it as a South
American might do: “lagoonah eeslah.” This indicates the possibility of an emergent
language shift away from the syncretisms of the high standard English.
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CHAPTER 4: PERSONHOOD

Introduction
Shifting from degrees of peoplehood to the problematic of personhood, this chapter will
outline Falkland Islanders’ historical strategies for capturing wealth through marine resource
exploitation, and explore their current preparations for a commercial offshore oil industry.
Here I do not follow the social contract model of personhood, but rather personhood’s
significance for modern progress deriving from ethnographic and historical research,
particularly the work of John and Jean Comaroff (2001) and James Ferguson (2013) on
southern Africa.
Investigating whether the idea of “the autonomous person” is a European invention,
the Comaroffs found that among the Tswana, personhood is indeed an intrinsic social
construction in which men, in particular, were expected historically to climb ranks and attain
social status. I argue that, like that of the Tswana, the Falkland Islanders’ form of personhood
is not a state of being, but a “state of becoming” (J. L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2001, 271).
However, while colonizing missionaries’ countervailing versions of self-construction may
have eclipsed aspects of the Tswana conception of personhood, as a European-descendant
settler colonial “people,” Falkland Islanders took as their starting point modern notions of
progress. Here, I want to explore how the modern teleology of progress has manifested in
what Ferguson calls “declarations of dependence.” In the context of “surplus population” in
long-proletarianized regions of southern Africa, Ferguson analyzes the uncomfortable ways
in which unemployed laborers pursue social assistance or subordination. Even after
independence from colonialism, Ferguson finds that continuity persists in crafting
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personhood through mutual belonging.206 Promoting such a distributed notion of personhood
at the risk of the colonial trappings of patronage, Ferguson argues that we ought not “treat
‘dependency’ as a disease” (J. Ferguson 2013, 237).
Although Ferguson does not take it up explicitly in that article, it may be fruitful to
apply this treatment of personhood to a related form of dependence, also commonly
perceived as pathological: the “resource curse,” referred to elsewhere as the Dutch disease or
devil’s excrement.207 The resource curse is the label for a set of perilous dynamics that
economists and political scientists argue high dependence on natural resource rents causes:
namely, nondemocratic political orders, stagnant economies and environmental disasters. Of
course, resource dependence has distorted institutions in oil producing nations, such as
Nigeria and Venezuela (Watts 1992; Coronil 1997). As Coronil (1997) analyzed astutely in
the context of Venezuela, rent dependence empowered the landlord state to “sow the oil” in
democracy and perpetuate a myth of progress.
However, while it is important to draw attention to the relationship between global
inequality, state power and energy regimes, as Gisa Weszkalnys (2011) has shown, the
resource curse often acts as a performance of economic theory, a black box that explains the
unexplained. Much of the literature lacks attention to local knowledge and history, so it
remains unclear whether oil is the root cause of problems, or if instead resource dependence
exacerbates already existing afflictions. Moreover, with so much emphasis placed on the
power of the state, proponents of the resource curse hypothesis remove blame from
corporations.
By rethinking the resource curse hypothesis through personhood, I aim to consider
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how the Falkland Islanders attempt to transcend or circumvent political dependence, by
asserting themselves as modern individuals and rightful proprietors of mind, body and nature.
As we shall see, early settlers took advantage of their fortuitous position as exclusive owners
of a bustling extractive frontier to accumulate personal wealth. Heroes of the Argentine cause
decry the dismemberment of the body politic in the unfulfilled quest for territorial integrity,
but as Islanders have become increasingly dependent on revenue from natural resource
licensing, their own sense of personhood has also begun to splinter. Embracing an economic
future based on production and exchange of oil and other marine resources has placed the
Islanders at the mercy of speculative investors in an unstable global commodity market.
This chapter will analyze how the Falkland Islanders try to avoid a “resource curse”
and “future proof” personhood in the formation of various marine resource licensing regimes.
It will describe tensions between the new fiscal scheme and a growing international network
of technical, financial and diplomatic oil trustees. Ultimately, it will show how the Islanders’
resource-dependent personhood has led to its potential eclipse by a charismatic face of
corporate personhood channeled by visiting oil executives. But first, I will relate how the
offshore oil projects, which Argentina’s government considers illegal, are the outcome of
past strategies by Islanders to capture value on the margins of empire, by salvaging
shipwrecks, supporting sealing and whaling, and licensing commercial fishing.

Shipwreck Salvage Accumulation
The Falklands/Malvinas are often portrayed as remote and isolated, but it is important to bear
in mind that before the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, the vast majority of traffic
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans passed by the islands. Vessels struggling to journey
past Cape Horn took refuge in the islands for provisions or ship repair, and even though
agriculture would become central to the Islanders’ economy, ship chandlery and wreck
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salvage helped to define the archipelago as an extractive frontier.
Here, I borrow Anna Tsing’s framing of creative forms of extraction on the edges of
capitalism, which she calls “salvage accumulation” (Tsing 2015b; Tsing 2015a, 63). For
Tsing, salvage accumulation describes the process through which “raw” nonhuman materials
and human labor become understood as capitalist resources and gather value as commodities.
Tsing uses the term primarily to study the global commodity chain of matsutake mushrooms,
comestible fungi that grow in the “ruins of capitalism,” i.e. deforested industrial plantations.
The mushrooms are not produced under conditions of capitalist control, but capitalists may
take advantage of their scalable value by extracting them from noncapitalist value regimes
and circulating them in the market.
In the case of the Falklands, salvage accumulation was first literally just that:
generating wealth by treating shipwrecks as resources. Stranded wrecks were gifts of the built
marine environment, products of “second nature” that settlers could coopt to accumulate
surplus value (N. Smith 1984). Islanders developed a thriving business out of seizing and
beaching wrecks, auctioning off their cargo, repairing them and re-using them as hulks for
storage. In a more violent sense, settlers-turned-pirates could also “make a wreck,” through
more coercive means, by exercising their local authority to detain vessels. Such legal or licit
forms of capturing wealth were perhaps more akin to “plunder” than salvage (Mattei and
Nader 2008). Of course, instances of more overt piracy and theft were also common in waters
outside the rule of law.
As Atlantic historians have examined in other frontier areas, “shipwreck salvage, an
essentially extractive process in which Europeans of all nationalities engaged, yielded
products of high value, high processing costs, and uneven distribution” (Bushnell 2008, 198).
Elsewhere in the Atlantic World, salvors recruited Natives for diving, and wrecks stimulated
trade with coastal Amerindians receiving them, but in the Falklands salvage extraction
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became an economy exclusive to the British settlers, boosting their autonomy as individual
persons. Initially, the settlers repaired and refilled damaged vessels at a lower rate than what
might have been charged in Montevideo or other ports of South America, but as the business
grew, they used their position of considerable advantage to charge several times the cost of
repairing a ship in San Francisco.208 Remarking on the inflated wages settlers obtained from
wreck salvage or ship repair, Governor George Rennie wrote in 1855, “The operatives are
thus enabled to provide themselves with every reasonable comfort, and in many cases to lay
aside considerable sums of money—nor is it any exaggeration to say that a stranger seeing
them on holidays with their families might doubt whether there are (judging by their diets)
any working people in the Colony.”209 In 1855, eleven vessels wrecked on the shores of the
Falklands: two on fire, eight others in extreme distress, several with sick crews or without
food or water; cargo warehoused and reshipped exceeded £21,000, including several hundred
tons of expensive machinery, manufactured goods and copper ore.210
The Falklands’ early development as an extractive frontier for marine resources was
thus built on salvaging the value of wrecks and/or extorting the captains of distressed or
damaged ships. Even today, wrecks carry value as cultural heritage products, and an FIG
Customs officer holds the title “Receiver of Wrecks.” The position consists mainly of
informing local wood lathing hobbyists when pieces of decomposing wrecks come ashore,
but the job is not always as dull as it might sound. During my research, wrecks factored into
an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for an exploration campaign by Noble Energy in
2015. Planned drilling areas were believed to be in the vicinity of “war graves” from World
War I, although seismic surveys were not effective in locating them. There is also one wreck
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from the 1982 war, the British ship Atlantic Conveyor, which rests near one of the wells.
Fortunately, none of the firms are prospecting near Argentine sunken ships from 1982, on
which they have a much more certain bearing. Of course, the wreck of the Belgrano, is
located conveniently outside of oil exploration areas in international waters, hence the
controversy surrounding its sinking. However, in 2015 an Argentine yacht La Sanmartiniana
made its way to the islands and became the center of controversy. Some media sources
reported that the Kirchnerista youth movement La Cámpora owned the yacht, and that its sole
purpose was to show the Argentine flag in protest. While Buenos Aires denied the connection
between that yacht and La Cámpora, its journey did cause a minor air incident when the
British military sent an RAF Typhoon from the Mount Pleasant Complex to warn away
Argentine search aircraft. No blood was spilled, but much to the delight of vitriolic British
trolls in Falklands-themed Facebook groups, the FIG’s “rules of salvage” did apply.211

Sealing and Whaling: An Earlier Era of Oil Exploitation
There is a saying in the islands that the only difference between a sealer and a pirate is
opportunity. Irrespective of the sovereign status of the islands, transient crews, originating
primarily in North America and Britain, had long used the many sheltered harbors, coves and
inlets of the archipelago as bases for plundering the natural abundance of marine mammals.
While the agrarian colonies of Spanish and Ríoplatense settlers were concentrated on
East Falkland Island in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, sealers established
bases primarily in the northwest outer islands of the archipelago. At West Point Island, a
stone’s throw from the northwest corner of West Falkland Island, a hut remains, marking a
key harbor for up to eight American sealing schooners at a time, including gardens,
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introduced pigs and rabbits and a blacksmith shop.212 Focused primarily on the exploitation
of fur seals for pelts sold in China, sealers clubbed and lanced hundreds of creatures in a
single swoop. In smaller satellite islands, they burnt through the thick tussac grass covering
the littoral areas in order to gain access to seal colonies of the interior.213 Having exploited
most of the colonies onshore, by the turn of the twentieth century, they took their hunt to the
open sea.214

Figure 24 Sealers' hut, West Point Island. Author photo.

The Spanish Governors tried to enforce regulations against the unauthorized
destruction of seals in West Point. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Luis Vernet, Political and
Military Commander of the Malvinas for Buenos Aires, also enforced restrictions on sealing,
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which led to his colony’s demise.215 Yet, Vernet was not the only target of American
intimidation in protection of sealing interests: when British Colonial Governor Rennie
arrested and tried Americans who admitted killing sea lions “for fun,” a US warship arrived
in Stanley Harbor, compelling their swift release.216
Marine mammal exploitation was not exclusively a business for “foreigners.” Besides
the Spanish, who tried primarily to restrict rather than encourage marine mammal
exploitation, the French and British settlers took seals and whales (as well as penguin and
albatross eggs), exporting hides and oil for profit.217 Prices varied for sealskins, depending on
whether they were fur seals, sea lions or elephant seals.218 Whale oil was more profitable than
seal oil.219 In the mid-nineteenth century, the FIC, as well as rival merchant John Markham
Dean—in collusion with resident sealers—seized the opportunity for buying and
transshipment of skins, oil and whalebone, as well as supplying sealers with provisions.220
There was no season for sealing, so schooners and cutters sailed into Stanley every 3-4
months to sell their cargo of skins and oil for reshipment, and to cash in their receipts on
drinks, merchandise and ship repair. This system kept the sealers indebted to Mr. Dean and
the FIC year-round.221
While some settlers gained individual autonomy and profited off of the sealing
industry, others saw its presence as a hindrance to “moral progress” in the nascent British
colony. The local Church-sponsored Falkland Islands Magazine attributed a murder, which
215

For Vernet’s plan to regulate sealing and whaling, see Vernet, “Introductory Plan for Sealing and Whaling on
and about the Coasts of Patagonia and its Dependent Islands,” AGN VII, 2-3-6, cited in Bernhardson (1989,
199).
216
Statement of William Edward Murphy, January 9, 1854, B/8, JCNA and Rennie, despatch to Earl of
Newcastle, March 16, 1854, B/8, JCNA, discussed in Bernhardson (1989, 698).
217
For a French naturalist’s account of sealing in the early settlement at Port Louis, see Pernety (2013 [1771]).
218
See Lane Despatch 95, January 29, 1862, JCNA. The British colonial government passed a Seal Skin
Ordinance in 1903, charging a duty not to exceed ten shillings for each skin. Falkland Islands Magazine,
October 1903.
219
In 1846 settlers traded whale oil at 45s. or £562 per barrel. Colonial Report for 1846, JCNA. For an account
of sealing and whaling in the South Atlantic from this period see Clarke (1854).
220
See Lane’s Despatches 22, June 15, 1859, as well as Despatches 101-110, JCNA.
221
Lane Despatch 36, November 17, 1859, JCNA.

170

led to the assailant’s execution, to the social decay caused by the moral standards of sealers
and whalers. Similar to the way the British settlers (and Argentine criollos on the mainland)
regarded gauchos as degenerative (see Chapter 1), the conduct and language of the sealers
and whalers were considered “relics of barbarism.”222 Quality of character aside, sealers and
whalers did operate at the limits of the rule of law; poaching on the far reaches of the
archipelago, such as the Jason Islands, was common.223 The capture of marine mammals
therefore presented settlers with prospects for both commercial blessing and social affliction.
In the 1860s, settlers attempted to develop their own branch of the business by boiling
down penguins. They marched the penguins into large casks called “try pots,” with slits down
their sides for oil to ooze through when pressed. The FIC even tested the market for exporting
penguin skins as “Ladies wear.”224 (Fortunately, this never became fashionable.) The
government passed ordinances to prevent FIC from commercial killing of penguins on Crown
Land, meant not for the preservation of the seabirds, but rather in order to allow settlers to
continue collecting eggs for food.225
Like hydrocarbons today, sealing and whaling inspired speculative investments that
were just as likely to sustain a loss as a profit. The demand for oil fluctuated, collapsing in
the 1870s, and marine mammals became overexploited in the Falklands. This pushed the
industry’s frontier farther out to South Georgia and the South Shetland Islands. Yet, as these
islands were “Dependencies” of the Falklands, Stanley benefited by regulating their whaling
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stations through a licensing regime beginning in 1906.226 This kept the economy afloat as
maritime traffic decreased due to the construction of the Panama Canal. Local residents
speculated about a possible fad diet of canned whale and panicked about their possible
extinction; whalers sang songs about the “thrilling toil” of producing “eight thousand tons of
oil;” and shareholders celebrated full cargoes of up to 40,000 barrels produced per ship.227
Despite numerous efforts to revive it, the industry remained less profitable within the
Falklands. In 1908 the Norwegian whaling company Salvesens, with bases in Scotland and
Leith Harbour on South Georgia Island, constructed a whaling station at New Island.
Governor Allardyce (1904-15) was hopeful that the new station would discourage poaching
and deliver wealth to the Falklands. Nonetheless, the whaling operation at New Island did not
last long, as oil production paled in comparison to the factories on South Georgia.228 Sealing
picked up again momentarily in the Falklands when a temporary halt to the business expired
in the early 1920s. John Hamilton, settler of the western Weddell Island, invested in a shortlived sea lion oil factory.229 Islanders attempted twice more to develop a sealing industry,
unsuccessfully, from 1928-40 and 1949-52 at Albermarle Station, West Falkland Island
(Allan 2010).
Other potential marine resource industries, such as guano from penguins and kelp
seaweed for iodine and potash, never became commercial.230 But the ambiguous, boom and
bust legacy of these early modern marine resources industries endures in Islanders’ personal
aspirations for wealth and progress in present regimes of fishing and oil exploration.
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Figure 25 Falkland Islands Magazine, April 1915. Source: Jane Cameron National Archives (JCNA).

The Post-1982 Commercial Fishing Boom
In the same year as the military conflict between the UK and Argentina, the UN held its Law
of the Sea Convention (1982), which defined the international maritime regulations for
national territory in ocean waters. The convention set the spatial limit of an Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) to extend 200 miles from national coasts. Even after surrendering in
the war, Argentina’s government began regulating its natural resources according to such an
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EEZ, without relinquishing its claim to the islands as part of the nation’s official territory.231
Nevertheless, Falkland Islanders lobbied the UK FCO to create two different fishing zones in
the waters surrounding the islands in 1986 (the FICZ, originally meant for military
protection) and 1990 (the FOCZ).232 The revenue Islanders accumulated from East Asian and
Spanish squid fishing activities subsequently lifted the sheep-based colonial backwater into a
stable economy with a new enclave of wealthy local license brokers.233
Since the establishment of the commercial fishing zones, the FIG has issued licenses
to at least fourteen different companies, accumulating revenue of between £10 and £29
million each year.234 While finfish, such as Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides,
marketed as “Chilean sea bass”) are licensed increasingly in the Falklands and South
Georgia, squid is the most frequent catch. The Doryteuthis gahi (hereafter, Loligo) species,
marketed as “Falklands calamari,” is consumed primarily in Spain, while the larger Illex
Argentinus (hereafter, Illex) species is consumed mostly in Southeast Asia (more on this
distinction in Chapter 6). With a total annual catch of more than 250,000 tons, the squid
fisheries make up 5-10% of the global supply and 50% of the European Union’s Loligo
calamari. The trawlers fishing for Loligo are primarily joint ventures between license-owning
businesses founded by Islanders and Spanish fishing fleets, while the “jiggers” fishing for
Illex tend to be Taiwanese or Korean fleets holding licenses directly from government. No
matter what flag a given vessel flies, the nationalities of crews range from Indonesian and
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Chinese to Filipino and Peruvian.
Without a doubt, fishing has become the most thriving commercial sector of the
islands’ economy, representing 45-60% of GDP on a given year. For nearly two decades, the
business consisted in little more than re-selling annual licenses, but in 2005 the local fishing
companies became more involved in actively managing quota through the establishment of
the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system for all fishing except Illex. Only companies
registered in the Falklands can hold ITQ (allocated based on previous track records of
companies); the system allows for longer-term licenses starting at 25 years. The companies
can borrow money or trade out of the ITQ if they desire. Islanders working in fishing use a
global value chain analysis to explain that their regime is just “first value” because the
Falklands companies are not involved in processing (second value), storing (third value) or
selling (fourth value) products to market (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Gereffi et al.
2005). Some Islanders now “own steel” (e.g. a fleet of trawlers), but they still primarily act as
agents distributing quota. To the chagrin of some Fisheries managers who wish the Islanders
were more committed to the industry, fresh fish is not even sold locally. One can purchase
locally caught fish at either of the two local supermarkets, but only in frozen packages. Other
than the few weeks per year when dozens of jiggers crowd into Stanley Harbour to renew
their licenses, Islanders barely ever see the fishing crews.
However, the inhumane working conditions of the jiggers have been the subject of
heightened controversy. Each year, when the jiggers come in to harbor to collect their
licenses, cases are reported of crewmembers jumping overboard and drowning. Innocuous
stories circulate about homesick crewmembers swimming ashore to call their families and
then return to their ship or their home countries. Some crewmembers jump to escape the
harsh conditions or physical abuse. Even before Argentine media called attention to the brutal
and unfair labor practices of the jiggers, the local Penguin News investigated the problem of
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crew welfare (Watson 2014; Martinez 2015). According to the report, from 1985-2014 there
were 35 reports of “man overboard,” with 89 persons lost at sea, and 122 deaths on board
ships caused by murder, fires or illness. Of course, “sea slavery and servitude” is a worldwide
problem (Urbina 2015). The flag state of the vessel, and not the licensing government, is
responsible for operation on board, and the FIG Fisheries focuses primarily on monitoring
stock, not labor. The Seamen’s Mission Centre, a charitable organization, offers refuge,
advocacy and pastoral care, including telephone access, basic provisions and accommodation
in Stanley.
The scope of violence and inequality is especially stark in Stanley Harbour when
luxury cruise ships escort tourists past the rusty jiggers collecting licenses. Ironically, the
brutal conditions of the factory fish vessels yield far more local wealth, albeit more unevenly
distributed, than tourism does. In short, while FIG and individual Islanders have become
more autonomous persons as tax collectors and quota holders, they have done so through
dependence on over-exploitation of labor. Despite a gap of several decades, these dynamics
show continuity to the construction of personhood through sealing and whaling, as the
Islanders transition into broader scales of resource licensing through mineral extraction.

Figure 26 Jigger in Stanley Harbour for licensing. Author photo.
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A Company Named Desire
Since the early twentieth century, Falkland Islanders have envisioned a rosy future of modern
progress built on oil development.235 Yet, while British and North American geological
studies date back to the 1920s—with seismic surveys beginning in the late 1950s—
production has remained little more than a pipe dream.236
One British petroleum geologist devoted much of his life to making this dream a
reality. In 1977, Colin Phipps, a former Shell employee turned Labour Party politician,
published a controversial Fabian Society pamphlet on oil prospects entitled What Future for
the Falklands? Militant nationalist Argentine writers have vilified Phipps colorfully as an
opportunistic British “pirate” and an “English Indiana Jones” (Bernal 2011, 28–31; 94–96).
But it is important to note that in this original proposal, what Phipps (1977) actually outlined
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was a strategy for resolving the sovereignty dispute with Argentina, through the stated
principles of mutual understanding, cooperation and joint development of hydrocarbons.
While he defended the right of Falkland Islanders to self-determination, Phipps proposed that
an “accommodation” with Argentina would be in their best interests; he viewed offshore oil
development as the catalyst for breaking the geopolitical deadlock.237
Of course, Phipps did not foresee the Argentine invasion and subsequent war of that
same year.238 After the British victory, the FIG sought unilaterally to model an offshore oil
bonanza on the fishing boom of the late 80s. The FIG licensed a round of seismic surveys in
1992, and the oil company licensees, Geco-Prakla (a subsidiary of Schlumberger) and
Spectrum received “letters of comfort” from the UK and “letters of discomfort” from
Argentina. Unfazed, the FIG’s new “Oil Management Team” began crafting mineral resource
legislation, including a fiscal regime of 9% royalties on potential profit.239
At this conjuncture, Argentine Foreign Minister Guido di Tella, serving under the
neoliberal-Peronist President Carlos Menem (1989-1999), launched a “charm offensive”
(“estrategia de seducción”). Exiled in Oxford during the Dirty War, di Tella (1982) had
developed a sophisticated theory of the frontier, which tied technological change to economic
expansion. He proposed that Argentina—a country built on one big wave of agricultural
production—might benefit from expanding its territorial frontier to capture newly discovered
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rent through spurts of mineral resource extraction. Given the opportunity to apply these
insights concretely as Foreign Minister, di Tella considered the autonomous personhood of
the Islanders in unprecedented and creative ways. He made regular phone calls to FIG
Legislative Assembly Members and sent residents hand-signed Christmas cards and Winniethe-Poo teddy bears. As relations warmed, the UK and Argentina formed a Joint Declaration
on Cooperation over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic in 1995. The umbrella
arrangement established a “Special Area” for hydrocarbon exploration in the adjacent
Malvinas Basin that preserved the rights of either party without invoking sovereignty claims
(i.e. it was a non-legally binding political agreement over natural resources, not territory).240
Re-enter Colin Phipps. Having built Clyde Petroleum into a £130 million firm since
its founding in 1977, Phipps had become an authority on offshore oil in the North Sea.241 In
1995 Phipps retired from Clyde, and in 1996 he promptly founded Desire Petroleum, which
partnered with the British firm Lasmo. Desire took its name from the Falkland Islanders’
motto “Desire the Right.” (Falkland Islanders and their British trustees have long held that
the English captain John Davis first sighted the archipelago on his ship “Desire” in 1592,
even though Iberian maps dating from up to fifty years earlier feature a comparable
archipelago.) In total, the new joint licensing regime attracted fourteen oil firms, including
majors and “super majors,” such as Hess and Shell.242 Investing £100 million, the licensees
drilled six exploration wells in the North Falkland Basin in 1998, finding “subcommercial”
amounts of hydrocarbons in five. None of the wells drilled in the Argentine part of the
Malvinas Basin were considered commercial.
When the price of oil fell in 1998, most of the licensees opted not to renew their
licenses in the risky frontier area—with notable exceptions: Argos Resources (a company
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also connected to fishing) and Phipps’ firm Desire Petroleum. Unlike other licensees, a
majority of Desire’s shareholders were Falkland Islanders and British veterans of the 1982
war.243 Rex Hunt, former Falkland Islands Governor during the invasion, sat on the
company’s board of directors. The Falkland Islander shareholders are not necessarily elites,
but as one informant described as “everyday Joe Blows” that have invested anywhere from
£1,000 to £15,000—often significant chunks of their savings. Some of them just buy and sell
shares when they know a rig is contracted and operating or not. These practices indicate that
unlike sealing and whaling, oil conditioned the possibility for a wider distribution of
personhood.
Desire kept the Falklands flame burning long enough for the oil price to rise again,
and in 2004 a new cohort of small risk-takers—Falkland Oil and Gas (FOGL), Rockhopper
Exploration, and Borders and Southern—collaborated to gather further seismic data and drill
again. During the Kirchner administrations, relations with Argentina soured, but this did not
prevent Desire and the other small firms from going forward with their exploration plans.
Having found no commercial hydrocarbons in the “Special Area,” Argentina’s government
backed out of the Joint Agreement in 2007. Argentine congress passed laws declaring the
exploration projects illegal, leading to lawsuits and threats of significant fines and up to
fifteen years in prison, but this legislation is domestic and thus difficult to enforce. Moreover,
none of the licensees had assets in Argentina. On the contrary, Desire and the other firms
courted tens of thousands of private London investors by branding themselves patriotically as
Falklands companies. When the major firms abandoned the area, these smaller ones acquired
vast license areas with high equity participation and 100% interest. The business model was
set up to fund relatively minor seismic surveys costing $10-20 million, then “float” their
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potential on the stock exchanges to raise cash for exploration, and attract partners to pay for
further drilling in exchange for equity.
Assuming that the natural resources in its conservation zones are entirely the property
of the British Overseas Territory, the FIG has continued to license new rounds of drilling
unilaterally. Colin Phipps died in 2009 before the presence of “commercial” oil was ever
confirmed in the South Atlantic, but Desire continued to operate under his son’s direction.
Finally, in 2010 Desire announced that it had discovered oil in the North Falkland Basin.
However, this statement was overly hasty: far from turning water into wine, Desire revealed
that this oil “find” was actually just water (R. Mason 2010).
During that same campaign, Rockhopper, one of the new companies named after a
local penguin species, actually did discover “commercial” amounts of oil (the equivalent of
400 million barrels) in the adjacent Sea Lion well of the North Falkland Basin.244 While
companies have drilled elsewhere, the focus since then has remained primarily on the Sea
Lion complex and adjacent northern wells, particularly Isobel Deep (estimated 500 million
barrel equivalent).245 Through a series of mergers and acquisitions, and subsequent rounds of
exploration and appraisal drilling in 2012 and 2015, Desire combined with FOGL and
“farmed-out” its acreage to Rockhopper, as well as the larger independent firm Premier Oil.
A more “grown up oil and gas company” with experience producing oil in other frontier
areas, Premier’s involvement, as well as that of Houston-based Noble Energy, raised the
expectations once more for oil production in the South Atlantic.
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Figure 27 Oil exploration zone and basins (Blair 2014).
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Figure 28 License Blocks and Falkland Islands Conservation Zones (Premier Oil 2014, 18).
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The Norwegian Model
The Sea Lion discovery was not a typical “gusher” moment. The results of the “wireline”
test, a radioactive measure of the type of rock and potential liquids, were initially unclear.
After a second look, news broke of the first official oil discovery, and the FIG Mineral
Resources department was abuzz with excitement. Government administrators celebrated
with champagne and bacon rolls, and individuals investing in the emergent energy industry
felt as though their patience had finally paid off.
Even after discovering oil, Premier and Rockhopper’s decision on whether or not to
push the final button to develop the Sea Lion well would depend on multiple rounds of
appraisal, as well as the price of oil and the profitability of production. But facing a sudden
potential upsurge in the economy, FIG counselors and directors sought immediate advice for
managing the future. The FIG’s fiscal regime had thus far mirrored much of the UK’s
legislation on North Sea oil, and as a UK Overseas Territory, any potential field development
plan had to be approved not only by locally elected FIG officials, but also ultimately the
Secretary of State for the FCO.246 One of the first steps legislators took was therefore to
travel to Aberdeen, Shetland and Norway to gain insight on crafting appropriate policy.
Economic advisors around the world praise the Norwegian model for avoiding the
problems associated with the resource curse by accumulating a sovereign wealth fund of
nearly $1 trillion. In the whole panorama of “resource-cursed” oil-producing states, Norway
is considered to be the one outlier that escaped. The explanations for why this is the case
generally emphasize sequencing, i.e., Norway’s development of strong democratic
institutions, oversight and monitoring agencies, social safety nets, and so on prior to the
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North Sea bonanza. To make the most of the non-renewable resource wealth, only 4% of
Norway’s sovereign wealth fund enters the national budget. In addition to a corporate tax rate
of 28%, Norway’s fiscal regime features a special tax rate of 50%. This may seem relatively
high, but Norway incentivizes companies in multiple ways, for example by covering up to
50% of equity for exploration, and unlike most other oil producers, the state does not collect
bonuses or royalties. The Norwegian government also owns two thirds of the firm Statoil,
which holds a majority of licenses.
While they intend to emulate the prudent Scandinavians, the FIG’s fiscal regime
differs from Norway’s significantly (besides the obvious demographic disparities). While
Norway offers much of the front-end costs and charges no royalties, FIG licensees must selffund their exploration activities and pay a royalty of 9%. But in order to encourage business
in the frontier regime, the FIG does not collect a Norwegian-style special tax on top of the
islands’ relatively modest 26% corporation tax. Furthermore, the FIG has yet to actually
create a formal sovereign wealth fund. The basic principle borrowed from Norway, then, is
simply to keep its fiscal regime from oil static and separate from other funds.
Still, specifically how to set requirements for distributing funds from oil differently
from other revenue streams has been somewhat inconsistent. At first, the government
proposed an Oil Development Reserve, which would be allocated toward advancing the
energy industry before any other uses. Then, the FIG switched to a more holistic approach to
managing the cash it holds on the stock exchange. Treasury separated financial reporting
practices on non-recurring revenue, such as tax revenue from oil. This allowed the
government to form a budget based on the state of its consolidated fund, without having to
account for the spikes in tax revenues during drilling campaigns.
Of course, this process requires that licensees report their taxes accurately. Yet, when
Rockhopper “farmed-out” 60% of its license for Sea Lion to Premier in 2012, conflicting
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assessments on capital gains led to a serious disagreement. Rockhopper submitted a $122
million tax bill to FIG and took steps to distribute reserves in the UK, but the FIG calculated
corporation taxes tens of millions of dollars greater. The expected proportion due at the time
of the joint agreement or later after “first oil” was also subject to debate, and, after an
agreement in principle, it took 18 months before Rockhopper and the FIG reached a binding
agreement on $146 million ($42 million due immediately). The international business media
picked up on this negotiation, portraying the FIG as greedy and overly conservative (Swint
2013). In turn, the tax debacle did irreparable damage both to the perception of the Falklands
within the oil industry, as well as how ordinary individual Islanders view their government.
Even though the FIG saw itself as emulating Norway by legislating rather than negotiating,
the disagreement gave some Islanders the impression that the government had botched the
regulations. During a dinner party, one Stanley resident compared the tax deal to him waiting
until I got on my bicycle, ready to ride home, and then giving me a bill for the meal. This put
the government in the embarrassing “Catch 22” scenario of: (1) appearing difficult or rude if
they enforce regulations; or (2) coming off as a passive victim of the bullying fossil fuel
juggernaut if they are more accommodating.
Now, to avoid the massive taxes on capital gains, other companies in Rockhopper’s
position might have just sold the company after finding oil. But the way in which
Rockhopper structured the sale of interest in Sea Lion indicated that the firm had aspirations
to grow into a competitive London-listed company.247 The transaction was the first of its kind
in the Falklands, but it would not have been unusual in the North Sea; Rockhopper assumed
that for “to be determined” items in the fiscal regime, the FIG would simply follow the UK
precedent of 20-30 years ago. Instead, the FIG took a hard line approach, insisting on credit
protection with more discretion than the industry anticipated. Rockhopper and other oil
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executives view this fiscal conservatism as symptomatic of a broader state of nervousness
within the FIG not to jeopardize Islanders’ personal fortunes. While Norway’s guiding
principle of long run consistency might have influenced the FIG, oil executives interpreted
the controversy as a short run failure to look at the bigger picture of encouraging
development and progress.
During the 2012 drilling campaign, I had the opportunity to discuss the uneven local
adaptation of the North Sea model with a crew of Norwegians, who were laid over in Stanley
waiting for provisions so that they could return to their search and rescue support vessel. Kaj,
a 25-year old crewmember, training to be captain, was proud and almost evangelical about
his nation’s oil successes. He is usually at sea four weeks at a time, working six-hour
alternating shifts. But Kaj only has to work half of the year and has an annual starting salary
of $70,000. In addition to the comfortable wages for relatively few hours, all members of the
crew receive electronic tablets and enjoy various other perks. Even though they were staying
in the two highest-rated hotels in town, Kaj and his mates were struck and disappointed with
how unprepared the Islanders seemed to be when one of two supermarkets had run out of the
necessary supplies. Unsympathetic to the Islanders on the issue of sovereignty, and wary of
wasting the oil company’s money, he proposed that they get supplies from Chile, Brazil or
even Argentina if the retailers didn’t move faster. Kaj felt that the whole town was “waiting
around for money to flow.”
At a FIG Legislative Assembly meeting, one counselor addressed this sense of
uneasiness. Calling for a public debate, the MLA warned, “Even though oil hasn’t started to
flow, money [from licenses and third party service agreements] has flowed through the
community,” adding, “it is not making people happy, but rather anxious.” Frustrated with the
unpredictable cycles of exploration that bring in revenue one year and leave the next,
individual Islanders wondered what they should be doing now that they were nearing the
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“trigger point” of production. Still, this trepidation was mixed with a gleeful excitement that
the dreams of autonomous personhood and individual wealth could soon be fulfilled. Another
counselor confided in me, “In a year or two we will have enough oil money flowing to bring
tears to your eyes.”

The Missing “Falklink” in the Oil Supply Chain
In Stanley, the aftermath of the Sea Lion discovery brought concern over managing money,
but it also made residents scramble to make sure all of the pieces were in place for the
industry to carry out its work. Uncertainty, curiosity and suspicion colored local residents
perceptions of whether or not the oil companies would use local services, skills and
accommodations as opposed to importing labor and facilities. (In the late 1990s local
business and government elites even held a “sweepstakes” to bet on how much the population
would increase due to oil development.) An extraordinary majority of Islanders identified as
“pro-oil,” but a patchwork of different sectors of the society and economy produced a range
of personal and public anxieties: Will the fishing industry be held to the same high health and
safety standards as oil? Will oil installations damage the image of the Falklands as a pristine
environment for tourists? Will revenue from taxes go to developing roads in the Camp? What
kinds of public works are necessary to make oil happen?
Oil managers ultimately gave credit to the FIG for following through with legislation,
but some industry interlocutors doubted if ordinary Islanders understood just how much
money sat on the horizon. They drew parallels between Stanley and the fictional Northern
Scottish village of Ferness, depicted in the film Local Hero. In this 1983 comedy, an
ambitious Houston oil company representative is tasked with convincing the whole town to
sell their land in order to develop a refinery. The picture represents the locals as naïve and
accommodating, apart from one beach-dweller claiming rights to a key coastal area. The oil
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business elites ultimately become seduced by Ferness’ quaint lifestyle. They embrace
conviviality, concede to the demands of the lone dissenter, and opt instead to develop their
refinery offshore in the North Sea. The head executive, who forms a cosmological bond with
the eccentric beach activist, even offers to donate an astronomical observatory and ecological
research facility to the people of Ferness.
As in Ferness, the question remained how to make oil work for the Falklands rather
than the other way around. As I will also discuss in a different environmental context in
Chapter 6, the terminology Islanders of various stripes employed for oil readiness was the
need for a “gap analysis.” To advance the skilling process and prepare the islands’ economy
for smooth integration with the oil industry, an entrepreneurial former civil servant associated
with Stanley’s Chamber of Commerce summoned the expertise of Terry, a veteran of the
North Sea oil industry living in Aberdeen. A chemical engineer by training, Terry had
worked for Schlumberger, BP, Chevron and Amerada Hess; he spent much of his life trotting
around globe wherever exploration-drilling rigs required geophysical or electrical
engineering, particularly in Southeast Asia.
When Hess employed Terry in the 1990s, the company emerged as a leading partner
of the joint venture for wildcat drilling in the South Atlantic. But when the oil price fell
(leading the company to discontinue its license from the FIG), Hess “diversified” Terry,
transferring him from engineering to business services and logistics. Terry was tasked with
developing a cross-industry “cost reduction initiative” to navigate a way past the accusations
that the petroleum industry was under taxed. To rescue the industry from being “taxed to
hell,” Terry compiled all the costs involved with a full cycle of producing a barrel of oil, and
mapped the entire hydrocarbon value chain.248
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Terry found that at $13 the firms were potentially losing $3 per barrel. In case this did not convince the
Treasury Department, Terry mapped the entire hydrocarbon commodity chain for the North Sea, including both
offshore drilling and onshore support. Armed with the details of specific businesses sprinkled throughout
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With the insights gained from the supply chain-mapping project, Terry was well
positioned to team with Islanders in 2012 and create “Falklink.” The aptly named project,
which has a similar ring to, but a different focus from Lucho’s Enlaces project, is a “skills
gap analysis” designed to align training services from the North Sea and developing local
businesses oriented toward the needs of the oil industry in Stanley. With funding from the
FIG, the Falkland Islands Development Corporation (FIDC) and Scottish Enterprise, Falklink
also held workshops in Stanley and in Aberdeen. Once sufficient data was collected, Terry
dusted off the supply chain map he had created for Hess in the 1990s and compared it with
Stanley’s to identify where the differences laid. This helped Falklink to establish “gaps” to
fill through partnerships with existing businesses, such as food, or by enlisting “migrating”
businesses that may not be likely establish a permanent presence in Stanley like steel mills,
manufacturers of gas turbines, production chemistry labs, etc. Terry had become Stanley’s
“guy in Aberdeen,” and as an intermediary he helped to set up a series of joint ventures to
certify and train Islanders to inspect containers, test pipes and certify rigs.249
From the initial seismic surveys to the production stage, Terry projects that for every
job offshore, there are at least three jobs created onshore: from government resource
managers, technicians, roustabouts, managers and control room operators to maintenance
planners, production engineers, warehouse and pipe yard operators, truck drivers, helicopter
technicians, pilots and more. There is already a semi-fluid labor reserve of casual workers
who hold full-time jobs but gain additional income as tour guides, but they do not have the
skills necessary for these occupations. Moreover, these drivers may be even more needed for
permanent crew changes if oil development occurs. Falklink began to address some of these

Scotland and England, as well as the corresponding number of employees, Terry pressured MPs throughout the
country with the number of jobs that their constituencies would lose if Parliament imposed further taxes on the
industry.
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To complement Falklink, the FIDC created a registry of Stanley suppliers, contractors and oil and gas
operators available to support the oil and gas industry, as well as an oil and gas certification program.
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“gaps,” but there are lingering questions regarding: (1) how to maximize these career
opportunities for local individuals without distorting other businesses and institutions in the
Falklands; (2) when to invest by building housing and other support facilities if the licensees
were not yet fully committed to building production installation; and (3) how to “open up the
doors” to migration for the workforce needed to support one or more well developments.

Engaging in Oil Diplomacy
Islanders’ uncertainty about the future impact of the oil industry became compounded by
economic pressure from Argentina under the Kirchner administrations. The sovereignty
dispute has stunted the growth of the energy industry in two ways.
First, in addition to impacting the traffic of cruise lines and other ships through the
Gaucho Rivero bill (see Chapter 1), a significant area of impact was containerization.
Leaning on all large container companies to ban Falklands containers, Argentina’s
government was successful in influencing the main commercial carrier Hamburg Sud to end
business with the Falklands. Buenos Aires blocked ships found to have containers in the
Falklands, and these are typically charter vessels charging rates of $35-40,000 per day, so the
diminished rewards made the link uneconomical. To circumvent this problem, the Islanders
began using their own leased containers, so-called “grey boxes” not tied to any shipping line.
The Falklands’ only container ship (apart from the Ministry of Defense’s cargo vessel) flies
the neutral flag of Antigua and Barbuda in order to gain access to South American ports.
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Figure 29 Container yard, Stanley. Author photo.

Second, the political controversy has made the Falklands a difficult place for the FIG
or its licensees to attract new partners with the required capital to commercialize. In addition
to the added risks of the North Falkland being a new basin with complicated supply chain
logistics in its remote location (i.e. a “frontier area,” see Chapter 5), the geopolitical deadlock
has limited the bidding process for mergers and acquisitions.250 Banks that function as arms
of government, such as many of the firms associated with the oil industry in Asia, are closed
for business. And while British or international banks with no business in Argentina have
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Anadarko Petroleum, for example, whose board of directors included former US military commander Kevin
Chilton, reportedly flew a private jet to Stanley to bid for a partnership to develop Sea Lion, but when insiders
decoded the plane’s license and tipped off tabloids, the ensuing embarrassment caused the company to issue a
statement that they were backing out (Hawkes 2012). Petroleum geologists employed by super majors, such as
Shell have similarly received FIG mineral resources managers with enthusiasm, but because Shell has assets not
only in Argentina but also in neighboring ally countries Uruguay and Brazil, the company did not pursue it
further.
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been supportive of oil in the Falklands, the big UK banks with branches in Argentina cannot
finance the oil licensees for fear of the Argentine government freezing their assets.251
In spite of these difficulties, the FIG has altered its geopolitical and diplomatic
strategies since the “watershed” moment of the Sea Lion discovery. Courting opposition
lawmakers throughout the Americas and beyond, counselors use the promise of oil in the
South Atlantic to portray allying with Argentina as tantamount to foolishly missing out on
business opportunities. UK FCO Minister Hugo Swire went as far as to say, “I think
ironically that the Falklands can play a part in the economic recovery of Argentina, but that
requires Argentina to recognize the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, and to recognize the
fact that there are commercial opportunities here in the interest of both parties.” The Islanders
also point to licensees Premier Oil, which has licenses in Brazil and now-privatized Mexico,
as well as Noble Energy, which holds exploration licenses from Nicaragua, to demonstrate
that being party to the Falklands’ energy industry is not mutually exclusive with holding
concessions in Latin America.
During my fieldwork, delegations visited the islands from Uruguay, Brazil and
Trinidad and Tobago, and a potential oil partnership was a major theme for each. The
Uruguayans, representing the minority moderate to conservative opposition parties,
emphasized a history of cooperation in shipping, education and medical services and
expressed hopes for new partnerships to enhance common objectives for business, tourism
and culture. They took pride in the fact that gauchos from Uruguay had a presence in the
islands dating back to the nineteenth century. Uruguay, much like the Falklands, is poised to
develop an offshore oil and gas industry and is also planning development of a deepwater
port. A modest start would be a direct air link. This is Deputy Trobo of Uruguay’s dream: as
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he put it, “to board a plane in Montevideo, and after a snack, in two and a half hours we
would be walking along the waterfront of Stanley. And that [the Islanders] could do the same
in Montevideo.” Islanders that have become involved with the oil industry told me that the
only reason Uruguay, Chile or other neighboring countries continue to support Argentina’s
sovereignty claim is because they have something to lose by severing ties. But introducing a
couple of producing oil fields in the South Atlantic, and all of the sudden there's something to
be gained in that relationship with the Falklands. From this perspective, oil becomes a
“tipping point” for potential partners on the continent to bypass Argentina’s sanctions and
collaborate with the Islanders.

Figure 30 Uruguayan delegation. Author photo.

The Brazilian group consisted of scholars interested in geopolitics and international
law, while the Trinidadians represented the commercial oil and gas industry without
addressing the sovereignty question. The Brazilians were split between supporting the
Islanders’ wishes and giving lip service to Argentina’s claim, but all were impressed at the
comfortable living standards achieved in Stanley. However, they judged that the population
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of just under three thousand residents would be too small for having the minimal scale for
being viable, so they urged “more traditional” Islanders fearful of being overrun by new
national and ethnic groups to consider a more inclusive immigration policy. If there were a
way out of the political quagmire, Brazil could eventually supply pipe or other materials or
services, but Stanley Chamber of Commerce members remain suspicious of their “nearest
and dearest neighbors turning the tap on and off.”
Like the evangelical Norwegians, the Trinidadians presented themselves as authorities
on how to make oil work for the producing country, and not the other way around. The
Trinidadian trade mission showcased similar skilling and training as the Falklink project: the
group suggested that they would provide the same expertise as Aberdeen, only closer and
cheaper. Based on their visit, they envisioned townspeople as future mechanics, engineers,
drillers and health and safety officers. They invited Islanders to Trinidad so that they could
actually “touch and feel” platforms on live facilities or simulators before venturing onto the
real thing. Many Falkland Islanders saw the Trinidadians as relatable for being from a
comparable “small island” state.252 By connecting with Trinidad and Tobago, as well as other
Commonwealth countries modeled on the North Sea (particularly the provinces of eastern
Canada), Falkland Islanders have become enmeshed in a technopolitical network of not just
diplomats, politicians and foreign ministers, but also engineers, business groups, economists
and energy experts in the Americas.
Throughout their oil diplomacy efforts, the message Islanders seek to make clear,
which is obvious to nearly all of them already, is that they undoubtedly want to be British.
Trade missions unabashedly leverage their BOT status as an advantage. Chamber of
Commerce members described it as “quite the franchise,” a “dependent partnership” or a
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“modern-day protectorate.” The good governance clause enforcing UK standards in the FIG
constitution may limit autonomy of individual personhood, but Islanders concede that it
provides oil companies dealing with a small country like the Falklands the reassurance that
the government is going to uphold its agreements.

The Charisma of Corporate Personhood
While the Latin American delegations met with select representatives in government and the
private sector, another special visit from one of US oil firm Noble Energy’s most senior
executives drew a full crowd (75-100 people) to Stanley’s Narrows Bar. The Falklands’
weekly newspaper, the Penguin News, hailed Cara as an “inspirational Noble lady” for being
the highest paid woman among a 2009 list of 500 Houston-based oil executives.
A loud “Hey-yaw!” from Noble’s Texan country manager hushed the eager crowd
and the presentation began. Cara described how, as an impressionable middle child of five
from Canada, she had done an internship in the Arctic Circle and felt much nostalgia arriving
here in the sub-Antarctic. For Cara, the settler colonial, circumpolar “energy frontier” milieu
provided the pretext for Noble’s compatibility with the Falklands (Nuttall 2010). Cara later
commented on this with me, connecting her experience prospecting for uranium mining
companies in First Nation territories to exploring for oil in the Falklands. Spending a summer
“in an Inuit community that reminded [her] a lot of the Falklands,” Cara would “map, tent,
and fly out.” Cara explained that Noble takes explorations seriously, particularly in a
“frontier area” like the Falklands, and she defined a frontier area as one where no oil industry
is yet established with production and infrastructure.
Cara quoted Noble's slogan, which, to her, sets it apart from her previous employers
in the oil industry: “Energizing the World, Bettering People’s Lives.” “We are all about this,”
she affirmed. “We are a bunch of people in a company, not a corporate body.” Similar to
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Shever’s (2012, 169) description of a Shell executive building corporate community
partnerships in a shantytown bordering a refinery in Buenos Aires, Cara portrayed Noble not
just as a corporation or a legal “person,” but also as a collectivity of people. Emphasizing
how the company, like all human beings, wants to “make a difference,” she universalized the
company’s drive for revenue to an essentialized notion of anthropogenic progress. In doing
so, she eliminated unequal forms of personhood and represented its employees’,
shareholders’ and partners’ interests as reciprocal to the Islanders’ desires.
While she impressed Islanders with Noble’s overall success rate, Cara, in an assertion
of corporate “transparency,” informed her audience of the low probability of oil discovery.
She gave some preliminary figures from the over 40,000 square kilometers of seismic
surveys conducted to date. There was a potential for 14 billion barrel gross resource
equivalent, out of which they might be able to recover 20-30% at the most. Here the
presentation got technical, despite the stated principle of transparency, which Barry (2013)
argues makes knowledge not only available, but also marked by significant absences.
Nevertheless, Cara was very careful to apologize for using jargon, and to describe the “play
types” of offshore minerals, she referenced recognizable features of the onshore landscape.
For example, she compared the depositional fan to the iconic “stone runs” of the Falklands
that had mystified Darwin when he visited the islands during his journey of the Beagle.
Returning to the self-defining question of “who we are?” Cara paused and theorized:
“a company isn't just an entity, it's actually people.” Here, Cara employed a depoliticizing
discourse that decomposes the notion of corporate personhood: she suggested that the
corporation is a group of well-meaning, human individuals. She said that Noble is “true to its
values” and that integrity is one of its differentiating aspects. To drive home the point, Cara’s
tone became almost menacing. “We take this very seriously. We do not accept limits.” True
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to Marx’s theory that capital does not abide limits, but rather turns them into barriers to
overcome, Cara tells us that Noble believes “in limitless possibilities.”253
During the reception, I spoke at length with Zach, one of Noble's exploration
managers. Young for his rank, Zach reminded me of a Texas card shark despite his Midwest
origin. He even had a habit of using gambling metaphors. In describing cost assessment, he
differentiated between a “rig rate” and a “spud rate.” It costs millions of dollars each day just
to rent a rig vessel, he explained, let alone to actually begin drilling. Zach pointed out that
companies like Exxon or Shell are seen as reaping huge amounts of money but actually only
get 6-7% on return. “It is a numbers game.” Zach explained that there is only a 20% chance
of commercial discovery in the Falklands, and it's likely that something will go awry—even
when Cara and Zach are willing to “bet their shirts on success.”
More modest than Cara in his expectations, Zach conceded that the situation with
Argentina was something they had to consider. He was among those who had received letters
threatening legal action, and it had in fact influenced Noble to pull employees off a plane
before landing in Argentina. Still, Zach said that the geopolitics would not impact
development potential. He gleaned from FIG that there is an “official political policy” on the
one hand, and a “business reality” on the other. Immigration and labor recruitment are not
issues either, as Noble will import workers from the United States or elsewhere. Contrary to
Cara's speech about Noble’s commitment to the community, Zach indicated that they would
offer very few permanent jobs.
Even if direct benefits might be minimal and short-lived, Falkland Islanders informed
me that they were inspired by Noble’s arrival. On that same visit, Cara gave another
presentation to the business community in Stanley’s Chamber of Commerce. Derek, one of
the attendees, told me that he was especially impressed with the feeling of informed
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confidence that Noble brings. As he put it, “Noble means that the American dollar is here.”
One of the only Falkland Islanders with a high-ranking position with one of the oil licensees,
Derek is far from naïve. He pays attention to the seismic survey results and recalibrates his
expectations when firms scale back engineering designs, or downgrade an exploration well.
He came to understand how shareholder money factors in to the companies’ strategies for
risking and ‘de-risking.’ Nonetheless, Derek saw lasting benefit for the livelihood of the
Islanders, as a “people,” from Noble and its shareholders “driving everything.” For Islanders
like Derek, Noble’s corporate personhood had become a panacea for both the peril of a
potential resource curse and problem of contested peoplehood in the sovereignty dispute. The
settler colonial protectorate thus acquired new local meaning as a potential oil producer.

Conclusion
Focusing on marine resources, this chapter has traced how settlers of the Falklands/Malvinas
have crafted personhood through social incorporation into global commodity markets.
Treating shipwrecks as resources, settlers took advantage of their geographical position at the
limits of the modern Atlantic and Pacific Worlds to extract value through “salvage
accumulation” (Tsing 2015a). Settlers captured wealth from sealing and whaling by colluding
to offer transshipment and supply services that forced transient crews into their debt;
speculative investments in industrial manufacture of animal oil yielded mixed results. After
the 1982 war, Islanders lobbied for the rights to establish a commercial fishing license
regime, which has swelled government coffers, as well as the wallets of a new enclave of
elite license brokers.
Seeking to establish an offshore oil industry on the heels of the commercial fishing
boom, the Islanders’ oil licensees began drilling for oil in the 1990s, in cooperation with
Argentina. Oil findings in the South Atlantic were not declared “commercial” until the Sea
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Lion discovery of 2010, but by this time, Argentina’s government had rescinded their
agreement on joint development of hydrocarbons. Nevertheless, bracing for
commercialization, the Islanders have begun to prepare for oil production. Attempting to
model a stable fiscal regime on Norway’s sovereign wealth scheme, the FIG experienced
difficulty enforcing it, as disagreements over capital gains taxes followed the Sea Lion
discovery. Entrepreneurial Islanders enlisted North Sea experts to identify missing links in
the oil and gas supply chain. And to counter the Argentine government’s challenge to the oil
industry, they have engaged in new forms of oil diplomacy, spreading the message that oil
concessions in the South Atlantic are protected by popular consent to British sovereignty.
Multiple Islanders described the time between the Sea Lion discovery and Premier’s
unknown decision on developing the well as a “nervous period.” With poised trepidation,
local residents deliberated about what kinds of changes their society might undergo, and what
they could do to: (a) profit from it as individuals in ways that will last beyond the depletion
of reserves; and (b) do so in a way that will not risk losing their identity as “a people.” Oil
executives like Cara, exploring other areas in Falklands waters, dazzled Islanders with a
charismatic face of corporate personhood, characterized by swashbuckling confidence and
the power of the US dollar.
However, from the oil industry’s “sub-surface perspective,” the question was not how
but when the stuff will ultimately be extracted, “monetized” and sold to the highest bidder.
Oil company representatives were quite candid that if the islands were part of Argentina, the
regulations and logistics might actually have been easier. One confidential interlocutor went
as far as to say that the whole operation would be smoother for the oil companies if the
Islanders would just go back to the UK. Nonetheless, being designated a BOT has
conditioned the possibility for the energy industry to emerge in the South Atlantic, and oil
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prospects have made the Islanders more buoyant in their own capacity as autonomous
persons.
In short, some Islanders see potential oil wealth as a way to “buy” full decolonization.
UK government administrators hesitate to link oil with independence, reflecting on doubts
over the saga of Scotland; however, local residents envision possibilities not only for selfgovernment but also for reimbursing the UK for the costs of defense. Discussing the desire
for independence, one Camp resident said, “If you’ve got the money, and you’ve got the
commodity that the world wants, then you’re in it…nothing in this world today is about the
ethics of human rights. It’s nothing to do with human rights. It’s all about trade.” Here, rather
than asserting how self-determination is “enshrined” in the UN Charter—the FIG’s usual
argument for peoplehood— the Islander “dividuates” himself, declaring instead a higher
dependence on the power of capital.254
This formation of personhood based on the willful dependence on commercial
markets for marine resources parallels the slow devolution of political power in
decolonization. Here, in what Coronil (1997, 221–22) might have viewed critically as a
subtype of “rentier bonapartism,” the settlers do appear to exchange “the right to rule for the
right to make money.” Yet, this sense of dependent personhood conjures previously
unimaginable possibilities of new state independence. The next chapter will capture some of
the first tragic outcomes of this Faustian trade-off through an examination of the politics of
infrastructure.
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INTERLUDE | HYDROCARBON PRINCIPLES
The FIG and its licensees have undertaken a series of socioeconomic impact assessments
since the Sea Lion discovery to address some of the concerns discussed above, but the
question of state capacity remains a significant lacuna. During my research, the FIG invited
me to apply for a tender to conduct a social impact monitoring study for an upcoming round
of oil exploration. I was flattered and intrigued at this opportunity to apply my work
concretely, and to contribute something of practical value to my host community. However,
because the FIG, as well as the oil companies would fund the study, taking the position might
have risked being banned from research and travel in Argentina. After considering the ethical
and political consequences, I ultimately declined to apply, but I observed closely the
“hydrocarbon principles” that resulted from these studies.
First, to manage what the industry glosses as “non-technical risk” (NTR), in
2011/2012 Rockhopper hired a group of consultants from Plexus Energy Ltd to conduct the
first report that was specific to the potential development of Sea Lion. From Sea Lion alone,
Plexus estimated that revenues could more than double the islands’ GDP (£116.9 million).
(Of course, this would depend on the prevailing oil price.) However, remoteness and other
logistical issues, such as restrictions on migration and transportation, a relatively small local
workforce, limited housing, and a lack of infrastructure (as I discuss in Chapter 5) presented
limitations. The report saw upgrading, expansion of port facilities, investment in housing and
immigration reform as the most serious risks. (Wagner, Jones, and Dowse 2014).
Subsequent to the Rockhopper-Plexus study, the FIG initiated its own “Oil Readiness
Programme,” including another socio-economic impact study and monitoring programme,
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which consultants from a company called Regeneris carried out in 2012/2013 and 2015.
Unlike the Plexus report, this study was not limited to Sea Lion; the consultants continued to
base their predictions around the one Sea Lion oil field, but they expanded their figures for
alternate scenarios of various combinations of 1-3 oil fields, as well as a possible gas field,
LNG plant and on-going exploration. The consultants recommended that FIG build up to 40
homes per year and/or build more portakabins for the surging population. As I discuss
elsewhere, the FIG was also encouraged to actively recruit migrant laborers and develop
various forms of infrastructure, through a capital investment plan centered on a proposed new
port.
Regeneris found that the primary source of distress leading into potential oil
development has been over how to preserve the “Falklands Way of Life.” To most
respondents, this meant, again, the sense of safety to leave one’s house unlocked and keys in
the ignition, and the “community” and “cohesion” stemming from a small population where
everyone recognizes each other. But with an estimated peak of around 550 extra on-shore
workers (or up to 800 if an onshore liquefaction plant is built), including support for 170 jobs
in the islands and 125 offshore, the economic effects multiply and accelerate. This
demographic change threatens to distort the degrees of imperial sovereignty in the settler
colonial protectorate. The transformation would likely lead to more expansive urbanization of
Stanley and further depopulation of Camp, as well as the need for fewer constraints for
migrant workers. Those consulted, however, highlighted “a preference for English-speaking
immigrants and for avoiding too great an influx from any one nation/community” (Regeneris
Consulting Ltd 2013, 17). Still, the consultants acknowledged that migrants should be able to
get access to permanent resident status and property ownership in a more efficient way.
Regeneris recommended that FIG consider adopting a “proactive” recruitment policy geared
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toward families from “certain countries,” as well as reforms to open borders through existing
legislation (see findings discussed in Chapter 3).
While Regeneris’ social impact monitoring program enlisted local partners, some
Falklands residents viewed the consultations as a frivolous “check-box” exercise. Regeneris
faced some resentment, especially when the consultants assumed that townspeople had
already experienced a greater surge in population when the Mount Pleasant military complex
was built. This revealed that the researchers did not understand how removed the military
base is from Stanley, and how little interaction there usually is between ordinary Stanley
residents and military personnel. Other concerns were the availability of accommodations not
just for oil, but also for tourism. There were only about 200 respondents to the Regeneris
survey, so while it might have established a baseline, it was not comprehensive. Ultimately, it
revealed few surprises.
To re-center its role in the new commodity economy, FIG has crafted policies on
mineral resources in which the temporalities of peoplehood and personhood figure
prominently. FIG’s Executive Council published a list of “Hydrocarbon Principles” (FIG
Policy Unit 2013), setting out the Islanders’ regulatory powers:
1. Hydrocarbons in Falkland Islands waters belong to the people of the
Falkland Islands and their exploitation must be to the benefit of the people
of the Falkland Islands, both those of today and future generations.
2. The Falkland Islands Government will maintain constant supervision and
control over all hydrocarbon activities within the Falkland Islands
Designated Area.
3. Petroleum discoveries must be efficiently managed and exploited to
maximise economic recovery and to ensure the development of a longterm industry presence that will benefit the Islands for decades to come.
4. Development of the hydrocarbons industry must ensure the protection and
conservation of the Falkland Island’s environment and biodiversity.
5. Development of the hydrocarbons industry must take into consideration
existing commercial activity and promote the development of local
business capacity.
6. The exploitation of finite natural resources will be used to develop lasting
benefits to society across the whole of the Falkland Islands.
7. Transparency and accountability must be present throughout the
hydrocarbon development process from all parties involved.
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8. The Falkland Islands will only consider onshore hydrocarbon facilities if
they are considered to be in the best interests of the Falkland Islands, and
can be proven to satisfy all of the above policy goals.
The above emphasis on temporal security and insecurity is mine. Here, FIG articulates
Islanders’ visions of prosperity while simultaneously claiming authority as a people. As I will
discuss further in Chapter 5, seizing the moment to control resources thus becomes a way in
which to re-assert political stability.
FIG’s Legislative Assembly issued a similar statement, rejecting lawsuits filed against
the oil licensees in Argentina, in which they collapse the free market ideology of selfimprovement with the modern liberal notion of self-determination. Citing the 2013
referendum, the elected counselors defend the “right to develop our economy, including the
hydrocarbons industry…” as well as the “inalienable right to determine our own future” (FIG
Legislative Assembly 2015). Mitchell’s (2011) suggestion that energy from fossil fuels is a
means of making democratic claims thus resonates deeply in the current context of the
Falklands. In this particular hydrocarbon protectorate, settler peoplehood combines with
corporate personhood, and the universality of self-determination serves to eliminate fetters
for the global commodity market.
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CHAPTER 5: INFRASTRUCTURE

Introduction
On the fringe of both an ongoing sovereignty dispute and an emergent energy industry,
settlers of the Falklands find themselves compelled to ask two related questions: “Are we a
people?” and “Are we commercial?” These key questions have contrasting temporal
dimensions. As explored in Chapter 3, “peoplehood,” is a concept in constant flux, yet built
on a shared past (Wallerstein 1987). Personhood, specifically corporate personhood, on the
other hand, is future-oriented: it refers here only to the capacity of oil firms to produce a
profit, a fraction of which Falkland Islanders may recuperate through taxes and royalties. The
Falkland Islanders and their oil licensees are thus crafting a polity at the cusp of overlapping
frontiers: (1) a settler colonial frontier on the one hand; and (2) an oil frontier on the other.
Incorporating historical and field-based observations of local aspirations, I argue in this
chapter that the installation of temporary infrastructure, designed to build the Falklands into
an offshore oil frontier, ultimately reinforces the permanent instability of the Islanders’ settler
colonial frontier.
The chapter begins by building on Michael Watts’ (2014) definition of the oil frontier,
as well as anthropological research on the materiality and temporality of infrastructure, in
order to theorize what I call a permanent frontier. I discuss the chronic temporariness of
infrastructure in the Falklands’ built environment, and how it contributes to the islands’
frontier status. Suspended local plans to build a deepwater port reveal how the Islanders’
piecemeal settlement process is the result of contradictory claims of permanent residents on
the one hand, and “expat” government officials on the other.
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Building on Timothy Mitchell’s (2011) Carbon Democracy, the chapter focuses on
the “how” of oil production. I analyze the techno-social relations of the energy industry as an
object of ethnographic inquiry in its own right, and pay particular attention to the
construction of the aptly named “Noble Frontier” temporary dock facility (TDF), built to
accommodate drilling by Noble Energy and Premier Oil. On the surface, the infrastructural
development of the Noble Frontier appears to unite the dual desires of the Islanders
(peoplehood and commerciality), yet its temporary nature forecloses possibilities for local
aspirations. In analyzing how Falkland Islanders and their oil licensees try to secure their
disputed place in the South Atlantic in contradictory ways, the chapter ultimately attends to
the unintended consequences of infrastructure that allow for a “breakdown” between
technologies and social meaning (Larkin 2008). That is, ethnographic description of the
construction of the Noble Frontier on an ill-suited Gulf of Mexico template reveals not only
how temporary infrastructure fails to realize the settlers’ long-term desires for peoplehood,
but also how the permanent frontier’s unruliness limits the immediate profitability of oil.
Having seized control of resources in what had long been a classic frontier region, i.e. “at the
limits of central power” (Markoff 2006, 78), the settlers now seek to model an oil bonanza on
their heritage of salvage accumulation.

Theorizing the Permanent Frontier
As I outline in the next section, the settler colonial situation of the Falklands is
somewhat of an anachronism. Oil frontiers, in contrast, are currently pervasive. As we near
an end to the age of “easy oil,” firms and petrostates continue to enclose and extract vast
offshore reservoirs and shale deposits through “unconventional methods” like deepwater
drilling and hydraulic fracturing (fracking). Geographer Michael Watts has defined the oil
frontier as “the spatial, temporal, and, of course, vertical dynamics in which fields within a
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province are discovered, developed, and recovered—from primary reserve creation to tertiary
recovery from existing ‘matured’ reservoirs” (Watts 2014, 194).255 According to Watts, “oil
frontiers have no simple life cycle; they are dynamic and unstable, they are discovered and
rediscovered—opened and reopened—rather than simply open, closed, and depleted. In short,
the oil frontier appears as a permanent prospect” (Watts 2014, 193). Juxtaposing Watts’
geographical definition of the oil frontier with anthropological work on the temporality of
infrastructure, I propose a concept that I call the permanent frontier: a spatialization of
temporal insecurity comprising durable processes of short-term fixed capital. Specifically, in
the context of the Falklands, I will analyze how temporary infrastructure, designed to
advance the oil frontier’s commercial prospects, eclipses settler colonial claims to authority,
leaving conflicts over territory and sovereignty unresolved.
Recent ethnographic research on the politics of infrastructure in extractive frontiers
has focused primarily on the relations between and among material practices, social values
and global connections (Tsing 2005; P. Harvey 2014). While Fernando Coronil (1997)
argued persuasively that the Venezuelan state consolidated its power through magical
illusions that oil is natural wealth rather than material substance, others influenced by
Mitchell (2011) have highlighted how the materiality of carbon energy has conditioned the
possibility for democratic politics in resource frontiers. Through examination of quotidian
experiences with the materiality of infrastructure, social scientists have captured how
corporate elites, resource managers or marginalized publics apply pressure to either enhance
or challenge hegemonic regimes of property, citizenship and capital accumulation.256 In his
sweeping study of the controversies surrounding the construction of the disputed Eurasian
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Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, Andrew Barry (2013) analyzed how particular
materials, such as coating, alloys or cracks perform political functions for the oil business and
its antagonists as evidence of either transparency or deception. In the oil frontier of
Equatorial Guinea, Hannah Appel (2012b; 2012a) described how the spatiality of
infrastructure within onshore enclaves and offshore rigs produces an image of global
capitalism as disentangled and modular. And in nearby São Tomé and Príncipe (STP), Gisa
Weszkalnys (2015) has shown how measures of oil as geological matter allow industry
representatives and ordinary citizens to speculate about the indeterminate potentiality of “first
oil.”
While this sustained focus on materiality is helpful for considering how oil as a
substance shapes political imaginaries, I am especially concerned here with the temporal
work of oil infrastructure (Rogers 2015a). How does infrastructure serve as a medium
through which actors engage with the conflicting temporalities of anticipatory politics
associated with resources, such as oil? How does the adaptability or customizability of oil
infrastructure become key to negotiating shifting phases of stability, security and sovereignty
in frontier areas? And what happens when the temporality of infrastructure in an oil frontier
is nested within other regimes of frontier time with overlapping scales, markets and political
objectives?
These questions warrant our attention in a time of increased crisis, vulnerability and
ambiguity regarding the perceived abundance, scarcity and political-ecological impact of
non-renewable natural resources. As Ferry and Limbert (2008, 4) point out, resources
“inscribe teleologies; and they are imbued with affects of time, such as nostalgia, hope,
dread, and spontaneity.” One such well-traveled teleology is the aforementioned “resource
curse” theory. The boom and bust cycles associated with extracting non-renewables
presuppose non-contemporaneous presents and pasts, as well as futures (Koselleck 2004;
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Appadurai 1981; 2013). For example, Mandana Limbert (2010) has described how
perceptions of oil’s depletion in Oman made infrastructures and social relations associated
with the reserve’s career in time seem momentary and passing. Like the indeterminacy of
“first oil” in STP (or the Falklands), forecasts for the end of oil in Oman are in a perpetual
state of deferral.
To comprehend how these temporary phases of anticipation between speculative
exploration and near-total exploitation manifest in frontier areas, Akhil Gupta’s (2015) notion
of the temporality of infrastructure as “suspension” is especially useful here. By analyzing
how extensive investment projects become delayed or incomplete, Gupta draws attention to
the temporal gap between infrastructure’s promise and performance. This resonates closely
with the emergent oil frontier of the Falklands, where the industry’s imperative for high-risk,
low-cost exploration interrupts Islanders’ plans for permanent infrastructure, in turn
prolonging their unstable political status as settlers. While Gupta is right to call attention to
the idle incompleteness of long-term projects, I focus here on the role of temporary
infrastructure in the active suspension of the frontier. In doing so, I will show how petrocapitalism and settler colonialism complement and compete with one another in a
“conjuncture of temporal crisis” (D. Scott 2014, 70). I argue that makeshift forms of
infrastructure not only engage future uses for oil production, but also preserve the Islanders’
provisional political status in a liminal stage of settler colonial nostalgia.257 Even though
Islanders view infrastructure as a mechanism for resolving the contradictory desires of
retrospective peoplehood and prospective personhood, the permanent frontier ultimately
reproduces this temporal tension.
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Chronic Temporariness
In spite of family resemblances, the South Atlantic differs from other oil frontiers in multiple
ways. First, of course, unlike onshore oil frontiers in the Niger Delta or the Amazon, no
indigenous population inhabits the extraction site, and forms of political violence,
dispossession and confrontation are rare.258 Second, while the North Falkland Basin saw
twenty-two wells explored by 2013, seafloor of comparable area in the North Sea might have
something like 11,000 tapped reserves (Kemp 2011). Unlike in the Gulf of Mexico, wells
explored thus far in the North Falkland Basin have not met the technical criteria of “ultradeep,” yet oil industry personnel describe it as a similarly insecure, harsh drilling
environment.259 Gusting winds, swelling waves and frigid temperatures make the work
hazardous. Positioned 8,000 miles away from the UK, and limited by the “Gaucho Rivero”
ship ban, the Falklands are also physically remote and artificially secluded by polar-national
borders (Dodds and Benwell 2010).
These factors of harshness and remoteness contribute to the energy industry’s formal
categorization of the Falklands as a “frontier area” (Wagner et al. 2014), but perhaps more
central to that definition is a general lack of infrastructure. One oil consultant translated the
islands’ dearth of oil infrastructure to me in industry terms as “more risk for cost growth.”
Until oil is produced and revenue from royalties begins streaming in, the FIG has maintained
a relatively conservative policy of allowing the private sector to take the lead on
infrastructure development. As one FIG director put it, “Oil sits at the bottom of the sea.
They want to bring it out and make money out of it, and we'll welcome and want them to do
that. But somewhere that's got to play into our economy locally, as well.” The head of a local
fishing company who won the tender to construct a temporary hotel for the oil workers

258
259

See Watts (2008); Peel (2010); Sawyer (2004); Orta-Martinez and Finer (2010); Cepek (2012).
See Austin et al. (2007); Bond (2013); Watts (2015).

211

waxed poetic: “We are selling the shovels, not digging the gold.”
While part of the FIG’s policy includes ambitious plans for long-term fixed capital
projects (including a deepwater port as I describe in detail below), much of the islands’
infrastructure remains temporary. The vast roads network outside of Stanley is unpaved.
Containers are refitted for innumerable uses, and portakabins threaten to outnumber houses.
“Kit schools” and “kit churches” are propped up out of containers. And all rural residences in
Camp—including some occupied for over 150 years—are still referred to as “settlements.”
Even though the Falkland Islanders are adamant about their right to continue residing on the
islands, the manner in which they establish their dominion as a people appears by and large
transient.

Figure 31 Unpaved track on West Falkland Island. Author photo.

I argue that this temporary quality of infrastructure signals the materialization of what
member states of the UN C24 call the Falklands’ “anachronistic colonial situation.” Unlike
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settler colonies predicated on “the elimination of the Native” (Wolfe 2006) whereby nationstates have become naturalized to the point of widespread forgetting and disavowal of
genocide, the Falkland Islanders are constantly reminded of their contested peoplehood
without having colonized Native predecessors. The imbroglio calls into question how a
population can identify as “British to the core” on the global periphery. Infrastructure acts as
the vector through which Islanders try to constitute their peoplehood and belonging amid the
socio-material instability of being on the (literal and metaphorical) edge of capital
accumulation.
A prime example of frontier-making by means of temporary infrastructure is the
Falklands’ shipping apparatus. Since the 1982 war, the Falkland Islanders have relied for
shipping on a temporary floating dock in Stanley Harbour called the Falklands Interim Port
and Storage System (FIPASS), receiving supplemental cargo from Ministry of Defense
(MoD) vessels at the military-operated Mare Harbour near Mount Pleasant. The British
military installed FIPASS after the war and FIG inherited it as a stopgap before a
hypothetical permanent port. Having been a “long-term interim” infrastructure for over three
decades, it is only a matter of time before the rusty dock falls apart.
Previous oil exploration campaigns utilized FIPASS, but when Noble started scoping
for a 2015 exploration campaign, the firm’s inspectors told FIG that the risk of a potential
catastrophe was too high. This left FIG with no option but to maintain FIPASS at its current
level. In 2014 FIG budgeted for a 5-year expenditure of £1 million to maintain FIPASS, and
that projection continues to increase. Thinking contingency, FIG supported the oil
companies’ proposal to build what some Islanders refer to as a “mini-FIPASS,” a second
temporary dock—“permanent in Falklands terms,” as one informant put it—in Stanley
Harbour.
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Before FIG approved the new temporary dock, the government considered a number
of competing proposals to either transform FIPASS or build a permanent port elsewhere.
Premier proposed extending FIPASS with a permanent structure, and a few local businesses
seized this opportunity, investing heavily in design plans. However, FIG crafted policy that
disallowed a permanent port from being located in Stanley Harbour. A source of deep local
contestation, FIG informants blamed the failure to come to an agreement on the high prices
of a “greedy local private sector,” while business owners viewed the bureaucratic meddling
of “expat” FIG contract workers as relics of British “imperialism.”
In late 2012, FIG hired consultants to “develop a business case” for the construction
of a permanent port just outside of Stanley Harbour at a site called Port William. Even though
Stanley had been a working port since its founding in the 1840s, some of members of FIG
promoted the idea that the town should not be impacted by the pollution, light and noise of
the oil industry. Having already spent in excess of £2 million on consulting fees, FIG
projected an admittedly “highly speculative” budget for the port, associated industrial space,
a new road, and utility infrastructure of £5 million in 2017-18 and £10 million in 2018-19,
timed to coincide with potential “first oil” extracted at Premier’s Sea Lion well. Notably, FIG
expected the oil companies that are going to be “parked here” and using this permanent
infrastructure to contribute the bulk of remaining costs toward a total estimated £100 million.
However, as we shall see, these design plans for the port were contingent on the sliding
financial scale of commitment to the Sea Lion project. A proxy for understanding this
dynamic is another hypothetical infrastructural project: the engineering plans for a rig.

Does the Sea Lion Roar?
In January 2014 Argentina’s foreign minister Héctor Timerman challenged British Prime
Minister David Cameron over the sovereignty of the Malvinas. Provocatively, he reasoned,
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“The United Kingdom’s refusal to sit down at the negotiating table is compelling evidence
that, in the question of the Malvinas Islands, the lion roars but does not inspire fear any
more.” Presumably Mr. Timerman was not waxing poetic about the Sea Lion well, but if he
did, in retrospect he would have seemed clairvoyant.
Despite mounting pressure from Argentina, development plans for Sea Lion instilled
a proximate sense of importance among the Islanders and their licensees. Premier Oil, farmin partner with Rockhopper Exploration and the operator closest to extracting the waxy crude
of the Sea Lion field, had initially engineered for an extraction system centered on an FPSO
(floating production and storage offloading) vessel. The FPSO construction, which oil
company representatives described as “putting together Legos,” is a low-budget apparatus
common to frontier areas, often consisting of a converted tanker and temporary flow and
injection lines. The FPSO’s grid of multiple far-reaching subsea wells would have required
vast piping, thus creating a greater onshore presence of pipe bundle facilities than FIG had
warranted. Furthermore, Premier “had a view” that an FPSO should be bespoke, brand new
and designed for a 25-year fatigue life, making costs spiral. Premier therefore shifted plans in
2014 to instead construct a sturdier Tension Leg Platform (TLP) with a more permanent
drilling rig.
To inform about a dozen curious townspeople of what this change in design would
entail, Premier’s keen country manager, Les, presented a slideshow he had shown previously
to encourage London investors to commit despite the lack of infrastructure, remoteness and
“unfriendly neighbor.” Les described himself as a “big fish in a small pond.” While most
other oil sites would have an industry already present with a pre-existing social network, the
frontier aspect of the Falklands forced him to spend his leisure time with local residents. He
was a guarded yet energetic, unseasonably tan chap, who had built rapport with local
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business elites by organizing weekly poker games, cooking reindeer meat and inviting them
to stay in his Italian villa.
Outlining the technical specs of the new TLP idea, Les explained that its main
advantage is that unlike the FPSO, the TLP actually has a drilling rig on it, so there would be
no need for a separate rig or subsea wells. To calm audience members concerned about
safety, Les stated that the TLP would be installed and fixed with tethers reaching 450 meters
below the surface for the full 25 years of expected production at Sea Lion; it was what he
called a “closed system” without the need for flare gas.
However, far from a totally compact unit, the TLP set-up would require an additional
FPSO, as well as one other tanker. Audience members asked well-informed questions about
the linkages between the TLP and FPSO. They nudged Les to differentiate between the
construction phases of the FPSO and TLP, and to elaborate on the 25-year prediction of time
expected for active drilling. Hesitant to make any firm estimates, Les explained that the
timing would be dependent on the costs and price of oil.
To avoid dwelling on the touchy issue of finances, Les bolted into the mechanics of
the TLP. He suggested that it would be “made to order,” causing an impressed audience
member to remark that it appeared to be a “real pioneer design.” Les, however, rejected this
idea vehemently. He insisted that Premier’s emphasis was on using existing, proven
technology, and compared the design to Shell’s analogue Olympus TLP at the Mars B field in
the Gulf of Mexico (an oil frontier ironically notorious for disaster). Then Les showed an
image of the ship required to deliver the TLP, which looked almost like a truck carrying an
oversized house on its bed. In spite of the tremendous, unwieldy load, Les made it sound easy
to just “pop it on the back of one of those boats.” The crowd laughed at the tall task, and Les
accepted that it might be more challenging than he had claimed to load or unload—to which
someone added, “to say the least!” Here, again, Les described the TLP as an innocuous toy—
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like “playing with Legos”—and in a self-effacing manner, he attributed his cavalier
demeanor to the natural predisposition of “boys and their toys.” A Stanley woman observed,
“As boys get older, their toys get more expensive.”
After conveying the technical details, Les went through the timeline to “first oil,” or
as he liked to call it, the “water under the bridge.” Premier would need to finish the
engineering concept, submit a development plan for FIG approval, find a partner, contract a
rig, explore further appraisal wells, and if all goes according to plan, “first oil” could occur in
4-5 years. Les mentioned the cost figures, which were really only included for investors in
the City of London. But the crowd wanted to know what this all meant in terms of local oil
rent collection: What would be the estimated time to “payback?” What was the percentage of
market value? What would be the amount of royalties? And how much money was fixed?
Here, Les curiously drew a blank. He tried to calculate the rate of return, but came up empty
and asked the audience members to give him a call, and he would get back to them. He
confirmed that there was a 9% royalty of total oil and added sarcastically, “Your government
will make sure they are fairly compensated.”
Clearly a superior design, the TLP blueprint assumed, however, that there would be a
pool of capital available to fund its construction. While public consultations about the TLP
plan focused primarily on the technical aspects of the front end engineering design (FEED),
Premier downplayed a key detail: to “share risk” and finance equity and debt for the TLP, the
company would likely need to sell thirty per cent of stake in the project to a potential partner.
Les glossed this, saying “Premier can’t quite afford it,” and attributed the need to “farmdown”—he stopped short of calling it “selling”—to the company’s costs in the North Sea. An
audience member asked if such a transaction would be understood as an ongoing investment,
i.e. would Premier repay their potential partner and maintain their presence in the Islands?
His hand forced, Les answered, “No, it is a sell.” Another participant asked if the “farm-
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down” were critical, and if they did not find a partner, would they not develop. Les responded
circuitously, saying they would need some kind of financing, in order to manage Premier’s
“exposure” for shareholders.
Even though the “farm-down” (also known as a “carry”) has yet to occur at the time
of writing, when the oil price fell in 2014-15, Premier scaled back its engineering plan,
retreating to a slower-phased FPSO development design to quell investor concerns over
mounting costs. Their initial forecast did not match the volatility of the global price of oil and
its impact on the privatization of risk in speculative capital (A. Mason 2007). As Jane Guyer
(2007) has shown, “prophecies” of long-run growth tend to thin-out fluctuations in the near
and midterm future.
Stanley residents told me that they began to see Premier as “fickle,” and began to
suspect that the company would back out of Sea Lion altogether. While the industry
considered Sea Lion commercial upon discovery, the boomerang decision on the engineering
design made it apparent that the well’s profitability was in constant motion. One oil executive
told me that “commerciality moves around” because what might be considered commercial in
a $100/barrel “price environment” is not necessarily commercial at $50/barrel. Service costs,
such as the rate of contracting a rig, might decrease in tandem with the oil price, but a low
price squeezes the margin for “viability.”
This articulates closely with the on-the-ground flexibility of temporary infrastructure
in the permanent frontier. Wary of over-engineering, FIG scheduled any decision to build a
new port to be coterminous with “the golden goose” of a final decision on Sea Lion. From the
perspective of the oil companies, if there were desire for a permanent port, it would be most
necessary during the initial five-year surge of development, not during the gradual ebbing of
exploitation over decades. Informants in fishing and tourism industries felt under-valued, for
they would not be allowed to use the hypothetical port until at least five years after its
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installation. Ultimately, between FIG’s frustrations with mollifying “3,000 professional
opinions” on the one hand, and the Islanders’ seclusion in what one resident described as
“two islands surrounded by a sea of advice,” contending interests in extractive infrastructures
failed to harness the desire for a deepwater port. Instead, as we shall see, the oil firms’
interests in a temporary solution would come to serve a countervailing function to the
Islanders’ preference for permanence.

Materializing the Joint Venture
Speculative investors par excellence, oil executives often speak in visual terms. As above,
firms managers say they “have a view” of how best to bring a project to commercial viability,
but how explorers envision moving from the first discover to “first oil”—what “the view”
actually looks like—changes nearly every financial quarter. An expectation to reach “first
oil” in 3-4 years easily becomes 10 years, depending on the accelerations and decelerations
that follow the fluctuating global oil price. During this lead-time, the license, a covenant of
the development and an asset itself, typically changes hands several times, as partners “farm
in” and “farm out” of the license. Similar to a firm, where managers own the business and
have shareholders and partners, the joint venture designates one of the equity financiers the
operator, and it is that party—Premier Oil in the case of Sea Lion from 2012—that actually
contracts and builds on behalf of all partners. Like the FPSO with its lengthy deep-sea
appendages, the joint venture is a cascading assemblage of corporate promises and
bureaucratic structures, from technical committee agreements to management committees and
commercial committees. As one oil manager put it, “A joint venture isn't just a brass plate
above the door. You have to work at it and understand the nuances.”
Premier Oil’s Falklands Business Unit is based in the National Audit Office, a former
British Airways airplane hangar, in Victoria, London. There, more than 100 people, mostly
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engineers, are employed specifically for the Sea Lion project. In the office, posters stress
Premier’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) record and a long black arrow extends past
the borders of a map of the Falklands, pointing up to a pushpin on the wall where the Sea
Lion well would be located at that scale. One floor below the main Sea Lion office, I met
Brande, an external affairs officer who also handles CSR. Brande was confident that even
though it has been delayed numerous times, sanction would occur. Even if they do not
sanction development, she told me that “the desire is always to split your risk,” meaning that
getting all of this engineering done would position Premier to “farm out” to a partner.
Discussing the problem of state capacity, she described the FIG as small and inexperienced
when dealing with the oil industry. While the Islanders may be suspicious that the oil
industry is “out to screw them,” from Premier’s perspective, the Islanders seem unsure about
whether they actually want oil development. Brande saw the Islanders’ local content policy
and desires for permanent infrastructure as unrealistic and incompatible with the industry’s
specialized skills and timeframe. She suspected that the Islanders believe that Premier’s
pockets are deeper than they actually were, and she considered it unfair that the fees for
planning permissions were considerably higher for oil than other sectors. As for Argentina,
Brande described the dispute similar to how Islanders have portrayed it: as “a fly that keeps
buzzing and biting: an annoyance.”
The workplaces of oil country managers in Stanley offer a different outlook. Upon
entering “Argos House,” the newly finished dark wood-panel building perched atop Snake
Hill in Stanley, where the offices of the operating licensees are located, two clocks on the
wall to the immediate left display the time in Stanley and in London. As I waited for a
meeting in Premier’s office, seated in a plush black leather chair, I spotted some reading
material on the corner table. Upon closer inspection, I found that it was a copy of the FIG’s
“Our Islands, Our Home” pamphlet. A drill bit, painted silver and black with gold edges
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rested directly on top of it. This hierarchical order represented perfectly how the dominant
teleology of oil as a valuable resource, representing the corporate personhood of shareholders
and firms that I discussed in Chapter 4, was erasing the Falkland Islanders’ settler
peoplehood. When I asked about Sea Lion, oil firm representatives and FIG mineral resource
managers reacted the same way: they scrambled through their drawers to find their token
glass jar of crude. They told me to smell the oil and coated their hands with the stuff. The
waxiness of the medium crude requires careful flow assurance and management, and it would
likely mean that the expected market would be China where refineries for this chemical
composition are located.260 The extent to which the materiality of the oil had entered
everyday vernacular of individuals became abundantly clear one evening when I prepared
dinner with my housemate, a Mineral Resources officer: he compared the texture of our
gravy to the waxy crude of Sea Lion oil. In addition to the intricate FPSO diagrams and
playful Lego metaphors, the materiality of oil in Stanley offices and homes brought the
“indeterminate” future prospect of “first oil” into the immediate present of everyday life.261
While the Islanders seem to have exchanged their embodied property for a new economy,
these material artifacts show how they reconstitute personhood with traces of commercial oil
(Adkins 2005).

The Noble Frontier
At one of Premier’s public consultations held at a local bar, Les invited all in attendance to
have a drink (he recommended the whisky) and proceeded to give a PowerPoint presentation
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on the proposed development of the Sea Lion project.262 He started out in an unusually casual
manner with a bit of humor. On the screen appeared a photo of a bald, thickset, middle-aged
man who I later discovered was Noble’s charming country manager for the Falklands,
Mitchell. Grinning widely, Mitchell presented to the camera a brown trout he had recently
caught in one of the Islands’ well-stocked rivers. Les said he wanted to show us with this
photo that “there are now bigger fish than Premier” among the Falklands’ offshore oil
licensees. An outdoorsy Texan angler who contrasted with Les’s genteel British
Commonwealth sensibilities, Mitchell brought “competitive pressure” to the islands, as Les
put it.
This was all friendly banter, if delivered somewhat awkwardly, considering that
Mitchell was not even in the room that day. Premier and Noble were, in fact, close
collaborators. They had already been in talks to split responsibilities for the construction and
operation of a new temporary dock facility (TDF) that would be used to receive equipment
for the next round of exploration in 2015 (the two operators would also share a rig contract).
This barge, the “Noble Frontier,” would become symbolic of the offshore oil industry’s new
commitment to the Falklands, even though it was specifically designed to be temporary. (I
use the labels “TDF”—the abbreviation Islanders tend to use—and “Noble Frontier”
interchangeably.)
Noble first “farmed into” the vast, largely unexplored acreage licensed to FOGL and
the Italian firm Edison located east and south of the islands in 2012, and it now also holds a
license to drill in the North Falklands Basin. To many of my Falkland Islander informants,
the Houston-based firm’s installation of the Noble Frontier and its broader exploration
campaign represented tacit support from the United States, whose government had been
increasingly neutral in diplomacy related to the sovereignty dispute. Noble does, of course,
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have US Congressional approval to operate in the Falklands, even though the Argentine
government considers its activities illegal. The Kirchnerista press in Argentina even accused
Noble of having direct ties to the US “vulture funds” that held out for full repayment of
sovereign debt bonds in the wake of the 2001 crisis, forcing the nation into another default
(Renou and Chausis 2011). A Noble employee who spoke with me rejected these allegations.
I first introduced myself to Noble’s manager Mitchell upon overhearing his voice
mid-conversation with UK FCO advisors at a reception in Governor’s House for a delegation
of Uruguayan politicians. His unmistakable Texas accent grabbed my attention, for he and
other Noble employees were some of the only other Americans on the islands at the time. We
chatted briefly and he told me about his forty-plus years of experience in the industry and
Noble's work elsewhere in the Gulf of Mexico, the Eastern Mediterranean and West Africa.
By coincidence, an anthropologist had interviewed him previously in the Gulf of Guinea, so
he had some familiarity with my ethnographic endeavor.
Our mutual contact, along with our global knowledge and shared national origin
allowed Mitchell to connect with me on a more personal level, and in what appeared to be a
friendly gesture he lent me a book called The Secret of Sherwood Forest: Oil Production in
England During World War II by Guy H. Woodward and Grace Steele Woodward (1973).
This amateur history tells the story of a group of masculine “roughnecks”—the first
generation of Noble Energy workers—sent to England in order to explore for oil and thereby
rescue their vulnerable British “gentlemen” allies in need of fuel during World War II. An
intriguing story, the book is nevertheless suffers from the authors’ absolute devotion to the
company and its founder, Lloyd Noble.263 In describing the background of Noble, a “native”
Oklahoman who was born and raised in the Chickasaw Nation, the Woodwards (1973, 27–
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28) note that he had much in common with his British contractor, Sir Philip Southwell: both
served in World War I and had long worked in the oil industry. Given their respective life
experiences, the Noble settler and British colonialist saw each other as comparably dedicated
to modern statecraft and oil diplomacy. Evidently, it was these shared liberal-democratic,
inter-imperialist values that ultimately conditioned the possibility for Noble to participate in
this project. The Woodwards emphasize that Noble declined to take a profit, presenting him
as if he were the second coming of Robin Hood in Sherwood Forest.
Notwithstanding the potentially benevolent nature of the individual, the proclivity of
the corporation not to shy away from thorny situations is indicative of Noble’s lasting ethos.
This includes taking an active diplomatic role in geopolitics. Noble has stayed relatively quiet
on the subject of the sovereignty dispute over the Falklands. But in the Eastern
Mediterranean, where the firm holds licenses from the governments of Cyprus and Israel, it
has reportedly taken a leading role in negotiations to produce gas for Israel’s long-time
adversaries (Reed and Krauss 2014).
The World War II drilling campaign also brought into relief cultural differences
between the Americans and British that reflect the presence of Noble in Stanley today. Going
to the Victory pub for its weekly steak night puts anyone within earshot of a mix of male
engineers and construction workers chewing the fat about Noble and the TDF. They measure
the relative comfort of the Falklands vis-à-vis jobs in West Africa or paradisiacal Cyprus, and
discuss their preferences for sex and beer. The Woodwards give a similar impression of the
Americans in Sherwood Forest, noting that the black bitter beer that the “native villagers”
were accustomed to drinking in England disgusted Noble’s workers.
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Figure 32 The Noble Frontier temporary dock facility (TDF). Author photo.

Backed by the dollar, the Noble Frontier came to materialize hope for an offshore oil
boom in this new oil frontier of Port Stanley. Mitchell explained to me how the dock got its
name. “The Falklands is part of the International Frontier Business Unit, being frontier
exploration, so the Noble Frontier seemed to make sense. It's the marriage of Noble and one
of our frontier interests. It's the only barge that Noble owns, the first and only.” Investing in
the TDF would thus appear to be the fictive kin relation that makes public Noble’s
commitment to the Islanders’ permanent desires.
One of Noble’s slogans is “Unique. By Design.” Yet, the Noble Frontier follows the
capitalist logic of what Appel (2012a) calls “modularity.” That is, the TDF is an example of
an infrastructure that is at once customized and flexible, emergent and ephemeral. A mobile
frontier, the TDF’s adaptability allows it to be easily detached for shipment to other
exploration sites anywhere in the world. Like the Zimbabwe Bush Pump described by Laet
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and Mol (2000) the Noble Frontier is thus a “fluid object,” yet as we will see, its potential for
nation-building or integration with the community is rather more limited.
The TDF serves the immediate interests of Noble, yet it stops short of achieving the
long-term wishes of Falkland Islanders. According to Mitchell, one of the “covenants” of the
arrangement between Noble and FIG was that the TDF would be a short-term presence. It
would have a given life, a ten-year life expectancy, but it will have a three-year “use life” for
Noble. FIG maintained from the beginning that it wanted to eventually build a permanent
port. Temporary infrastructure should therefore hypothetically support the development of
that business case, and FIG trusted Noble to deliver on its word.
However, the mobility of the equipment gives Noble the option to disband, load it
back up and sail off. “That was one of the points that we like about it—the portability of it,”
Mitchell confirmed. If no discovery occurs during Noble’s explorations, and FIG does not
want to buy it after the company’s period of use, then Noble would simply sell it. The barge
will be kept “in class” with annual inspections, not to ensure its durability for FIG, but rather
to keep it “fit for purpose,” i.e. marketable after the initial three-year period.
Noble’s local managers pointed out that the TDF is “purely temporary in its purest
form.” There is no fuel supply, water supply or chemical supply. The only woman working
for a local contractor complained that the barge does not even have a toilet. Without any of
the services that a permanent port would include, access to and control over laydown areas is
thus where the local community (or at least elite shipping agents who own the land) stands to
benefit from the Noble Frontier.
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Figure 33 Noble Frontier TDF upon arrival in Stanley Harbour. Author photo.

Not All Frontiers Are Made Alike
Once plans were approved, the Noble Frontier completed its 5,000 km, 47-day journey from
the Gulf of Mexico, and it was built just to the east of the current FIPASS location. Noble
was in charge of construction of the TDF until installation was completed, at which point
Premier took over its operation. Boxing out locally owned businesses, the formerly
monopolistic FIC satisfied local content restrictions for hiring workers, and formed a joint
venture that brought in labor from another UK-based company called Trant Construction
(together they formed SATCO, South Atlantic Construction Company).
Apart from the stepson of an FIC manager, separately contracted divers or others
doing scope-work, no Falkland Islanders were actually part of SATCO’s construction team.
Alex, one of the Noble’s supervising engineers, wished more Falkland Islanders were directly
involved in the construction process, but health and safety regulations mandated that the oil
firms hire certified welders. The TDF seemed like a relatively simple job, “a floating barge
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with four things you join up with a floating causeway” as one oil worker put it. By the time it
was completed, however, the amount of work it involved “blew away” this same interlocutor.
Based on work experience in the North Sea oil industry, a construction worker I
interviewed (not involved with the Noble Frontier project) observed that oil workers tend to
slow down their work to maximize pay. For short-term subcontracted projects, the
extraordinary wages can outweigh any pressure from the licensee accruing costs. In the case
of the Noble Frontier, the British workers likely benefitted little from work slowdown, as
they were under a lump-sum contract, but there was speculation that the Americans on salary
tried to drag out their contract by working at a slower pace.
What drew suspicion was the preponderance of missing and damaged parts, which
resulted in an extended timeline. The Noble Frontier’s original end-date of July 1 was
designed to accommodate drilling to commence in the “American” or northern hemisphere
fall of 2014. Delays in contracting the rig pushed the exploration campaign back to early to
mid-2015, which gave Noble until the end of the year to reach the fixed installation phase.
Noble insisted that it was pushing forward with haste, but after inspectors discovered a dent
in the lacing of a crane, the end-date was reset for mid-August. To make matters worse, two
new equipment problems were discovered upon repairing the crane, one due to the weather
and another caused by faulty electric signals.
Indicative of the unruliness of infrastructure in the Falklands, these problems were a
hindrance to construction, but Alex appreciated the challenge of working in a frontier area.
Mitchell noted that even in other remote places where Noble operates, such as in West
Africa, it might have taken just two days (as opposed to the ten days it took) to receive the
replacement crane lacing. Even if the customs process is relatively efficient in the Falklands,
distance and travel restrictions present new obstacles.
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When installation was finally completed, Alex invited me on a tour of the Noble
Frontier. Upon entering the causeway’s new walkway, a noisy steel screech signaled the pile
adjusting to the changing tide. The tide affects the relative incline of the ramps connecting
the causeway to both the land and the barge. I happened to be there the first day that a tractortrailer would attempt to make it over these ramps, and even though forklifts and small
vehicles had already traversed the causeway, this was a significant test run.

Figure 34 US welders with Union Flag shield. Author photo.

Scattered throughout the causeway, the barge and the mooring dolphins, SATCO
workers were welding away. Some of the welders were wearing face shields painted with the
Union Flag, and I later found out that they were actually some of Noble’s own American
workers. “They didn't have any stars and stripes at Lifestyles [the local hardware store],” one
of them told me. The towering, red hydraulic Manitowac 999 crane that had been the source
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of so many problems was fully operative at the time of my visit, slowly making its way to
one side of the barge to leave room for the first lorry.
A worker approached Alex and asked if he had anymore galvanized eye bolts for the
walkway. Rust had been a significant problem during construction, and even the galvanized
rails of the walkway had broken down. The desired hardware was nowhere to be found, so
Alex instructed the worker to just use non-galvanized ones as a temporary solution. As I
backed away from the moving crane, I noticed a wooden pallet with the word “Pemex”
stamped on its side. Alex told me that some of the equipment likely had its origin with
Mexico’s national oil company. He reflected that the Noble Frontier was built to Gulf of
Mexico standards, which proved incompatible with the South Atlantic climate. He theorized
that the hole in the ozone layer directly above us allowed the sun to heat the galvanized
material to an unexpected degree.
The inadaptability of the Gulf of Mexico template reveals how the Noble Frontier was
in fact not “unique, by design.” Alex realized in hindsight that they should have relied more
on mechanical connections, for the climate difference posed a problem for welding, as well.
“Welding doesn't belong down here…we brought down what to us is a typical Gulf of
Mexico type design and we didn’t do too well.” On top of the mishaps with the crane, these
difficulties delayed construction considerably further. Alex explained to me how the
“resource-loaded schedule,” standard in construction, failed to account for the loss of
productivity. “For welding, for instance, you base it on pounds per metal that go into the
weld, and that is a rated deposition weight. You’ve got so many hours to put that on top of
welding, so you figure how much welding you have…and then everything else that goes on
around here, the rigging and driving piles, we use some man-hour estimates.” Considering
the frontier environment, Alex took a factor of two on welding. Nevertheless, the
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subcontractors refused to accept the extra hours, and at the time of my visit they were running
two and half times over schedule.

Figure 35 PEMEX wooden pallet. Author photo.

Alex spotted a lorry approaching and told me this was the big moment, the “first run.”
It remained unclear whether or not the ramps connecting the walkway to the barge would
allow safe passage of a fully loaded truck without sinking, depending on the tide. This was a
problem Noble anticipated, yet the vehicle’s bolts still slammed against the metal mat on the
first run. Engineers from Noble and Premier debated the relative merits of adjusting the bolts
versus laying out material to decrease the angle of the ramp, or even to just speed across to
reduce what one Premier expert referred to affectionately as the TED (Time Elapsed for
Disaster). Eventually, Noble modified the level of lead onto the ramp—with temporary
materials.
The barge, itself, was small compared to what Alex was used to building. While the
water depth in Stanley Harbour was just twenty-eight feet, a different barge he had just
shipped to Equatorial Guinea needed to reach a depth of 240 feet while supporting a 12,000-
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ton deck. Alex had even previously managed construction for part of BP’s controversial
Thunderhorse rig in the Gulf of Mexico—the largest offshore installation to date—which
tipped and nearly toppled over during a hurricane in 2005. Ironically, bathymetry (underwater
depth) proved to be one of the TDF’s most severe miscalculations, for when Premier took
over operations, they found that it was too shallow for most of their equipment vessels. The
Noble Frontier’s customizable design thus barely served its immediate purpose.
In the absence of a larger, permanent port of its own, and with “first oil” revenue
years away, FIG was ultimately left with no option but to plan tentatively on buying the
underperforming Noble Frontier. It may potentially “bridge the gap” between FIPASS and a
permanent port. Yet, even this plan rests on the confidence that oil will actually be produced
to fund construction of the permanent port within the barge’s ten-year life span. The Noble
Frontier had thus become the yardstick for the Falklands’ emerging energy industry writ
large.
The dock may have been temporary by design, but once dolphins were set and piles
drilled, causeways put in place and fenders installed, it seemed like a permanent fixture in
Stanley Harbour. Even Alex, who insisted from the start that the Noble Frontier would be
purely temporary, eventually conceded that it was definitely built to be permanent. Looking
back on the process as it neared completion, one Noble employee pointed out skeptically: “all
that concrete—for a temporary facility.” Despite appearances, it remained indeterminate
whether the concrete components of the TDF solidified the Islanders’ public desires, as it has
done elsewhere.264 In this sense, the Noble Frontier became indigenized as another symptom
of the chronic temporariness of infrastructure in the Falklands. Even the ribbon cut to
ceremonially open the Noble Frontier was makeshift: it was a safety barricade.
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Oil engineers I met appreciated the stripped-down surroundings of this former
colonial outpost with a fond sense of imperialist or colonial nostalgia.265 One interlocutor
described it as “half a century away and half a world away.” Alex told me that the Falklands
is really one of the best places he has had an assignment. Unlike other extraction sites, he
said, “It isn't the Third World. Everybody is friendly and it almost feels like you've gone back
thirty years.” Alex was presumably not thinking of the war that took place three decades ago
in the islands; rather he was referring to the low-tech yet comfortable living standards. This
anachronistic feeling of underdevelopment derives not from imperial subjugation, but from
the permanent frontier condition. He said that if he were to say one thing he likes most about
the place it is that “the entire country does not have one single traffic light.” Mitchell stole his
thunder when he said he had just seen one. Of course, the traffic light was, itself, temporary.

Figure 36 Temporary traffic light, Stanley. Photo by Miguel Barrientos.
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Conclusion
Through ethnographic description of the temporal politics of infrastructure during the lead-up
to a potential oil industry in the Falklands, this chapter has considered how temporary fixed
capital suspended the settler colonial situation of the islands in a permanent frontier.
Government planners vied with business elites and the broader public over ways to transcend
their frontier condition and reassert peoplehood through the establishment of a deepwater
port. The fraught logistics of developing oil in a remote, disputed frontier area have driven oil
engineers and managers toward speculative recalculations in London, as represented through
modified designs of a hypothetical rig. Facing an uncertain future in Stanley, resource
managers cherished material artifacts from the Sea Lion discovery as reassuring signs of
progress. However, long-run plans to build a permanent port were abandoned when the oil
firms gained permission to install a new interim floating dock in Stanley Harbour: the Noble
Frontier. The US oil company Noble Energy promoted an image of the corporation with a
shared set of Western values. Nevertheless, despite a series of unintended setbacks, Noble’s
final construction of the temporary barge thinly satisfied investors’ interest in low-cost
drilling without addressing the Islanders’ wishes for a more substantiated sense of belonging.
In sum, from an examination of efforts to increase the potential for offshore oil
production, we can conclude that the installation of temporary infrastructure ultimately
reinforced the boundaries of the Islanders’ permanent frontier. Once a cattle frontier, then a
sheep station and now an oil frontier, the islands can be understood as “a vanishing frontier”
that refuses to vanish (Cronon 1987). The purpose of a frontier in the classic (albeit flawed)
sense of the concept—derived from Frederick Jackson Turner (1920)—is to pave the way for
a civilization or industry that would ultimately replace it. But the Falklands remains literally
unpaved, and the modern teleological ideal of decolonization through new state independence
is not only unreached but also undesired.
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In this sense, the settler colonial protectorate turns on a state of suspended nostalgia,
as the Islanders press their retrospective claim to self-determination for British sovereignty
and simultaneously brace themselves for prospective oil production. Despite the
archipelago’s fortification as a bastion of the British Empire, or the government’s
precautionary hydrocarbon principles, the problem of state capacity continues to haunt the
Falklands. Specters of political instability manifest in the chronic doubt and uncertainty that
temporary infrastructures embody as durable debris, rubble in the built environment and the
imperial ruins and ruination of overlapping settler colonial and petrocapitalist regimes (Stoler
2013a; Gordillo 2014). Analyzing the role of temporary infrastructure in the settler colonial
protectorate has thus allowed us to ground the temporal and material relations of offshore oil
development in the reproduction of the Falklands as a permanent frontier.
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INTERLUDE | CONJURING COLONIAL UTOPIA

In spite of what many Falkland Islanders saw as a missed opportunity, the desire for a
deepwater port endures. Acting autonomously from FIG, a group of elite shipping agents
with considerable influence among local residents, and with partial ownership of what used
to be Desire Petroleum before it “farmed out” to FOGL, has developed intriguing plans for an
alternate location for the permanent port on the western side of East Falkland Island near a
settlement called San Carlos. When the local radio station and the Penguin News caught wind
of the alternate proposal, some residents of Stanley interpreted it as a satirical stunt for its
name: “Port Smyley.” While this may have looked like a clever crack at FIG’s (seemingly
failed) project at Port William, the shipping agents explained to me that it was chosen for the
historical significance of the pre-existing place at San Carlos, “Smyley Village.”
William Horton Smyley (1792-1868) was an American former sealer who was
integral to the early settler colony in the Falklands for his role in salvaging cargo from
shipwrecks in his schooner. Smyley was the entrepreneurial sailor who teamed with John
Markham Dean in the mid-nineteenth century to buy seal skins, oil and whalebone for
transshipment in exchange for supplies. Dressing as a British authority in order to seize
American vessels and vice versa, some locals saw him as a pirate and a charlatan. In fact,
before his voyages in the South Atlantic, Smyley had a background in theater, producing
blackface minstrel shows that portrayed negative stereotypes of American Indians at New
York City’s Bowery Theater (Antonini 2012). He was one of the few early figures to have
inhabited the islands under both the temporary management of Vernet, as well as under
British colonial rule after 1833. Smyley formed powerful alliances with local colonists in
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disputes with absentee landowners and the colonial government over rights to kill cattle, land
tenure and labor recruitment. One early manager of the Falkland Islands Company (FIC)
called him “a likeable Yank, but a terror if you crossed him” (Cobb et al., n. d.).
As an American outsider, Smyley’s power brokering transcended the islands: he also
played a key role in the colonization of the broader South Atlantic and Southern Cone region.
In fact, Smyley took part in the aftermath of the Wulaia Massacre described in the first
Interlude. Distressed at the lack of correspondence, Despard sent Smyley to search for the
missionaries. Smyley found the Allen Gardiner afloat but stripped of its parts and escorted
the cook, Cole, and O’rundel’lico back to Stanley for trial.266 The Royal Humane Society and
Patagonian Missionary Society awarded him for recovering the remains of the vessel and
rescuing the lone survivor of the group of missionaries. Smyley finally died of cholera in
1866 while preparing to sail to Río Negro at the edge of Patagonia, in support of its
colonizers (Tatham 2008).
“Port Smyley,” then, is less a dig at the contemporary FIG than a nod to the cultural
heritage of settler colonialism in the Falklands and South America. Here, the present-day
entrepreneurial Islanders idealize the colonial past and the frontier as a time of heroic fortune,
in which rugged seafaring individuals triumph by buccaneering. Smyley’s resourceful knack
for salvage accumulation, and his moral values of the West against the rest, offer a hopeful
memory of colonial utopia that the shipping agents sought to conjure through association
with the American spirit of capitalism embedded in the place of Smyley Village. Just as
Smyley had figured out a way to exploit not just the seals for their oil, but also the sealers for
their debt bondage, the Islanders were attempting to engage in new forms of licit swindling
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by trying to buy up and rent prime coastal land to the offshore oil producers.267 A visiting
consultant with experience in the North Sea energy industry saw the Port Smyley plan as “the
beginning of the greed of oil” that he had seen “bastardize” other quaint fishing and sheep
farming towns, such as Aberdeen, when it transformed into an offshore oil center.
In addition to the symbolic value of the location in Smyley village, the natural
features of the planned Port Smyley also seemed to make it ideal. It is positioned closer to the
discovered oil wells in the North Falkland Basin than Stanley is, and it offers a sheltered,
deep berth with low swell (Port Smyley Ltd 2014). However, its distance from Stanley means
that it may have even less access to transportation infrastructure and support services than
Port William. It is also not adaptable for accommodating other industries, such as fishing.
Finally, the impact assessments that Premier has conducted thus far indicate that the company
prefers to locate potential inshore transfer sites on the eastern side of the islands. These
factors may rule out Port Smyley. Still, some informants who have pride in the maverick
shipping agents perceive the project to be “the obvious choice in the pipeline.”
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CHAPTER 6: SCIENCE

Introduction
In addition to the lack of infrastructure discussed in Chapter 5, a dearth of scientific data on
the South Atlantic has made the islands a “frontier” of knowledge. During the temporary
Spanish settlement of the late eighteenth century, Alejandro Malaspina delighted in analyzing
wild celery and charismatic marine fauna.268 And in his own short-lived colony, Luis Vernet
took geographical bearings and produced some of the first maps of the islands. Robert Fitzroy
complemented this work with further surveys on the Beagle with Charles Darwin whom I
discuss in Chapter 7, but during the so-called “Heroic Age of Antarctic Exploration,”
scientists used the Falklands primarily as a stepping-stone to support voyages farther south,
notably Sir Ernest Shackleton’s Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition on the Endurance.269 At
the height of the British Empire, the Falklands served as the administrative center for
research in the expansive Falkland Islands “Dependencies,” which included South Georgia,
the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the Sandwich Islands, and the territory of Antarctica
known as Graham Land. Scientific work, particularly mapping, became central to claim
making in this remote corner of the Empire, as a series of research stations were established
for the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS), now the British Antarctic Survey
(BAS).270

268

David et al. (2002).
See Le Guin (2005) for an imaginative feminist short story of historical fiction, in which a crew of Latin
American women became the first to reach the South Pole, leaving no sign, or even footprints—a wonderful
contrast to the imperial-patriarchal romanticism of the “Heroic Age.”
270
For a history and geopolitical analysis of FIDS, see Dodds (2002).
269

239

The South Pole’s gravitational pull for imperial science left the Falklands underresearched by comparison. This chapter will describe how science has begun to evolve in the
islands since the emergence of commercial fishing and oil exploration. Similar to how the
research of Antarctic explorers, from James Weddell to FIDS, had been financed through
revenue accumulated from whale and seal oil, much of the current scientific research in the
Falklands goes hand in glove with natural resource exploration and exploitation—with few
exceptions. In what follows, I discuss how the ecological niche of squid, which straddles the
border of disputed economic zones, may be understood as what STS scholars call a
“boundary object” for advancing divergent aims of knowledge production for FIG Fisheries
and the Argentine Government.271
The chapter then outlines how the Argentine Government and the FIG have expanded
their respective marine ecology programs: the Pampa Azul (Blue Pampa) and the South
Atlantic Environmental Research Institute (SAERI). Focusing primarily on the latter, I draw
on participant observation from within SAERI’s office, as well as on co-research in the field,
to analyze the institute’s GAP project, which is financed jointly by the FIG and the oil
companies.272 I describe the process by which marine ecologists tag penguins with tracking
devices and “curate” their data as part of a new spatial-geographic inventory of the South
Atlantic. Data representing the penguins’ foraging patterns has been used for environmental
impact assessments and influences where oil exploration companies plan to locate drilling
and fuel transfer sites. Having participated in a series of public consultations and meetings, I
articulate the social forces competing over an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and
proposed marine spatial planning policy resulting from SAERI’s research. Ambiguities and
contradictions in potential transboundary impact, global climate change and intertidal zones
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suggest that the data gap analyses and confidence assessments informing the EIS act as
“circulating references” for contending propositions on multiple spatiotemporal scales
(Latour 1999a).

Whose South Atlantic Future? Squid and Knowledge in the Pampa Azul
While the cost of commercial fishing on wildlife is disputed, the sovereignty dispute has
posed a challenge to stock management and preservation. From 1990 to 2004, a boundary
organization called the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission (SAFC) conducted research
surveys and collaborated on scientific observation and monitoring in both the Falklands and
the Argentine EEZ. When the FIG introduced the ITQ system, establishing longer-term
fishing quota rights to Falklands companies (see Chapter 4), the Argentine government’s
scientists stopped participating in the commission. However, the ecological niche of Illex
squid straddles the Falklands exclusive zones, as well as adjacent Argentine, Brazilian and
Uruguayan waters. Stock assessment of Illex has thus become a boundary object for disputing
sovereign rights to common property resources as responsible managers of the marine
environment.
In spite of their relative isolation, the FIG Fisheries Department has gained a
reputation as a highly regarded and rigorous center, not only for resource management, but
also high-impact scientific research in marine ecology. FIG Fisheries argued that the
Argentine government’s refusal to share knowledge during the Kirchner administrations not
only led to a depletion of Illex, but also overtly encouraged predatory overfishing to damage
future stocks. Calling for more regional cooperation in governance, FIG Fisheries scientists
point to their stable management of the Loligo squid species as a control mechanism,
indicating a causal link between Argentina’s lack of collaboration and heavy fluctuations in
the annual catches of Illex. That is, age and stock analysis from measurements of otoliths (ear
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bones) indicates that like Illex, Loligo has a short lifespan, but in contrast to the former,
Loligo’s ecological niche does not extend beyond the Falklands conservation zones. With a
thorough quota system and friendly relations with European fishing firms that fish for Loligo,
FIG Fisheries blames the vulnerability of the conveniently-named Illex Argentinus on Latin
American governments and East Asian firms not participating in regional management
(Arkhipkin et al. 2013, 17).
Nonetheless, FIG Fisheries’ deployment of the “tragedy of the commons” trope—that
common property tenure in finite space risks overuse of resources in the absence of
regulatory mechanisms—is somewhat inconsistent (Hardin 1968). Stock of Illex is very
likely under threat, but what FIG Fisheries sees as improved regional management, their
Argentine counterparts view as denied access to higher rates of profit from squid in a
militarized zone of the South Atlantic. The FIG characterizes its own management as a
benevolent government-property regime, while depicting relatively less-regulated Latin
American government-property regimes as “open to all,” and therefore susceptible to overuse
that must end for the sake of potential value realization. This rhetorical asymmetry should not
be confused with the key distinction outlined in the literature on “common-pool resources,”
between: (1) a de facto common-pool resource property regime on the one hand; and (2) a
converted de jure government-property regime reverted to a de facto open-access regime on
the other.273
Of course, the islands’ conservation zone is not a common-pool resource regime.
There is no historical evidence that the islands have ever been host to peasant or indigenous
fisherfolk working communally for self-subsistence. Even if they are managed with scientific
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rigor, the commercial fishing regimes of both the FIG and Argentina are governmentproperty regimes open to maximal numbers of licensees for the available quota.
In 2014, the Argentine Ministry of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation
went beyond conventional understandings of resource management in order to invent an
entirely new way of imagining the South Atlantic: as the Pampa Azul (Blue Pampa). The
Pampa, of course, is the name for the vast breadbasket of the so-called “interior” of
Argentina—the cattle frontier and agricultural legacy upon which the Argentine nation was
built, through violent dispossession of Natives, following the logic of terra nullius.274 By
reconfiguring the Atlantic Ocean as the Pampa Azul, or Pampa Sumergida (Submerged
Pampa), and launching a public research project in that name, the Argentine state has
strategically asserted the country’s geopolitical sovereignty claim over maritime territory and
subsoil in the ostensibly benign name of scientific knowledge. The Pampa Azul project seeks
to enhance public Argentine awareness of the South Atlantic, but its main objectives are:
exploration, conservation and technological innovation expressly geared toward the
“productive sectors related to the sea”; as well as supporting the country’s sovereignty in the
South Atlantic area with “scientific information and presence.”275 In short, the Pampa Azul
initiative allows the Argentine government to argue that it manages marine resources that the
country claims, yet which are for the time being, out of reach or control.
Pampa Azul harkens back to the ambitions of Luis Vernet and others to build up the
merchant and shipping fleets of a country with a long coast. Yet, while it may conjure some
of the elements of Argentina’s historic ties to the region, one of the motivations for Pampa
Azul is to modernize their claim and wrench it from the past. With the Pampa Azul, the
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Argentine Foreign Ministry has attempted to argue that the Malvinas are Argentine not only
because of the “usurpation” of 1833, but also for more pressing reasons that concern future
sustainability in the region. That is, without actually occupying and governing the islands or
their resources, Pampa Azul is a way of claiming Argentina’s current and future relevance.
During my research in Buenos Aires, I attended a conference where leaders of the
social movement Pueblos Por Malvinas (People for Malvinas) assisted the government in
launching the Pampa Azul campaign at the Argentine National Congress, Circle of
Legislators.276 “Malvinas: Ultima Frontera Planetaria” (Malvinas: Final Frontier of the
Planet) was the name of the event, which featured international relations scholars and
politicians. The talk was held in an ornate gallery with a terrace. Photographs of the founders
of national political parties lined the walls, centering, of course, on Perón. As we waited for
the presentation to begin, blonde women in fur coats and Gucci accessories, and men in
tweed suits, sipped on espressos and discussed high-level policy; most were in their 60s or
70s, except for the main speaker (a doctoral candidate in social sciences with a background in
national defense strategy). The presentation offered a grand vision of the nation’s present and
future: Argentina is a country of the South that is Oceanic. It is South American, but also
European and developed. A more positive national brand could give Argentina the
opportunity to join the BRICs community of emerging economies.
In a time of increasing capitalist crisis—Argentina was on the verge of another default
at the time—it was proposed that the nation should take a pragmatic approach to producing
and consuming resources. In this context, Malvinas may be understood as “La Frontera del
Mundo de Recursos Naturales” (the Global Frontier of Natural Resources). The speaker
argued that ordinary Argentines are madly in love with Malvinas, but when asked why they
276

Pueblos Por Malvinas had been building a federal movement to collect signatures and raise awareness about
the sovereignty cause, by putting on a series of marathons. The purpose of the races, which took place in a
variety of provinces, was to move Malvinas to the heart of Argentina metaphorically: the idea was that the
aggregate of participants would run the same distance as from mainland Argentina to the islands.

244

think the islands are Argentina’s, they downplay its importance as a minor whim, a battle of
communication over a couple small pieces of land. Instead, the presenter emphasized how
actually the islands are vast, so much larger than just a couple of rocks, and if we broaden our
perspective on the South Atlantic more generally, considerable reserves of resources—
energy, fish and possible precious metals—come into view. The speaker compared the South
Atlantic not only to the resource-rich Pampa but also to the Cordillera de los Andes,
explaining how British oceanographers have mapped mountains of extractable minerals
below the ocean’s surface.
Yet as long as it is under British rule, the speaker argued that the South Atlantic
serves as a “militarized highway” for exclusive UK exploration leading to Antarctica. He
pointed out that scientific research framed around biodiversity has allowed UK scientists to
discover new species and commodify them by making patents. Moreover, Antarctica is a
“continent of lakes,” a source of fresh water, which may well be the scarce resource over
which geopolitical struggles will proliferate in the future. As the staging ground for the
broader South Atlantic and Antarctica, the Malvinas, then, is not an insular phenomenon but
rather a gigantic opportunity: “Malvinas es una Cuestión del Futuro” (Malvinas is a question
of the future).
Rethinking the South Atlantic as Pampa Azul thus requires transcending the impasses
of political memory, justice and democracy, in order to embrace an economic future of
natural resources. It warrants understanding Malvinas as the “heart” of the Argentine Atlantic
Ocean. How to operate this heart transplant of the body politic? Proposals for action included
creating a commission of ocean regulators. This entailed disrupting the balance of power in
the South Atlantic through advances in the Argentine military. However, instead of invading
the Malvinas again with armed forces, this time around Argentina would occupy the South
Atlantic with scientific vessels. As the speaker put it, “The greatest triumph of the UK was
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not the victory of 1982. It was the colonization of our resources.” The talk ended with the
determined statement: “Vamos a volver a Malvinas. América Latina con ciencia.” (We will
return to Malvinas. Latin America with science.)
The Circle of Legislators event provided a vivid image of the strategic purpose and
goals of Pampa Azul, but what are the perspectives of Argentine scientists on the project’s
potential? Edith, one of the principal marine ecologists involved in the campaign—who is
also a resident of Patagonia with five generations of descent from Welsh settlers—told me
that individual investigators had long established relationships with UK scientists, as
colleagues who share resources, software and data without any political issues. However,
since ties between Argentine scientists and their counterparts in the islands have broken on
joint exploration and management of marine resources, they have not been permitted to
interact with Falklands/Malvinas-based scientists in an official institutional capacity. Edith
and her colleagues had even been invited to collaborate in workshops in the islands, but the
Foreign Ministry restricted them from participating. Edith told me that it was from this
breakdown in relations that Pampa Azul emerged.
If there is no communication between the experts within the islands and those in
Argentina, and if scientists within the islands are involved in both government regulation and
industry consulting (as I explore below), how free is science from political and economic
partiality? Epistemologically, if a researcher cannot think freely, how can she guarantee and
enforce objective measures to protect the environment? How, for example to maintain the
oxygenation of the water, which sustains the broader ecosystem and food chain?
These “transboundary” concerns were voiced not only by Edith but also functionaries
of the Secretary of Sustainable Development and Environment for the province of Tierra del
Fuego, whom I interviewed in their Ushuaia offices. These government officials were aligned
completely with the Kirchner administration’s total opposition to the “militarization” of the
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South Atlantic and FIG’s unilateral licensing of resource exploitation—not only because of
the ongoing sovereignty dispute, but for fear of risks to the region’s environment. As one of
them put it, “The environment does not recognize borders, it does not recognize nations.”
Without the power to enforce the domestic legislation that Argentina’s congress has passed
against the oil exploration (Ley 26.659), they fear potential collisions. They are especially
worried that the necessary logistical support for offshore oil is not in place in the islands if a
spill were to occur.277
One role of Pampa Azul scientists like Edith is to identify aspects of “Argentina’s”
ecosystem that are impacted by potential exploitation of resources. Edith is building on
already-established baseline data to evaluate potentially irreversible harm that could be done
to “Argentina’s” ecosystem by oil production. Armed with substantial data, the Foreign
Ministry may be able to quantify specifically what damage resource exploitation might cause
to the nation’s ecosystem.278 This is difficult to assess before “first oil,” but it may be one
way to litigate if oiled animals washed ashore in Argentina: Edith explained that her
colleagues are able to identify the source of petroleum by analyzing its chemical composition.
The Pampa Azul campaign has conditioned the possibility to take this line of reasoning and
appeal for support from the international community.
So, is Pampa Azul first and foremost a political project or a scientific one? An
appointed Governor of the Falklands dismissed it in an interview with me, as “simply a
sovereignty argument.” But because Pampa Azul is a long-term project that is publiclyfunded and carried out by Argentine scientists working continuously in the region, Edith
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argued that it has more potential to be impartial than research conducted by scientists within
the islands, whom she suspected were British researchers on temporary contracts.

The Emergence of the South Atlantic Environmental Research Institute
Parallel to Argentina’s Pampa Azul campaign, a competing research center formed in
Stanley. The South Atlantic Environmental Research Institute (SAERI) was not created as a
reaction to Pampa Azul (SAERI predated it slightly); rather it was borne out of a separate
FIG economic development strategy to grow a “knowledge economy” in the Falklands. The
islands had long served as a staging post for research in Antarctica, yet little was known
about the environment, biodiversity, and the population dynamics of manifold species in the
South Atlantic. With increasing numbers of scientists based at FIG Fisheries and FC, local
knowledge production had grown significantly in the 1990s and 2000s. However, research at
FIG Fisheries was relatively confined to stock analysis, and Falklands Conservation had been
more focused on raising awareness through its watch group and penguin rehabilitation center.
It was therefore proposed that a research institute would re-center and localize more wideranging scientific work in the new “knowledge frontier” of the South Atlantic.
With funding from the FIG, the Government of South Georgia and the UK FCO, the
British Antarctic Survey (BAS) conducted a feasibility study for the potential research
institute in 2010. Considered a relatively “pristine environment,” various ecological aspects
of the South Atlantic invited further research on elements of air, earth and water: (1) the
atmosphere offers a clear, unpolluted sky beneath the ozone hole; (2) an emergent oil
industry and peaty soil implies prospects for petroleum geology and climate change studies;
and (3) the thriving fisheries, under-analyzed benthic ecosystems (sea floor habitats) and
unique oceanography present opportunities for marine ecology. As I suggest below, these
ecological research areas become ranked based on relative “demand” for science, and the
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frontier concept meets the market model when scientific work is geared toward the oil
industry. BAS and FIG found ample reason to “enhance the value” of local scientific activity
by creating an institute, and in December 2011 the FIG Executive Council approved SAERI’s
formation with three years of seed money.
SAERI’s birth also coincided conveniently with my own multi-phased research in the
Falklands. John, the research center’s Director, allowed me to rent office space throughout
my fieldwork in Stanley. Being in such close quarters with SAERI’s researchers on a regular
basis made them some of my closest interlocutors and, indeed, friends in the Falklands. They
allowed me not only to carry out my own research, but also invited me to take part in their
field research, including tagging penguins with locational trackers, supporting shallow
marine dive surveys, and more. I was welcomed as part of the budding SAERI community: I
answered phone calls, participated in office meetings, planned events, and, toward the end of
my work, SAERI hosted a public talk that I gave for Stanley residents. After departing the
islands, SAERI invited me to participate in a workshop on data analysis and marine spatial
planning at the University of Cambridge, to monitor the socio-ecological impacts of oil
development. In the spirit of this openness and hospitality, I want to be clear that any critique
in discussion of SAERI should be understood as a reflection of broader political, economic
and social forces, and not the character of individual researchers, for whom I have the utmost
respect.
Projects at SAERI that overlapped with my fieldwork included: the creation of an
information management system and GIS data center, an inshore fisheries research project,
marine spatial planning, and a data gap analysis project jointly-funded by the FIG and its oil
licensees. I will focus primarily on the latter project in the following sections, as it related
most closely to the preparations for environmental management of potential offshore oil. In
addition to these internal projects, SAERI served as a central hub for visiting scientists
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researching or making policy on biodiversity, sea birds (penguins and albatrosses), marine
flora (kelp and algae), cetaceans (whales and dolphins) and pinnipeds (seals and sea lions), as
well as terrestrial ecologists, geologists, paleoarchaeologists, shallow marine survey divers
and nature documentary filmmakers.
SAERI’s office is located in Stanley Cottage, an historic building with low ceilings,
where the altruistic Mrs. Orissa Dean had once hosted lavish dinner parties for the colony’s
elite merchants, transients and swindlers in the late nineteenth century.279 Stanley cottage is
centered in the town’s main seafront “thoroughfare,” Ross Road, which made it an expedient
base for my research. The office has three rooms with several tables and chairs to
accommodate a maximum of ten to fifteen people. Even though John, the most senior “boss,”
is male, most of the researchers on contract at SAERI were women, so while the hierarchical
structure did enable casual sexism, the gender dynamic and “situated knowledge” of the
institute differed perhaps from masculinist scientific laboratories common elsewhere
(Haraway 1988). Canvas prints of field photographs capturing albatross, sea lions and lobster
krill, as well as posters stating SAERI’s mission statement research aims, and abstracts of
articles published, decorated the otherwise sterile, white interior. The windows were painted
shut, to the dismay of a neighbor's horse, which became particularly curious during the
frequent storms and harsh weather.
Scattered among SAERI’s open plan tables were microscopes, stacks of plastic slides
with biological samples, maps and bills, which reflected the perhaps inevitable chaos of such
an enterprise in its early stages. My time at SAERI predated the hire of a Business and
Development Manager, so much of the shared day-to-day work consisted of securing external
funding for the fledgling institute, tweeting and blogging to increase its web presence,
negotiating how to allocate money to different projects and monitoring the costs of
279
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researchers’ airfare or Skype usage down to the megabyte. Occasional disagreements on the
expected scope and scale of individual researchers’ projects or budgets led to flaring
arguments and smoldering tensions between and among clusters of investigators. This state of
anxiety was exacerbated by the precariousness of researchers’ temporary contracts (most staff
were British, European or Antipodean): Would it be worthwhile to ship a pet for only a year
or two of work? Is it a waste of time to pay into a pension that does not transfer out of the
islands? How to make the case for another phase of research as the contract nears expiration?
And how to establish a permanent knowledge base with such constant turnover? To gain a
sense of place in the Falklands, some researchers on temporary contracts became close
friends with Falkland Islanders and even acquired elements of settler colonial diglossia, while
others tacked between the Government House political class at “expat”-centered events in
Stanley and Latin Night with Chilean temporary contract workers. Others still were more
introverted and experienced the Camp landscape by foot on weekends.
Despite considerable success in obtaining external grants and donations from
philanthropic billionaires, John also complained about feeling like a traveling salesman.
Having been raised in the former Rhodesia and educated in the UK, John made the Falklands
his home when he joined FIG Fisheries in the mid-1990s to research toothfish and prevent
bird mortality, among other topics. He is married to a Falkland Islander who teaches in
Stanley, and they have a young son whom John is proud to say is a ninth-generation Islander.
Nonetheless, since founding SAERI, John has had to spend much of his time away from the
islands, traveling to the UK or other Overseas Territories, as well as North America, where
SAERI established affiliations with University of Maine, Yale and other institutions. Still,
one gets the sense that when John would burst out of his office to bemoan delays or “fiascos”
from international contracts, they were also subtle ways of boasting about SAERI’s
snowballing business. When unrestricted funding came through, he could not contain his
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excitement, shouting figures of donations to the whole office: £207,864.52 in one day! Selffunded with £1.7 million accumulated in the first two years!
John insisted on scientific rigor and objectivity. However, while SAERI may be less
explicit than Pampa Azul in its indirect political aims, the sovereignty issue does inevitably
leak into the institute’s affairs. The Governor and FIG have insisted that there not be
“crossover” between politics and science; however, on visits to the islands, UK FCO
Ministers and Directors asked SAERI researchers how they might be able to use SAERI’s
research to spoil Argentina’s claim. John dismissed this approach as naïve because he holds
science to be apolitical. Yet, he also felt strongly about the Falklands’ claim to selfdetermination, describing the UK’s approach as “softy.” When Daniel Filmus, Argentina’s
then-Secretary of Malvinas, critiqued the oil exploration activities for risking a potential
“eco-disaster,” John suggested that SAERI should try to be “mercenaries” about this and use
it to leverage funding.280 This was not a knee-jerk response. Rather, it was a strategic move to
push back against these accusations by asserting that there is already an objective research
institute taking extraordinary measures to identify data gaps and assess environmental
impact. If redirected this way, Pampa Azul might have actually helped SAERI’s case for
more funding from the UK.
To showcase their role as environmental stewards, SAERI researchers participated in
FIG diplomacy trips, and focused much energy on recruiting and publicizing teams of
visiting scientists from throughout the Americas and Europe. In presentations, SAERI
researchers tried to brand the institute as having a wide scope, ranging “from the tropics to
the ice,” with research in the BOT Ascension Island (rented to the US for a military base), as
well as Antarctica, and the vast South Atlantic in between. They illustrated this using an
image of a yellowed map with an early modern “voyage” leitmotif that reproduced imperial
280
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scientific exploration of the South Atlantic. Given these efforts to demonstrate local
commitment, it was especially trying for SAERI when the only researcher who grew up in
the Falklands, and is viewed widely as a Falkland Islander even though she was born in the
UK, withdrew from a Ph.D. There was no question that she was an asset for her local
knowledge, and her participation in SAERI had symbolic value for combatting Argentina’s
accusation that the institute is another manifestation of an “implanted population” because it
is made up of temporary British contractors. It is perhaps ironic that the researcher took a
new job in FIG’s Mineral Resources Department instead.

Figure 37 Image from SAERI flyer. Design by Amélie Augé.
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=771741309559386&set=gm.657813987668436&type=3&theate
r.

Seeking to become incorporated and grow independent from government, SAERI has
swiveled into the field of energy consultancy. Being registered in the UK and affiliated
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academically with the University of Aberdeen allowed SAERI to pursue funding from the
UK, as well as the EU. Becoming an NGO might help SAERI circumvent the overt
geopolitics of the sovereignty dispute, but the new affiliations carry their own sets of political
assumptions and consequences. As I indicate below, SAERI has gone from reviewing
environmental impact statements to drafting them. The institute also plays host to potential
investors in the science of oil. For example, during my fieldwork a petrochemical business
owner became interested in collaborating with SAERI to build the islands’ first chemistry
lab. This would give the chemist an early monopoly on chemical engineering for the new
hydrocarbons industry, conditioning the possibility to monitor and oversee how the oil
operators separate oil from gas and water, how they are redistributing and recycling, and what
kinds of chemicals they use to make it a transportable, non-toxic commodity. In the Falklands
this might mean transubstantiating the waxy crude of the Sea Lion well into liquid. Here, the
chemists expressed an intense drive to master nature through science to produce useful,
profitable objects. One of the visiting chemists told me how frustrated she was that certain
“resources” exist but are not being used. She suggested, for example, that we should be
reusing human hair—collecting it from beauty shops, rather than sweeping it up and
dispensing of it—because hair is an apt absorbent for oil spills.281 This reflects values not just
of environmental sustainability, but a total harnessing of science for resourcefulness, a drive
toward more efficient commodification and neoliberalization of nature more generally (N.
Smith 1984; Castree 2008).282
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This technique may have already been tested when people donated hair so that it could be used to clean up
the massive Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, but BP refused to use it (Blackstone 2010; BBC
Magazine 2010; All Things Considered 2010).
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The commodification of nature permeated various research projects at SAERI. Another particularly clear
example was a project to research the potential for a new commercial fishery. The researcher tasked with this
project was frustrated trying to figure out how to “age” barnacles, one of the species she saw as having a
potential market. She immersed herself in the science of the barnacle. John encouraged her interest in this
problem, suggesting that they could be the first to figure out how to age them. Then an FIG Fisheries scientist
noted that the age of the barnacles was not necessary: they only needed the size to see if there is biomass in
particular areas for commercialization. Even though these were baseline surveys backed by government or
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In exchange for the new chemical engineering capacity, the potential arrangement
would provide John with a state-of-the-art lab that might also serve the needs of marine
biologists analyzing samples. Until Premier makes its decision on developing the Sea Lion
oilfield, such relatively permanent infrastructure development is perhaps unlikely to come to
fruition, but SAERI has made an effort to put the pieces in place. While there was certainly
variation among them, SAERI’s scientists were collaborative with, rather than antagonistic
to, industry. One of them clarified that she was an ecologist, not an environmentalist or
conservation scientist. A central tenet of SAERI is that resources, including oil, can be used
in ecologically sound ways.

The GAP Project: Tracking Penguins, Stalking Petroleum
One of the ways in which SAERI became an instrument for propelling the Falklands’
emergent offshore oil industry has been through the GAP project: an initiative to highlight
and address lacunas in environmental research data on the South Atlantic. With joint funding
from the FIG and the Falkland Islands Petroleum Licensees Association (FIPLA), the GAP
project was a product of the Falkland Islands Offshore Hydrocarbons Environmental Forum
(FIOHEF), an advisory group.283 Once the forum had identified some of the “priority gaps,”
SAERI recruited researchers to carry out the project, both on a 2-year contract. The intention
was to complete the gap analysis by “first oil” because, as John put it, “the industry isn’t
going to wait for it.” Both of the researchers came to the islands from Australia: Keith
specializes in benthic systems, while Wendi focuses on higher predators, specifically
NGOs and not “commercial biology” funded by industry, the commodification of nature was a determining
factor.
283
FIOHEF does not have any specific powers, but it holds bi-annual meetings for stakeholders, including oil
companies, as well as other industries (particularly fishing), NGOs and government officials with interests in the
environment. Minutes of the forum’s meetings are not for public consumption, and they are not publicized, but a
synopsis is produced. The meetings are not confidential, but these privacy protections were designed to
encourage different social actors to speak candidly. I consented to this protocol when I was given permission to
attend both FIOHEF meetings in 2014, so while I will not describe the events in detail, this experience informed
my discussion of the GAP project and the other sections that follow.
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penguins. The two main GAP researchers also worked closely with SAERI’s GIS specialist;
they would also later collaborate with a visiting expert on pinnipeds to track sea lions.
Together, their data would be used for upcoming environmental impact assessments (EIAs).
Keith’s background concerned environmental impacts of coastal cities on marine
ecosystems, centering on the enhancement of urban structures, such as sea walls, wharves or
jetties to recreate habitats for organisms in intertidal zones. He then became involved in
energy consultancy, providing science support, reviewing documentation and then carrying
out new monitoring for a massive infrastructure development of an offshore port for the LNG
(liquefied natural gas) industry. Keith had not planned to work in energy, but collaboration
with the industry allowed him to do experiments on an enormous scale that he said he could
not have done as part of independent science. He viewed massive infrastructure development
as a real-world experiment with opportunities for “value added” science that tests hypotheses
on anthropogenic impacts at an appropriate scale.
Wendi’s initial research focused on Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, where she
developed ways in which to use particular species in these environments as an indicator of
broader ecological health. She used species at the top of the food chain or food web, such as
elephant seals and penguins, to make assumptions about the rest of the system. Her research
asked what kinds of parameters can be measured in these species to provide information
about the ecosystem writ large, and how can that information be used for environmental
management. She then moved into science policy related to spatial monitoring and decisionmaking, based out of Cambridge, UK, and also worked as a tour guide on cruise expeditions
back “down South.” I participated directly in Wendi’s research, which has allowed me to go
into greater ethnographic detail in describing the process below.
Keith worked more independently, and most of his research took place on his
computer or outside of the islands. The seafloor covering the oil wells is too deep for human
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divers to reach, so Keith intended to hire an ROV (Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicle),
basically an amphibious drone, equipped with a camera and arms for collecting samples. This
plan to “add new value” to the benthic system data had not yet taken place during my
fieldwork, so Keith’s main remit was to collate, review and analyze extant data collected
during previous research. In some senses this made Keith’s task less onerous because the
industry provided access to most of the benthic data that it held. In addition to meeting with
consultants who have done surveys in the past, Keith established affiliations with the British
Geological Survey (BGS) and the Natural History Museum in London, making his objective
not only to collate or store the data, but to literally “curate” it, i.e., to build up ecological and
biological records needed to underpin environmental data sets that would enable
“searchability” and recoverability. Beyond taxonomy, this would include sex ratios, growth
distributions, isotope analysis, etc.
However, developing a strategy for forming a “unified taxonomy” out of the extant
benthic data proved a challenge. First, it turned out that BGS had little to no oversight of
sampling in the Falklands. There was a complete disconnect between research undertaken by
professional survey companies in the field and remote, subcontracted storage and analysis in
London. As Keith put it, “It's all a much bigger mess than we thought, but it does highlight
the need to be centralizing this in the Falkland Islands, especially if we're going to have an oil
and gas industry which is going to require environmental data.” Second, Keith found that the
voucher specimens collected thus far were largely missing, unlabeled or described
incorrectly, making them useless as references. Moreover, if any were stored at all, they were
contained in a freezer that failed, causing samples to perish. According to Keith, the industry
consultants who collected the samples had been concerned more with the company’s bottom
line than science, a tension that he had come to understand through his previous consulting
work. Design flaws underscore how the surveys had been done as cheaply as possible in
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order to tick boxes, for example if the requirement was to collect X number of samples, they
did what Keith referred to as a “double grab,” which is simply collecting a bigger section of
ocean floor and cutting it in half. Rather than collecting two independent samples, this would
amount to pseudo-replication.
Having worked with Chevron, BHP Billiton and other companies operating offshore
in Western Australia, Keith praised the collaborative nature of the Falklands’ nascent energy
industry, which seemed less guarded than other extraction sites. There is extraordinary access
to both government and industry, largely because of the multi-stakeholder environmental
forum. “This is what we should have been doing 20 years ago [in Australia],” Keith said. “It
showed a lot of foresight and a lot of vision.” Elsewhere, Keith said that environmental
science “tends to scare” oil companies, because, as he put it, “they always think it's a stick
that they're going to be beaten with. This adversarial relation has led to what Keith called
“green-mailing,” a form of black-mail with environmental science in which researchers
demand research funding in exchange for not tarnishing oil companies’ environmental record.
The threat lies in the ability of scientists to do the research independently and withhold data
until it is published.284 Environmental research related to oil in the Falklands had been
considerably less adversarial, largely because hired consultants had conducted much of it.
The drawback was that, according to Keith, these industry-driven studies cut corners.
Wendi also had to collate and review data from previous researchers. In addition to
baseline surveys and coastal monitoring, scientists have long conducted seabird monitoring
using remote sensing technology. According to a visiting researcher, the practice can be
traced all the way back to the Romans, who tied strings to birds in 200 BCE. Throughout the
twentieth century, Antarctic expeditions adapted military homing devices as tools for
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Interestingly, in finance, green-mailing has a separate connotation as an investment strategy in which
monopoly capitalists threaten to takeover corporations but stop in exchange for smaller payments. Here, science
has the power of money; not the money to directly acquire a firm’s assets, but rather to damage its public image.

258

measuring penguins’ migration patterns in the region. Devices were modified over the years
to ensure that seabirds “behave naturally,” and since the 1960s trackers have gone from
analogue to digital, enhanced by the emergence of GPS in 1983 for military purposes (and
2000s for public use). Once tracking devices earned researchers’ trust as reliable nonhuman
“actants” (Latour 1987), researchers tinkered with perspective: For bathymetric and temporal
data, scientists attached watches to birds that stopped and started when diving underwater.
For data at the scale of the body, internal and external sensors detected when birds feed, and
light sensors or magnetic sensors recorded day length periods to calculate distance. And for
data on a longer and wider scale, scientists have employed video cameras, camera traps or
satellite images to observe remote populations or new colonies.285
While previous data had been collected on penguin foraging areas in the Falklands,
they lacked consistency in terms of the type of species and time of year. For example they
might focus on the chick-rearing period but not the incubation period or the winter season.
Wendi’s time and energy therefore went into creating a new penguin-tracking program to
understand how feeding synchronizes and intersects with the market for oil. She focused
primarily on the Northeast and South of the Falklands, areas hosting penguin colonies whose
foraging patterns might overlap with drilling areas. For each colony, Wendi was interested in
patterns of foraging, such as differences in age, sex and consistencies in the annual cycle that
might provide a more comprehensive understanding of their “interaction” with oil work.
Dividing “target areas” by season and behavior, Wendi concentrated on three species:
Rockhopper, Gentoo and Magellanic penguins. Much previous data had been gathered on
Gentoos in particular, so tagging would occur primarily on Rockhoppers and Magellanics.
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I borrow this narrative from a presentation on February 25, 2014, by visiting researcher Jonathan Handley in
Stanley’s Chamber of Commerce.
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To track the penguins, Wendi used both GLS (global location sensing) tags, which
were attached to the birds’ ankles and record light levels twice per day, and PTT (platform
terminal transmitter) or GPS (global positioning system) satellite tracker tags, glued onto
their backs. The latter are far more precise, but the former are relatively inexpensive (around
£100 compared to the roughly £1,000 plus £30 per month subscription for real-time satellite
tracking with PTT), so most of the tags used were GLS. There are certain efficiencies, which
make the GLS tags less costly. First, they are only accurate beyond 100km, so if penguins
travel within that distance from their colony, the tags are not particularly useful. The recorded
light levels allow one to work out latitude and longitude by an algorithm, but multiple
sunlight readings per day cause aberrations. Extensive “data-cleaning” during analysis make
statistics difficult to run. Second, these tags “archive” data, which means that it they are not
detectable remotely, and they need to be physically retrieved for analysis. While penguins
tend to return to the same colony each season, recuperating tags can prove difficult,
especially for Magellanics, or “Jackass” penguins in local vernacular, which burrow into the
ground, and are often infested with fleas. Thankfully, the penguin-tagging work for which
Wendi enlisted me involved Rockhopper penguins rather than Magellanics.
Together with Wendi and two other researchers from FC and SAERI respectively, I
volunteered to remove location sensors that had been attached to Rockhopper penguins at
Cape Bougainville on East Falkland Island and the northwest Pebble Island. Wendi selected
these sites, along with other colonies at Diamond Cove, Cape Dolphin and Cow Bay because
she expected them to be most affected by a potential uncontrolled oil spill at Premier's Sea
Lion well. She referred to them as “priority gaps.” Wendi and her collaborators also collected
evidence from penguins tagged a season before at the southeast Bleaker Island, and
incorporated previous data on penguin colonies elsewhere on the East and Beauchene Island,
farther south. They did not expect penguins on West Falkland Island to be significantly
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impacted by hydrocarbon explorations because these birds tend to migrate west and away
from anticipated drilling wells. When Wendi came aboard, trackers had already been put on
birds foraging over winter, so the initial aim was to get those trackers back, in order to
download data and prepare for the analysis. Wendi would also undertake a summer tracking
program in order to understand where the birds go over the breeding season, when they go
out for incubation, as well as the chick-rearing period.
Cape Bougainville is located on land owned by Falkland Islanders who trace their
descent back to the 1840s, having first settled from Gibraltar via Montevideo. It is about two
hours away driving north on the dirt “road” from Stanley, and another hour or more off-road
through five sets of fences on a perpetually wet, hilly track. In fact, on the way back to town,
we achieved a Falkland Islander rite of passage—getting “bogged”—requiring us to attach a
second Land Rover to pull ours out of the mud. Other than this, Cape Bougainville was a
breathtaking point of East Falkland Island, out of the range of tourists. Tussac grass-dotted
hills jut out to the northern coast, dropping off dramatically on cliffs covered in sluggish sea
lions with huddling Rockhoppers and Imperial shags peppered throughout. The nearest fence
was down, and sheep had apparently gnawed down much of the Tussac that had served as
shelter from the incessant westerly wind when the first team of researchers tagged the twenty
Rockhoppers prior to our visit.
Upon arrival, we took a preliminary glance at the Rockhopper colony to see if we
could spot any tags on their ankles. We did not see any. There were two groups of
Rockhoppers in the colony, about fifteen feet apart, and they had actually shifted since the
previous visit. We spent most of the day staring at the birds’ pink ankles, searching for any
sign of the black band and green disk of the GLS tag. Many were paired with eggs
underneath them, so we had to be careful that if we interfered, we were not exposing the eggs
to the predatory Skuas, gull-like seabirds hovering around. Gently, we took turns prodding at
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the Rockhoppers’ ankles with poles and, if we found a tag present, we isolated tagged birds
with fishing net.
We then brought the chosen birds to Wendi who held them in her lap with the legs
facing out for me to cut off the tag from around their ankles. After disposing of the tiny
anklet, I stashed away the GLS device and recorded with a mechanical pencil and paper the
number-letter combination label on the device, as well as the apparent sex (Wendi would
confirm these data by the more rigorous beak-measurements taken when the same-labeled
birds were first tagged.) While the birds wiggled around in Wendi’s lap, and gnawed at her
forearms, I then labeled a small Ziploc bag "CB" for Cape Bougainville, along with the date
(mm/dd/yyyy) and the same number-letter label. Gripping the bag tightly in the persistent
wind, I brushed my left index finger along the white breast of our squirmy research subject,
in order to sift down to a single feather to pluck as a sample. Four to six feather samples per
bird would suffice to run isotope tests, which would be used to analyze diet and other
biological features. Next, I stowed away the baggie of feathers, and ran a small blue bungee
cord under the bird's belly, making sure it lay high under the wings; I attached the cord to a
hanging scale. I recorded the weight: most weighed in at about 3.3kg. Finally, Wendi would
then reintroduce the bird to the rest of the colony where, typically greeted by a barrage of
outstretched cawing beaks, it would hop around (hence the name) in zigzags to circumvent
defensive couples guarding their eggs. We carried on with this “conveyer belt” method with
steady success, locating and processing nine out of the twenty previously tagged birds.
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Figure 38 Penguin tagging process. Photo by Amélie Augé.

At this point, we hit a wall. Hours went by without finding further tags. Our eyes
glazing over in the maze of penguin ankles, we decided to try and thin out the colony to get
past the perimeter of tag-less birds and allow some room to creep closer in. The method we
came up with could not have been more apt in the Falklands: of course, a corral! As I have
discussed in the previous chapters, before the advent of conservation in the islands, gauchos
corralled feral cattle, while sealers and settlers used the same technique on penguins in order
to funnel them into so-called “try pots,” in which they were boiled down for their oil to be
exchanged as a commodity. Here, ironically, the birds were being corralled so that we could
protect their colony with scientific knowledge, and close the gap on new potential oil riches,
which might, in turn, pose a threat to their livelihoods if an uncontrolled spill were ever to
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occur. As illustrated by the continued practice of the corral, the data gap thus functioned as
yet another form of enclosure.
Pulling the Land Rover closer to the colony to shield us from the gusting wind, we
wrapped chicken wire around plastic stakes, which we reinforced with ties and metal stakes.
While one researcher captured random birds with the net, I picked them up by the ankles,
carried them over (avoiding their beaks), and laid them down gently inside the corral. This
method was effective in keeping the penguins temporarily separated, thus allowing Wendi an
opening to the core of the colony. Wendi waded through the inner circles of the colony on all
fours, but no further tags were to be found. Eventually, we accepted our limitation and let the
group become whole once more. We were not 100% satisfied with nine out of twenty tags;
Wendi had retrieved twice as many, eighteen out of twenty, the day before at Diamond Cove.
Wendi and her collaborators planned to return to Cape Bougainville for the remaining tags
during the incubating period.

Figure 39 Searching for tagged penguins at Cape Bougainville. Author photo.
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Figure 40 Penguin corral at Cape Bougainville. Author photo.

My next penguin-tagging event was even less successful. Despite only being
accessible by air (and occasionally by sea), Pebble Island, unlike Cape Bougainville, is a
tourist destination. The site of a famous air raid on an Argentine air base during the 1982 war,
the island is also home to an array of rare fauna, including Rockhopper, Gentoo, Macaroni
and Magellanic penguins in close proximity. Again, we focused on Rockhoppers, yet here we
failed to find any tags at all in an especially hostile rocky environment of wind, freezing rain
and keen Skuas gliding in at any opportunity to snatch an egg. The weather also kept us from
attempting to deploy new PTT devices that would be unlikely to stay glued to the birds with
wet feathers anyhow. Apart from avoiding hail in the Land Rover, we were able to set up a
camera to record a leukistic Rockhopper (an extremely rare vanilla-colored bird). Wendi and
another SAERI researcher returned to Pebble about a month later and were able to attach the
five PTT tags, but mysteriously there remained no sign of the GLS tags at this site.
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The GLS tags that Wendi did retrieve had to be calibrated before and after
deployment. This entailed tossing them into a horse paddock and letting them sit in the sun
for a week before taking them out to a penguin colony. Wendi and her collaborators did this
after retrieving them, as well. Much of the rest of the technical function of the GLS tags
remained somewhat of a mystery, even to Wendi. The PTT trackers were more
straightforward. One of the ways the data was represented was as a KML file, so each tag had
a separate vector on Google Earth. Out of the twenty PTT trackers deployed, there were a
couple of satellite errors, but the majority seemed accurate. Most of the sample birds had
been feeding at medium distance, but some ventured as far as 400km, including one from
Pebble Island and another from Cape Dolphin, which traveled right through where the Sea
Lion oil well and proposed drill site was located.
The new data from the GAP project would ostensibly inform new strategies to
minimize and mitigate impact in environmental management plans, but Wendi
acknowledged, “In all honesty, I don't think there’s any way they’ll stop going ahead with the
drilling.” Tracking penguins may offer insights on the birds’ foraging patterns, which will
likely “interact” with oil exploration activities, but as I have described, the GLS tags did not
yield significant data at the time of my research. Moreover, as we shall see, this research does
not address more urgent matters of environmental risk arising from offshore oil development.
In what follows, I will analyze how the tragic irony of the GAP project became inscribed as
confidence ratings in environmental impact statements, which in turn present alarming new
political ecological lacunas.

Conflict and Confidence in Environmental Impact Statements
The GAP Project was supposed to feed directly into the crafting of environmental regulations
for offshore oil exploration in the Falklands. As part of a broader Environmental Impact
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Assessment (EIA) structure and process that ranges from baseline data analysis to public
consultations, Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) precede each round of drilling
licenses. During SAERI’s initial period as a government-funded center, John would review
them and pass comments on to the regulator, FIG Mineral Resources. The oil companies and
the FIG had typically subcontracted independent consultants based primarily in the UK, such
as RPS or the Scottish Association for Marine Science (SAMS) to draft and review the
statements. A lack of familiarity with the South Atlantic environment, as well as marketdriven efficiency measures made the quality of these statements vary. They typically
contained myriad inaccuracies and false assumptions. Oil consultants described the EIS to me
as a “box-checking” exercise: in some cases, consultants had literally copied and pasted
sections from previous statements based on Northern Hemisphere standards. With its
pioneering role in the GAP Project, SAERI was well positioned to contribute new local
knowledge to FIG’s vetting process.
However, as it began to distance itself from government, SAERI not only reviewed
EIS’ but also accepted contracts from the oil companies to produce them. Conflicts of interest
may be inevitable in such a small, remote “island community” where everyone wears many
hats and has fingers in several pies. It is very common in the Falklands for multiple people to
“declare an interest” mid-sentence in a meeting. In this case, SAERI found itself in an
awkward position because it remained partially government-funded. To circumvent a
potential conflict, FIG issued a letter stating that the government would not interfere in the
process, and that SAERI was essentially an independent organization with regard to the
consulting work. Of course, SAERI did not review its own EIS, and John indicated that if
they produce them regularly, they will not continue reviewing others because SAERI might
be perceived as more damning to competitors. If SAERI both reviews and produces EIS’
consistently, then it may need to split into separate legal entities. John was quite honest about
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the decision to begin producing EIS’s: reviewing them pays “peanuts” or nothing at all, and
why not utilize the local skills and expertise SAERI has to do them in order to generate an
income that may support other forms of academic knowledge production? Similarly, oil
company managers who spoke with me focused on what they were trying to achieve, and
asserted that SAERI likely provided the best possible information and knowledge on the
subject.
Accustomed to rigorous science that advances understanding rather than simply
meeting accepted standards, SAERI and its independent collaborators attempted to transform
the quality and structure of the EIS by tweaking its methodology. Specifically, John and his
co-authors questioned the qualitative nature of oil spill fate modeling that had long been
based on incomplete data. Initially, the common assumption was that the Sea Lion discovery
was far enough away from the islands—100 miles north—so if anything were to go wrong,
prevailing currents would carry a blowout or spill away from the islands (this obviously did
little to address Argentine concerns). However, a British engineer who worked with BP
following the Macondo disaster adapted a computerized “plume 3-D” model that suggested
otherwise. The model was developed by Norwegian experts, using 20 years of “hind-cast”
data incorporating winds, currents and waves, and suggested that 2% of the hypothetical
blowout, equivalent to about 250-300 tons, would arrive on the northern coast of the
Falklands in a worst-case scenario. The model showed that the especially waxy Sea Lion
crude would solidify and form an emulsion of individual “waxlets,” which would rise to the
surface, making wind a stronger factor than currents.
This model caused alarm among Falkland Islanders worried about the pristine coastal
image, but local scientists from SAERI and FIG Fisheries were less concerned than the oil
company representatives. They questioned the data sources, arguing that they neglected
oceanographic research on the region’s unique system of geostrophic currents, eddies flowing
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in a western-northwestern direction (Arkhipkin et al. 2010). While the quality of these
models has improved over time, until SAERI took the helm, the probabilities of risk still were
not considered relative to the breadth of understanding. To make these assumptions more
transparent, SAERI introduced “degrees of confidence” into the EIS. Depending on the
availability of data, the confidence intervals of a spill model could be measured in statistical
terms, e.g. plus or minus one standard deviation, 95% confidence, a range, variance or
standard error. Armed with a vulnerability score or index parameter, the authors could judge
that the less confident one is in an assessment; the more conservative one would need to be in
estimating potential risk. In public consultations, Premier’s local representatives and
environmental officers highlighted that the data gaps were included in these “degrees of
confidence,” saying that they were “proud of the world class product of the Falkland
Islands.”
Nonetheless, as Andrew Barry (2013) has shown in the context of the “measured
impacts” of the disputed Eurasian Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, transparency may
ironically inscribe absences. In the EIS that SAERI produced for Premier Oil, the degrees of
confidence ratings did not have a major impact on the overall statement. To arrive at the
degree of confidence for assessing the impact of a project activity, including accidental
events, such as an uncontrolled spill, SAERI considered how the nature of the effect
corresponded to its magnitude and the sensitivity of the “receptor” based on environmental
baseline data available. Here, the marine ecosystem was understood as relatively passive, and
it did not include all organisms that could constitute “environmental receptors” of
hydrocarbons, for example microbes, which had become key sites of knowledge production
in the Gulf of Mexico following the Deepwater Horizon spill (Bond 2013).286 The effect’s
magnitude and the sensitivity of the “receptor” informed the rating of impact significance:
286
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low (no action required); moderate (action required to reduce risk through mitigation); or
high (also categorized as “major,” meaning risk unacceptable and immediate action required).
This in itself did not differ greatly from previous EIS’, but SAERI added a confidence rating
to the formula. Degrees of confidence were based on: (1) how clearly the activity was
defined; (2) how well understood the sensitivity of receptor was based on availability of data;
and (3) how well understood the nature of the impact was.

Figure 41 Environmental Impact Assessment Process (Premier Oil 2014, 21).

Yet, when Premier held public consultations, it remained unclear in which areas the
confidence rating affected the assessment, if at all. One audience member pointed out that
there was no area that was so data deficient that it significantly changed the impact. Out of
the possible categories of confidence—“certain,” “probable,” or “unlikely”—all aspects of
the EIS were rated as either “certain” or “probable.”287 Assumptions informing the EIS
process were described as “areas of uncertainty,” including final selection of offshore
chemicals, a detailed drilling schedule, requirements for well testing and drilling, the type of
287

John told me that one item was rated “unlikely” but he could not recall which one. Upon several reviews of
the statement, I cannot locate a single item with this confidence rating.

270

hydrocarbon encountered and temporary accommodation arrangements in Stanley (Premier
Oil 2014, 56–7). Yet, where the word “unlikely” does appear, it was almost always employed
to describe potential impact as negligible, or to reinforce the low probability of a worst-case
scenario spill (even if the impact significance of an uncontrolled release was assessed as
“major” or “high”).288
Rather than creating an additional layer of rigor, the confidence ratings thus produced
a “bandwagon effect” for the government to continue issuing licenses (Fujimura 1988). In
some cases, pointing to “many unknowns” signaled caution (Premier Oil 2014, 302), but in
other areas a lack of confidence softened the severity and likelihood of a potential spill. In
turn, this lowered the impact significance from “major” to “moderate” (Premier Oil 2014,
36). Uncertain confidence ratings also rationalized the need for new data gap analyses—
implying further funding for SAERI—that would inform future environmental management
plans (EMP), and set acceptable performance standards and monitoring methods. This is not
to suggest that SAERI engaged in nefarious forms of “green-mailing” discussed in the
previous section, but by drawing the conclusions “data gathering required,” “monitoring
required,” or “compensatory mitigation,” and suggesting that they must go into the EMP, the
assumption is that acceptable impact significance would be contingent on contracting future
research in the Falklands (Premier Oil 2014, 177; 304). Who else but SAERI would be
capable of carrying out this contingent work, and where else to store the data?289
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To solve the problems of isolation and duplication of independent research, SAERI has made an ambitious
effort to compile and curate scientific data in a new IMS-GIS Data Centre (Information Management System,
Geographic Information System). From its database headquarters in the Falklands, an extremely hard-working
SAERI contractor has organized for each of the UK Overseas Territories in the South Atlantic islands to create
and manage a secure server and dedicated online data repository. Data “custodians” in each of the islands
require researchers to submit licensing agreements and metadata forms that become collated in a central
WebGIS catalogue for data owners and data requesters to access later, including commercial users (for a fee).
Data also become the basis for decision-making processes, which we see in the case of the EIS, as well as
SAERI’s marine spatial planning project, which I do not have space to discuss at length: To avoid potential
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Scaled Out: Transboundary Impact, Global Warming and Intertidal Zones
Despite their immediate urgency, glaring unanswered questions of spatiotemporal scale lurk
behind the confidence-building technologies of the EIS. First, and perhaps most alarming is
that the contested regional politics of the sovereignty dispute and Argentina’s contradictory
claims over maritime zones are not discussed. This highly controversial aspect is not even
factored into SAERI’s assessment of drilling’s “transboundary impact.” The ostensible
reasoning for this ogling omission is that it is an assessment of environmental, not
socioeconomic impact. Yet, the EIS does address some socioeconomic aspects, such as the
effect on the businesses of local tourism and commercial fishing.
Even if it is externalized from the environmental assessment, the FIG has
acknowledged that a spill passing into Argentina’s zone would be a political disaster. In
accordance with UK regulations, the oil companies have run fate models on an extremely
unlikely 30-day easterly wind to envision oil reaching the coast of Argentina (the region is
iconic for strong westerly’s). But of course, Argentina claims the entire continental shelf (the
Pampa Azul) as its national maritime area. Even if a spill were to stay within Falklands
waters, the FICZ is not a true EEZ, and is not recognized as such by the UN. Some FIG
counselors have argued for regional cooperation in knowledge sharing, comparable to
previous agreements on fishing, but as it stands, legislators have not sought transboundary
consent because they view it as unachievable when the actual boundaries are not even agreed
upon. FIG Mineral Resources officers have been working around the clock to craft pragmatic
and effective regulations, but it has been a steep learning curve. For the time being, the EIS
and eventual EMP are based on “polluter pays” principles, modeled on the UK and Australia,
which are “goal-setting” or risk-based rather than prescriptive, and thus designed to keep the

conflicts or collisions in the economic zone, GIS data on different species habitats have informed how and when
resource users may request commercial activity.
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onus on the operator.290 Considering that their activities are technically illegal in Argentina,
the operators are not likely to consult the neighbors. They are active members in a global
network called Oil Spill Response Limited, which has an office in Brazil, but it could take
weeks before support vessels arrive to control an accidental spill. An ecological casualty of
the geopolitical dispute, transboundary impact thus remains a significant under-analyzed
aspect of the EIS.
Second, the scale of global warming and climate change in the EIS’s discussion of
atmospheric emissions was restricted to the local activities of the drilling rig and its support
system (Premier Oil 2014, 207). Even though the explicit aim of the activities is to find,
extract and circulate fossil fuels for a global market, any emissions from distribution and
consumption were excluded from the EIS. Thus, the severity of the effect on global warming
was considered to be “slight,” with a “negligible environmental effect” (Premier Oil 2014,
212). The statement analyzes ozone-depleting substances in considerable detail, and yet the
sensitivity of the receptor was considered “low,” even in a drilling site that sits directly below
the ozone hole. The EIS asserted: “Assessment of the significance of greenhouse gases and
carbon dioxide generated as a result of the drilling campaign is considered on a global scale”
(Premier Oil 2014, 213). There were even sections on “cumulative effects” and “residual
impacts,” yet the scale was restricted to the drilling campaign and possible development of
the Sea Lion offshore oil field, and thus the pre-mitigation and post-mitigation impacts were
rated “low.”
This would be unsurprising for a typical subcontracted EIS, but SAERI’s intention
was to deliver new layers of scientific precision. The authors adhered closely to a
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There are three aspects to the FIG’s polluter pays policy: (1) refunding costs of regulation, so if the regulator
needs to carry out a routine inspection, then those costs are passed onto the operator; (2) operating costs of
administration; and (3) the polluter pays principle, which means that the responsibility for any pollution, and
damage caused thereby, should duress the operator. This could mean either direct damage, say to fishing
companies, or it could be the cost of what the government has had to take to avert or remedy that pollution.
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methodology that measured the immediate impact of energy emissions, but stopped short of
actually applying it to global impact. Far from naïve, John told me, “whatever happens, the
world still is utilizing oil, and whether people like it or not, there is an oil industry developing
in the Falkland Islands, and it would be, well it would be difficult to stop for a start, so what
we need to do is ensure it’s the best regulated in the world and the most environmentally
regulated in the world, and that’s the certainly the vision for FIG and people involved.” Still,
scientists and governments around the world have come to an overwhelming consensus that
we are facing global ecological crisis due to climate change caused by greenhouse gases. The
global value chain for oil and gas is well understood, but life cycle assessments are a best
practice that rarely occur on the environmental side of extractive industries (Bridge 2008;
Bridge and Le Billon 2013). Instead of calculating potential emissions based on the
production of petroleum for consumption, it is perhaps more likely that companies with large
reserves would be forced write down some of their assets (and their value to shareholders) as
a result of climate change mitigation rules, carbon taxes and so on. Nonetheless, assessing
global warming impacts of upstream oil exploration without addressing potential downstream
emissions offers selective confidence at best and climate change denial at worst.
Lastly, the transition from upstream to downstream may be the point at which a spill
would have the most immediate environmental impact in the Falklands. Despite Falkland
Islanders’ demands that little or no development occur onshore, Premier Oil engineers found
that whether it used the FPSO or TLP design (see Chapter 5), they would need to use an
inshore transfer system to export the oil to market. Here, the debates over whether or not an
oil spill would reach the islands’ coast from the North Falkland Basin became relatively
inconsequential. Concerns over the harsh ocean, offshore safety, and restrictions from
accessing a sheltered location near the continent due to the sovereignty dispute left Premier
with only one option: inshore ship-to-ship transfer. The prevailing westerly winds required
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Premier to choose among three sheltered inlets on the east side of East Falkland Island. The
first, Berkeley Sound lies just outside of Stanley Harbour; there is traffic with fishing and
cruise vessels. The second is Low Bay, which lacks roads if there were ever an emergency (it
is also uncomfortably close to an island owned by the FIOHEF chair). The third possible
location is Choisel Sound, near Mare Harbour, the military’s main port facility.
The inshore transfer condition left a “gray box” unchecked in the EIS: the ambiguous
“boundary objects” of coastal or intertidal zones (Fujimura 1992). Premier contracted a local
environmental consultant to create a risk matrix, combining “coastline environmental
sensitivity” and “oil vulnerability” indices. This mechanism measured how absorbent the
coastal material is, and what kinds of “important bird areas,” particularly penguin colonies,
might be impacted. However, available data on these areas were very limited. Historically, in
most Camp settlements, the beach was treated as a garbage dump, making it a barrier to
ecological value. Independent conservationists have begun to build a database of baseline
surveys, compiling recordings and GPS bearings on the presence of intertidal wildlife and
other environmental variables. In these areas, conspicuous “indicator species,” such as Kelp
Geese, Logger Ducks and passerine land birds serve as proxies for the ecological health of
individual islands and coastal zones (Tabak et al. 2014). Yet, because SAERI’s GAP Project
has focused on more charismatic higher predators and offshore areas, all of the onerous work
that went into penguin tagging did not factor directly into the environmental impact
assessment of inshore areas. Tragically, this had been the subject of the PhD researcher based
at SAERI who resigned—in order to work for FIG Mineral Resources.
These urgent matters of transboundary impact, global warming and intertidal zones
dodged the GAP project and slipped between the scales of the EIS. Reflecting on these tragic
absences, one researcher, frustrated with the impossibility of prioritizing risks and collecting
new data in a limited timeframe, told me that they hoped that the companies never develop
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oil in the Falklands. “For just 2,000 people, they can survive without oil.” While most
Islanders are used to ignoring the sovereignty dispute and living everyday under the gaping
ozone hole—making transboundary impact and global warming seem relatively
insignificant—stakeholders wondered if the inshore transfer issue might be the factor that
makes the Falkland Islanders stop and think that they might not want any oil after all. In spite
of the encouraging impact ratings, it seemed that the environmental research had
“coproduced” a shortage of confidence (Jasanoff 2006).

Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the development of science in the South Atlantic since the
establishment of new regimes of fishing and offshore oil exploration. Recent campaigns by
the FIG Fisheries Department and the Argentine Government have attempted to leverage
their respective sovereignty claims by demonstrating environmental stewardship through
scientific research. Rather than combining epistemological networks to manage shared
natural resources (Forsyth 2002, 140), knowledge of squid became a boundary object that
FIG Fisheries expressed through a problematic common resource pool framing. In response,
Argentina’s government has re-conceptualized the South Atlantic as an emergent national
frontier: the “Pampa Azul” (Blue Pampa).
With the establishment of SAERI, the FIG has sought to re-center scientific
knowledge production of the South Atlantic in the Falklands. Ethnographic analysis of
SAERI’s GAP Project reveals how data gaps may be understood as what Bruno Latour
(1999a) calls “circulating references.” Drawing on his own ethnographic co-research with
soil scientists in the Amazon, comparable to the penguin tagging fieldwork I describe above,
Latour argues that rather than bridging the gap between the natural world and human
language through direct correspondence, circulating references model differing propositions
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that may or may not articulate with one another. As he puts it, “Not having to fill a huge and
radical gap between two realms, but merely shift through many little gaps between slightly
different active entities, reference is no longer an all or nothing correspondence” (Latour
1999b, 148). This is instructive for trying to understand the tragic shortcomings of scientific
knowledge production.
In the case of the GAP Project, the customization of scientific research for extractive
industries suggests that analyzing data gaps does little to change political-ecological
outcomes: circulating references also circulate capital. Filling gaps with ambiguous facts
about penguin migration patterns and general ecological sensitivity does not alter the
trajectory of oil exploration campaigns. The data gap analyses enhance the EIS with
confidence assessments that “coproduce” the instability of the permanent frontier in the form
of a “standardized package” with “bandwagon effects” for drilling to carry on (Fujimura
1992; Jasanoff 2006). Ultimately, the raw data of science reinforces notions of environmental
stewardship and political stability that fly in the face of violent realities: namely
transboundary impacts exacerbated by the sovereignty dispute, the crisis of global warming
and undervalued aspects of local ecology, such as the fragile ecology of intertidal zones.
In sum, this chapter has shown how the permanent frontier condition of the settler
colonial protectorate takes on new contours in the realm of science. Both Pampa Azul and the
GAP project are frontier-making schemes that depend on imagined horizons of knowledge, as
well as new enclosures for easy rents of extractive capital accumulation. Similar to the points
required for permanent residence that I discussed in Chapter 3, the confidence ratings in the
EIS also function as degrees of imperial sovereignty. Data gaps and degrees of confidence
operate on selective scales of exclusion that are designed to guarantee safety, and yet risk
serious injustice within and beyond the settler colonial protectorate.
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INTERLUDE | MARCH OF THE PENGUIN CONSERVATIONIST

“No one is hated more by both industry and conservation as much as Mike Bingham,” a
Falkland Islander told me. In his self-published exposé, The Falklands Regime, independent
British penguin biologist Mike Bingham tells the impassioned story of his fight to save the
Falklands’ penguin population from decimation. The “regime” in the book’s title is an
allusion to the kind of anti-democratic dictatorships that the Falklands war was ostensibly
supposed to have ousted, and the sensational cover photo shows a beach full of penguin
corpses. Bingham placed the blame for an apparent decrease in penguins in the 1990s
squarely on the emergence of a commercial fishing industry in the Falklands, and his early
resistance to oil drilling remains one of the only local acts of defiance against the Falklands’
emergent energy industry.291 His whistleblowing earned him personal threats and forced him
to seek exile in Argentina and Chile, but only after taking his case all the way to the UK
Supreme Court—and winning.
To gather up-to-date information, I spent an afternoon with Bingham at a
sandwichería in Punta Arenas, Chile. He cut an unmistakable figure: blonde with glasses and
biceps bulging out of a penguin-printed t-shirt. Bingham first came to the islands as a
Conservation Officer with the nascent Falklands Conservation (FC) under a work permit in
1993. There, he overhauled the NGO’s seabird monitoring program and conducted baseline
surveys and a census to determine the demographics of penguins, albatross and other wildlife.
This entailed traveling the unpaved Camp by Land Rover and on foot for observations and
291
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mapping, as well as aerial photography in collaboration with the Royal Air Force. As a result
of this research, Bingham presented alarming findings to the government and published
controversial articles, which compared his 1996 census figures to previous studies conducted
before the establishment of a commercial fishing regime in the Falklands.292 Bingham
concluded that a decline of the total penguin population by 84% was the reduction of fish and
squid due to commercial fishing, thus removing the penguins’ primary food source.
Thus began a battle between Bingham on the one hand and the government and local
business elites on the other, who, as we have explored, amassed growing wealth from
commercial fishing licenses and taxes. Bingham’s critics argued that the reduction in penguin
numbers was part of a global trend, so to prove them wrong he conducted comparable
censuses, out-of-pocket, in Chile and Argentina, where no-fishing zones were enforced near
penguin colonies. Meanwhile, oil exploration began around the Falklands, and some of the
elites with major interests in oil companies, such as Desire Petroleum, as well as in
commercial fishing, had taken charge of the board of FC. Again, conflicts of interest are
inevitable in a place with such a limited population, but Bingham claimed that this takeover
amounted to a coup, designed to neutralize environmentalist objections to business.
When he voiced concerns over oil spills, which were probably caused by a tanker
rather than drilling, Bingham earned the designation “undesirable” in the Falklands (see
Chapter 3). He was fired and replaced at FC, and his application for permanent residence was
repeatedly denied, but Bingham took a new job with the Power Station that allowed him to
continue residing in the islands. He leveled a series of charges against the FIG, including:
attempted bribery; false accusations of data theft, burglary and fraud; framing him with
possession of contraband pornographic film; planting firearms; delivering death threats and
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malicious phone calls; committing perjury; fabricating documents; and sabotaging his
vehicle.
The Falklands Regime has a somewhat panicked, conspiratorial tone, and Bingham’s
numerous critics point to inaccuracies, simplifications and exaggerations. Islanders who
interacted with Bingham called him a “fantasist,” who bought his “rubbish” Ph.D. off the
Internet. Bingham’s thoughts and words move at a frenetic pace, and his book gives
excruciating detail not only about his research or his case against the government, but also
physical illness, including cancer, and marital issues. Portraying himself as a tragic hero
fighting a just cause of conservation, Bingham excelled at self-publicizing his agenda (who
doesn’t love penguins?).293 Threatened with deportation on multiple occasions, Bingham
argued ultimately that this violated his right to freedom of speech. In November 2003, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Bingham, judging that the appointed British Governor and
FIG broke the law by refusing his application for residency on the grounds that he had
criticized the government (hence his label for the FIG as a “regime”).
Going out on a high note, Bingham left his Falklands research behind after his
triumphant court case. He had lived there for 11 years, from 1993-2004. Currently, he
focuses his monitoring activities primarily in the Chilean Island of Magdalena, as well as
Cabo Vírgenes, near Río Gallegos, Argentina: both no-fishing zones. Bingham said his
current research is funded entirely by the sale of his book and “adopt-a-penguin” donations.
Unsurprisingly, his book sold far more copies once it was translated into Spanish; when I met
him, he boasted having 1.148 million “likes” on his Facebook page. Given his intense falling
out with the FIG, one might suspect that Bingham would be a collaborator in Argentina’s
sovereignty cause, but this is not the case. When he first moved to Río Gallegos, he was
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literally the neighbor of then-President and First Lady, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner. He
claims to have known them “quite well,” but they never asked him to make derogatory
remarks about the Falklands, nor would he have done so because he does not see validity in
the Argentine claim. The Chilean and Argentine governments support his work with their
permission—he stays in a lighthouse on a Chilean nature reserve—but they do not fund his
project.
At an “International Penguin Conference,” Bingham clashed with his successors from
FC. They published articles that reevaluated historical data on Rockhopper penguins, arguing
that while there have been population decreases, they were slightly less dramatic than
previously thought. Moreover, they suggest that, while there may be overlap between
penguin foraging and commercial fishing, global scale changes in ocean temperature were the
principal cause of these declines.294 Bingham concedes that Rockhopper and Gentoo species
of penguin have leveled off or recovered by adapting their diets, but he rejoins that a
temperature change would have increased food supply rather than harm the birds. Currently,
he focuses primarily on Magellanic penguins, which he says are affected most from
commercial fishing and continue to thin out at a disproportional rate in the Falklands,
compared to the nearest colonies in Chile and Argentina, where populations are healthy and
increasing.
Even after his ordeal, Bingham has a deep appreciation for the “Falklands Way of
Life.” He attributes to Falkland Islanders such qualities as “down to earth, hardworking,
friendly and above all honest” (Bingham 2005, 8). In fact, some farmers he worked closely
with in Camp continue to count their penguin colonies and send him new data. Despite his
outrage at what he viewed as poor governance and a corrupt “regime,” Bingham supports the
Islanders’ self-determination claim. After his victory in court, Bingham received fair support
294
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from ordinary Falkland Islanders, and now his controversy is mostly forgotten in the islands.
Nonetheless, his ordeal speaks to the limits to political rights and environmental justice for
“undesirables” in the settler colonial protectorate.
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CHAPTER 7: NATURE

Introduction
Toward a theory of settler indigeneity, this chapter will capture a narrative of environmental
stewardship that selectively reinforces the Western agroindustrial and technoscientific norms
and values described thus far. Situated at latitude 51°S with London located nearly 8,000
miles away, at 51°N, the Falklands are a quintessential example of the temperate zones that
Alfred Crosby (1986) termed “Neo-Europes.”295 Through ethnographic research with white
settlers in the Antipodes and Southern Africa, social anthropologists have begun to examine
how attachments to place in such frontier areas may constitute not just extensions of Europe,
but also assertions of indigeneity or autochthony. In New Zealand’s high country, Michéle
Dominy (1995; 2000) argued that European descendant “Pakeha” construct a sense of home
through a discourse of “authenticity” in connections to land. From a more critical perspective,
David Hughes (2010) argued that by affiliating with land and building dams, white
conservationist large-scale farmers are also asserting indigeneity in the “failed neo-Europe”
of Zimbabwe (Hughes 2006, 269). Most recently, in the less egregious postcolonial context
of Batswana, Catie Gressier (2015) has described how white “minorities” resolve political
insecurity through claims to “experiential autochtony,” i.e. emplacement in the
environment.296
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While there are certainly parallels, unlike the enclaves examined in these cases, as I
have noted above, there is no historical evidence of a pre-colonial indigenous population in
the Falklands. The unusual nature of the Islanders’ self-determination claim unsettles our
assumptions of how its principles usually apply, prompting new political-ecological
questions: What constitutes an indigenous or settler ecological landscape? How have the
Islanders naturalized their colonial British heritage, as stewards of the land with authority
over the environment? How are they negotiating asymmetries in national, ethnic, and racial
identity, as they assert their “inalienable” rights to territory as “a people?” And what makes a
non-native population of a UN-designated “non-self-governing territory” either a settler
colony or an alien invasion, in the first place?
Through examination of quotidian practices to ensure biosecurity, this chapter offers
an anthropological perspective on how settlers of the Falklands are reinventing themselves as
“natives” through environmental management. I begin by considering how multispecies
ethnography provides a surprisingly apt methodology for investigating the Islanders’
appropriation of self-determination. Taking a historical anthropological approach, I analyze
how the Islanders’ assertion of peoplehood is rooted, paradoxically, in the dehumanization
and genocide of the Natives of Tierra del Fuego. Examining a series of human-nonhuman
interactions, I then consider how the course of eradication changed over time in the islands,
from extermination of “native pests” in the Falklands and Patagonia (1833-1982) to defense
against “alien invasion” (1982-present). Toward a conclusion, I analyze how Islanders have
begun to deracinate their ecological imperialist past and “colonize” with native species,
through removal of British-introduced “invasive” species, as well as habitat restoration
methods designed to protect globally “important birds” and reintroduce endemic plants.
geographical externality on the one hand (the ostensibly hostile Okavango Safari), and internalized universalism
on the other (the spiritual morality of experiential autochthony). Gressier dismisses Hughes’ critical political
position, but fails to appreciate his treatment of dam-making as a production of nature that undergirds white
settlers’ constrained “disregard” for racialized Others (Hughes 2010, 12). See also Crapanzano (1985, 21; 39).
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The Nature of Settler Indigeneity: a Multispecies Approach
The classical liberal logic of enclosure and improvement of the commons described earlier
served to legitimize colonialism in the British Empire, based on notions of wilderness, the
desert and terra nullius.297 Multispecies ethnography offers a generative methodology for
analyzing what counts as wild, feral or domesticated (S. E. Kirksey and Helmreich 2010;
Lowe 2006). Reflecting on a species of “alien” plants blamed for a fire in South Africa, Jean
and John Comaroff (2001) found, for instance, that naturalizing territory of the nation enables
the cross-species ascription of contemptible attributes to particular persons and things.298
While their observations are characteristically rich and persuasive, John Hartigan (2013, 385)
argues that the Comaroffs’ notion of plants as “alibi,” which mark social and political
difference, decenters non-human species unjustly as objects of ideological transference or
displacement, rather than subjects of ethnographic inquiry in their own right.299 As I
discussed in Chapter 4, Anna Tsing (2015a) has aimed to rectify such anthropocentrism,
pushing for a collaborative analysis of the more-than-human from the particular vantage
point of the matsutake mushroom, a gourmet fungus that thrives in the deforested ruins of
industrial capitalism.
Proposing a different version of “anthropology beyond humanity,” Tim Ingold (2013,
19) argues that there is “nothing new” about multispecies ethnography. Ingold rejects the
fashionable multispecies turn, and even the concept of species itself, for being imprecisely
plural. In response, Kirksey (2015b) draws on ethnographic work among taxonomists to
argue that framing studies around a multiplicity of species is useful for making sense of, and
caring for neglected creatures. In this debate, I defer to Donna Haraway’s judgment that
while the word species carries dubious connotations of race and sex, it may still be a useful
297
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tool for critically analyzing structures and discourses of colonialism (Haraway 2007, 18). As
she put it, “The point is not to celebrate complexity but to become worldly and to respond”
(Haraway 2007, 41).
Whether critiquing or defending the species concept, what many of these works share
is an ecological optimism, if not ecomodernism, which revels in how nonhumans flourish in
increasingly toxic environments (E. Kirksey 2015a). In light of seemingly insurmountable
crises of climate change, human agency and global capitalism, this comes as a refreshing
challenge to the destruction of what geologists call the Anthropocene (Chakrabarty 2008;
Haraway 2016; Latour 2014). However, even as they show how extraordinary nonhumans
defy anthropogenic precarity, these studies tend to downplay hegemonic structures of power.
Like humans, nonhumans are not reducible to conscious, empowered “agent-subjects” (Asad
2003, 67–99). A more comprehensive analysis requires refocusing our ethnographic attention
from the prior innocuous “use of race on nonhumans” (Hartigan 2013: 373) to practices that
have institutionalized some nonhumans into systems of racial and colonial classification,
whilst making others appear natural in particular periods and locations. While scholars of
animal studies and environmental humanities have begun to probe ethical questions of
species commodification, endangerment, extinction and eradication, relatively few
anthropologists of human-nonhuman relations have been attuned to the political motivations
of such ecological doxa.300
An instructive exception is the envelope-pushing work of Stefan Helmreich (2009,
145–249; 2015, 62–72). This chapter builds on Helmreich’s insights into how biologists and
Native Hawaiians think about species they categorize as “alien” or “native” in the settler
colonial context of Hawaii, where the word “native” also suggests indigenous rights to
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sovereignty (Helmreich 2005; 2009, 145–170). Helmreich notes that the species category
“invasive” is a metataxonomic classification that challenges what counts as natural or
biological: its content is not purely or monolithically scientific, but rather woven into social
and economic “contexts” and “parameters” that biologists help produce (Helmreich 2005,
109–110; 125). Moreover, in Hawaii, experts face a dilemma of whether to classify species
associated with Native Hawaiian culture and livelihood—but transported by Polynesians
before the arrival of Captain Cook—as “native” or “introduced” (Helmreich 2005, 113).
Helmreich shows convincingly how the category “native” becomes either a difference in
“kind” or “degree” (Helmreich 2005, 116).
Building on this work, in what follows I connect the contemporary eradication of nonnative nonhumans and restoration of native habitats in the Falklands to the attempted
elimination of the native in the broader region of Patagonia. Taking a historical
anthropological approach to multispecies ethnography, I aim to demonstrate that even in a
fiercely disputed territory, the boundaries that categorize races and natures are powerful yet
permeable, and unstable over time.

White Settler Self-Determination and the Dehumanization of Natives
While I have discussed strategies that Islanders use to circumvent the history and politics of
race in order to claim self-determination, not all Falkland Islanders are interested in “passing”
as “native” or denying its possibility. As we have seen, some embrace the idea that the
Falklands is a kind of settler utopia. When Argentina’s history of violent national expansion
came up in a dinner party conversation, one former government director commented: “That’s
true, but we used to go over to the mainland and shoot Indians like pheasants.” He then
added, “There really is no better way to govern than genocide.” I tried to hide it, stuffing my
mouth with grilled squid, but his capricious delivery of this statement put this outwardly
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naïve, white male American anthropologist into shock.301
This was not the only Islander who revealed to me that their ancestors were paid
mercenaries who “hunted Indians” in Patagonia (Bjork-James 2015). This bloodthirsty
professional sport was obviously more common among those who settled permanently in the
continent. During the migration of Falkland Islanders to Patagonia in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, “Animals were swapped and people were swapped,” as one Islander
put it. In the process, landowners regarded both Upland Geese and Amerindians as “native
pests” to be “exterminated.”302 It was ordinary and unremarkable for sheep farmers to string
together savings literally, by collecting goose beaks and human ears alike for bounty. The
FIC paid its employees ten shillings per hundred beaks;303 in Patagonia, landowners such as
José Menéndez and mining investor Julius Popper paid one-pound sterling to clans of “Indian
hunters” led by Alexander Mac Lennan aka Chancho Colorado (“Red Pig”) for each pair of a
deceased Selk’nam (Ona) person’s ears.304 With the complicit support of the Argentine
Republic and Chile, settlers thus valued a Native human’s life equal to the lives of two
hundred native geese. What does this metric tell us about the hierarchical ordering of race and
nature in a settler colonial situation (D. S. Moore et al. 2003)?
A key figure bridging the social formations and ecological assemblages of the South
301
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Atlantic and Southern Cone in the region’s early stages of European colonization is Charles
Darwin. In the conclusion to The Voyage of the Beagle, Darwin ranked the Yámana people he
encountered in Tierra del Fuego as “man in his lowest and most savage state” (Darwin 1997
[1839], 730). He considered them less intelligent or capable of semiotic communication than
domesticated animals, yet he noted their remarkable ability to imitate foreign sounds (Taussig
1993, 73–87). Like the parodied anthropologist in Raoul Ruiz’ absurd 1986 film On Top of
the Whale, Darwin assumed erroneously that the Yámana possessed a lexicon of fewer than
100 words. Missionary Thomas Bridges would later list at least 32,000 words and inflections
in his English Dictionary of the Yámana language (Bridges 2007, 34). Unlike the Iroquois,
Inca or Aztec, whom colonizers viewed as civilizations worthy of limited diplomacy, Darwin
compared the Yámana with exotic nonhuman animals in ecological niches: “the lion in his
desert, the tiger tearing his prey in the jungle, or the rhinoceros wandering over the wild
plains of Africa” (Darwin 1997 [1839], 730). In their “wild” condition, the Yámana were not,
to Darwin, “‘at home’ in a European milieu” (Stoler 2013b, 56).
Legal scholar William Ian Miller (1998) uses Darwin’s encounter with a singular
Yámana Native of Tierra del Fuego as a point of departure for theorizing the emotion of
disgust. Darwin (Darwin 2009 [1872], 269) reflects: “the native touched with his finger some
cold preserved meat which I was eating at our bivouac and plainly showed utter disgust at its
softness; whilst I felt utter disgust at my food being touched by a naked savage, though his
hands did not appear dirty.” Here, Darwin acknowledges that there is something illogical
about feeling a threat of pollution after his food was handled cleanly. Miller (1998, 3)
explains that “the native recoils at the idea of what manner of man could eat such stuff,
whereas Darwin fears ingesting some essence of savagery…” While Miller does not make
explicit the racist classificatory work that the emotion of disgust has done for genocidal
political regimes, Sara Ahmed (2004), rethinks the “sticky” qualities that make objects
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designated as disgusting seem like they are invading one’s bodily space. She notes that
disgust performs a slippage: the sickening and hateful textures of a foreign object can take the
form of the bodies of others in order to construct them as non-human or lower than human
(Ahmed 2004, 97). The disgusting qualities of such bodies thus justify their expulsion.
The next sections of this chapter aim to track a reverse process. I examine how the
historical disgust that Darwin and European settlers felt toward Native humans of Tierra del
Fuego became constitutive of the desire to expel non-human bodies and objects in the
Falklands.

A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: Rendering Natives “Pests” (1833-1982)
In 1833, just months after the British settled the islands permanently, Darwin visited the
Falklands. Upon disembarking his vessel, Darwin found himself among a small population of
Englishmen, gauchos and other “runaway rebels and murderers” (Darwin 1997 [1839],
180).305 While the islands’ white managers viewed the largely mestizo (mixed-race) gaucho
workforce as barbarous, no Native human population was present on the archipelago to greet
Darwin with the disgust he experienced in Tierra del Fuego. Nevertheless, Darwin did
describe the islands as “miserable” and its treeless rocky landscape and windy climate,
“wretched” (Darwin 1997 [1839], 220).
One particular species, the only native land mammal of the islands, mystified the
otherwise unflappable Darwin: the Falkland Islands Wolf (or in local vernacular, the
Warrah). Everyone Darwin consulted confirmed that the wolf species had not been found in
any other place than the archipelago. In a moment reminiscent of Darwin’s encounter with
the Yámana Native—both mediated by meat—he describes a gaucho technique of luring in
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the wolf with a piece of meat in one hand and sticking it with a knife with the other. Thanks
to this method, the Warrah would become extinct by 1876.

Figure 42 Warrah (Dusicyon australis). Source: Waterhouse, George. 1838. “Canis antarcticus.” In The
Zoology of the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle, edited by Charles Darwin. London: Smith Elder and Co.
http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=35&itemID=F8.2&viewtype=side.

During the week of the 2013 vote, the wolf threatened to steal media attention away
from the referendum, when a scientific article was published solving Darwin’s mystery.
Based on a comparison of the wolf’s teeth with that of other South American species,
scientists dated its origin in the Falklands/Malvinas back to a period when an ice bridge
connected the archipelago to the rest of the continent. The researchers hypothesize that the
wolf followed seals and sea birds as food sources, but that no other land mammal was able to
make the journey at that time (J. J. Austin et al. 2013).
Before its extinction, the original South American colonizer of the islands had
291

become one of their first “native pests.” Considered an audacious threat during the lambing
season, the Warrah was remarkably tame.306 Selk’nam Natives in Tierra del Fuego used
relatives of the same genus Dusicyon for hunting, pointing to the likelihood that humans had
domesticated the Warrah before its isolation and extinction in the Falklands. Introduced feral
cattle and horses have now followed in the wolf’s destiny. After British settlement, Lafone’s
FIC imported gauchos from South America to tame and kill wild cattle in Darwin, the first
main settlement outside of the port town of Stanley. However, due to the lack of shelter in
Lafonia, FIC growers noticed that cattle had “degenerated” beyond the possibility of
improvement.307 Their destruction ushered in the monopolistic land tenure regime focused on
sheep farming. As discussed earlier, parallel to this shift in livestock, British shepherds,
primarily from the Scottish Highlands, displaced the South American gauchos who the
British colonial government always considered “alien.” In addition to the gauchos, British
colonial administrators viewed sheep imported from Río de la Plata as a racially inferior
breed and therefore crossbred them with English rams.
The rising socio-economic valorization of sheep co-produced a new assemblage of
“native pests” in the islands. Farmers began to view birds of prey and scavengers, such as the
Striated Caracara (known locally as the Johnny Rook), the Crested Caracara (Carancho), the
Giant Petrel (Stinker), the Skua and the Turkey Vulture, as dangers to lambs. Farmers also
accused rare marine fauna, particularly the burrowing Magellanic “Jackass” penguins, as well
as sea lions, of causing soil erosion and grass degradation.308 As I have examined, settlers and
transient sealers dating back to the French, British and Spanish colonies of the late eighteenth
century had slaughtered elephant seals and sea lions, melting their flesh for oil and preserving
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their skin.309 They also collected penguin (and albatross) eggs on a mass scale.310
Reclassifying these animals this way, Falkland Islanders rationalized the continued practice
of boiling them down for oil: quite literally, they rendered natives pests.
Targeting native fauna as pests did not result in an immediate boom in wool
production. The operation struggled to meet its goals until 1867 when, under the direction of
Frederick E. Cobb, and Wickham Bertrand, a visiting sheep farmer from New Zealand, the
Islanders initiated their first non-native species eradication: ticks (or ked) and the dermatitis
caused by their faeces (scab).311 The scab disease that one Governor called “the bane of
sheep-farmers” prevented sheep from growing wool and became treated as a serious
economic affliction.312 To eliminate scab, Bertrand advanced what would become a local
custom of “dipping” freshly sheared flocks in solutions of tobacco and sulphur, lime or
arsenic and smearing them with tar, oil and ointment.313 In an effort to kill two birds with one
stone, one “resourceful” grower even requested permission from the Governor to dress
scabbed sheep with penguin oil in 1875.314 When a scab ordinance went into force, the
Falkland Islands Magazine and Church Paper published infringements to publicly shame
offenders who mixed flocks or failed to dispose properly of carcasses.315 Once the Islanders
removed scab and expanded enclosures, wool flourished as the staple commodity.
However, the wool industry introduced new antagonism due to an uneven land tenure
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system and a sharp class division between growers and workers. While workers pined after
the possibility of raising their own flocks, growers culled sheep at their employees’ behest.316
Again, as the proletarianized settlers also began to self-identify as “native” Falkland
Islanders, colonial administrators started to treat them as subjects rather than citizens. Bearing
remarkable likeness to Darwin’s comparison between the Yámana and undomesticated
animals, one British medical officer said of the undereducated children of the remote
settlements on West Falkland Island: “In cunning and cruelty they resemble animals and
birds of prey, and they are essentially wild creatures.”317 Ironically, the Scottish shepherds
recruited to displace the “alien” gauchos, had thus descended the social-natural ladder,
becoming “feral” humans (I discussed in Chapter 3 the conceptions of race associated with
this “degeneration”). One visiting inspector went so far as to say that despite the abundance
of land for grazing, the Islands had been “overstocked” with Scotch shepherds (Bernhardson
1989, 486). Colonial administrators borrowed the term “stock” from reporting throughout the
British Empire on capital accumulation through sheep raising (Franklin 2007, 46–72). Yet, as
I have examined, despite their ambiguous racialization, rural labourers came to view
themselves as proud “native” kelpers. The human demography of the colony could thus only
be described as a multispecies ensemble of native seaweeds and introduced ruminants: the
settlers had become both “indigenous ‘kelper’ stock” and “British stock” at the same time.
It may seem like a relic of the colonial past now that fishing, oil and tourism sectors
have emerged, but one look at the Falklands’ current coat of arms reveals the continued
cultural importance of sheep to Islanders. Illustrating the Falklands’ “layers of
naturecultures” (Haraway 2007, 16), a ram features most prominently, floating precariously
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on a patch of tussac grass atop ocean waves.318 One of the ironies of the seal of the colony is
that the sheep are responsible for the degradation of native tussac grass. Similar to other
colonial situations in the Americas and the Antipodes, the irruption of “ovine colonizers”
damaged the landscape (Melville 1997; Woods 2015). Embodying both “biological control”
and “biology out of control,” as Sarah Franklin (2007, 5) put it, sheep have become a
domesticated economic resource, as well as a dominant social force in the Falklands.

Figure 43 Coat of Arms of the Falkland Islands. Source: Open Clip Art Library.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Coat_of_arms_of_the_Falkland_Islands.svg#file.
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Interestingly, the species of animal on each version of the coat of arms has changed twice, in order to reflect
more accurately its centrality for the local economy. The colony’s earliest badge depicted a bull, representing
the abundance of wild cattle during colonization. Traces of cattle farming are evident on the next version in a
leather gaucho horse-gear strap on which the motto is inscribed, but the animal changed into a sea lion. This is
perhaps indicative of how the islands were once a principal destination for animal oil. In fact, the “right” in the
motto was actually a pun, referring to the species of whale by that name. Finally, once wool production became
staple in the mid-twentieth century, the sea lion morphed into a ram. When I discussed the coat of arms in
conversation with a local townsperson on an exploratory visit this past July, he suggested, “They ought to
update the image of the sheep and ship once more to a squid and an oil rig.” See also Robin (1997; 2007) for a
comparable symbolic value of nature for nation and empire.
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Defending Against “Alien Invasion” (1982-Present)
Once boiled down for oil by early settlers, penguins now enjoy the distinction of being
immortalized by the very same taxidermist who melted the Iron Lady into a bronze bust that
was unveiled at the edge of Stanley’s Thatcher Drive in 2015. Settlers disregarded penguins
as “native pests” historically, but a widespread local embrace of conservationism has
reclassified the Falklands’ seabird populations as “globally important.”319 The adored
seabirds also draw in thousands of tourists annually. Testament to their increased local value
is that presently, farmers protect penguin colonies located within their properties from their
sheep rather than the other way around. This reclamation of local seabirds as “natural assets”
signals a wider shift in the Islanders’ environmental management: not only do they prize
livestock or exotic “native” species, but they have also come to regard introduced species,
including some of British origin, as “alien invaders.” Focusing on the post-war era here, I
will discuss how the naturalization of sheep intensified the eradication of particular “alien”
plants after the Argentine invasion. I also examine how Islanders’ extermination of “alien”
insects has become a way in which to manage post-invasion trauma. Without suggesting
direct causation, I propose that the condition of having been invaded animates settler
assertions of indigeneity. Moreover, claims of settler belonging manifest in other
environmental practices besides species removal. As I describe, habitat restoration has
offered a way for settlers to reclaim home within “native” surroundings.
In addition to recent eradication campaigns against various introduced mammals, new
waves of “alien” plant eradication have altered the islands’ countryside since the war.320
Calafate or Magellan Barberry plant, used in Patagonia for fruit and red dye, has been subject
to elimination in the Falklands because sheep get caught in its thorns. A sensational headline
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from the British newspaper The Independent read: “Calafate invasion: Falklands natives
under threat from an Argentinian force of nature: Invasive – and tenacious – South American
shrub affecting plants and damaging sheep.” The connection between Calafate plants and the
1982 Argentine invasion is rather tenuous because they were introduced well before that as a
garden ornamental. However, according to FIG’s Environmental Planning department,
Argentine soldiers did introduce another “alien” plant: Mouse-Eared Hawkweed. Like
reincarnations of Fogwill’s (2012 [1982]) fictional Pichiciegos—pink Patagonian armadillos
representing Argentine combatants burrowing into the soil—farmers bemoan Mouse-Eared
Hawkweed’s unassailable force. It spreads over large areas and chokes out other vegetation
more palatable for sheep. These South American species are considered “invaders,” even
though 85% of flora are also native to Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, and all endemic plants
in the region share affinal ties (D. M. Moore 1968).
Even though it is not of South American origin, the Scottish Thistle has also become a
“priority species” for eradication in the Falklands. Thistles’ thorns taint sheep’s wool and
make “native” bird and animal habitats impenetrable. Thom, a Scottish construction manager,
stationed in the Falklands under a temporary contract, signed up reluctantly with the NGO
Falklands Conservation to go “thistle bashing.” Anyone who has viewed the prominent place
of the thistle in Scotland’s heritage sites, such as James V’s Palace at Stirling Castle, would
understand how Thom felt insulted by Islanders complaining about “the dreaded thistles.”
Pulling up his sleeve, Thom revealed that he even has a tattoo of a thistle, emerging out of a
“tribal” design on his left bicep. In repeated visits to Saunders Island, on the northwest edge
of the archipelago, Islanders and “expat” volunteers like Thom pull the plants out by hand to
stop them from seeding. The neighboring Keppel Island, where British missionaries once
tried to “civilize” captive Yámana Natives, has become “overrun” with thistles. Civilians are
not usually granted access to Keppel, so a group of officers from the Royal Air Force went by
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helicopter on a voluntary mission to rid the abandoned settlement of thistles. Meanwhile, the
soldiers’ own base at Mount Pleasant is also on thistle alert, as well as Stanley residents’
lawns. One FIG counselor warns that any private property could be a source of a thistle
outbreak, so “everyone has to do their part.” The Islanders must remain vigilant because
thistle seeds stay dormant for up to fifteen years and still potentially germinate.
These “alien” plant eradication programs reveal how the political relations between
human and nonhuman species in the Falklands entail what Ogden (2011, 27) calls a “shifting
assemblage and alliance” in the landscape. The islands’ British settlers, and even its stationed
military officers, are no longer cleansing their land of so-called native pests. Rather, they
seek simultaneously to protect introduced sheep and native habitats, by removing both South
American “aliens,” and select vestiges of the British Empire. The Islanders may continue to
consent adamantly to British sovereignty through self-determination, but in the process of
defining the nature of their polity, they have begun paradoxically to decolonize the landscape.
While the eradication of “alien” plants has become a priority, the most “high-profile”
of the Falklands’ “alien” species are insects. Apparently introduced via South America, the
European Earwig is invading Stanley residents’ vegetable gardens and homes. Woody, an
especially cheerful organizer of Stanley’s annual horticulture show, spent decades honing his
gardening skills in Camp, first in a remote corner of West Falkland and later at the Goose
Green settlement on East Falkland. Notwithstanding the occasional glut of cabbage, Woody
is able to produce fresh vegetables year-round. However, he told me, “Earwigs are a problem.
And the earwig debate is probably about as big a debate as the referendum was. Probably
bigger because the referendum nobody talks about: we talked about it; we've got the results.
But we're still talking about the earwigs.” Eradication methods range from pesticide spray
and washing-up liquid to biological agents like chickens and tachinid flies. With the latter,
the former battleground is paying homage to a long British imperial tradition of using winged
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insects for brigading and espionage.321
Islanders negotiate daily irritation from the sovereignty dispute through talk of insect
invasion. Conversation topics among Stanley residents switch seamlessly between “the
bloody earwigs” and “the bloody Argies!” Similar to the previous headline about Calafate,
the FIG Biosecurity Officer published a story on invasive ants in the local paper under the
headline “Falkland Islands’ biosecurity officers thwart Argentine ant army invasion” (R.
James 2016). Taking this discursive juxtaposition seriously, the earwigs or ants may be
understood as more than mere symbols for Argentine antagonism. A common perceived
threat of invasion entangles insects with the South American neighbors, both having occupied
homes and eaten food without permission. One Islander I interviewed during the referendum
had been locked in a hall in Goose Green for 29 days during the 1982 invasion, given only
rations of three spoons of baked beans and crackers per day. He told me “There are some
good Argentines; they’re the ones in Darwin.” (He was referring to the cemetery of Argentine
combatants.) Traumatized Islanders have petitioned for laws banning Argentine flags, and
signs that say “No Argies” wreathe many doors. Most Islanders take a moral high ground and
frown upon xenophobia, but earwig or ant extermination provides an outlet for fortifying
homes through acceptable forms of violence.322 The eradication demonstrates how
experiences of invasion inspire new forms of disgust and racial exclusion that enhance settler
claims to belonging.
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Figure 44 Invasive species awareness poster. The vegetation indicates that the landscape depicted is not
the Falklands. Courtesy of FIG Environmental Planning Department. Source: Binns, John. n.p.:
International Reptile Conservation Foundation and UK Overseas Territories Environment Programme.
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“Pure” Environmentalism: The Eradication of Reindeer on South Georgia
Like the sheep of the Falklands, another introduced species—reindeer—stands atop the seal
of the colony for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. But far from having
naturalized residency, the reindeer are being rounded up and slaughtered for meat. One does
not expect to find “Rudolph” quite so close to the South Pole, let alone anywhere near her
dinner plate, but it should come as no surprise that a British government is going to such
great lengths to regulate the lives of deer. Scandinavians first introduced reindeer to South
Georgia between 1911 and 1925 as a source of protein for whaling crews (Leader-Williams
2009). After their population irrupted to an unsustainable scale, the British government of
South Georgia, in conjunction with the Norwegian Nature Inspectorate, recruited a group of a
dozen indigenous Saami of Finnmark to fence, herd and butcher the reindeer for the first
round of eradication in 2012. Initiated by the same British “expat” who would later become
the FIG PR/Media Manager responsible for wording the actual referendum question, the
rationale was that: (1) culling them was too expensive in such a remote location; (2) their
grazing caused significant land degradation; and (3) the government needed the reindeer and
any carrion gone in order to efficiently eradicate rats, which prey on the seabird
population.323
To learn more about the reindeer eradication, I visited the South Georgia
Government’s Office in Government House, Stanley, where Anne, a British Environment
Officer, met with me in a storage room without anything on the walls, other than a framed
portrait of Margaret Thatcher. Anne explained to me that people find rats disgusting, and
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British people in particular are bird-lovers, so they despise South Georgia’s rats for predating
on rare burrowing seabirds. Reindeer, however, possess the Christmas “cuddle factor,” and
thus, like penguins, they have more social capital.324 Coupled with the fact that South
Georgia has no human “natives,” this made it so that “selling” the reindeer eradication
required a purely environmentalist logic.325
This is a different kind of abstract geohistorical imagination from that of the Falkland
Islanders’ self-determination claim, for the UK removed South Georgia from the governance
of the Falklands’ “native settlers” by turning it into a separate BOT in 1985.326 According to
Anne, biosecurity in the case of near-pristine South Georgia is “a way to emphasize how
unique and special the place is.” She explained, “South Georgia is great in a way because we
don't have a human population, so there’s that whole side of it that you can take out and you
can just look at what’s going to be best for the environment.” Surrounded by the world’s
largest sustainable use marine protected area, the territory is owned entirely by the Crown,
enabling resource managers like Anne to experiment with extreme biosecurity measures for
total eradication, i.e. going beyond “population control.”
While this “pure” environmentalism might help to endear the eradication project to
Western wildlife tourists, the Saami reindeer herders did not find this reasoning to be
compatible with their own social values. No one had ever tried to eradicate reindeer
anywhere else in the world, and so since there is no proven methodology, the South Georgia
Government ultimately chose the Saami through a preliminary process of elimination.
Animal welfare experts, vets, scientists, eradication experts from around the globe—who
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have carried out comparable projects targeting goats, camels, pigs, and other mammals—put
their minds together, and decided against aerial shooting for a variety of reasons, electing
instead to find people that are used to herding the animals, understand how they behave, and
know how to slaughter them.

Figure 45 Loading reindeer carcasses onto seatruck. Photo C. E. Kilander (Government of South Georgia
and the South Sandwich Islands 2012).

Accustomed to preserving and underproducing the herd as pastoralists—not simply
hunters or ranchers (let alone eradicators!)—the Saami wanted to go at a more tempered pace
than the cost-conscious government (Ingold 1988). Methods they were used to employing in
the Arctic tundra also faltered in the sub-Antarctic. For example, the Saami tried using a
ribbon to funnel the herd, but this method accidentally gathered fur seals along with the
reindeer. Moreover, due to the strict regulations in the pristine territory, the Saami were not
permitted to use quad bikes. According to Anne, “this was a shock” to the Saami who had
become accustomed to a developed setting where automobiles had become the norm, as well
as working on more level terrain and staying in more comfortable accommodations.
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Summoning the techniques that gauchos had employed to herd cattle in the Falklands during
the nineteenth century, as well as the method SAERI researchers used to tag penguins, the
Saami eventually put up temporary corrals for the reindeer. They fenced the herd in at the tip
of a peninsula, where they killed the reindeer with a captive bolt and slaughtered them.
Unlike the British government officers who viewed the reindeer as a “problem” that
needs to be eradicated, Anne told me that the Saami saw reindeer as an “asset,” so they did
not want to “waste” any of the animals. “In Finnmark, they're working with their own animal,
and their animals are their wealth, their inheritance, and what they're going to pass on to their
children.” In contrast, “These were our reindeer, they were South Georgia Government
reindeer, so [the Saami] didn't have that same personal investment.” The collaboration
between British conservation officers and Saami reindeer herders thus presented an
opportunity for bridging different cultural understandings of property and value. However,
despite their extraordinary efforts, more than half of reindeer in this phase were shot rather
than herded, in order to meet government deadlines.327
Reminiscent of the “factory ships” of the earlier era of whaling in South Georgia, the
Saami butchered the reindeer they had herded within a makeshift, floating abattoir: a
converted fishing vessel that the government chartered. To recover some of the government’s
costs, the Saami produced about four tons of meat, which was sold to cruise ships and
Falklands residents; the Malvina House Hotel in Stanley offers reindeer carpaccio on its
menu. Yet, while some Falkland Islanders revel in this luxury as “conservation in action,”
others found the reindeer eradication tragically hard to stomach. Bobby, an elderly Falkland
Islander who worked on Christian Salvesen’s Leith Harbour whaling station more than 50
years earlier, called the reindeer eradication “the biggest sin and the biggest disaster.” Bobby
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invited me to his home to discuss his experiences whaling in South Georgia, and his opinion
on the reindeer eradication. Seated at his kitchen table, next to the stove, was a margarine jar
full of empty, broken shells of Gentoo penguin eggs. Bobby supported the rat eradication, but
he thought the reindeer should have been allowed to die out more naturally, by, say,
castration rather than hiring Norwegian “marksmen.”
Paradoxically, Bobby and others are outraged at the reindeer elimination because the
antlered ungulates serve as the living link to the history of industrial whale destruction. The
initiator of the reindeer eradication project reflected:
Your people population is a global one, and on an island like that where there
isn't a passport holder saying “I am a South Georgian,” it attracts massively
strong associations for people, whether they’re historical or “I went there and I
just loved it,” or whether it’s aspiration, you know this “frontier” at the end of
the world type thing, so it’s something that generates amazingly strong and
passionate views from a huge diversity of people. So certainly, whilst the
reindeer thing as an example, you didn't have to go out and canvas the locals
on South Georgia and say “how do you feel about this?” but you've got the
heritage aspects to consider.
In Trouillot’s (1997) sense, the extreme eradication of reindeer today “silences the past” of
the near-total decimation of whales for whalers like Bobby.328 Bobby takes comfort that
before the eradication had even been planned, local residents salvaged reindeer from South
Georgia and, without a formal “business case,” they introduced them to areas of outer
Falkland Islands.329 He prefers to procure his reindeer meat directly from one of these
residents, refusing the more expensive meat that the South Georgia Government offers
Stanley residents.
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colleagues caught accidentally pregnant mothers carrying nearly born calves.
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pointed out that reindeer also populate the Kerguelen Islands in the southern Indian Ocean.
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Figure 46 Child's hand-drawn Christmas card. Author photo.

“Colonizing” with Natives
Islanders and their British trustees are making themselves home not only through “alien”
removal, but also “native” restoration. There is a new effort to balance the ecological values
of tussac grass vis-a-vis sheep’s wool. Tussac grows in tall clumps, typically reaching two
meters high. The plant hugs coastlines, providing cover for colonies of seabirds and marine
mammals. Sheep damaged the roots of tussac on the perimeters of the larger, settled islands.
However, Falklands Conservation and independent landowners have begun fencing off
and/or replanting tussac. Alongside this effort is a widening move away from set stocking
toward “holistic” rotational grazing methods. Local conservationists argue that the
effectiveness of land restoration or holistic farming will also have to depend on the
proportion of native to invasive plant species already on the land.
With assistance from the Kew Botanical Garden and Natural History Museum in

306

London, Redd, a habitat restoration manager with Falklands Conservation, is developing a
business plan for a “native seed hub.” The Falklands’ ubiquitous exposed clay and sand
patches are “hard to recolonize” with native vegetation, Redd explained, so he is creating a
“seed bank” to reclaim the landscape and, as he put it, “colonize” with native species.330 Redd
is conducting a series of restoration trials on seventeen of the most eroded patches of land on
East Falkland Island, as well as collecting more native specimens of fodder grasses for the
seed stock. He explained that while tussac is a massive grass, and easy to replant by pulling
out the tillers, it is monospecific. Redd’s alternative is to have a multiplicity of native seeds
available to sow. In addition to spoil heaps and nutrient-rich penguin colonies, one of the
areas in which this experiment is set to take place is newly cleared minefields. Fenced off
since 1982, the land has had time to replenish. Redd is therefore hopeful that by replacing
landmines with native seeds, they will support native microbes in the soil.331 By making their
post-war environment more “native,” Islanders and their British trustees also seek to cultivate
an image of themselves as responsible stewards.
Finally, complementary to these remarkable practices of colonization with native
nonhumans, in partnership with SAERI, visiting scientists from University of Maine’s
Climate Change Institute have begun searching for definitive evidence of a prior Native
human presence in the Falklands’ soil. Previous palaeoecological analysis of carbon-dated
charcoal raised the possibility of pre-colonial indigenous human activity in the Falklands
(Buckland and Edwards 1998). In addition to containing signs of possible burning by earlier
non-European settlers, peat cores may include fossils of Warrah, or evidence of interaction
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among seabirds, soil, vegetation, pollen and metals that might be markers for previous human
settlements. Contrary to the popular slogan promoted during the referendum, “British to the
Core,” earth science may reveal that at its true core the Falklands are not so British, after all.
Moreover, the cores provide a gauge on climate change: how the last Ice Age formed, what
kinds of life used the islands as refugia, and other biogeographical enigma from the
Holocene. In addition to core extraction, archaeologists are searching for middens, shell
waste piles that would prove more convincingly that Amerindians inhabited the islands
before Europeans.

Figure 47 Tussac grass on Bleaker Island. Author photo.

Conclusion
This chapter has shown how patterns of species eradication and habitat management offer a
parallax view of a settler society’s ethnogenesis. As I discussed what constitutes an
indigenous or settler ecological landscape with Falkland Islanders, they joked regularly that:
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“the ultimate invasive species here is humans.”332 Nonetheless, by organizing the landscape
in hierarchical categories of race and nature, Falkland Islanders asserted themselves as
environmental stewards with claims to settler indigeneity: a paradoxical social formation
combining British colonial heritage with constructed “native” status.
In the early period of permanent British occupation, settlers attempted to annihilate
what they considered to be “native pests”—humans and nonhumans of Patagonian and South
Atlantic origin—that posed perceived threats to efficient exploitation of wool from
introduced sheep. As sheep naturalized, and Islanders claimed a bolder sense of belonging,
the targets of eradication shifted from natives to non-native “aliens.” The Argentine military
invasion and occupation in 1982 intensified local hostility toward plants and insects
introduced from South America. Yet, eco-tourism and conservationism has inspired Islanders
to assign greater value to nonhumans formerly known as “native pests.” Indigenizing colonial
rule ultimately entailed displacing nonhuman plants originating in Europe with restored
native habitats.
The content of what kinds of life forms the settlers chose to destroy, or what they let
grow, altered in significant ways, based on unstable concepts of race. How have the Islanders
negotiated asymmetries in national, ethnic, and racial identity, as they assert their
“inalienable” rights to territory as “a people?” Early colonists harnessed disgust to rationalize
violence against Native humans and nonhumans. Assimilated into nature through colonial
subjection, “feral” settlers became both “indigenous ‘kelper’ stock” and “British stock” in the
racialized sheep raising language of colonial administrators. In response, settler nativists
adapted to “non-native” eradication, turning disgust outward to defend their introduced
regime of nature and property against organisms deemed “aliens.” Finally, an interest in
sustainability has now conditioned the possibility for embracing more-than-European
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definitions of the Falklands.
This multispecies approach reveals another layer to the racial, political and ecological
logic of the settler colonial protectorate and the permanent frontier. The historical and
ethnographic evidence on offer suggests that the Falklands’ indigenized settler landscape
constitutes more than simply a making of the colonial world in Europe’s ecological image.
Rather, the people and territory of the archipelago follow a distinct mixing of colonial
organizing principles and “native” logics of inclusion or exclusion (Cooper & Stoler eds
1997: 3; Helmreich 2005). We can conclude that by colonizing with native species, the
settlers aim paradoxically to assert indigeneity while embracing British heritage. A critical
multispecies approach that not only chronicles nonhuman success stories, but also probes the
historical roots of environmental practices, offers fertile ground for further comparison.
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CONCLUSION
This study described how settlers of the Falklands/Malvinas have constructed themselves as
“natives” through changing relations with the environment and extractive regimes of
accumulation. Even though there is no historical evidence of an initial colonial encounter
between Europeans and indigenous people in the islands, our point of departure was
displacement. Contending claims over the emergent cattle frontier led Buenos Aires to lose
its young colony before the Argentine Republic had expanded to conquer Patagonia.
However, when we take the “civilizing” practices of British missionaries and participation of
Islanders in “Indian hunting” into consideration, the settler colonial archipelago may be
understood, in a certain sense, as fundamental to the dispossession of Native peoples in the
continent.
Even after permanent British colonial occupation in 1833, subjugated South American
gauchos revolted against their sustained system of debt peonage. In contemporary Argentina,
proponents of the sovereignty cause have drawn on this contested historical crisis, as well as
kinship allegories to press the sovereignty cause, through an appeal to a romantic gendered
discourse of the protective nation. Meanwhile, a divergent line of defected Islanders
reproduces active memories of British imperial customs and agricultural norms from within
their adoptive homeland.
Within the islands, the only remaining vestiges of the cattle venture are corral ruins,
which proud British Islanders have surprisingly appropriated as local cultural heritage
products. Classical liberal property ideologies took a forceful hold under British colonial
administration. Despite new practices of enclosure, a monopolistic land tenure system
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focused the economy increasingly on sheep farming through uncontrolled grazing. The
settlers embraced frontier ideals of the self-sufficient, rugged individual, as well as
collaborative mutual improvement programs. These localized norms and values manifest in
current forms of energy use, horticulture and reciprocal exchange of gifts. Nonetheless, the
hegemony of the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) went virtually unchecked until a sweeping
subdivision of land occurred subsequent to the 1982 war.
As settlers formed a distinct social class from British colonial administrators,
struggles for the right to work and hold office produced an alliance of nativist “kelpers,” who
consented to British sovereignty and military defense through popular claims of inherited
whiteness. Here, we begin to observe the formation of a settler colonial protectorate that
would become central to the Islanders’ postwar extractive economic boom. Concentrations of
transient British contractors and military personnel have created an enclave effect, separating
elite “ex-pats” from rural local residents, yet excluding migrants considered “undesirable”
from political rights and other social programs. Birthright secures access to the settlers’
peoplehood, as well as British citizenship via “Falkland Islands Status.” In addition to salient
racial categories, long-term migration is contingent on “degrees of imperial sovereignty”
(Stoler 2006), represented as points for permanent residence, which govern who may or may
not “desire the right” to self-determination.
With British sovereignty cemented after the 1982 war with Argentina, Islanders
lobbied for rights to sell fishing licenses, which have generated tremendous wealth for the
FIG and local business elites. The recent turn toward marine resource exploitation follows a
long history of “salvage accumulation” (Tsing 2015a) in the islands that can be traced back to
previous modes of opportunistic wealth extraction, including ship repair, sealing and
whaling. In the 1990s, the Islanders began licensing offshore oil exploration. Agreements on
joint development with Argentina have expired, but new forms of anticipatory politics have
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materialized since the “commercial” discovery of oil at the Sea Lion well in 2010.
In spite of a new fiscal regime, supply chain management, the near-unanimous
referendum and oil diplomacy efforts, the Islanders have entered a state of collective angst
over their autonomous personhood due to heightened dependence on tax revenue. One
especially pessimistic Falkland Islander reflected:
When you look at the history of the islands: they raped the whaling—
massive amount of tax from that—that was the main income for
government; the farming basically sort of raping the land—they went up
to over 700,000 sheep, they can't get anywhere near that now, the place is
drying out; and now then you’ve got the fisheries, well they’ve raped that
to a level…and now we’re on the next rape, which is the oil.
Here, nature is viewed dispassionately as a passive victim of sexual assault, a political
ecological affliction resulting from the nested scales of primitive accumulation (Federici
2004). In addition to the violent imagery, this somewhat Malthusian analysis points to a
“conjuncture of temporal crisis” (D. Scott 2014, 70) in the environment: whales have neared
extinction, land is degraded, fish stock is precarious, and oil is a non-renewable resource.
Through ethnographic description of the politics of infrastructure, I analyzed how this
temporal crisis has materialized in the built environment during oil preparations. Temporary
and makeshift forms of fixed capital have suspended the islands in a permanent frontier
situation, and the construction of a temporary dock, the Noble Frontier, eclipsed Islanders’
desires for a permanent deepwater port. Temporary infrastructure appears to act as a vector
for managing the problem of sovereignty and the promise of oil. Yet, the engineering of the
temporary dock on a modular frontier model—the Gulf of Mexico—shows us that what
might be suitable in one offshore frontier may not weather the conditions of another. The
global infrastructure of oil in all its enormity is shot through with geopolitical, economic and
ecological differences, making singular site-specific technologies like the Noble Frontier
impossible to customize. An anthropological approach to the temporal politics of
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infrastructure allows us to lay bare these unruly links in the hydrocarbon commodity chain,
enabling a greater understanding of the permanent frontier as an enduring limit of power.
As a gateway to Antarctica, the South Atlantic may also be understood as a frontier of
knowledge. The FIG and the Argentine Government are hinging their respective claims to
sovereignty and marine resources on scientific research. Argentina’s government promoted
an image of the ocean as Pampa Azul, an allusion to the historical agrarian frontier of the
nation, acquired through the attempted annihilation of Native peoples. On the ground in the
islands, the FIG established SAERI: a government-sponsored institute with close ties to the
oil industry. As part of a consultancy project for the oil licensees, marine ecologists tag
penguins with tracking devices, yet the ways in which this data inform environmental impact
assessments were limited. Ambiguities and contradictions in assessments of transboundary
impact, atmospheric emissions and intertidal zones suggest that the data gaps and
transparency measures act as “circulating references” for modeling non-corresponding
propositions on uneven spatiotemporal scales (Latour 1999). Ultimately, these scientific
calculations reinforce notions of environmental stewardship and political stability that fall
short of addressing urgent matters related to the territorial dispute, global climate change and
key indicators of local ecological conditions.
Finally, to analyze how Falkland Islanders are naturalizing settler colonial belonging
through environmental management, I examined changing forms of authority over agriculture
and conservation, particularly species eradication and habitat restoration. What do these
ecological practices tell us about the nature of a non-native population of a UN-designated
“non-self-governing territory?” Is the Falklands better understood as a settler colony or an
alien invasion, and what anthropological concepts offer insights on this distinction?
Assertions of settler indigeneity warrant a cautious response. Without endorsing or
advocating for claims of settler indigeneity, taking it seriously requires that we abandon

314

absolutist racial notions, yet throw critical light on appropriations of political selfdetermination. While they were certainly not dispossessed in a colonial encounter, and
currently enjoy the protection of a UK military base, the Islanders have faced periods of
colonial subjection and foreign occupation. Through the “imperial eyes” (Ho 2004) of UK
administrators, the Islanders have been viewed as both relationally indigenous and resolutely
British. Depending on one’s perspective, their settler indigeneity resembles anti-essentialist
notions of “diasporic natives” in the process of “becoming indigenous” in Clifford’s (2013,
84) sense, or “perfected natives” with “degrees of imperial sovereignty,” in Stoler’s words
(1997, 7; 2006). Most share British ancestry, and nearly all consent to remaining a UK
overseas territory, but their “emergent autochthony” has become a source of capital for
resource extraction (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Hilgers 2011; D. S. Trigger 2008). One
way to parse the claims at hand would be to accept elements of the Islanders’ autochthony as
“local people,” without affirming their “criteria” for indigenous or aboriginal status because
they are neither confirmed prior inhabitants nor confined tribal sovereigns.333
The Falkland Islanders are not yet producing petroleum, but by consenting to British
sovereignty in a settler colonial protectorate, they have been extracting indigeneity
throughout their history. This process has largely taken the form of nativist assertions of
settler belonging through territorialization: Lockean enclosures, restricted access to “the
Falklands Way of Life” and exclusive control over marine resources. However, it has also
involved the displacement of indigenous peoples and the extraction of their labor, which we
have observed in the history of the Allen Gardiner, the work of the de-miners or the
recruitment of Saami herders for reindeer eradication on South Georgia.
Scholars have begun to think of settler colonialism as a structure rather than an event
(Wolfe 2006). In other words, it is a complex social formation governing the seizure of land
333

See Moreton-Robinson (2007); Gausset et al. (2011); Povinelli (2011); Coulthard (2014); Simpson (2014).
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by means of exclusion or elimination, which is continuous through time and restructured by
indigenous refusal (Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014). Most frontier zones, where authority is
unstable, have been conquered or narrowed. Settler peoplehood in a European “overseas
territory,” without a historical trace of a pre-colonial indigenous population, can be thought
of as a different sort of dynamic. The permanent frontier is not necessarily a past event, rigid
structure or linear process, but rather a suspended state of colonial nostalgia that makes
imperial possibilities present in a new constellation (Bissell 2005; Piot 2010; Wilder 2015).
The Falkland Islanders conjure past colonial utopias through speech habits and naming
practices, which we have explored through analyses of Allen Gardiner, settler colonial
diglossia and Port Smyley. Moreover, preparations for oil have repositioned the Islanders in a
new imperial network of corporations, consultants and energy experts with complementary
aspirations, but also incompatible aims to the Islanders’ long-term wishes and interests.
In this context, the current layering of an oil frontier on a disputed imperial frontier
not only builds foundations for new forms of corporate personhood, but it also has a doubling
effect of keeping the seemingly closed structure of the settler colony open. Temporary
infrastructure investments, changing engineering designs, and “check box” environmental
impact assessments may be common for oil companies staking out acreage on oil frontiers.
Yet, in contrast to postcolonial contexts where oil perpetuates uncontrolled violence (Watts
2006), in situations, such as the Falklands, oil prospects heighten the temporal crisis of
geopolitical domination, reminding us that the settler colonial protectorate is never complete.
The 2015 elections of Mauricio Macri as President of Argentina and of Jeremy
Corbyn as Leader of the UK Labour Party offer an unexpected window of opportunity for
mitigating and potentially resolving the sovereignty dispute, or collaborating to produce oil.
Unlike his predecessors, the neoliberal Macri has already promised less contentious relations
with the UK over the Malvinas, and the FIG has sent him congratulations in the hope that
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they may be able to build peaceful dialogue.334 From a contrasting left-wing political
position, Corbyn has long supported dialogue with Argentina. The dispute has seen little
movement toward resolution, however, because while the Argentine Foreign Ministry has
insisted on bilateral negotiations with Britain, the UK FCO under David Cameron refused to
discuss the issue without the presence of Falkland Islands representatives.
Speculating on potential resolutions to the sovereignty controversy can be as
unpredictable as wildcat drilling. The dispute takes on new contours of contestation on a
regular basis. As I prepared this dissertation for submission in 2016, the UN Commission on
Limits of the Continental Shelf ruled in favor of extending the Argentine continental shelf,
which Macri’s administration has interpreted as an affirmation of its claim over the subsoil
and mineral resources of the South Atlantic. Nonetheless, Macri deprioritized the Malvinas in
his Foreign Ministry, and dismissed most of the staff in the Malvinas Secretariat. With a
permanent seat in the UN Security Council and powerful military forces installed in the
islands, the UK dismissed this ruling as non-binding.
Finally, imperial nostalgia may have inspired the UK to leave the European Union,
yet “Brexit” has made colonial holdouts like the Falklands more vulnerable. Even though
roughly half of the calamari consumed in Southern Europe originates in Falklands waters, the
introduction of tariffs would put the lucrative squid industry at risk. With fishing’s future in
question, Islanders rest their hopes for stability on the prospect of offshore oil. To ensure
unfettered access to markets, the Islanders might be inclined to build neighborly relations. If
the new political climate does foster direct dialogue between the Falkland Islanders and the
Argentine government, then this historical and ethnographic analysis will hopefully offer
critical insights on the nature of self-determination.
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Interestingly, both Macri and now former UK Prime Minister David Cameron were implicated in the
offshore tax haven scandal revealed in the Panama Papers leak. See ICIJ (2016).
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APPENDIX

A. Glossary of Gaucho-Derived Terms
Colloquial Expression
Aiguada Cove
Alasan

Origin
Spanish: aguada
Spanish: alazán

Albermarle Rincon

Spanish: rincón

Ames Rincon
Apregatos / Alpagatas
Arroshure/Rowshure

Spanish: rincón
Spanish: alpargatas
Spanish: arroyo

Arroyo Malo
Azalaker
Bahia del Laberinto
Bajho

Spanish: arroyo malo
Spanish: azulejo
Spanish: bahia de
laberinto
Spanish: bayo

Ball-oes/Bolas336
Bastos
Blanco

Spanish:
bolas/boleadoras
Spanish: bastos
Spanish: blanco

Blanco Bay

Spanish: blanco

Boca House

Spanish: boca

Bocao

Spanish: bocado
Spanish: pantalones
bombachos

Bombachos

Bombilla / Bombeezsha337 Spanish: bombilla
335

Meaning335
Place name referring to a water supply.
Sorrel or chestnut horse color.
Place name for the corner of a
settlement on West Falkland Island.
Place name for a corner memorializing
a dead horse.
Indoor canvas shoes.
Stream or gully.
Place name for a stream that was bad
i.e. difficult to cross by horseback.
Blue/white horse color.
Place name for a sound.
Yellowish dun horse color.
Throwing weapon used to capture cattle
or other animals, made of stone,
guanaco hide and ostrich sinew.
Leather saddle cushion.
White horse color.
Place name for a bay on East Falkland
Island.
Place name at the mouth of an inlet on
East Falkland Island.
A strip of hide used to tie the lower jaw
of a horse and attach reins.
Wide, loose trousers that fit the leg
above the ankle.
Metal straw with a strainer for drinking
mate; place name on East Falkland
Island.

Despite understandable errors of translation, which I have tried to correct here, I draw heavily in all three of
the appendices from the glossary compiled in Blake et al.’s (2011) dictionary of Falkland Islander vocabulary,
as well as Munro’s (1998) booklet on place names, both to which I owe a considerable debt. Most definitions
here are paraphrased from these references.
336
In the Falklands/Malvinas the children made these out of tabas, bones from the hind legs of cattle, and snared
geese.
337
Bombilla is also the name of a hill and farm settlement on East Falkland Island.
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Bosal

Spanish: bozal

Bratal

Spanish: petral
Spanish: brazo del
mar

Brazo del Mar
Buying a Piece of
Ground338

English

Cabaresta / Cabresta

Spanish: cabestro

Cabesada
Camilla Creek

Spanish: cabezada
Spanish: camilla or
camila

Camp

Spanish: campo
(countryside)

Camp Burning

Spanish: campo

Camp Fires

Spanish: campo

Camp Matches
Camp Skins and Camp
Wool

Spanish: campo

Camp Time
Campamenta Bay

Spanish: campo
Spanish: campamento

Campers
Campito
Campo Verde
Camps339
Canada

Spanish: campo
Spanish: campito
Spanish: campo verde
Spanish: campo
Spanish: cañada
Spanish: caneca or
conejo
Spanish: cantera
Spanish: capa

Caneja Creek
Cantera House
Capa340

Spanish: campo

338

A halter to fasten horses.
Breastplate fastening the saddle to the
horse's neck.
Place name for a sound.
Falling or being thrown from your
horse.
A leading rein or tether made of
rawhide attached to the head or neck of
a horse.
Pommel of the saddle. (The bridle
without reins.)
Place name on East Falkland Island.
Everywhere in the Islands outside
Stanley (or sometimes to be
distinguished from other settlements),
but also used to refer to the ground
itself.
A custom of burning dead white grass
in the spring to encourage growth.
Either camp burning above or
accidental fires that can last for months
due to the peaty soil.
Special matches with a large head to
enable burning in windy environments.
Skins or wool that came from sheep that
had died in camp.
The timezone of rural residents who do
not change their clocks during the year
(Stanley residents change their clocks to
give more daylight for cutting peat or
gardening).
Place name for a former encampment.
Rural residents of the
Falklands/Malvinas.
Place name for a small farm area.
Place name for a green farm area.
Farm areas divided by fences.
Ravine.
Place name for a wooden vessel, bucket
or rabbit.
Place name for a former quarry.
Layer or covering made of guanaco

This is a particularly clear Lockean adaptation of gaucho practices.
This is another Lockean adaptation of gaucho practices. Note that Camp or land is divisible and even mobile
in the Falkland Islander lexicon.
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Carancho
Carancho Bluff

Spanish: carancho
Spanish: carancho

Carensed/Carenched
Cargero / Carrigero
Cavadi Ridge
Cebruno341
Ceritos

Spanish: querencia
Spanish: carguero
Spanish: curvado
Spanish: cebruno or
cervuno
Spanish: cerritos

Cerro Monte

Spanish: cerro monte

Chamoro Valley

Spanish: chamorro or
chamarro

Chancho Point

Chay/Chey/Ché342
Chico Arroyo
Chimango Valley

Spanish: chancho
Spanish: chapina or
zueco
Spanish: chato
Tehuelche; Spanish:
ché
Spanish: chico arroyo
Spanish: chimango

Cinch

Spanish: cincha

Cojonillo / cocconeezsha

Spanish: cojinillo

Colorado Bay/Brook/Pass
Colorow

Spanish: colorado
Spanish: colorado

Comoda Ditch
Company's Camp

Spanish: comodo
Spanish: campo

Chapina
Chata Flats

340

skins, usually thrown over a sofa or
armchair.
Crested Caracara.
Place name on West Falkland Island.
Inclination or tendency of people and
animals to return. It was eventually
used to describe sheep that congregate
in a corner of a “camp” near where they
were last kept.
A packhorse used to carry loads.
Place name pronounced caveda.
Muddy reddish brown, deer-like horse
color.
Place name for small hills.
Place name for a hill, originally Cerro
Montevideo, named for a homesick
gaucho from Río de la Plata.
Place name for a valley lacking
vegetation, either named after a cut of
meat or a woolen cape.
Place name referring to an area with
feral pigs.
A maimed animal compared to a
woman's clog.
Place name for plains.
Friend, mate or man.
Place name for a small stream.
Place name after a species of caracara.
Cinch holding the saddle on the horse
made from twisted rawhide. Cinched
horses were used to transport fence
posts to a new fence line.
A sheepskin placed over the saddle for
comfort.
Place names for reddish features of the
land.
Reddish horse color.
Place name for a comfortable,
convenient drainage.
Falkland Islands Company-owned vast

Used as a garment in Tiera Del Fuego and southern Patagonia, guanaco skins were made by Selk'nam (Ona)
or Tehuelche Indians. The artifacts demonstrate how involved Falkland Islanders were in the colonial situation
of the Southern Cone.
341
Barroso for cattle.
342
While this is a popular Argentine Spanish colloquialism, made famous by the nickname of revolutionary
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the Islanders attribute it not to the nation of Argentina but rather to the Tehuelche
people of Patagonia.
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Congo House

Spanish: congo

Corona/coroner

Spanish: corona

Corral

Spanish: corral

Correone

Spanish: correón

Cushy’s Hill
Diamond Rincon
Dos Lomas

Spanish: unconfirmed
Spanish: rincón
Spanish: dos lomas

Double Creek Rincon
Doughfries
Ensenada de Luisa
Estancia House/Mount
Farka / Farker

Spanish: rincón
English and Spanish:
tortas fritas
Spanish: ensenada
Spanish: estancia
Spanish: faja

Flores Harbour
Gallina Rock
Galpon / Galapon

Spanish: flores
Spanish: gallina
Spanish: galpón

Gateado Pond
Gateaow

Spanish: gateado
Spanish: gateado

Gaucho
Gregorio Rock

Spanish: gaucho
Spanish: Gregorio
English and Spanish:
campo
Greek and Spanish:
hipódromo

Hard Camp
Hippadrum/Hippodrome
Horqueta/Orqueta Valley,
House
Hunter’s Arroyo
Inca’s Pond
Isla Chica

Spanish: horqueta
Spanish: arroyo
Inca/Spanish
Spanish: isla chica

Jackass Rincon

Spanish: rincón

John’s Rincon
L’antioca Stream, Ridge
Labuna

Spanish: rincón
Spanish: anteojo
Spanish: lobuna
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tracts of land.
Place name named after a Black
resident.
A piece of thick leather placed between
the rug and the bastos on the horse's
back, used to prevent chafing.
A pen or enclosure used for capturing
or holding horses or cattle.
Long strips of rawhide used for
tightening
Place name memorializing a gaucho
who lived there.
Place name for the corner of a cove.
Place name for two hills.
Place name for a corner where two
drainages meet.
Fried pieces of bread dough served with
mutton chops at breakfast.
Place name for an inlet.
Place name for a farm settlement.
A belt with multiple uses.
Place name likely memorializing
gaucho Luciano Flores, one of Antonio
Rivero’s comrades.
Place name referring to a hen.
A shed used to store gear.
Place name for a pond referring to a
striped horse.
Black-striped horse color.
A horse-rider, deriving primarily from
the Southern Cone of South America,
referring broadly to the occupation of
herding cattle and sheep.
Place name referring to a gaucho.
Dry, arid land.
A corral.
Place name referring to both a fork in a
stream but also a particular horse.
Place name for a stream.
Place name referring to an alazan horse.
Place name for a small island.
Place name for a corner that is a habitat
for Magellanic (aka Jackass) penguins.
Place name for a corner referring to a
shepherd.
Place name for a circular stream.
A black striped horse color.

Ladrillo Island
Laguna Babas

Spanish: ladrillo
Spanish: laguna babas

Laguna Isla
Laguna Seca, Verde

Spanish: laguna isla
Spanish: laguna seca,
verde

Lasso
Lonco
Lorenzo Cottage

Spanish: lazo
Spanish: lonja
Spanish: Lorenzo

Lower Malo House

Spanish: malo

Lucas Rincon

Spanish: rincón

Madassa

Spanish: mordaza

Malacara

Spanish: malacara

Malacara Valley
Maletas

Spanish: malacara
Spanish: maletas

Manada

Spanish: manada

Manada Paddock

Spanish: manada

Manares

Spanish: maneas or
apea

Mandile

Spanish: mandilar

Maneador
Manero
Mate344

Spanish: maneador
Spanish: mañero
Spanish: mate

Menguera Point

Spanish: manguera
Spanish: mocho or
mocha
Spanish: mocho

343

Mocha Ridge, Valley
Mocho / Mocher
343

Place name for a source of brick
building material. (Pronounced:
latherijas.)
Place name for a slimy pond.
Place name for a lake with an island.
(Pronounced: lagan-eyesla.)
Place names for dry, green lakes.
A twisted or plaited rawhide rope used
to capture animals.
Horse hide used for sewing.
Place name referring to a gaucho.
Place name for a house near Arroyo
Malo.
Place name of a corner, the site of a
whaling wreck.
A round stick with a slit, used to soften
strips of rawhide.
The color of a horse with a white strip
or spots on its face.
Place name referring to a white striped
horse.
Saddlebags.
A set of animals of the same species,
usually referring to a "troop of brood
mares."
Place name referring to an area for
breeding mares.
Rope about 80 cm long, with a stick as
a crutch tip and an eyelet on the other,
used to lock or tying the horses.
A cloth or apron, used as protection and
for cleaning.
Long strips of rawhide used for tying
loads or the legs of horses to
immobilize them.
A disobedient horse.
A loose-leaf tea.
Place name likely referring to a cattleherder.
Place name referring to a de-horned
cattle.
An animal without horns.345

This was used as a portable tree because the islands’ landscape lacks forests. It was also spelled “manez” and
could be used as a verb: to menare the horses.
344
Given the rise of possessive individualism, it is interesting to note that in contrast to their South American
counterparts who tend to drink mate communally, the Falkland Islanders who drink mate usually have their own
gourds and bombillas.
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Moro346

Spanish: moro

Mount Maria
Mount Vernet

Spanish: Maria
French

Neuquen Stream
Oscuro

Spanish: Neuquén
Spanish: oscuro

Overo

Spanish: overo

Packador

Spanish: empacador

Palinkey
Paloma Pond/Sand Beach

Spanish: palenque
Spanish: paloma

Pampa
Pangare

Spanish: pampa
Spanish: pangaré

Pasalibre

Spanish: paso libre

Pasa Maneas

Spanish: maneas

Pasear

Spanish: pasear

Peone

Spanish: peón

Picaso Pond

Spanish: picazo

Picasso
Picos, The
Piedra Sola
Piojo Gate
Playa Ridge

Spanish: picazo
Spanish: picos
Spanish: piedra sola
Spanish: piojo
Spanish: playa

345
346

An iron-grey horse color; Place name
for a moor.
Place name referring either to María la
Grande, a Tehuelche cacique who
visited the islands or María Sáez de
Vernet, the wife of Luis.
Place name memorializing Luis Vernet.
Place name referring to the Patagonian
town of Argentina.
A black horse color.
A grey horse color with patches of other
colors.
"To sulk or jib. This was a name given
to a horse which was sulky and would
not go. It was applied to both riding
horses and cart horses. 'The horse
packadored and I couldn't get him away
from the stable.'"
A wooden frame used to hang mutton
or beef carcasses…It is also used to
refer to a post and rail for tying up
horses or a post in the center of a corral.
Place name referring to a dove.
A horse color featuring a white blaze on
the face and a pinkish nose.
A horse color with light deer-like tones.
Cattle/sheep grid at entrance or exit of
settlements; Place name.
Place name referring to the above
gaucho rope gear.
Converted to a noun in usual Falklands'
speech: a walk or stroll. It is also a
verb: one goes "pasearing."
A rail used to hitch horses (see also
palinkey).
Place name referring to a white-blazed
horse.
A horse color featuring a white blaze or
spots on the face, not more than two
fingers wide (to differentiate from a
pampa).
Place name for peaks.
Place name for a stone area.
Place name referring to lice.
Place name for a beach.

The Spanish origin indicates the inverse: an animal with horns.
The former meaning obviously derives from the Spanish racialization of North African Muslims.
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Polinki Pond

Spanish: palenque

Poncho
Ponchos Pond, Shanty

Spanish: poncho
Spanish: Pancho

Pony’s Pass
Poocha / Poocha Man /
Poocha Man Chay

English

Praltos
Prosilla
Quebracho

Spanish: Paralta
Spanish unconfirmed
Spanish: quebracho

Racker Pond

Spanish: rajar

Revenkie

Spanish: rebenque

Rincon
Rodeo
Rodeo Pond

Spanish: rincón
Spanish: rodeo
Spanish: rodeo

Rolon Cove

English/Spanish

Rosijha

Spanish: rosillo

Ruana
Rubicana

Spanish: ruano
Spanish: rabicano

Ruggles Rincon

Spanish: rincón

Sabruno Ditch
Saddleback

Spanish: sabruno
English

Saddle Up Valley
Sal Point
Saladero
Salinas Beach
Salvador
San Carlos, Port
Sarko-eyed
Sino
Sinuelo

English
Spanish: sal
Spanish: saladero
Spanish: Salinas
Spanish: Salvador
Spanish: San Carlos
Spanish: zarco
Spanish: zaino
Spanish: señuelo

Sober Cinch
Sobre Poister/ Sobre

Spanish: sobre cincho
Spanish: sobrepuesto

Spanish: pucha
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Place name for a body of water with a
“palinkey.”
A woven wool garment with a neck
hold and slits for arms.
Place name referring to a gaucho.
Place name referring to a gaucho named
Henry Powney.
An expression of amazement or
emphasis.
Place name referring to a gaucho named
Dominicus Paralta.
See Lasso.
An iron post.
Place name where split fencing sticks
were left.
Horse whip, usually homemade out of
leather.
A small naturally-formed camp, such as
a peninsula where animals can be
contained with minimal fencing.
Herds in semi-tamed cattle.
Place name where herding occurred.
Place name referring to Thomas Rolon
a resident from Montevideo.
A horse color featuring red and
grey/white hair.
A gold horse color with pale mane and
tail; a type of poncho; place name.
A horse with a white tail.
Place name for a corner referring to a
sealer.
Place name referring to a mouse-like
horse color.
Descriptive place name.
Place name convenient for adjusting
gear.
Place name referring to salt.
Place name referring to salting meat.
Place name referring to salt water.
Place name referring to Jesus Christ.
Place name referring to a Spanish sloop.
Odd-colored eyes in a dog or horse.
A reddish-black horse color.
An animal used as a decoy or leader.
"This was a smaller lighter version of
top piece and cinch, which went over
the cojinillo and was tightened to hold it
in place over the saddle."
A piece of soft leather used to keep the

Puesto
Soger

Spanish: soga

Tabiana
Teerone
Terra Motas Point

Spanish: tobiano
Spanish: tirón
Spanish: terra motas

Teruna

Spanish: unconfirmed

Tientos

Spanish: tientos

Toe Stirrups
Tolero
Torcida Point
Tordijho

English
Spanish: talero
Spanish: torcida
Spanish: tordillo

Tostow/tusdow

Spanish: tostado

Tranquilidad

Spanish: tranquilidad

Travar
Triste Island
Tropilla (pronounced
tropeezsha)

Spanish: traba
Spanish: triste

Tumbledown Mountain

Wacho

English
Spanish: guacho (see
also huajcha in
Aymara or huachu in
Mapuche)

Witingtons Rincon

Spanish: rincón

Yapper
Yerba

Spanish: yapa or ñapa
Spanish: yerba

Zaino Rincon

Spanish: zaino rincón

Spanish: tropilla
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"cojinillo" dry.
Rope used to tie up animals.
A brown and white or black and white
horse color.
To tug or pull.
Place name for a flat or bog.
A male horse that is not fully castrated
due to an ascended testicle.
Thin strips of hide used for multiple
purposes, e.g. to tie maletas to the
saddle.
Footholds made out of wood and
leather used for riding with bare feet in
Patagonia.
A horse whip (used mainly in Lafonia).
Place name (twisted).
A black and white mixed horse color.
A roasted coffee horse color, sometimes
featuring a white blaze.
Place name (pronounced: “trink-lydar”).
A piece of rawhide used to attach a
horse's hind legs to the manares.
Place name (sad).
A group of horses.
Place name famous for a 1982 battle,
but referring to a herd of horses driven
by gauchos.
An orphaned animal, usually used to
describe a lamb in the Falklands.
Place name referring to G. T. and J. B.
Whitington.
A bonus or something extra, such as an
unexpected day off.
Loose-leaf tea for mate.
Place name for a corner referring to a
chestnut-colored horse.

B. Glossary of Enclosure Terms
Colloquial
Expression
Blowfly
Caravan
Crate/Crates
Cut the
March/Cut the
Flock
Cutting
Fish Wall
Gorse Sword
Hanging the
Fence

Origin

Meaning

English A wheel used to tighten wire on fencing.
A hut made out of wood and corrugated iron, used by workers
English fencing far from the settlement, or as a peat bog shelter.
Square or triangular wooden structures filled with rocks, used
English where a fence ends on a beach, or in rocky ground.
English
English
English
English
English

Inside the Wall

English

Iron Post

English

Laying a Fence
Night Paddock

English
English

Paddock
Park
Private or
Privates

English
English

To divide a flock of sheep by riding through them on either
side. This practice reinforced boundaries before fencing.
Tracks cut by hand down steep hillsides.
A stonewall built within a creek to trap and catch mullet.
An imported blade used to trim gorse hedges.
An expression used to describe horses or sheep that are
reluctant to leave their corner, or people who are homesick.
Shepherds of Lafonia used this term to describe animals
located south of the Boca wall.”
A type of fence post, deriving from the South American
quebracho, used in the Falklands as a “palinkey.”
Dismantling a section of fence in order to allow a vehicle to
cross.
A fenced area designed to hold sheep overnight.
A fenced area close to a settlement. It is smaller than the
"camps."
An expression used to describe a paddock in Lafonia.

English Horses owned by individuals rather than the farm.
A fenced passage used to transport sheep between the
Race/Lead
English settlement and camp.
Settlement
English A farm headquarters.
The position when the number of titles simplified during
subdivision, combining the occupations shepherd and
Shepherd General English roustabout.
Sod Wall
English A wall to enclose a garden or corral.
An expression used by Lafonia shepherds to refer to area south
South of the Wall English of the Boca wall on East Falkland Island.
Spinning Jinny
English A homemade tool used to wire fences.
A wire tie used to hold metal and wood together in order to
Sprogg/Sprag
English hinge gates together without metal.
Standard
English A metal post to support a fence.
Station Brand
English A brand on cattle and horses indicating its farm settlement.
Two meanings: (1) stirrups attached from one side of the horse
Tiedowns
English to the other; and (2) anchors for a fence over a small hollow
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Tin Whistle
Titan
Track

English
English
English

Wheel Sleigh

English

Wire Gate

English

created by crossing vertical and horizontal wire with a stake.
A hollow tube of metal used to drill fencing wires into soft
ground.
A tool used to tighten wires in fences.
Paths made by the wear of horses riding between settlements.
A wooden platform with two wheels, pulled by a horse, used to
carry fencing or other materials.
Sheep enclosure adapted from a New Zealand model, made of
wire.

C. Glossary of Peat Energy Terms
Ash Heap/Pit
Ashdrums
Bankers
Bulldog No. 9
Croozie/Cruisie
Lifter
Open Fire
Peat
Peat Ash
Peat Bank
Peat Bog
Peat Box
Peat Boy
Peat Bucket
Peat Carting
Peat Chopper
Peat Cutting
Peat
Dust/Mould/Coom
Peat File
Peat Knobblings

English

Place to discard ash from peat fires.
Fort-five gallon drums used to burn rubbish and contain
English discarded ash from peat fires.
Large sods of peat used to "bank" the fire by burning it
English slowly throughout the night.
English A spade used to cut peat.
Scottish A home-made lantern.
English A tool for lifting the lid of a peat stove.
English A large fireplace with a grate to contain peat.
The principal fuel source for Islanders until recently,
comprising bricks of carbon-rich dried soil cut out of the
English land.
The accumulation of burnt peat, which had to be raked daily
English and was used in vegetable gardens to control weeds.
Interchangeable with peat bog, a human-made strip of cut
land. It also refers to the natural features where peat has
English been prospected but not yet extracted.
English Area where peat is extracted.
English Containers used to store peat for open fires.
English See house boy.
English A pale used to transport peat from the bank to the house.
English The process of transporting peat from the bog to the house.
A small hatchet used to chop dried peat bricks into pieces
English for burning.
The extraction of peat by hand, usually in early Austral
English spring.
English
English
English

Peat Officer
Peat Shed

English
English

Peat Stack

English

Excess peat remains.
A tool used to sharpen a peat spade.
Broken up pieces of peat used for kindling.
The government official in charge of allocating peat banks
for individual households in Stanley.
A building with slatted sides, used to store dried peat.
A pyramid-like structure comprising blocks of dried peat,
built to keep the peat dry and to withstand wind and

327

Sod

English

Windcharger
Peat Rickling

English
English

precipitation.
A block, specifically of peat.
Wind-powered blades used to generate electricity in the
1930s.
Stacking blocks of peat into small heaps to dry.
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